- Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits
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- by Alt, James
- We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimate two separate effects of elections on government performance. Holding tenure in office constant, differences in performance by reelection- eligible and term-limited incumbents identify an accountability effect: reelection-eligible governors have greater incentives to exert costly effort on behalf of voters. Holding term-limit status constant, differences in performance by incumbents in different terms identify a competence effect: later-term incumbents are more likely to be competent both because they have survived reelection and because they have experience in office. We show that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under term-limited incumbents (accountability), and under reelected incumbents than under first-term incumbents (competence), all else equal. In addition to improving our understanding of the role of elections in representative democracy, these findings resolve an empirical puzzle about the disappearance of the effect of term limits on gubernatorial performance over time.
- Publication Type: Published Paper
- Publisher: Journal of Politics
- Published Date: January 2011
- Field of Interest: Comparative Politics
- Alt, James, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Shanna Rose. "Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits." Journal of Politics 73 (1), 2011.