- Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments
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- by Alt, James; Dreyer Lassen, David
- The paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under unified government, where government cannot control itself.
- Publication Type: WCFIA Working Paper
- Published Date: June 15, 2007
- Field of Interest: Comparative Politics
- Alt, James, and David Dreyer Lassen. “Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments.” Working Paper 2008-0004, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, June 2007.