Publications
- Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions
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- by Robinson, James A.; Acemoglu, Daron
- We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model
consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form
of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus
labor repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the
exercise of de jure and de facto political power. A change in political institutions, for example
a move from nondemocracy to democracy, alters the distribution of de jure political power,
but the elite can intensify their investments in de facto political power, such as lobbying or
the use of paramilitary forces, to partially or fully offset their loss of de jure power. In the
baseline model, equilibrium changes in political institutions have no effect on the (stochastic)
equilibrium distribution of economic institutions, leading to a particular form of persistence in
equilibrium institutions, which we refer to as invariance. When the model is enriched to allow
for limits on the exercise of de facto power by the elite in democracy or for costs of changing
economic institutions, the equilibrium takes the form of a Markov regime-switching process
with state dependence. Finally, when we allow for the possibility that changing political institutions
is more difficult than altering economic institutions, the model leads to a pattern of
captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive, but choose economic institutions
favoring the elite. The main ideas featuring in the model are illustrated using historical
examples from the U.S. South, Latin America and Liberia.
- Publication Type: WCFIA Working Paper
- Published Date: February 2006
- Field of Interest: Political Economy
- Robison, James A., and Daron Acemoglu. "Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions." Working Paper 2008-0106, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, February 2006.
