

Coalition Brokers or Breakers? Brazilian Governors and Legislative Voting

John M. Carey and Gina Yannitell Reinhardt
Department of Political Science, Box 1063
Washington University
One Brookings Dr.
St. Louis, MO 63130
314 935 5834
jmcarev@artsci.wustl.edu

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Abstract: Reforms to decentralize political power have taken place in scores of countries during recent decades. Gubernatorial influence can complicate the formation and maintenance of national-level political coalitions. This paper examines the relationship between state-level politics and legislative coalitions through an analysis of voting in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. We demonstrate that Brazilian legislative parties are relatively disunified in comparative perspective. This disunity, however, is mirrored within state party cohorts of legislators, and is not primarily driven by divisions among states. We offer models to estimate the influence of governors over the unity of legislative allies – both partisan and coalitional – from their states. Governors do not systematically affect the voting unity of their state party cohorts, but they do diminish the voting unity of coalitions of parties with which they are allied, suggesting that state legislators tied to governors are subject to pressures from competing principals.

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In recent years, reforms decentralizing political power to subnational governments have taken place in settings as diverse as India, China, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Britain, and Russia. Devolution of authority and policymaking responsibilities is often advocated in terms of government responsiveness to local conditions, and fiscal and regulatory efficiency (Tiebout 1956; Weingast 1995; Montinola et.al. 1995). Decentralization, however, presents challenges that can complicate the formation and maintenance of national-level political coalitions (Eaton; O'Neill 1998; Triesman 1999). This paper examines the relationship between state-level politics and legislative coalitions at the national level through an analysis of voting in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.

Four countries in Latin America -- Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela -- are constitutionally federal, in that state (or provincial) layers of government are endowed with powers, responsibilities, and institutions that parallel those at the national level.¹ In each of these countries, reforms in the 1980s and 1990s increased the electoral independence of state-level from national-level politicians, and boosted their access to revenues as well as their responsibility for the provision of basic services (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999; Garman, Haggard, and Willis 2001). The rising prominence of state governors elevates their status as potential coalition brokers, even in politics at the national level.

Argentina's national budget process in 2000 presents a case in point. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, the new presidential administration of Fernando de la Rúa drew up a plan featuring strict austerity measures. The budget package faced serious resistance both from the opposition Peronists (JP) and from within de la Rúa's own Alianza coalition. Before sending the budget bill to Congress, de la Rúa summoned all 24 provincial governors -- 14 of whom are Peronists -- to Buenos Aires and engaged in protracted negotiations over the plan. At the price of some concessions from the president's initial proposal, 23 of the governors signed a pact supporting the overall package of spending cuts and controls. With the provincial governors on board, Buenos Aires's *Clarín* newspaper concluded, "Now the agreement ought to be passed by Congress and the state legislatures for its final approval. This step should not present big obstacles." (Helfgot 2000). Spiller and Tommasi (2000) argue more generally that, with decentralization, Argentine provincial governors increasingly control the political futures of national legislators, which in turn undermines Congress as an arena in which policy compromises can be efficiently struck and enforced. One result, they conclude, is that, "Often these bargains take place in executive quarters, in meetings of the president with governors" (p.21).

With the end of one-party dominance, and the top-to-bottom discipline that characterized the long rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), observers of Mexican politics are watchful for a similar dynamic (Ugalde 2000). Garman, Haggard, and Willis (2001: 233) argue that the demise of one-party dominance led "federal legislators [to become] increasingly dependent on oppositions governors," complicating the process of building coalitions behind legislative proposals. In Venezuela, reforms beginning in the late 1980s increased the stature and autonomy of state governors, although it is not certain this trajectory will be sustained in the wake President

¹ Decentralization in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was not limited to the federal systems. Many of the constitutionally unitary countries, most dramatically Colombia and Bolivia, established direct elections for regional governments and tilted the national-regional allocation of responsibilities toward the latter. These reforms were accompanied by shifts in formulas for revenue sharing between national and regional governments that increased regional access to resources, although whether changes in this direction were sufficient remains a point of controversy (Alesina et.al. 2000, O'Neill 1998).

Hugo Chavez's transformation of that political system. At a minimum, the direct election of governors was not rescinded in the 1999 constitutional reforms, and the few state executives controlled by Chavez antagonists are the only serious pockets of opposition to the president in any Venezuelan government institutions. Even in nonfederal Colombia, regional politicians are now regarded as potential veto players over proposals for electoral reform at the national level (Alesina et.al. 2000; Shugart 2001).

In short, the relevance of governors as potential brokers of legislative coalitions is raised in recent work on federalism throughout Latin America. Such accounts are most familiar in Brazilian politics. Among Latin America's federal systems, state governments in Brazil have most consistently controlled substantial resources, and its politicians and parties have cultivated support bases and sustained careers at the state level (Mainwaring 1999; Samuels 2000c). Governors regularly weigh in on national policy debates and are widely regarded to influence the prospects for presidents and parties to pursue their legislative agenda (Montero 2000). Samuels's (2000a and 2000b) work on state-level coalitions in Brazil demonstrates the powerful influence of governors on the electoral fortunes of the alliances of congressional candidates attached to their coattails.

The central theme of this essay, then, is the relative importance of state-level factors – specifically, governors – to national-level factors in explaining patterns of voting among national legislators? The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly review current literature on Brazilian legislative parties and the factors that influence legislators' voting decisions. Next, we introduce two indices for measuring the voting unity of any bloc of legislators, whether designated by party, coalition, state, region, or any combination of characteristics. We use the indices, together with comparative data on levels of party unity from 10 legislatures, to place Brazil in comparative perspective. Then, we show Brazilian unity indices by state, as well as party, illustrating the relative importance of each to patterns of voting behavior. Next, we develop two sets of hypotheses regarding the nature of gubernatorial influence over voting by their state legislative cohorts, and test these against recorded vote data from 1989-98. The conclusion discusses the results.

Brazilian coalitions: state governors vs. national parties

Brazilian legislative parties are routinely characterized as weak and undisciplined at the national level (Ames 2001b; Geddes and Ribeiro Neto 1993; Weyland 1996). Mainwaring and Perez Liñán (1997) document low rates of party cohesiveness in roll call votes during the late 1980s, when the Brazilian Congress acted simultaneously as a constituent assembly to redraft the country's basic charter. A number of institutional factors are summoned to account for this result, including Brazil's open list electoral system, and the state-based nature of parties. Brazil's open list electoral system pits candidates from the same party against each other in competition for personal votes, and thus generates incentives for legislators to cultivate personal reputations that distinguish themselves from their copartisans (Carey and Shugart 1995). State-level party organizations control nominations for candidates to most important offices in Brazil, and state governments control copious budgetary and patronage resources (Mainwaring 1999). As a result, scholars summon state-level factors in explaining Brazilian legislative behavior. Ames (2001a), for example, explains policy proposals by national legislators with reference to the characteristics of particular governors and state-level political machines.

Recent work by Samuels (2000a and 2000b) examines the electoral influence of state governors on national legislators. The electoral alliances formed by Brazilian parties at the state level – for gubernatorial and legislative elections – often do not correspond to those that form at the national

level around presidential candidates. In a given state, the strength of gubernatorial alliances better predicts the electoral fortunes of legislative lists than does the strength of presidential alliances. Samuels concludes that this makes governors the key brokers of legislative coalitions:

Gubernatorial coattails consequently weaken the president's ability to construct a governing coalition. When elected deputies arrive in Brasília to serve their terms, they must continue to pay attention to the incumbent governors in their states, so as not to create powerful enemies (2000a: 250).

Brazilian legislators, then, are commonly portrayed as motivated by local interests and unconcerned with the cohesiveness of their parties at the national level. The fact that the electoral coattails from state governor elections are longer and stronger than those from the executive elections at the national level suggest that governors may exert substantial influence on legislative voting.

Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi (2000) challenge this portrayal of Brazilian legislative parties. They contend that Brazilian presidents form governments based on multiparty coalitions analogous to those in parliamentary systems, that presidents and legislative party leaders are equipped with sufficient procedural tools to dominate the legislative agenda, and that Brazilian legislative parties are unified actors.² Focusing on parties at the national level, Figueiredo and Limongi show that most legislative initiatives offered by Brazilian presidents are approved, that Brazilian legislators tend to vote according to the recommendations of their parties' leaders, and that legislators from parties in the president's coalition tend to support presidential initiatives. They conclude that Brazilian parties and the executive structure the legislative process in an orderly and predictable way, and that deadlock is not the norm.

The theoretical foundation of Figueiredo and Limongi's argument is that the president "controls resources upon which politicians depend for their political survival," – policy influence and patronage (2000:152, 165). Because the rules of legislative procedure concentrate agenda control in the hands of the president, individual legislators have little to gain by challenging the executive, even if their local bases of support would favor such behavior, because isolated acts of independent voting would not affect policy outcomes. Acting collectively, on the other hand, legislators stand a chance to extract concessions from the executive. Figueiredo and Limongi contend that parties are the means by which legislators organize collective action, and accepting national party discipline is the price accepted, even by individualistic and localistic politicians, for leverage in bargaining with the president.

The literature on Brazilian legislative parties raises three questions. First, statements about high or low levels of discipline beg the response "compared to what?" Are Brazilian parties disciplined in comparative perspective? Second, how does voting unity among national parties, and party coalitions, compare with that among legislators from the same state, and from parties and coalitions that operate at the state level? Third, along these same lines, do the resources controlled by governors explain their ability to influence voting by legislators from their states, and so to act as coalition brokers at the national level?

² The empirical basis of the argument rests on the same data on legislative votes used in this paper. Figueiredo and Limongi generously provided their dataset of recorded votes from the Chamber of Deputies.

Two measures of legislative voting unity

Carey (2001) proposes two measures of unity that can be applied to any relevant group of voters – e.g. members of the same party, coalition, state delegation, ethnic identity, gender, etc.

$UNITY_{ij} = | \%aye_{ij} - \%nay_{ij} |$ for group i on vote j , where the percentages are calculated as shares of all members of the group. UNITY can range from zero (no members voting, or equal numbers voting aye and nay) to one (all members voting together); and

$RICE_{ij} = | \%aye_{ij} - \%nay_{ij} |$ for group i on vote j , where members of the group who do *not* cast an aye or nay vote are not considered. That is the proportions of ayes and nays are based only on those voting *either* aye or nay, and so sum to 1. The RICE score can range from zero (equal numbers voting aye and nay) to one (all members who vote voting together).

The two scores are related, but UNITY is discounted according to the share of the group membership that casts a decisive vote. Thus, UNITY reflects the extent to which a group mobilizes its potential voting influence, whereas RICE measures just the cohesiveness among those members of the group that cast votes. Both scores range from 0 (for a group mobilizing none of its decisive influence, or evenly split between aye and nay votes) to 1.0 (for a group fully mobilized and unified).

We weight the scores to generate indices for large numbers of votes according to the closeness of the vote to a tie.³ This is a means of discounting consensual or lopsided votes, on which any subset of legislators is, by definition, highly unified, and where a change in voting behavior by any legislator is certain to be inconsequential to the outcome. The intuition behind the weighting system is that we are more interested in voting unity within any group, the higher the probability that a change in any legislator's vote would have been pivotal to the outcome. The scores (either UNITY or RICE) for any subset of legislatures are weighted as follows to arrive at the weighted index:

$$INDEX_i = \sum SCORE_{ij} * CLOSE_j / \sum CLOSE_j$$

where

$$CLOSE_j = 1 - (1/THRESHOLD * | THRESHOLD - \%aye |)$$

for legislature as a whole on vote j .

Brazilian party unity in comparative perspective

Figures 1-4 describe party unity in recorded votes from eleven legislative chambers in ten countries, from which substantial numbers of votes are available.⁴ Figures 1 and 2 show the means of party UNITY and RICE indices, with presidential systems on the left side of each

³ It is important to keep in mind that in most legislatures, some votes are not decided by a simple majority of those voting. The two main types of deviations from simple majority are when thresholds for passing measures are set in absolute terms (i.e. as a share of the total membership of the legislature, rather than of those voting), and when passage requires extraordinary majority (e.g. 3/5, 2/3, etc.) support. The formula for weighting votes takes into account these factors, so that a "tie" vote is regarded as one where a change of behavior by any legislator would be pivotal, rather than simply where the aye = nay (Carey 2001).

⁴ Argentina has the fewest votes available (103) and the U.S. House the most (4,473), with all other cases falling between 300 and 800 votes.

figure, and three parliamentary systems are on the right.⁵ The data in each figure are the same, but within each regime type, the cases are displayed in decreasing order of mean UNITY in Figure 1, and decreasing order of mean RICE in Figure 2

[Figures 1 and 2]

A number of patterns are evident. First, legislative parties in the parliamentary systems vote in a more unified manner than in the presidential systems. The difference is most stark with respect to the RICE index, where parties in each of the parliamentary systems are highly cohesive. The parliamentary systems exhibit more variance with respect to the UNITY index. The drop-off from perfect UNITY in Australia and, even more, in Canada, must be due to non-voting, given the near-perfect RICE indices; even Canada would count among the more UNified presidential systems, and the parliamentary average on UNITY is well above that of the presidential systems.

Second, the rank ordering among the presidential systems differs according to which index is used. Mexican parties are most unified by either index, Russian parties least, and Brazilian parties are around the middle of the pack. On the other hand, Argentina, Chile, and Peru are relatively unified (just behind Mexico) on the RICE index, but near the bottom in the UNITY rankings.⁶ These are legislatures in which casting votes against one's copartisans is relatively rare, but in which parties frequently fail to mobilize their full complement of legislators to vote, even on close votes. By contrast, both chambers of the United States Congress rank high on UNITY, but low on RICE. U.S. legislators show up to vote in large numbers, but are more inclined than representatives in other systems to vote against their copartisans.⁷

Figures 3 and 4 show the range of index scores for parties in the same systems, providing a picture of the variance within each legislature. Again, the parliamentary systems are notable for their compact configuration on both indices – within each parliamentary legislature, unity across parties is closely correlated. Brazil stands out in these figures, even among the presidential systems, as having the widest spread on both indices. That is, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies has some parties that are highly unified and others that are deeply divided. On both indices, the

⁵ In each case, deputies are assigned to a single party during a given legislative period for the purposes of calculating unity indices. In most cases, this is consistent both with the data available (i.e. legislative rosters identify each representative with a single party) and with practice (i.e. party switching during a legislative period is rare). In Brazil, by contrast, party switching is common, and the roll call vote dataset provides a separate partisanship variable for each deputy for each vote. In measuring party unity for Brazil, therefore, one could rely either on each deputies' original partisanship, or on partisanship at the time of each given vote. The former approach measures the extent to which those elected under a common party label act as a unified bloc in the legislature, and implicitly regards party-switching (at least to the extent that switches are followed by changes in switchers' voting behavior) as a manifestation of party *disunity*. The latter approach measures the extent to which pressure from one's current party influences voting, without regard for deputies' original partisanship. Which method of measuring unity is appropriate depends, therefore, on the implicit conception of unity one has in mind. We adopt the former method here. It will be worthwhile, in subsequent work, to compare the results with those obtained using the latter method.

⁶ It is worth noting that all the Peruvian votes included here were taken between 1998 and early 2000, when Fujimori's grip on power still appeared secure, and his *Nueva Mayoria* party was highly unified. Future work will examine the shifting nature of Peruvian legislative coalitions that accompanied Fujimori's downfall.

⁷ The close correspondence between the RICE and UNITY indices for the U.S. indicates that almost all the shortfall from perfect unity is accounted for by cross-voting, not non-voting.

bulge in the Brazilian distribution is on the low end, indicating that the high-unity parties are the relative outliers.

[Figures 3 and 4]

On the whole, these data show that Brazilian parties are not highly unified in comparative perspective. They are far less unified in their voting than parties in parliamentary systems. Among presidential systems, they are in the middle of the pack on average, but their average indices are inflated by a couple of highly unified parties that are, as we shall see, neither among the largest legislative parties nor the governing parties.

Party, state, and state-party voting unity

The focus by many authors on the state-centeredness of Brazilian politics, and the fact that partisan electoral alliances at the state level often differ from those at the national level, suggest that state legislative delegations, and state party cohorts, might exhibit patterns of unity in legislative voting that are distinct from national party cohorts. UNITY and RICE indices, moreover, can be calculated separately for each relevant cohort of legislators, allowing us to break down unity into its state and partisan components. The top row of Table 1 shows the UNITY index for the 12 largest Brazilian parties during the 1989-98 period; the left hand column shows UNITY for each state's entire Chamber delegation; and the interior cells show UNITY for each corresponding state-party cohort. Table 2 shows weighted RICE indices in the same fashion.

[Tables 1 and 2]

The states are grouped by region: northern, then northeastern, southeastern, western, and southern. Brazilian states elect a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 70 deputies each. Parties are listed in order of how many deputies elected under their labels over the three congresses (1986-90, 1990-94, and 1994-98) spanned by the vote data. Indices are calculated for every state party cohort that included more than one deputy in at least one legislative period. Thus, the largest parties have indices for almost every state. Parties with indices for fewer states tend toward the populous states, especially Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Minas Gerais.

In keeping with the conventional wisdom on Brazilian parties, the Partido Trabalhadores (PT) and the much smaller Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB) are far more unified than any of the others. The Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) is true to its reputation as a big tent, encompassing a range of ideological positions and policy priorities, and is one of the least unified. It is not the case, however, that small parties are on the whole more unified than large ones.

Party indices tend to be higher than state delegation indices (shown in the second column of each table). The mean UNITY index for parties is .57; whereas for state delegations it is .39. On the RICE index, the corresponding numbers are .77 and .53. Some state delegations, however, are more unified than others. In particular, delegations from small states tend to be more unified than those from more populous ones. The bivariate correlation between state population and state delegation UNITY index is -.48 (sig. .05), and for the RICE index it is -.52 (sig. .01). The interests of deputies from less populous states are evidently more homogenous than those from large states. This is consistent with the proposition that politics in the less populous states is about securing targetable benefits from the federal government – an interest shared by all deputies from a given state – moreso than in larger states (Geddes and Ribeiro Neto 1994). Thus, some of

the small state delegations – Acre, Piaui, Rio Grande do Norte, Matto Grosso do Sul – have indices on par with, or higher than, the average for parties.

It seems natural that state party cohorts should be relatively unified, given the coincidence of regional interests, coupled with common partisanship. State party cohorts are more unified on average than state delegations but not more than national parties. Tables 1 and 2, show state party cohort indices that are lower than those for the corresponding state delegation in **bold**, and those that are lower than the corresponding national party in *italics*. The state party cohort index means are actually lower than those for national parties (UNITY .55 vs. .57; RICE .71 vs. .77).⁸

Party disunity in legislative voting at the national level is not a function of state-based divisions within parties. Copartisan deputies from the same state divide on legislative votes as much as copartisans nationally. This supports the proposition that party disunity in Brazilian legislative voting is driven by factors that operate within states, such as the intrapartisan electoral competition among deputies on the same party list, more than by divisions among states.

Hypotheses: gubernatorial dominance versus competing principals

We now turn to the question of whether gubernatorial influence affects the voting behavior of state-level cohorts of deputies in a systematic way. The literature on Brazilian federalism emphasizes that governors control access to resources – patronage jobs, control over licensing and regulatory authorities, targetable spending programs, influence over nominations to future office – that can be distributed to legislators from their states so as to influence legislative decisions.

How should gubernatorial influence their legislative allies manifest itself in state-level unity indices? Consider two scenarios. The first is devoid of influence by national party and coalition leaders on over legislators so that, apart from legislators' own preferences, pressure applied by governors is the main influence on legislative votes. State party and state coalition cohorts associated with governors should vote in a more unified manner than those not associated with governors, all else equal, because governors use the resources of their office whip legislative allies into line. This would manifest itself in a “governor’s boost” in voting unity among those state party and state coalition cohorts tied to governors. Specifically,

H1: For any given state party, control of the governorship should boost voting unity within the party’s state cohort in Congress

H2: For any given coalition of parties at the state level, control of the governorship by that coalition should boost voting unity among the coalition’s cohort of deputies in Congress.

This is the gubernatorial dominance account of legislative voting in federal systems, as reflected in the vignette on the Argentine budget vote recounted at the beginning of this essay. Ames (2001b) posits a similar governor’s boost effect modeling whether deputies vote in accord with party leaders’ recommendations, finding no consistent pattern. A more appropriate specification, however, may explicitly take into consideration that party leaders’ recommendations may conflict with those of governors, even within parties.

⁸ Not all deputies whose votes are included in calculating national party indices are included in calculating state party cohort indices, because many state party cohorts consist of single deputies.

Consider an alternative scenario, in which governors are not the dominant cue-givers to legislators, but rather compete with national party and coalition leaders to influence legislative votes. To the extent that the preferences of national party and coalition leaders diverge from those of state governors, deputies whose party or coalition controls the state governorship are subject to contradictory demands from competing principals. In concrete terms, if the PMDB governor from Minas Gerais is telling his cohort to do one thing, and the PMDB leadership in Brasilia is telling all PMDB deputies to something else, the result may be that governors, in fact, sow disunity among the cohorts of their legislative allies. If this is the case, then H1 and H2 should be inverted, such that:

H1~: For any given state party, control of the governorship should depress voting unity within the party's state cohort in Congress

H2~: For any given coalition of parties at the state level, control of the governorship by that coalition should depress voting unity among the coalition's cohort of deputies in Congress.

This competing principals account of Brazilian politics is consistent with Figueiredo and Limongi's (2000) emphasis on the partisan influence over legislative voting, but it adds the potentially complicating element of gubernatorial crosspressures on deputies.

Models of state-party and state-coalition unity

To test these hypotheses, we propose the following models of unity in recorded legislative voting among various cohorts of deputies. The first model addresses voting unity within parties; the second within coalitions. The central question is whether control of the state governorship affects voting unity in state cohorts tied to governors.

For all major parties (i), in each state (j):

$$\text{UNITY}_{ij} = \text{constant} + \text{National UNITY}_i + \text{Governor}_{ij}$$

where

- UNITY_{ij} is the weighted index of UNITY_{ij} scores for the state party delegation during a given congress.
- National UNITY_i is the party's weighted index of UNITY_i scores at the national level
- Population_j is the population of the state
- Governor_{ij} is a dummy indicating whether the party held the governorship of that state.

The dependent variable is the state party cohort's level of unity on legislative votes. All state party cohorts that elected at least two members are included in the analysis. The logic behind the independent variables is as follows. National UNITY is the UNITY index for all deputies from the party nationwide, and controls for differences in overall cohesiveness across parties. The more unified a party is nationally, the more unified each of its state party delegations ought to be, so the coefficient should be positive.

Having controlled for the generic unity of each party, we can then estimate the additional boost, or liability, to State Party UNITY associated with control of state governorships. The "gubernatorial dominance" account (H1) suggests that state party cohorts associated with governors should exhibit higher unity than those not associated with governors because governors bring resources to bear to mobilize their copartisans. The "competing principals" account (H1~)

suggests that gubernatorial influence undermines the voting unity of state party cohorts to the extent that it drives a wedge between legislators and national legislative party leaders.

The second model tests analogous propositions for state-level coalitions of parties that support common gubernatorial candidates (H2 and H2~). For every coalition of parties that ran a gubernatorial candidate during each of the three gubernatorial election years, 1986, 1990, 1994:

$$\text{UNITY}_{hj} = \text{constant} + \text{National UNITY}_h + \text{Governor}_{hj}$$

where

- UNITY_{hj} is the weighted UNITY index for the state coalition's delegation during a given congress
- National UNITY_h is the coalition's weighted UNITY index at the national level during the period
- Population_j is the population of the state
- Governor_{hj} is a dummy indicating whether the coalition held the governorship of that state during that period.

The models are tested separately for each of the three congresses for which recorded voting data are available, using both weighted UNITY and weighted RICE indices based on all the votes included in the Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) dataset.⁹ The results from the OLS regressions are shown in Table 3.

[Table 3]

The national party indices behave as expected. National Party UNITY and National Party RICE are always strong predictors of State Party UNITY and State Party RICE. This simply indicates that parties that are cohesive at the national level tend to have cohesive state party cohorts. Controlling for national party unity allows the Governor variable to measure the effect of control over state executives without being confounded by the particular characteristics of the parties that happen to win governorships.¹⁰

With respect gubernatorial influence, there is no support for the idea of a governor's boost (H1), and some support for the idea of a penalty. Starting with Model 1, estimating state party unity, the coefficients on Governor are negative for the 1986-90 congress, and suggestive although they fall short of conventional significance levels. For the latter periods, the coefficients are positive

⁹ The models run for the 1986-90 Congress do not include the states of Roraima, Amapa, Tocantins, which were not created until the 1987-88 constituent assembly, and therefore did not hold gubernatorial elections in 1986. Also excluded from that period are the Distrito Federal and Espiritu Santu, for which no gubernatorial results are included in Nicolau (1998). Deputies from these states do show up in the roll call voting dataset, which begins in 1989, however, so once we can collect data on the partisan identify of the governors from these states, we will be able to include them in the analysis.

¹⁰ We also ran all the regressions shown here including state population as an additional control variable. The logic is that the economies of Brazil's less populous states are more dependent than those of more populous states on government spending, and their deputies are widely held to be more resolutely dedicated to securing federal resources for the state. If less populous states generate partisan cohorts with more homogenous preferences than more populous states, then Population should take a negative coefficient. In the event, the coefficients on Population show no consistent patterns, are substantively inconsequential, and are statistically insignificant in most model specifications. The estimated effects of the rest of the variables in the models are robust to the inclusion of Population. In no case do any other coefficients change appreciably, or significance levels change at all when Population is included.

but miniscule and entirely inconsequential. In short, there is no support for the gubernatorial dominance account of voting within state party cohorts of deputies, and very little for the competing principals account.

With respect to Model 2, estimating state coalition unity, the story is more interesting. Governor takes a negative coefficient in every regression. For the first period, these are strongly significant in estimating State Coalition unity, as measured by either index. For the second period, 1990-94, the effect is weaker and only significant in estimating State Coalition UNITY. For the most recent period, the significance disappears.

The substantive interpretation of these results is as follows. Imagine two different states in which the same combination of parties coalesces behind gubernatorial candidates. In one state, the coalition wins the governorship; in the other it loses. In both states, the parties in the coalition send cohorts of deputies off to Brasilia. The cohort backed by a state governor is expected to be substantially less unified in its voting than the cohort of deputies not backed by a governor. For the 1986-90 congress, the effect (-.12) was equivalent to three-quarters of a standard deviation on National Coalition UNITY and half a standard deviation on National Coalition RICE. For 1990-94, it was a third of a standard deviation on National Coalition UNITY.

In short, there is evidence early on of a governor's penalty (H2~) in state-level coalitions, which supports the competing principals account of influence on legislative voting, but the effect appears to diminish over time. Furthermore, the difference between the estimated effect of Governor on UNITY versus RICE suggests a subtle difference in the behaviors the two measures are picking up. The Governor penalty is stronger on UNITY than on RICE, substantively and statistically in each of the regressions run on Model 2. If the competing principals account is on target, at least for the earlier periods, this suggests that deputies subject to cross-pressures from their governor and their coalition (or, more likely, from their national party, whose influence is manifest in the National Coalition variable) were more inclined to respond by not voting, thus driving UNITY down, rather than by splitting their votes against each other, which would drive both UNITY and RICE down.

Conclusion

This essay suggests modifications to various accounts of the Brazilian legislative party system. Crossnational data show that, notwithstanding Figueiredo and Limongi's (2000) argument about the strength of Brazilian parties, they are on the low end of the legislative unity scale. Moreover, the fact that state-level party cohorts are no more unified on average than are their corresponding national-level parties suggests that it is the effort to distinguish oneself from one's copartisans at the state level, rather than conflicts among internally cohesive state party cohorts, that accounts for party disunity in Brazil. This is consistent with explanations that attribute disunity to the incentives for intraparty competition within states generated by Brazil's open list electoral system.

The results here also illustrate, however, that Figueiredo and Limongi's emphasis on the importance of national parties should not be discounted. Hypotheses based on a pure gubernatorial dominance account of Brazilian politics yield little insight into legislative voting patterns. Those positing that gubernatorial influence competes with pressures from national parties yield more promising results. In particular, state coalition cohorts subject to both sorts of pressure exhibit less unity than those spared the "curse" of access to gubernatorial largesse.

It is widely held among scholars of Latin American federalism that state governors affect the voting behavior of national legislators. Collectively, this research suggests the importance of developing models to explain how, and how much, gubernatorial influence matters. This essay represents a first step in that direction. Building on inferences from the existing literature, we develop two competing sets of hypotheses regarding gubernatorial influence. Analysis of recorded votes in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1989-98 provides no support for the idea of a governor's boost in state party unity in legislative voting, and some support for the idea of a governor's penalty that applies to state coalitions. The analysis here supports the general hypothesis that federalism, and the pressures associated with state-level loyalties, can complicate the formation of legislative coalitions at the national level considerably. The contribution of the essay is to develop data to describe the relative influences of state and party on voting behavior in the Brazilian Chamber, as well as models that estimate these influences.

A number of extensions to this research agenda suggest themselves. First, rather than inferring gubernatorial influence on the basis of overall voting unity indices, it would be ideal to be able to focus specifically on instances where gubernatorial preferences contradicted those of deputies' national parties. The recorded vote data analyzed here provide information on the directives issued by national parties on many votes, but there is no corresponding indication of governors' preferences. Qualitative analysis of policy conflicts pitting state governors against national party leaders – coupled with analysis the associated legislative votes – may be useful here. Another approach will be to extend similar analyses to other federal systems. Argentina and Mexico are the prime candidates for which recorded vote data will soon be available. The analysis need not be limited to Latin America or pure presidential systems, however. Studies of voting in systems where subnational loyalties are widely regarded as powerful, such the Russian Duma and the Indian Lok Sabha, are natural extensions. A third extension would be to test whether the political strength of state-level executives can help explain their relative influence over legislators. For example, state governors who enjoy strong popular support and are not subject to term limits, and therefore might be expected to control political resources long into the future, should be able to exert more influence over legislators than those that are proscribed from reelection or otherwise are politically vulnerable. The constitutional reform of 1997 allowing consecutive reelection for Brazilian governors opens up the prospect of variance among governors in “lame duck” status. As recorded vote data for more recent periods becomes available, it will be possible to test more subtle models of whether the institutional strength of governors affects their influence as legislative coalition brokers, or breakers.

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Table 1. Weighted UNITY indices for Brazilian parties, state delegations, and state-party cohorts, 1989-98.

		PARTY											
National level:		PMDB	PFL	PSDB	PDT	PT	PTB	PDS	PRN	PL	PSB	PDC	PCdoB
		.48	.65	.62	.57	.79	.57	.48	.46	.45	.52	.42	.80
STATE	Delegation	Index values for each state-party cohort in cells below											
Roraima	.28		<i>.44</i>				<i>.16</i>	.71					
Amapa	.31		.52										
Para	.27	.45	.58			.47	.50	.55					
Amazonas	.45	.46	.47										
Rondonia	.42	.52	.56	.42			.40						
Acre	.55	.57	.76					.48					
Tocantins	.51	.61						.66					
Maranhao	.35	.35	.54	.42				.45	.66				
Ceara	.41	.52	.55	.64	.66			.53					
Piaui	.61	.52	.68					.66					
RG do N	.59	.53	.65										
Paraiba	.52	.58	.55		.33			.58	.54				
Pernambuco	.25	.57	.68		.45	.54			.59		.47		
Alagoas	.45	.32	.45	.43									
Sergipe	.32	.20	.48					.78					
Bahia	.39	.68	.79	.55	.51	.58	.57	.45	.53		.23	.61	.83
Minas G.	.37	.49	.69	.72		.76	.58	.74	.56	.26			
Espirito S.	.35	.48	.61	.50	.07								
Rio de J.	.20	.41	.68	.72	.61	.55	.67	.43	.63	.35		.61	.56
Sao Paulo	.22	.50	.65	.65	.50	.80	.60	.45	.46	.66			
M.Grosso	.46	.64	.63				.63			.51			
Dist. Fed.	.35	.62	.73	.64		.80							
Goias	.41	.58	.54									.30	
M.GrossoS.	.57	.31	.36	.71			.54						
Parana	.31	.56	.71	.67	.23	.56	.49		.51				
S.Catarina	.29	.60	.54	.72	.52	.57		.54					
RG do S	.23	.64	.76	.61	.76	.79		.64					

State party cohort indices are calculated for all state parties that elected more than one deputy in at least one of the elections in 1986, 1990, or 1994.

Interior cell entries show state-party cohorts that are less unified than the corresponding

- state delegation as a whole in **bold**;
- national party as a whole in *italics*.

Table 2. Weighted RICE indices for Brazilian parties, state delegations, and state-party cohorts, 1989-98.

		PARTY											
National level:		PMDB	PFL	PSDB	PDT	PT	PTB	PDS	PRN	PL	PSB	PDC	PCdoB
		.65	.85	.78	.74	.96	.76	.72	.73	.71	.76	.69	.94
STATE	Delegation	Index values for each state-party cohort in cells below											
Roraima	.41		<i>.61</i>				.25	.86					
Amapa	.45		<i>.64</i>										
Para	.37	<i>.63</i>	.88			.52	.71	.78					
Amazonas	.67	.54	.54										
Rondonia	.64	<i>.77</i>	<i>.76</i>	.48			.74						
Acre	.77	.76	<i>.79</i>					<i>.77</i>					
Tocantins	.69	<i>.70</i>						.81					
Maranhao	.52	.50	.85	.55				.79	.85				
Ceara	.55	<i>.75</i>	<i>.76</i>	.81	.82			<i>.76</i>					
Piaui	.80	.65	.89					.78					
RG do N	.79	.64	<i>.83</i>										
Paraiba	.67	<i>.73</i>	<i>.69</i>		.62			.62	.68				
Pernambuco	.36	<i>.78</i>	.90		.52	.58			.81		<i>.73</i>		
Alagoas	.67	.35	<i>.69</i>	.54									
Sergipe	.48	.23	<i>.63</i>					.89					
Bahia	.49	.83	.95	<i>.61</i>	<i>.64</i>	.66	.59	.75	.81		.27	.83	<i>.90</i>
Minas G.	.48	.65	.90	.89		.95	.77	.80	.85	.34			
Espirito S.	.45	<i>.61</i>	<i>.80</i>	<i>.57</i>	.10								
Rio de J.	.29	<i>.59</i>	<i>.86</i>	<i>.91</i>	<i>.81</i>	<i>.69</i>	<i>.90</i>	<i>.69</i>	<i>.86</i>	<i>.59</i>		<i>.79</i>	<i>.59</i>
Sao Paulo	.30	<i>.71</i>	<i>.86</i>	<i>.81</i>	<i>.58</i>	<i>.95</i>	<i>.75</i>	<i>.78</i>	<i>.77</i>	<i>.76</i>			
M.Grosso	.63	<i>.76</i>	<i>.83</i>				.82			<i>.72</i>			
Dist. Fed.	.44	<i>.82</i>	<i>.86</i>	<i>.77</i>		<i>.90</i>							
Goiias	.57	<i>.81</i>	<i>.75</i>									.56	
M.GrossoS.	.77	.35	.54	.78			.80						
Parana	.40	<i>.70</i>	<i>.92</i>	<i>.79</i>	.33	.68	<i>.61</i>		.80				
S.Catarina	.38	<i>.76</i>	<i>.64</i>	<i>.88</i>	<i>.54</i>	<i>.58</i>		<i>.77</i>					
RG do S	.29	<i>.79</i>	<i>.76</i>	<i>.62</i>	<i>.87</i>	<i>.94</i>		<i>.82</i>					

State party cohort indices are calculated for all state parties that elected more than one deputy in at least one of the elections in 1986, 1990, or 1994.

Interior cell entries in show state-party cohorts that are less unified than the corresponding

- state delegation as a whole in **bold**;
- national party as a whole in *italics*.

Table 3. Effects of control of state executives on state party and state coalition voting unity.

Independent Variables	Model 1						Model 2					
	Dependent variables											
	State Party UNITY			State Party RICE			State Coalition UNITY			State Coalition RICE		
	1989-90	1990-94	1994-98	1989-90	1990-94	1994-98	1989-90	1990-94	1994-98	1989-90	1990-94	1994-98
Constant	.27*** (3.50)	.17*** (3.21)	.12 (1.20)	.49*** (5.10)	.30*** (3.13)	.09 (0.63)	.43*** (6.63)	.27*** (4.84)	.49*** (6.71)	.56*** (6.80)	.44*** (6.55)	.66*** (7.24)
National Party UNITY	.64*** (4.37)	.79*** (7.68)	.65*** (4.23)									
National Party RICE				.42** (3.22)	.65*** (5.06)	.68*** (3.70)						
National Coalition UNITY							.32** (2.59)	.64*** (5.43)	.23* (1.90)			
National Coalition RICE										.30** (2.53)	.49*** (5.24)	.10 (0.82)
Governor	-.04 (-1.15)	.001 (0.33)	.001 (.03)	-.06 (-1.65)	.02 (0.81)	.02 (0.32)	-.12*** (-3.28)	-.04* (-1.76)	-.04 (-0.97)	-.09** (-2.27)	-.01 (-0.27)	-.02 (-0.29)
Adjusted R2	.38	.36	.18	.36	.19	.13	.33	.40	.05	.25	.28	.02
N	75	101	77	75	101	77	52	69	66	52	69	66

* sig >= .10

** sig >= .05

*** sig >= .01

Figure 1




Figure 2





Figure 3. Range of weighted UNITY indices for parties across lower chambers.



VAR00001

Figure 4. Range of weighted RICE indices for parties across lower chambers.

