Publications
- Eppure, non si muove: Legal Change, Institutional Stability and Italian Corporate Governance
- Download: PDF 145.32 KB
- by Culpepper, Pepper
- Prevailing theories in political economy hold that a coalition or political party, acting
through parliament, can break down institutions of stable shareholding. In spite of
extremely favourable conditions in the late 1990s—the election and durable rule of a
leftist government supported by a transparency coalition, a bureaucratic elite that
favoured institutional change, and substantial state shareholdings which the government
could privatize in pursuit of its objectives—these reforms failed to affect the
concentration of shareholdings among the largest private companies in Italy. This
disjuncture between legal change and actual practice in Italian corporate governance
suggests that current theories of institutional change in corporate governance systems
are incomplete. The focus of inquiry needs to turn to the political resources of those who
support the existing system: managers and large shareholders.
- Publication Type: Published Paper
- Published Date: September 2007
- Field of Interest: Comparative Politics
- Culpepper, Pepper. "Eppure, non si muove: Legal Change, Institutional Stability and Italian Corporate Governance." West European Politics 30, no. 4 (September 2007): 784 – 802.
