Publications

Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics
by Keohane, Robert

Thomas Hobbes posited a dilemma between insecure anarchy and predatory despotism, but both of these situations are highly unsatisfactory. In a nuclear age, insecure anarchy is too dangerous; in a cybernetic era, predatory despotisms cannot be technologically advanced and economically dynamic. In international politics, sovereignty has been the traditional response to Hobbes's Dilemma, limiting conflict without fundamentally changing state interdependence. Under conditions of high interdependence, in the Zone of Peace among advanced democracies, sovereignty has fundamentally changed, becoming less a territorially–defined barrier than a bargaining resource in negotiations that often take place within international institutions. However, in the Zone of Conflict, including much of Africa, the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union, Hobbes's Dilemma retains more force and sovereignty is likely to retain its traditional role. The creation and maintenance of effective international institutions will be difficult enough in the Zone of Peace and often impossible in the Zone of Conflict. However, in the long run such institutions are essential if international conflict is to be moderated and patterns of cooperation encouraged.

Publication Type: WCFIA Working Paper
Published Date: January 1993
Field of Interest: International Relations
WCFIA Working Paper 93–03, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1993. Later published in Holm, Hans-Henrik, and Georg Sorensen, eds., Who's World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.