- Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information
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- by Aghion, Philippe; Fudenberg, Drew; Holden, Richard
- The theory of incomplete contracts has been recently questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. Our main result is that the mechanism may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero.
- Publication Type: WCFIA Working Paper
- Published Date: December 6, 2007
- Field of Interest: International Economics
- Aghion, Philippe, Drew Fudenberg, and Richard Holden. “Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information.” Working Paper 2008-0001, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, December 2007