Ever since the September 11 attacks of last year, I have resolutely believed that the re-sponse to terrorism, by the United States and other nations, ought to be undertaken squarely within the confines of what I will call the “international system.” By that I mean the United Nations institutions, together with the body of human rights and humanitarian law that either came into being after World War II or were (as in the case of humanitarian law) much enhanced after the war.

I have believed in the importance of the international system for three reasons.

First, the events of September 11 are themselves best understood as a fundamental violation of international human rights and humanitarian norms. Direct and intentional armed attacks on defenseless people unmistakably constitute a “crime against humanity” and should be dealt with as such.

Second, the “international system” was designed to help states avoid the strong temptation to overreact in the face of public emergencies such as those caused by terrorism. That temptation is so devilish just because the need for heightened vigilance is so obvious. The United Nations system, with all of its imperfections, remains an indispensable means for rallying collective, cooperative action, and thereby discouraging impetuousness and arbitrariness in international affairs. Moreover, scrupulous adherence to international human rights and humanitarian norms under conditions of public emergency is strong proof that a country is not overreacting.

Third, the United States, under present circumstances, bears a special responsibility to uphold and strengthen the international system. Its enormous, and virtually unchallenged, military and economic might undoubtedly sharpens the temptation to overreact and overextend. With apologies to Lord Acton, if power corrupts, super-power may well “super-corrupt.” Furthermore, the United States does not, as we know, have a particularly distinguished record in coping with national emergencies. James Madison summarized things best in 1798: “Perhaps it is a universal truth,” he said, “that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad.” Finally, because of its unrivaled position, the United States has a golden opportunity to set a good example for the rest of the world. That is reason enough to bend over backwards to support the international system.
Since September 11 of last year, how has the Bush administration been doing in regard to supporting the international system, and particularly in regard to its Iraq policy? The overall record as well as the policy toward Iraq, is deeply and in my view, disturbingly, ambiguous on that score.

Not everything is negative. From time to time, the administration has done the right thing. Nine days after the attacks, President Bush stated that the campaign against terrorism is “not just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight.” More than once has he affirmed the importance of the rulings of the United Nations, together with international human rights standards, as imposing binding obligations on the United States in its “war on terrorism.” Most important, the U.S. explicitly justified its military response to Afghanistan last year in reference to the UN Charter, and specifically invoked several post-September 11 UN Security Council resolutions, including one that authorized force in exercising “the right of national self-defense against an armed attack.” All this, and some other things we could mention, is very much in the right direction.

There is, however, a dark side. That is, in general, what I would describe as a pattern of initial defiance toward international institutions and norms followed under pressure by reluctant, even grudging, acquiescence. One sees this pattern, for example, in regard to the application of the Geneva Accords to the prosecution and treatment of the detainees at Guantánamo in Cuba. One also sees it in respect to the special military tribunals that the president instituted last year, and then, in response to strong reaction, brought somewhat closer to the standards of due process.

But more to the point, this same pattern is at the heart of the policy toward Iraq. You are fully aware of the sequence: Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice-President Cheney, supplemented by a number of statements from the president, set the initial tone with uncompromising observations about why the U.S. must now solve the problem of Iraq, quite on its own if need be, and on terms, including “regime change,” that it should dictate. The original formulations explicitly evaded the need for new Congressional or Security Council authority. As we know, such unbending unilateralism was not thoroughly well received at home or abroad, and the Bush administration, true to pattern, partially (and, I think, reluctantly) acquiesced. It finally agreed to submit its case both to Congress and the Security Council, while still recommending resolution language that preserved wider discretionary authority for the U.S. than either body was initially happy with. In the Congress, we have witnessed a process of adjustment and compromise that ultimately yielded a resolution that is improved for having tied the president’s action more closely to the UN Security Council process than the administration originally favored.

On the other hand, the resolution is still too open-ended. The language does not, as it should, link the right of national self-defense against Iraq to the U.S.’s continuing obligation under Article 51 of the Charter to seek Security Council confirmation for any use of force. Nor does it, in my opinion, sufficiently acknowledge the continuing, overriding authority of the Security Council under Article 39, to determine “any threat to the peace.”
As to the resolution now being drafted by the Security Council, one hopes that it will bring attention back to what has unquestionably been the dominating concern about Iraq since 1991: finding an enforceable disarmament policy. One also hopes that emphasizing that common focus will work to strengthen an underlying idea of the UN, namely, “collective security” — an idea, incidentally, that has not had much currency of late, particularly on the part of the Bush administration.

Still and all, it will be asked: Doesn’t Saddam Hussein’s startling ability to defy the international system, by pursuing his weapons programs despite all the Security Council huffing and puffing, prove that the international system is a paper tiger? Is it not time for the vaunted international system to step aside and allow for effective, albeit unilateral, U.S. action? There is, to be sure, something to these claims. On any reasonable assessment, the Security Council’s longstanding apprehensions about Saddam are justified, while its disarmament record is, especially recently, dismally ineffective. Worse yet, that record of failure has been re-enforced by the unseemly reluctance of several Security Council members to give up ulterior economic and strategic interests in Iraq. And it also needs to be conceded that all the threatening talk by the Bush administration is in large part responsible for the renewed international concern over Saddam’s delinquency.

Nevertheless, there is another side to the story. At least up until the Gulf War, the United States, because of its own ulterior strategic interests, actively supported and strengthened Saddam, and even assisted in obscuring his genocidal treatment of the Kurds. Somehow this part of the record is never mentioned when we talk about the “malfunction” of the international response to Saddam Hussein!

But even more significant is the gravity of the risks of a war with Iraq that is undertaken without substantial international support. The prospect of a post-war Iraq indefinitely under the political and economic control of the United States has all the earmarks of a neo-colonial undertaking that has most of the rest of the world, understandably, up in arms. Worldwide apprehension only deepens in the face of suggestions by members of the Bush administration that overthrowing Saddam Hussein and reforming Iraq is but the first step in “a strategic transformation of the whole region.” Such a geopolitical vision combines neo-colonialism with neo-imperialism in an extremely frightening combination. The likely consequences of such ill-considered policies could in fact be quite catastrophic. It is, then, the need to restrain dangerous unilateralist impulses on the part of the Bush administration that is one additional reason for favoring continuing cooperation with the international system.

Add to that the extensive uncertainties concerning the threat Iraq represents. I need not rehearse the details of the intense and rather inconclusive debates surrounding Saddam’s nuclear capabilities, or his disposition to use them or other weapons, or his connections to terrorism, or his designs on the United States. The central point is this: As things stand it is very hard to be sure about a number of the key concerns. Under conditions of uncertainty, it is prudent to find policies that reduce uncertainty, as the inspections proposals being discussed right now in the Security Council are clearly intended to do. Even if Saddam finally thwarts an inspections policy, he will be thwarting a collective policy, and presumably face a collective response. That is a crucial difference.

Karl Deutsch, former professor of government here at Harvard, once said during a debate over the Vietnam war, “When in doubt, kill fewer people.” We might expand on Professor Deutsch’s wise words: “When in doubt, get wider support.” Both versions are profoundly relevant to our present situation.