In protracted ethnic conflicts, threats to identity have been described as one of the explanations for why conflicting parties seem unable to come to a negotiated end to the conflict, even when there appears to be a way in which the interest of both sides can be accommodated (Kelman, 1997). According to Kelman, threats to identity create a zero-sum view of the conflict, where one's very existence seems inextricably linked to the negation of the other. An acknowledgment of the identity of the other is perceived as an act of self-destruction, as recognizing the experiences of the other fundamentally brings into question one's own interpretation of history, the conflict, and of the responsibility one holds for the past, present, and future shared realities.
     In this paper, I would like to explore the obstacles and resistances to de-linking those aspects of identity that pose the greatest threat to parties in conflict, then examine ways in which the mutually destructive elements might be reconstructed so that both parties could begin the process of reconciliation, which might enable former enemies to co-exist without fear of annihilation. Kelman has described this process of reconstruction as "negotiating identity," where both sides engage in a reciprocal process of examining those aspects of one's identity that do not threaten its core and the letting go of which could significantly allay some of the fundamental threats that the destructive aspects trigger in the other (Kelman, 1999).
     In order to better understand what identity negotiation involves, both in terms of the process that is required to bring about the necessary changes in identity and the resistances and challenges to such change, I will anchor this analysis within a theory of human development that describes the "normal" process of identity formation. By "normal" I mean the learning process one engages in when living under conditions that support growth and development. The Piagetian model of social-cognitive development will be the foundation of the conceptual framework, with some additional refinements (Hicks, 1991). By gaining insight into the conditions and circumstances that promote constructive learning about the self and other, we can then examine what happens to the process of identity formation under circumstances of conflict, when one experiences an existential threat.
     After describing the developmental framework, this analysis will focus on the specific aspects of identity that are open for negotiation in conflict relationships and what the implications are for the type of process that is needed to promote successful reconciliation. Finally, a variety of processes will be explored to include adaptations to the interactive problem-solving model of intergroup conflict resolution developed by John Burton (1991) and later refined by Herbert Kelman (1992) as well as an examination of the limits and strengths of the role of forgiveness in promoting reconciliation.
     At the outset, I would like to make explicit the following assumptions about identity and its development.

• There are two aspects of identity, the "I" and the "Me" (Mead, 1934). The "I" is the core identity, that which one cannot change such as the fact that I am a woman, North American, etc. The second aspect is that part of the self that is socially constructed, the part that evolves as a consequence of our interaction with the world. This is the "Me," that which I will call the constructed identity. I will be focusing my remarks on the "constructed" aspect of identity.
• The process of identity development requires social interaction. One's understanding of others and the world is dependent on engaging with them and it. One has to be in relationship with others and the world in order to learn and develop. Development occurs in the context of relationship. The unit of analysis of the development of one's understanding of the self and the world is the relationship, not the individual.
• Identity development is a process. In other words, there is not an endpoint one arrives at, but it is a lifelong process (Kegan, 1994). If one is open to learning, identity is in constant evolution.

Piaget's view of development:
     It is important to make clear at the outset that Jean Piaget, who has often been (mis)labeled a child psychologist, was not interested in child development per se. His primary concern was how individuals come to understand their relationship with the world, their interactions with it and on what basis they arrive at conclusions about others and the events of the world. His observations of children, and the progression of their understanding of the world from one in which the egocentric child is the center of the universe to an adult "objective" view, where one can tolerate multiple perspectives and can see oneself in relation to others, provided the data he needed to develop a theory of knowledge; a theory of knowledge that tracked the progression of the construction of reality from the simple to the complex, and that defined growth and development as a consequence of one's active engagement with others and the world (Kitchener, 1986). In his view, one did not come to know the world by passively observing it and watching it unfold. One's understanding of the self and others emerge as a consequence of interaction, which provided the context for the development of internal structures that serve as both a repository for the acquired knowledge, and a way of maintaining a sense of inner equilibrium so that one can function in the world. In fact, in Piaget's view, "development" can be described as a process of "increasing equilibrium" between the organism and the environment (1937). That is, an increase in the individual's capacity to integrate a more complex understanding of and relationship to the world without becoming de-stabilized. More will be said about the details of the equilibration process below.
     We gain an understanding of ourselves and the world through the medium of interaction. We construct our understanding and learn about ourselves and the world by engaging with it. We construct our own reality, our own interpretations of how the world works, and end up with a set of beliefs about the self, others, and the world. The construction of reality, and the beliefs that result from the process of "making sense" of the world changes with development. There are qualitative shifts in the way we make meaning as we proceed through the lifespan, with implications at every stage for how much we can integrate from the outside world, into our internal repository of knowledge without becoming psychologically de-stabilized. Within this internal repository of knowledge, is a collection of beliefs about the self (what I am calling the constructed aspect of identity), others and the world that one develops as a consequence of one's continued interactions with the world. These beliefs serve two purposes: They provide us with a set of expectations about the world that enables us to function without being completely overwhelmed with the barrage of stimuli that confronts us at every moment. Second, beliefs create a sense of inner coherence and stability. They allow us to gain control over the anxiety-producing effects of uncertainty in our world, uncertainty that would otherwise overwhelm us. The beliefs provide a (temporary) resting place, until such time that we experience the limits of their usefulness and become a de-stabilizing force in themselves, giving rise to the need to re-examine them and to opening ourselves up to new learning.
     I will next describe in more detail, the mechanisms that allow for learning in Piaget's view, along with some of my own refinements of the theory that are useful when considering how conflict affects this "normal" process of the development of our understanding of ourselves and the world.

Development as a process of increasing equilibrium between self and the environment:
     According to Piaget, a major challenge to the process of development is being able to maintain an inner sense of balance (equilibrium) while integrating new information from the outside world. As one develops a more complex understanding of the self and the world, one's capacity to tolerate challenges to one=s existing worldview increases. It is, however a delicate balance. There are limits to the amount of anxiety one can tolerate when trying to take in new information that challenges one's existing understanding of the world. Too much change too fast, can create tremendous upheaval, the felt experience of which is extremely uncomfortable, setting off what appears to be a reflexive reaction to protect the threatened views of the self and the world. It is important to point out that the instability triggered by an overload of the learning process is more than just a "cognitive" overload. The psychological "disintegration" is felt at an emotional level as well, producing, in extreme cases, debilitating fear, rage, and anxiety when one perceives a threat to one's integrity, either or both at the physical and psychological level (Hicks, et. al.,1996).
     The development process that Piaget describes of increasing one's capacity to take in more complex information about the world without being thrown out of balance is the process of adaptation. This is a dialectical process where the individual is engaged in assimilating the environment into one's existing cognitive structure while at the same time, accommodating to the new information from the environment by changing the existing cognitive structure. The end result of this process is not only a new way of looking at the self and the world, but achieving a more sophisticated balance between the self and its environment. The "assimilative" aspect of adaptation builds an internally coherent structure, a repository of what we think we know, part of which contains views of the self in relation to the world. This becomes our "constructed self." The process of "accommodating" requires an externally focused mechanism that allows us to take in information from the outside world, that which becomes the content of our understanding. The end product of simultaneous interaction of assimilation and accommodation is learning. One without the other, that is, only taking in information into the existing structure is not learning, nor is only being open to outside information. Both must be happening at the same time to produce a shift in one's worldview. For example, an individual who perhaps listens to the perspective of the other, (a perspective that may challenge one's own view) but does not make the change in one's internal structure or belief, is only Assimilating." No learning is taking place. In Piaget's terms, the individual is behaving egocentrically because he is not open to being changed by the new information. On the other hand, a person who is constantly changing her point of view, every time she encounters new information, and not developing an internal structure (self) in which to put the information is not learning either, because she is simply parroting the ideas that she has taken in from the outside. Woody Allen's character Zelig from the movie, "Zelig," is the perfect example of one who only accommodates. He takes on the ideas and personality of every new person he encounters. There is no inner coherence, no internal sense of self. This person could be labeled an "aliuscentric," or one is completely "other" centered (Hicks, 1991).
     Under non-threatening conditions, we are constantly making adjustments to our self by integrating new information from the outside that we gain by interacting with others. We are constantly refining and expanding the self and our beliefs about others and the world with new experiences. Even though the process of identity development is ongoing and ever changing, in order to be able to function in the world, we need some stability and certainty about what to expect in the world, but this stability and certainty comes with a price. As a part of the self-structure, we develop beliefs about how the world works, that is, beliefs about our self (both positive and negative evaluations) as well as beliefs about others and the world. This is necessary so that we can function in the world. Our beliefs underlie our expectations about others and the world. Again, these beliefs are always open to change when one is living under the conditions that promote learning and development.
     When we are in a learning mode, under the best case situation, we can live with or tolerate some uncertainty about our beliefs, accepting that with new experiences with others and the world, they may be open to change, or that they may be "wrong" to begin with. This is a very important aspect of development, that is, the extent to which one accepts the possibility that one's worldview, images of self and other, are incomplete and subject to change.
     In addition, we may have beliefs that are unsettled in our own mind, beliefs around which we experience some ambivalence. Accepting ambivalence means that we can tolerate having mixed feelings about ourselves and the world, that we can exist even with competing beliefs that appear to contradict each other. For example, under most circumstances we all have mixed feelings about ourselves. We are aware that there are aspects of the self that we are comfortable with and others that we are not. The same is true for the other. We rarely, if honest, have a simplistic view of anything. Under conditions that promote growth and development, we can accept the fact that we are constantly living with ambivalence and uncertainty.
     One could consider the extent to which one can tolerate uncertainty and ambivalence a measure of egocentrism: the more one is steadfast in holding onto beliefs, especially when there may be disconfirming evidence, the more egocentric (embedded in one's own perspective) is one's understanding of the world. Conversely, the more one is open to changing one's beliefs (accepting uncertainty and ambivalence) about others and the world when there is new information to adjust to, the more sociocentric (one is capable of tolerating multiple perspectives) one becomes.
     I would like to elaborate on the concept of certainty. As I mentioned earlier, in order to function in the world, we need to develop a set of beliefs about our self, others, and the world. Along with the beliefs that we establish, comes a degree of certainty about those beliefs. In other words, we seem to have a very strong compulsion to want our understanding of the world to be "right." There seems to be a very strong desire to be "right" and a very strong aversion to being "wrong." This is an interesting phenomenon. There are probably functional, self-preserving aspects to it, but I really do not fully grasp the importance, from a developmental point of view, of feeling the strong need to be right. It creates so much resistance to change and development. It seems to threaten development rather than promote it.

Experiencing the limits of our capacity to be open to learning
     As I mentioned earlier, there are, even under "normal" circumstances, limits to how much new learning we can tolerate. Too much, too fast can de-stabilize us, creating the felt experience psychological disintegration. Our capacity to take in more and more complex information, and the resultant shift our inner sense of equilibrium, changes with development. I will not go into this now, but Piaget tracks the qualitative shifts in understanding that take place as we develop over the lifespan (internal structural changes). The more we move through the stages of cognitive development, the more sophisticated we become at integrating information about others and the world. As we develop these more sophisticated capacities, we grow out of our egocentrism, or our belief that we are the center of the universe (which characterizes a child-like view of the world) and that our take on the world is the "right" one. With development, we become increasingly aware of the extent to which we must include others in our understanding of the world, and develop a "sociocentric" view of the relationship between the self and the world. With this more complex worldview, one is much more reticent to be invested in being "right," realizing the limits of one's capacity to make such a claim in a world where uncertainty dominates reality.
     We know we are at our limits of what we can take in because we feel it or experience it as overload. In other words, we begin to psychologically "disintegrate." Depending on what the nature of the information is that overloads the learning mechanisms, it is experienced as fear, anxiety, anger, exhaustion, a general breakdown in our ability to function. We become psychologically "de-stabilized," and at these times, there is an automatic, self-preserving homoeostatic process is activated that shuts the learning channels down. When I say shuts the channels down, I mean those mechanisms that allow for the changes and refinement of the self-structures and the mechanism that allows in the new information that is used to refine the self-structures. These two dialectic process (assimilation/accommodation) shut down. The consequence is that the self-structure is no longer open to refinement and expansion, and the capacity to take in information about others and the world are also frozen, as are the existing beliefs about the self, others, and the world. In this sense, the frozen beliefs act as a stabilizing mechanism, one that moves us from a felt experience of disintegration to one where we are psychologically integrated and balanced again. As a consequence of the "shut down," beliefs become rigid and extremely resistant to change, complexity is lost, certainty of our assessment of what is "right" rises, and the feeling of ambivalence about what we "know" is lost. All of this is "lost" in the service of self-protection.

Identity Development under conditions of conflict
     With the learning/development framework as backdrop, I would now like to examine what happens to the process of identity development under conditions of conflict. That is, when one experiences an existential threat.
     Given the assumption that identity development occurs in the context of relationship, when the nature of the interaction between two people or groups becomes threatening, the process of identity formation shuts down. One feels de-stabilized by the threatening event, creating fear, anger, anxiety, and an impulse toward self-preservation and what often seems to be the case of directing the anger and hostility toward the threatening other. An impulse (self-preserving /other annihilating) for revenge and violence toward the threatening other is activated, a reaction that appears to protect us from physical annihilation. The felt experience of being psychologically diminished and the consequent feelings of humiliation that accompany it fuel the need for revenge and violence, perhaps as strongly as if it were a physical threat. This simultaneous impulse toward "self-protection" and "other annihilation" seems to be automatic. In order to "right oneself" and to return to a state of equilibrium so that we can function, the self-preserving mechanism that I described above is activated, closing down the free flow of information between self and other, information that would normally allow for the refinement of our set of beliefs about our self, others and the world, in essence, closing down the opportunity for growth and development, all in the service of survival. As a consequence of the traumatic and threatening event, one forms a negative image of the other, which becomes frozen into one's belief system. Any refinements in the beliefs about the other are formed in the absence of interaction. Input from the other is often not available. There is no opportunity for the other to challenge or change the negative images. This is when enemy images and other destructive social psychological processes develop. Because the mechanism that allows in new information is closed down, even new and disconfirming information about the other is not allowed in. The images of the other are frozen in time. The process of identity formation is also frozen, keeping in mind always, that this is a self-protective mechanism. It allows one to function in the world, and not experience the psychological disintegration that the traumatic event triggers. The closing down of the learning process is a survival mechanism.
     Along with the frozen beliefs, the degree of certainty about one's beliefs also solidifies and becomes rigid. Both sides feel that their take on what happened is "right." They become entrenched in a battle over whose view of the events that took place is more accurate. Not only does one feel that his point of view is the correct one, one also feels extreme certainty about how to rectify the situation and who is responsible. The conclusions that one reaches about how to resolve the conflict are formed in the absence of any interaction with or input from the other. The other's point of view is expelled from the process of forming an outcome to the conflict. The desired outcomes to the conflict are seen in zero-sum terms, because each side has expelled the other and the experiences of the other from one's assessment of what is "right." The need to be right seems to intensify as a part of the destructive dynamics of identity threats.
     Along with the rigidity one's need to be "right" about the other and the events surrounding the conflict, is the need to place blame for what happened. It is rarely the case that one looks inward for one's own contribution to the failed interaction. There appears, again, to be a reflexive reaction to put all the responsibility onto the aggressive and evil other, protecting one's righteous self-image. The deflection of responsibility is a direct consequence of the powerful reaction to protect oneself from further trauma.
     What also naturally occurs is a breakdown in social interaction. Both parties retreat from one another, creating physical and psychological distance between them. The distance further exacerbates the frozen images of the other, as there is absolutely no chance for hearing disconfirming information by listening to each other's view of the conflict. The communication void becomes filled with more negativity and hostility, giving rise to the development of a number of cognitive distortions about the other (Kelman, 1997, Holt & Silverstein,1989, Silverstein & Flamenbaum, 1989), further limiting the chance for new learning.
     Our observations as facilitators of dialogues between communities in conflict have given us ample data that supports the above speculations regarding the role of identity in perpetuating and maintaining intercommunal conflict. In Sri Lanka, where the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil peoples have been engaged in a violent conflict for more than 17 years, the protection of identity plays a significant role in the conflict. Both sides feel that their identity is profoundly threatened by the position or desired outcome of the other side, creating what feels to both sides as an existential threat. The Sinhalese demand for a unified, Buddhist state that protects and maintains the integrity of their unique Sinhalese-Buddhist identity completely negates the Tamil Tiger's desire for a separate state, which would protect them from further persecution and marginalization as a minority peoples. Similarly, the Tamil demands for separation negates the Sinhalese demand for unity. These "zero-sum" positions make it impossible to arrive at an outcome to the conflict that satisfies the needs and interests of both sides.
     The threat to the identity of both sides triggers what I have described above as a self-protective reaction to hold onto their beliefs about the self and are highly resistant to change. Out of fear of annihilation, both sides have retreated from one another, creating the absence of interaction or isolation from each other that keeps parties open to learning and a possible unfreezing of their views of themselves and the other. They cling to their beliefs about what is "right," making it highly unlikely that they will let go of the "death grip" regarding their positions on how to end the conflict. The history of threatening and traumatizing each other has eroded any possibility of opening the learning process, therefore making it impossible to create the trust that is necessary to move the intractable process of reconciliation forward.
     One must keep in mind that underlying a breakdown in trust is a history of trauma and humiliation. In the Sri Lanka conflict, both sides have experienced considerable trauma and humilitation. During the British colonial period, the Tamil minority was "favored" by the British in the sense that they were taught English and therefore, had greater access to education and job opportunities (Little, 1994). The Sinhalese felt marginalized and discriminated by this "favoritism," creating the kind of revenge cycles that one sees being played out in the current conflict. The Buddhist clergy was also marginalized and humiliated during the colonial period, according to their accounts, lost their power and authority in the Buddhist community. One could argue, it is why they are so adamant today about preserving the Buddhist integrity of the state of Sri Lanka. Such losses of dignity can remain alive within an identity group for centuries. Vamik Volken has described the power of such trauma and humiliation in maintaining enemy attitudes toward the hated other. He has described how the trauma is transmitted for generations until and unless the parties engage in a healing process that acknowledges and grieves the lost integrity (Volkan, 1991).
     For the Tamils, the history of discrimination and marginalization by the majority Sinhalese created very deep traumas for their people. One faction of the Tamil community, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, have claimed the need for a separate state in order to protect the Tamil people from persecution. Although there are other Tamil groups that do not support the desire for a separate state, the other "moderate" Tamils would nevertheless agree that their identity has been profoundly threatened over the years, and that changes in the political structure are necessary to protect themselves from further threat and persecution.
     The important point to be made from this illustration is the extent to which threats to one's identity can interrupt the normal flow of interaction between groups, creating a hardwired "revenge" reaction that gets triggered in the service of survival. In so doing, beliefs about self and other become frozen in time, resistant to the "normal" social interchange that produces the free flow of information from one's environment, causing an interruption of the normal flow of identity development.

What are we "negotiating"?
     In this developmental framework, it is clear that what happens under conditions of traumatic threat is a breakdown in the free flow of information between self and other, or an arrest of the learning process, or the co-construction of identities. I have made the point that when one experiences a traumatic, threatening event that disrupts one's inner stability, the mechanisms that allow for learning close down. There is an automatic shut down of the mechanism that preserves us from further threat or injury. From this developmental perspective, one could argue that the threat experienced by parties in conflict are experienced not only as threats to one's identity, or our collection of beliefs about who we are, but more broadly a threat to the way we maintain our inner sense of coherence and stability. In so doing, the threat not only challenges the beliefs we hold about ourselves (our identity), but how we arrive at those beliefs, and how we ultimately use those beliefs as stabilizing mechanisms that allow us to function in the world. Furthermore, it challenges our evaluation of the "rightness" of those beliefs. Taken together, the threat becomes a threat to one's integrity, as the sum total of our understanding of the self and the world and that which gives us the psychological equilibrium or the felt experience of stability that allows us to navigate through the world with all its uncertainty. The biggest threat of all is to imagine letting go of those beliefs that have stabilized one for a long time. They fear both the other and re-experiencing of the feeling of disintegration caused by the threatening other. Anyone who has been traumatized by a threatening other knows that there is no way he or she would want to re-experience the trauma. The self-protective mechanisms within us are very powerful and prevent us from re-living the injury.
     In summary, what is happening under conditions of traumatic threat is a felt experience of psychological disintegration (anger, fear, anxiety), the degree to which this is felt depends on the severity of the threat. Self-protective mechanism is triggered automatically shutting down the mechanisms that allow the kind of interaction between self and other that promote new learning. Beliefs about the self and the other become frozen. These "frozen beliefs"(images of self and other) act as stabilizing forces that firmly anchor oneself so that one does not revert back to the terrifying threat. The learning process, that process which opens oneself and the other to new experiences with the other, is indefinitely frozen. The context for growth and development (the relationship) becomes poisoned by the simultaneous destructive impulses of self-protection and other annihilation.
     Assuming that the threat that is experienced is a threat to one's integrity, that is a threat to how one is psychologically held together, and what holds us together or stabilizes us back to a sense of equilibrium are our frozen beliefs about oneself and the other (one's identity). What we are actually negotiating is not only identity, but our integrity, that which keeps us stable in the world, that inner coherence and stability that keeps us functioning. We are, more broadly speaking, negotiating our integrity.
     What we end up negotiating are the conditions under which one would be willing to open oneself up to new information, information that could change not only one's existing beliefs about the other, but of oneself as well. The result of this re-opening process is that the experience of the other is re-introduced into one's existing world view without feeling de-stabilized.

Implications for process
     What kind of process could create the conditions that would enable parties to "negotiate their integrity"? What would be required of the participants? What would be the components of the process?
     The process issues addressed in this paper are limited to the work of reconciliation, where the goal is to create the conditions that allow former enemies to co-exist without the fear of domination and annihilation. The political implications of coming to terms with domination is not of concern here. It is assumed that a different forum convened at the official level (Track One) will address the political aspects of equalizing the relationship between the two groups.
     A basic assumption of this unoffical or Track Two approach is that participants would have to agree to at the outset, is that conflict is a relational phenomenon and is a result of failed interaction. Therefore, reflection on both the causes and the potential resolution of the conflict involves an interactive process where the issue of responsibility is explored. This in no way negates the fact that one side may have been more responsible than the other for causing the conflict in that an asymmetry of power often characterizes the relationship (Rouhana and Korper, 1996) where one group is dominating the other to the extent that it's basic human rights are being violated. What is does imply, however, is that both sides have a role in reconstructing the relationship, and in so doing, reconstructing their identities.
     What does it require to reconstruct the relationship from one that is characterized by dominance and subjugation to one that is respectful of human dignity? I would like to make a distinction between the role of the low power group and the role of the high power group as the issue of responsibility is not the same for both.
     For the high power group, it is necessary for them to come to terms with the consequences of maintaining a dominance relationship, insofar as they have denied the low power group their human dignity and rights as a people. They need to accept that as a result of their domination, they caused immeasurable suffering and humiliation for the low power group. What makes this so difficult is the exposure one feels in accepting the not-so-righteous aspects of one's group identity--that part of the human psyche that is capable of traumatizing the other and thereby denying the other its human dignity.
     For the low power group, their role is as difficult if not more so. If there is any way to reconstruct the relationship to promote reconciliation and co-existence, the low power group will have to let go of their victim identity, which would require them to relinquish the moral advantage that been the source of their power for the duration of the conflict. In so doing, they would have to come to terms with, that is to say to let go of the understandable hostility and need for revenge that they feel toward group that has caused their suffering for so many years. Some believe that this is too much to ask of the victimized group. Is it even humanly possible to re-humanize the other that has dehumanized you? Perhaps this is the core of the issue. A necessary condition for reconciliation is the restoration of humanity: restoring human dignity to both the victim and the victimizer.
     What kind of process would promote the restoration of humanity for both sides? Once again, the structural changes that are necessary that guarantee the rights of the low power group are not the concern of this essay. Those political changes are necessary but not sufficient to bring about reconciliation. The psychological shift that enables parties to unfreeze those aspects of their identity-the beliefs that are making it possible for them to maintain their inner stability and coherence at the cost of creating an existential threat for the other-is the locus of concern in this essay. The question is, what sort of process could create the conditions for such a shift?
     Desmond Tutu has argued that forgiveness is the only way to restore the dignity to a relationship that has been violated by conflict (Tutu, 1999). The low power group would have to forgive the high power group and the high power group would have to forgive itself. Although it may very well be true that forgiveness not only helps free the victimizer of and shame and the burden of wrongdoing, but can liberate the victim as well (Enright, et. al.,1999), the problem with it is that it cannot not be forced. We can no more force a group that is in denial of the effects of its domination and subjugation to face its denial (to examine the not-so-righteous aspects of its identity) than legislate the low power group to let go of its understandable rage and to forgive its oppressor (give up victim identity). I would argue that it is unethical to push forgiveness onto anyone who is not ready. Minow (1999) has pointed out that victims need to feel the anger associated with a violation of their dignity, as it enables them to maintain a sense of self-esteem after the assault.
     Even if we all agreed that forgiveness could be the mechanism that would enable the reconstruction of identity -a critical component to the process of reconciliation--we are faced with what feels like a moral dilemma. We have insight into the mechanism that could promote the shift, but are aware that it not something that any third party could require of participants. Engaging in a process of forgiveness is a personal choice and must remain in that realm, whether we are talking about forgiving someone for violating one's dignity or forgiving oneself for robbing others of their dignity. The best one could hope for is to create the conditions that would give rise to forgiveness.
     Susan Dwyer (1999) has argued that forgiveness is not a necessary component in the reconciliation process. Her conceptualization of reconciliation--what it takes for two parties to arrive at an "equilibrium," or shared interpretation of seemingly incompatible versions of reality-focuses primarily on the level of meaning making. She argues that human beings create narratives around events, the purpose of which is to provide coherence and stability in one's understanding of the self, others, and the world. In essence, Dwyer argues that when outside forces threaten one's identity, it creates a disruption in one's world view, particularly one's notion of self and other, creating, ultimately, a breakdown in one's narrative. The task of reconciliation, therefore, is to create the conditions so that the two former enemies could develop a "mutually tolerable" interpretation of events. It is an epistemological exercise to the extent that the process involves at least a partial co-construction of meaning, restoring the necessary equilibrium that could enable them to leave the past and to the envision the possibility of a shared future. Dwyer suggests that there will always be tension surrounding this process, and the goal is not to eliminate those tensions. Rather, the goal is to try to incorporate the source of those tensions--the trauma, the humiliation, the violations of one's dignity--into a new way of holding them in one's identity such that it does not cause psychological disintegration for either party.
     One can see that Dwyer's conceptualization of the goal of reconciliation is consistent with what we know about identity development and the ideas put forth in this essay. She may be partly correct in describing the process as epistemological in nature except that reconstructing a shared interpretation of events fails to address the "felt experience," what happens at the human level, when one has sustained an assault to one's integrity. When one's narrative has been challenged by a traumatic assault, it cannot be rectified by simply engaging in an epistemological exercise of reconstructing the narrative. The injuries endured by the victim require more than a cognitive re-construction of events, although such a reconstruction is certainly the outcome that is ultimately desired. The process needs to include a component that addresses the emotional trauma victims have sustained. This aspect of the process requires more than just a cognitive exercise. What this aspect of the process looks like is still in question, although much has been written about what it takes to promote healing of victims of politically motivated violence.
     To summarize, the process cannot be limited to negotiating a new construction or co-construction of events that took place. That is the desired endpoint, but other emotional demands required to get to a truly "mutually tolerable" interpretation of events requires a much deeper process that addresses the needs for healing and recovery of the assault to one's dignity. Addressing and acknowledging the emotional component allows the parties to do the reconstruction of events. One cannot be expected to give up an aspect of one's identity without addressing the conditions that gave rise to it in the first place. The experience of humiliation and suffering a low power group experienced must be addressed before being able to "let go" of it in support of a new "mutually tolerable" interpretation of what happened. Similarly, the high power group needs to emotionally integrate that aspect of their identity that enabled them to perpetrate acts of violence onto the other.
     Given the delicate nature of the work being proposed. It is recommended that the first phase of the process be done within the communities, before they are brought together for the face to face, "interactive" phase. What it takes for both groups to "unfreeze" their identities is difficult enough to do without the presence of the other side. Only after the critical task of self-examination should the parties be brought together in a face to face interaction for the "reconstruction" phase of reconciliation.
     For the high power group, exposing oneself to the not-so-righteous aspects of one's identity can be extremely difficult and embarassing. The first phase is to break one's denial that one is capable of inflicting injury onto the other. This would require the safest of environments, with the support of a third party that is not judgmental, and who could create the conditions for such self-analysis. Perpetrators would have to engage in a slow process of exposure before they could be able to expose themselves to those whom they have injured. Exposing too much too soon can be psychologically devastating.
     For the low power group, a safe environment would have to be created by the third party in order for them to articulate what happened to them and to have acknowledged that what happened to them was wrong and that no human being should have to suffer the way they did. They would be taken through their process, with the hope that both the telling of their story and the acknowledgment by the third party that what happened to them was wrong, could prepare them for facing the high power group in a face to face interaction.
     As one can see, the role of the third party is not one in which they assume impartiality. In fact, the third party should be prepared to acknowledge the suffering and violations of dignity of the low power group. The defining characteristic of the third party work with the high power group would require a non-judgmental and compassionate approach so that the group would be able to expose themselves without fear of being humiliated. The hope with the high power group is that the environment created by the third party would be safe enough that they would be willing to examine the darker side of their identity and in so doing, could begin to accept responsibility for their actions.
     It is far beyond the scope of this essay to propose a detailed description of these processes. My point in introducing the issue of process was to help us think more clearly about the role identity plays in the reconciliation, and to differentiate the goals of the process for the two groups. What it takes for a low power group to let go of the aspects of their identity that makes reconciliation difficult is different from what the challenges that the high power group faces. Finally, it is proposed that the individual group work would enhance the possibility of being able to jointly reconstruct the narratives of both sides so that a "mutually tolerable" interpretation of the past can be achieved, paving the way for the development of a shared future in the context of a relationship that permits both groups' identities to develop and flourish.
     One last point that I would like to make explicit regarding the process of reconciliation--a point that is implied in the above analysis--is that in my view, a disproportionate emphasis has been placed in the discourse on reconciliation on the role of the victim in promoting reconciliation, and in particular, on the role of forgiveness. As the above analysis of process indicates, the task of reconstructing identities (narratives) and ultimately the relationship between two parties involves shared responsibility. It is uncommon to read about process that support perpetrators through the process of coming to terms with the aspect of their identities that allow them to commit acts of violence onto the other. It is my view that practitioners are putting an undo burden on the low power group by suggesting that "there is no future without forgiveness." I would like to balance the scales by suggesting that we focus more attention on what it takes to break the denial of high power groups so that they can come to terms with what they have done in a way that protects their human dignity. It is our challenge, as practitioner, to understand the needs of the perpetrator and to develop process that would enable them to take responsibility for their actions and still maintain their psychological integrity.
     It may be true that "there is no future without forgiveness" but what kind of future will it be if forgiveness is not accompanied by responsibility? Are we doing the high power group any favors by enabling them to stay in a state of denial about who they are and what they have done? The restoration of humanity requires an identity shift on both sides of the divide. By emphasizing one process over the other, we are perpetuating the continuation of the asymmetrical relationship and undermining the very idea that the resolution of these deep-rooted identity conflicts requires an unfreezing of both identities and the existential threats that are released in the process. The acknowledgement of wrongdoing (and the concomitant shift in identity that it requires) could make it profoundly easier for the victims to let go of their anger and need for revenge, creating the conditions that could promote a shift in their identity and the relationship. This could enable both parties to move out of the past, into the present, and onto imagining a future not only absent of existential threat, but filled with possibility and the freedom to develop and flourish.

Bibliography

Burton, John (1991). Conflict: Human needs theory. Macmillan Press: London.

Crocker, D. (1999). Reckoning with past wrongs: A normative framework. Ethics and International affairs, Vol. 13, pp. 43-64.

Dwyer, S. (1999). Reconciliation for realists. Ethics and international affairs, Vol. 13, pp. 81-98.

Enright, R.D., Freedman, S. & Rique J. (1999). The psychology of interpersonal forgiveness. In Enright, R. & North, J. (Eds.), Exploring forgiveness. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin.

Hicks, Donna (1991). Beyond egocentrism: A question of certainty. Unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Hicks, D. O=Doherty, H., Steiner, P., Taylor, W., and Trigeorgis, M. (1994). AAddressing intergroup conflict by integrating and realigning identity: An Arab-Israeli Workshop.@ In, Group Process and Political Dynamics. Mark Ettin, (Ed.), International Universities Press, Madison, CT.

Holt R. & Silverstein B. (1989). On the psychology of enemy images: Introduction and Overview. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 1-ll.

Kegan, R. (1994). In over our heads. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA & London, England.

Kelman, H.C. (1982 ). Creating the conditions for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 26, pp. 39-75.

________ (1987). Political psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Political Psychology. Vol 8, No. 3, pp. 347-363.

________ (1992). Informal mediation by the scholar/practitioner. In J.Bercovitch & J. Rubin (Eds.), Mediation in international relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management (pp. 64-96). New York: St. Martin's Press.

________ (1997). Social psychological dimensions of international conflict. In Peacemaking in international conflict, edited by Zartman, W.I. & Rasmussen, L.J., United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

________ (1999). The role of social identity in conflict resolution: Experiences from Israeli-Palestinian problem-solving workshops. Paper presented at theTwelfth Conference of the International Association for Conflict Management in San Sebastian-Donostia, Spain, on June 22, 1999.

Kitchner, R. (1986). Piaget=s theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press: New Haven, CT.

Little, David. (1994). Sri Lanka: The invention of enmity. United States Institute of Peace Press. Washington, D.C.

Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois.

Minow, M. (1998). Between vengence and forgiveness. Beacon Press: Boston, MA

Piaget, J. (1937). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Ballantine.

Piaget, J. (1970). Genetic epistemology. Columbia University Press: New York.

Rouhana N & Korper, S. (1996). Dealing with power asymetry: Dilemmas of intervention in asymmetrical intergroup conflict. Negotiation Journal, 12, 315-328.

Silverstein, B. & Flamenbaum, C. (1989). Biases in the perceptions and cognition of the actions of enemies. Journal of Social Issues, Vol 45, No. 2, 1989.

Tutu, Desmond. (1999). No future without forgiveness. Doubleday: New York, New York.

Volkan,Vamik. (1991). On chosen trauma. In Mind and Human Interaction. Vol. 3, No. 13.