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Efficient Expropriation: Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy
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by Gopinath, Gita; Aguiar, Mark; Amador, Manuel
We study a small open economy characterized by two empirically important frictions—incomplete financial markets and an inability of the government to commit to policy. We characterize the best sustainable fiscal policy and show that it can amplify and prolong shocks to output. In particular, even when the government is completely benevolent, the government’s credibility not to expropriate capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy and may be "scarcest" during recessions. This increased threat of expropriation depresses investment, prolonging downturns. It is the incompleteness of financial markets and lack of commitment that generate investment cycles even in an environment where first best capital stock is constant.
Publication Type: WCFIA Working Paper
Published Date: January 10, 2006
Field of Interest: International Economics
Gopinath, Gita, Mark Aguiar, and Manuel Amador. "Efficient Expropriation: Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy." Working Paper 2008-0035, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, January 2006.