- Colonial Land Tenure, Electoral Competition and Public Goods in India
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- by Iyer, Lakshmi; Banerjee, Abhijit
- Social scientists have long emphasized the importance of institutions in nurturing economic growth
and development. Douglass C. North defines institutions as the "rules of the game in a society" which limit the set of choices for individuals and argues that institutions, both formal ones such as laws and constitutions, as well as informal ones such as social norms, are important in determining the transaction costs of production and exchange, and thereby have an impact on economic growth. He goes on to discuss the mostly incremental nature of institutional change and highlights the difficulties in implementing radical institutional change. This line of argument therefore suggests that
the impacts of institutions are likely to be felt for a very long time, and hence points to the need for
detailed historical analysis over long periods in order to quantify the impact of institutions.
- Publication Type: WCFIA Working Paper
- Published Date: February 2008
- Field of Interest: International Relations
- Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. "Colonial Land Tenure, Electoral Competition and Public Goods in India." Working Paper 2008-0065, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, February 2008.
- Also Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-062.