Publications
- Economic Interests and the Origins of Political Systems
- Download: PDF 427.51 KB
- by Iversen, Torben; Cusack, Thomas R.; Soskice, David
- The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal
work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class
interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution,
and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically
different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR—minimum winning coalitions
versus consensus—we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory
frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were
important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries
with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and
weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This
explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why
they persist over time.
- Publication Type: Published Paper
- Published Date: August 2007
- Field of Interest: International Economics
- Iversen, Torben, Tom Cusack, and David Soskice. "Economic Interests and the Origins of Political Systems." American Political Science Review 101 (August 2007): 372-91.
