

Economic Interests and Congressional Voting on Security Issues

Abstract

Most research on congressional consideration of foreign and defense policy concludes that ideology is the most important influence on roll call voting and that constituent economic interests are not very important. This paper challenges this conclusion on two grounds. First, most previous research conceives of constituent economic interests on these issues very narrowly, examining only the benefits constituents obtain from providing military goods and services rather than their economic stakes in the broader goals of national security policy. Second, constituent economic interests can influence the ideology of their representative, something most research does not consider. An examination of key votes on military resource allocation, intervention, and foreign aid from 1947 through 2000 supports these objections.

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What explains the preferences of domestic political actors on security issues? Examples of rancorous political conflict over issues such as military spending, intervention, alliances, and the like are easy to find, but the reasons for these debates are not well understood. As Frieden (1999, 62-3) notes in reviewing theories about the origins of preferences in international relations, research on international political economy has been able to draw on well-developed economic theories explaining actors' policy preferences. Partly because no comparable body of work exists to account for differences over questions of war and peace, sub-national preferences on security issues have proven more difficult to explain. In research on international conflict, there is a long tradition of abstracting away from domestic differences, or even denying that they affect policy choice. Although scholarly interest in the impact of domestic politics on international conflict has grown enormously in recent years, much of it has focused on the role of domestic institutions rather than on the preferences of domestic political factions (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Russett and Oneal 2001). This line of research has produced many useful insights but it has left the origins of domestic differences over these issues obscure. Overall, even though most scholars would probably agree that the preferences of domestic political factions affect policy choices on security questions, the issue has received relatively little attention.

Studies of foreign and defense policy in the United States Congress constitute an important exception to this generalization. Congressional voting provides a useful window onto the sources of political conflict over security issues. Scholars have an enormous amount of information about members of congress and their constituents. This information can be used to test hypotheses about many possible influences on members'

foreign and defense policy positions. Most research along these lines points to ideology as the most important predictor of congressional voting on these issues. By contrast, the economic interests of their constituents appear to have little influence.

This paper considers two possible objections to these conclusions. First, most research has treated economic interests narrowly, focusing mainly on benefits that flow from the production of military goods and services rather than economic interests in the broader policy goals that national security initiatives are intended to support. Second, research concluding that ideology is the most important influence on congressional voting has rarely considered the effect of constituents' economic interests on the ideology of their representatives. This influence is another avenue through which these interests may indirectly influence congressional voting. An examination of a large number of roll call votes on foreign and defense policy in the Senate during the postwar era supports both these objections.

This paper proceeds in four parts. The first reviews arguments about the sources of preferences on security issues advanced in the literature on congressional voting and explains the objections outlined in the last paragraph in more detail. The second section sets out a research design for testing the hypotheses these objections imply. The third section presents the empirical results. A final section summarizes and concludes.

Explaining Preferences on Security Issues

One of the most important problems in testing any argument about policy preferences is that the object of study is difficult to observe. Because roll-call votes require members of congress to state their preferences in a meaningful and public way, and because we know much about the constituencies, ideologies, and other characteristics

of members of congress, roll-call voting provides an unusually promising setting for testing theories about the origins of preferences on a variety of policy issues. Scholars of American foreign and military policy have taken advantage of this source of data, testing arguments about the effect of ideology, constituent economic interests, institutions, and other considerations on issues such as military contracting and spending (Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Fleisher 1985; 1993; Goss 1972; Lindsay 1990; Mayer 1991; Moyer 1973; Ray 1981a; 1981b; Russett 1970), nuclear weapons (Bernstein and Anthony 1974; Lindsay 1991a; 1991b; Overby 1991; Wayman 1985), military intervention (Burgin 1994; LeoGrande and Brenner 1993); international treaties (McCormick and Black 1983) as well as the broader foreign policy orientations of members of congress (Cronin and Fordham 1999; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; Meernik and Oldmixon 2004; Wittkopf and McCormick 1998).

The results of large bodies of empirical research are often difficult to summarize. Quantitative research on American foreign and defense policy is an exception to this rule. As one review of this research through the early 1990s succinctly put it, "studies of roll-call votes generally find that ideology (as measured by interest group ratings), rather than constituency economic interests, provides the best predictor of congressional voting (Lindsay and Ripley 1992, 433)." Because ideological explanations center on the internal beliefs of the members, they are usually compared with alternatives stressing the external pressure of constituent interests. Indeed, in principal-agent models of representation, ideology is commonly defined as the shirking of constituent interests in the pursuit of the member's own preferences (e.g., Kalt and Zupan 1984; Peltzman 1984; 1990; Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). The generalization that ideology trumps constituent interests holds

across a wide range of security issues. There are a few exceptions, such as voting on military bases (Lindsay 1990, 180-3; Mayer 1991, 139-42), on which immediate benefits to members' districts are the main consideration, and the special influence of members of defense committees (Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Goss 1972), who appear to be able to garner a greater-than-expected share of military spending for their districts. There is also some evidence that constituent interests may act as a constraint on ideologically driven voting in some cases (Fleisher 1985). Ideology is clearly the dominant source of preferences, however. In this conclusion, research on defense policy parallels analyses of roll-call voting on domestic issues, which also places a great stress on the role of ideology over other considerations (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1997).

What is the causal process linking ideology to congressional voting on foreign and defense policy? Early works asserting the importance of ideology answered this question in some detail. In their study of voting on an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, Bernstein and Anthony (1974, 1198) begin by commenting on the potential importance of "an internalized set of political beliefs, variously termed political doctrine, conscience, or ideology. It is assumed that the ideology of virtually all U.S. Senators may be ordered along a liberal-conservative continuum and the more conservative the Senator, the more likely he is to favor the ABM." Citing the writings of liberal and conservative groups and individuals, they argue that liberal-conservative ideology is especially important on national security issues

...because the relevant sub-dimensions of that typology tend to be reinforcing. That is, the conservative tends to support the ABM not only because of his focus on the 'priority of American interests and rights' but also because he believes that communism presents a grave danger to the U.S., that our defense should be adequately maintained, that defense is one of the few legitimate concerns of the national government, and that it may

be necessary to risk war to prevent the advance of Communism. The liberal tends to reject each of these positions. He emphasizes the equality of nations, suggests many other functions of government that should have priority over an increased defense effort and fears nuclear war more than he fears intermediate levels of Communist expansion.

Subsequent work has used different language to make essentially the same argument about the effect of a broader set of ideas and principles on foreign and defense policy. For example, Lindsay (1990, 957) refers to "conceptions of good public policy", Fleisher (1993, 393) writes of "policy predispositions," and Wayman (1985, 226) notes members' "general voting tendencies as measured by ADA rating." The crux of this argument is that their commitment to these ideas leads members of congress to prefer policies on security issues that are consistent with the ideology. In their general account of the role of ideology, Hinich and Munger (1994, 20) make this point starkly: "the set of ideas comprising the ideology must *causally imply* the set of policies that citizens associate with the position. It is not enough for an ideology to be a shorthand signal, a correspondence between a name and a set of actions by the government."

The abundance of empirical evidence that ideology predicts voting on security issues better than does constituent interest appears to justify the conclusion that members' internal dispositions are simply more important in this particular policy area. After all, constituent pressures on international security issues may be relatively weak because these concerns are remote from most Americans' daily lives except under unusual circumstances. Although this conclusion is plausible, two reasons for continuing skepticism will be considered here.¹

¹ These are not the *only* reasons for doubting that ideology matters most. For example, Cronin and Fordham (1999) argue that ideology does not predict the same set of foreign policy positions over time. Fordham (1998) presents evidence that party and ideology mediate the effect of economic interests, with some interests influencing only members of one party.

The first is that the understanding of economic interests employed in most of the literature is incomplete. Constituent economic interests are usually understood as a function of income from military spending, measured by federal spending on contracts, or wages and salaries, in the district. The idea that these interests could influence members of congress is certainly plausible, but the claim that they are the primary source of domestic political differences on security issues strains credulity. Qualitative accounts of the politics of military spending generally place a greater emphasis on the economic beneficiaries of military spending than one finds in most quantitative research. However, in these accounts such parochial concerns are usually embedded in debates over the broader foreign policy goals to which military spending contributes, as well as the implications of military spending for taxation and the resources available for other policies. For example, Wirls (1992) roots political conflict over defense policy during the 1980s in conservative concerns about the Soviet threat, and liberal worries about both the domestic costs and foreign policy dangers of the weapons the Reagan administration sought to construct. Similarly, in Fitzgerald's (2000) account of the Strategic Defense Initiative, political conflict within the Reagan administration revolves around conflicting views about the effectiveness of both missile defense systems and potential arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. An explanation of national security policy preferences that ignores these broader issues is simply implausible, like an account of the criminal justice system in which prison construction contracts trump concerns about crime. It is hardly surprising that roll-call analysis finds so little support for it.

The economic stakes on national security issues extend well beyond the pork-barrel dimensions of military spending. National security, understood as the defense of

the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, and the physical safety of its citizens against foreign attack, is a public good. Because it has weak distributive implications, it provides little basis for explaining systematic political differences. However, American security concerns during the postwar era have extended well beyond the public good of national security. Postwar American policy makers envisioned a world order open for American trade and investment. Their efforts to contain or eliminate challengers to this order entailed a wide range of international security commitments and demanded substantial national resources. Policy makers believed the world order they sought would make the United States more secure as well as more prosperous, but American foreign policy cannot be understood as a purely defensive effort to provide the public good of national security.

This account of the goals of postwar American foreign policy was once put forward mainly by "revisionist" historians, but has gained much wider acceptance since the end of the Cold War. Whether one condemns it as a form of imperialism, or celebrates it as a force for the advancement of democracy, most observers now agree that postwar American foreign policy was not simply defensive and reactive. For example, the post-revisionist John Lewis Gaddis (1997, 13) comments that "[t]he United States would seek power in the postwar world, not shy away from it as it had done after World War I. It would do so in the belief that only it had the strength to build a peace based on Wilsonian principles of self-determination, open markets, and collective security." Bacevich (2002, 3) links the economic and security goals of American foreign policy even more clearly, and suggests the continuity of these goals during and after the Cold War. "Its ultimate objective is the creation and maintenance of an open and integrated

international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms." Support for national security policy should reflect the costs and benefits of this world order to political actors within the United States.

The postwar world order underwritten by the United States created economic winners and losers within of American society. Those well situated to take advantage of international opportunities for trade and investment stood to gain. Those threatened by foreign competition, or simply unable to gain much from international trade and investment, had much weaker motives for paying the considerable costs of constructing and policing this ambitious world order. As with policies more immediately linked to international trade, export-oriented industries stood to benefit from the broader implications of military spending. Import-competing interests stood to lose. Although this line of argument about the economic origins of policy preferences is not new (e.g., Ferguson 1984; Frieden 1988; Trubowitz 1998), it is rarely considered in analyses of roll-call voting on foreign policy issues.² The model of Senate voting on military issues estimated here will address this omission, estimating the effects of states' stakes in the international order on Senate voting.

A second objection to the consensus that ideology trumps constituent interests is that the ideologies of members of congress may be partly a function of their constituents' economic interests. After all, candidates for public office advertise their ideological orientation and its policy implications. Voters may choose candidates whose ideologies suit their interests. While most scholars would probably accept this rather obvious line of

² Exceptions include Eden 1985; Fordham 1998a; 1998b; Trubowitz 1992; 1998. However, in part because of limitations in the availability of data, these works have either examined very short periods of time or used region as a proxy for economic interests.

argument, the models used to test the influence of ideology and constituent interests on congressional voting implicitly rule it out. Nearly all quantitative analyses of congressional voting on foreign and defense policy employ a single-equation model, treating the voting record as a function of ideology, constituent economic interests, and other considerations. Inferring the effect of constituency economic interests from such a model implies that these interests do not influence the ideology of members of congress. If this assumption is incorrect, then estimates of the effect of economic interests on foreign policy preferences must include not only the direct effect estimated in the single equation model, but also the indirect effect economic interests have through their influence on ideology.

The assumption that members' ideologies are independent of their constituents' economic interests is demonstrably unrealistic (Fordham and McKeown 2003). Economically interested constituents have every reason to pay attention to the ideology of potential representatives. Constituents cannot usually extract from their representatives commitments on how they will vote on specific issues after they are elected. Even if a contract of this sort could be written and enforced, it would still not always be possible to predict what issues would arise during a representative's term in office. As Hinich and Munger (1994, 67-72) point out, ideology is one of the few ways constituents have of overcoming this problem. Because an ideological representative's positions follow from an underlying set of principles, constituents can infer what the representative will do under a wide range of circumstances. It makes sense to expect constituents who follow their economic interests to use ideology in order to select the candidate most likely to advance those interests. Although it is rarely modeled, an indirect effect of constituent

interests through ideology is not alien to the literature on foreign and defense policy voting. For example, Fleisher (1993, 394) notes that "[t]o receive the party's nomination, a congressional aspirant must prove to important activists and allied interest groups some degree of congruence in policy views."³ If this is indeed what takes place, then there will be a systematic relationship between constituent interests and ideology. The analysis presented here will test this relationship.

Research Design

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate two sets of claims about the influence of economic interests on congressional voting about military policy issues. The first is that constituent interests in international trade influence their representatives' positions on defense policy questions. The second is that these same constituent interests influence the ideological orientation of their representatives. Testing the specific hypotheses that these general claims imply raises several research design issues.

Roll Call Voting on Security Issues

What votes should be used to represent preferences on national security issues during the postwar era? The empirical analysis presented here will consider all Senate "key votes" identified by *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* between 1947 and 2000 in three major areas of national security policy: military resource allocation, military intervention, and foreign aid. There were 146 such votes during this 54-year period, 56

³ Although their work is not a study of roll-call voting, Russett and Hanson (1975, 56-7) discuss the plausibility of this same causal path. "[T]he causal arrow might run equally well economic interest → domestic conservative → foreign policy hawk as economic interest → hawk, and we would have to carry out careful probes to see which is more important. Nevertheless, the distinction becomes important *only* if the individual links from economic interest to domestic ideology, and especially from economic interest to foreign policy preference are themselves strong." Their tests turned up no evidence for an indirect effect of economic interests through the ideology of the business people they surveyed.

on military resources, 31 on intervention, and 59 on foreign aid. Appendix A provides a short description of each one.

Military resources, intervention, and aid encompass many of the most important national security policy questions that came before congress during the postwar era. The enormous resources allocated to the military during the postwar era—human as well as material—were the most expensive component of American foreign policy. Intervention includes many of the most controversial issues of the postwar era, including the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, as well as many smaller conflicts. Votes on foreign aid are often considered an element of foreign economic policy, but are also an important aspect of national security policy. Votes on aid bear on security commitments, as with the Greek-Turkish aid bill that made the Truman Doctrine a reality in 1947 and the many measures related to American involvement in Central America during the 1980s. There are relatively few ratification votes on alliance agreements, but many roll calls on foreign aid measures supporting alliances after they were formed. Each vote was coded according to whether it would have expanded the resources available for the military, intervention, or foreign aid, or would have removed restrictions on the use of these resources.

Using the key votes insures that the measures considered were important. Examining votes on minor issues or questions that have already been effectively decided might not reveal much about members' real preferences. *Congressional Quarterly* selects its "key votes" to represent issues of major controversy and importance. They include critical procedural votes rather than votes on final passage of a measure when those effectively decided the issue. The votes considered here encompass many of the most

important questions of the postwar era. The selection of these votes by *Congressional Quarterly* also helps insure that these votes were not chosen to support any particular conclusion in this analysis.

The long period of time covered here helps minimize the impact of the limited congressional agenda on inferences about the sources of policy preferences. In any given year, the agenda-setting power of the president and the congressional leadership, as well as events in the world, allow consideration of only a few issues from among the many that bear on national security policy. Agenda-setters may have strategic reasons to force votes on issues where members' positions are not representative of their underlying preferences on broader policy questions. This pattern may produce misleading conclusions about the sources of these underlying preferences. World events can have a similar effect. Even if events are random with respect to members' preferences, votes from a brief period of time may reflect the unusual features of that time rather than members' broader preferences. The examination of a large number of votes over a long period of time helps to minimize these effects. Both international conditions and the interests of agenda-setters varied widely over the 54 years considered here.

Measuring Ideology and Constituent Economic Interests

Like most recent examinations of roll call voting, this one will use the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scores developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) as an indicator of liberal-conservative ideology.⁴ These scores vary between 1 and -1, with conservatives falling at the right end of the continuum, closer to 1, and liberals falling to the left end, closer to -1.

⁴ These scores through the 106th Congress are available online from the Voteview project at either Princeton University (<http://www.princeton.edu/~voteview/>) or the University of Houston (<http://voteview.uh.edu/>).

One well-known problem with measures of ideology derived from congressional voting is that, as Jackson and Kingdon (1992, 809-14) and Vandoren (1990, 315-6) have pointed out, these indicators systematically overestimate its importance, and tend to suppress the importance of other variables. This problem is serious, but is less important here than in other voting studies for two reasons. First, the bias entailed in the use of voting scores runs against the central argument of this paper: that a broader conception of constituent economic interests makes a difference. Such a bias does not cast doubt on the major conclusions of this paper, but suggests instead that the effects of constituent economic interest have, if anything, been underestimated. Second, this analysis is intended to deal directly with one aspect of the problem: that vote-based indicators of ideology already embody the effects of other influences on voting. The empirical analysis will consider the effect of constituent economic interests on member ideology.

Another problem with any indicator of ideology in this context is that previous research indicates that the relationship between ideology and foreign policy voting is not consistent over time (Fordham and Cronin 1999). During the early Cold War era, liberals tended to support a more activist foreign policy, while conservatives were relatively skeptical. After the early 1960s, these two groups roughly switched places, with conservatives becoming more supportive of an activist foreign policy. This shift in the meaning of ideology can be modeled using an interaction term. I will return to this issue when presenting the empirical results.

Measuring each state's economic stake in the world order American foreign policy makers sought to build and maintain during the postwar era poses a more substantial data collection problem. There are many potential costs and benefits, which are often difficult

to measure. The model includes variables indicating the economic importance of export-oriented and import-competing manufacturing and agriculture in each state. (Appendix B provides details on the sources and computation of these indices.) The fact that only state-level data are available for the full period considered here limits the analysis to the Senate. Conceptually, the variables indicate the economic impact of exports or imports in manufacturing or agriculture on the economy of the state. It is worth noting that this impact may be quite small even if the manufacturing or agricultural sector in a given state is very export-oriented or import-competing, if that sector is very small. For example, the estimated share of exports in New York's manufacturing sector in 1950 was 0.032. The comparable figure for North Dakota was 0.022. However, because the manufacturing sector's share of personal income was 0.259 in New York but only 0.028 in North Dakota, the 1950 manufacturing export orientation index is much higher in New York.⁵ (The actual index is the product of these figures for each state, roughly 0.0083 for New York and 0.0006 for North Dakota.)

It is tempting to combine the export-orientation and import-competition figures for manufacturing and agriculture into a single trade-orientation index for each state. Unfortunately, doing so would not produce realistic results. Because of the limitations of the available data, these scores were not calculated in precisely the same way. Among other differences, the figures for agriculture are based on export and imports in eleven major commodity groups that represent most major agricultural products but do not encompass the entire agricultural sector. The manufacturing scores cover the sector more comprehensively.

⁵ Personal income was used instead of gross state product, because the latter is only available since 1977. Personal income is highly correlated with gross state product, and is available for the entire period considered here.

Combining the figures on export-orientation and import-competition into a single trade-orientation estimate raises similar problems. An additive combination of these figures assumes that export-orientation and import-competition have symmetrical political effects. This is not a safe assumption. Because the benefits of trade protection are concentrated, it should be easier for import-competing interests to organize politically. Indeed, some research has found import-competition, but not export-orientation, to be politically important (Baldwin 1985; Fordham 1998a). Estimating the effects of export-orientation and import-competition separately avoids the dubious assumption that these effects are symmetrical.

Ideally, the model would also include some indicator of a state's ability to take advantage of foreign investment opportunities as well its stake in international trade. Previous studies have examined the international orientation of major banks and large corporations in each state (e.g., Fordham 1998a). Unfortunately, collecting these data for every state throughout the postwar era is impractical. Although this omission is unfortunate, the manufacturing export-orientation variable should capture some of the effects of foreign investment. Most American foreign investment in the postwar era took place in the manufacturing sector. Previous research suggests that exports and foreign investment are complementary (Lipsey and Weiss 1981; 1984). Because exporters at one stage of the product cycle will often become foreign investors in the same markets (Vernon 1966), manufacturing exporters should be especially keen supporters of an international order that keeps this option open for them.

Although previous research has found that a state's stake in military spending has little or no effect on Senators' voting patterns on foreign and defense policy, military

spending remains theoretically relevant to an analysis of the effects of constituent economic interests. This analysis will include the military share of personal income in the Senator's home state.

Empirical Results

The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the individual vote on one of the roll calls in the dataset. This vote is coded "1" if it supported one of the components of American national security policy considered here, and "0" if it does not. Probit regression is used to estimate the model. Three additional features of the model are worth noting. First, some votes were nearly unanimous while others were closely divided. The circumstances surrounding each vote, including the nature of the specific issue as well as broader domestic and international political conditions, affected the baseline probability of a "yes" or a "no" vote. In order to capture this effect, the model includes a fixed effect dummy variable for each roll call. Second, the political history of each state, and thus the policy views of its congressional representatives, was shaped in part by economic conditions correlated with those included in the model. In order to insure that the estimated effects of the economic variables represent exposure to international trade rather than correlated features of each state's political culture that are not included in the model, a fixed effect dummy variable for each state is also included. For reasons of space, estimates for these fixed effects are not reported. Third, the use of aggregate annual indicators of state economic conditions in an analysis of voting by individual Senators makes it likely that the errors will be correlated within each unit where the economic indicators are constant. In order to correct this problem, robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the state-year are reported in the tables that follow.

Table 1 presents the results of four models testing the influence of constituent economic interests and ideology on support for national security policy. The first specification includes only the economic interest variables. The second adds ideology. The third includes an interaction term modeling the changing relationship between ideology and support for American foreign policy. The final specification adds several other variables commonly thought to influence support for foreign policy, including partisanship, membership in the president's party, and three demographic variables. Because the demographic variables were only available through 1996, the number of observations in this model is somewhat smaller than in the other three.

[Table 1 about here.]

Several features of these results deserve comment. First, the results concerning the manufacturing sector support the argument that a broader economic stakes in American foreign policy influenced congressional support for it. The presence of export-oriented or import-competing manufacturing in a state influenced Senators' support for national security policy in the votes examined here. These two independent variables were statistically significant in all four specifications. Their effects were also substantively important, especially in the first two specifications. On average across the 1947-2000 period, Senators from the ten states most dependent on manufactured exports had a 0.71 probability of voting to support military resources, intervention, and foreign aid, while Senators from the ten states least dependent on manufactured exports had a 0.33 probability of casting such a vote.⁶ (This comparison holds other variables at their

⁶ The top ten states, in order, were Michigan, Delaware, Indiana, Ohio, Connecticut, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, with an average manufacturing export orientation score of 0.020. The bottom ten states, starting with the least dependent on manufactured exports, were

mean values.) American efforts to secure a relatively international order open for American trade and investment benefited these states more and their Senators voted accordingly. Similarly, Senators from the ten most import-competing states in manufacturing had a 0.42 probability of voting to support the elements of national security policy considered here. Those from the ten states least affected by manufactured imports had a 0.64 probability of casting such a vote.⁷

The trade-orientation of the agricultural sector had no statistically significant effect here. This result does not support the argument set out in the opening section. There are several possible explanations. First, American agriculture was heavily protected throughout the postwar era. The fact that it was relatively insulated from foreign competition may have diminished the foreign policy concerns of import-competing segments of agriculture. Second, part of the effect of manufacturing export-orientation probably reflects foreign direct investment activity. As was noted earlier, direct investment and exporting are complementary activities within the same sector. Because most American foreign direct investment during the postwar era took place in manufacturing, this effect was weaker in the agricultural sector, and may have produced a relationship too small to be statistically significant.

Hawaii, Wyoming, Alaska, Nevada, North Dakota, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, Florida, and Nebraska, with an average score of 0.003.

⁷ The ten states most sensitive to manufactured imports were Michigan, Indiana, Rhode Island, Ohio, Maine, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Connecticut, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania, with an average score of 0.021 over the 1947-2000 period. The least sensitive states in this respect were Hawaii, Alaska, Wyoming, Nevada, North Dakota, New Mexico, Montana, Florida, South Dakota, and Nebraska, with an average score of 0.005. The lists of the most export-oriented and most import-competing are very similar, reflecting the relative size of the manufacturing sectors in these states. It is worth remembering that there was an enormous amount of variation over time, however. For example, in large part due to the declining competitiveness of the American automobile industry, Michigan was far more import-competing during the latter part of the period considered here than during the early portion. The state's export-orientation score in 1947 and 2000 were nearly the same—0.035 and 0.038 respectively. By contrast, its import-competition score rose more than twelve times during this period, from 0.005 to 0.062.

Like most previous research on this question, these results model do not indicate that the military share of personal income in their state influenced Senators' voting records on military spending. The fact that trade interests in manufacturing were significantly related to Senators' views on military spending, even though the parochial benefits of this spending were not, suggests that the omission of the broader economic stakes in military spending might produce the misleading conclusion that economic interests had little effect on the politics of national security policy. It may indeed be true, as many of the authors who have presented such results have written, that members of Congress were more concerned about wider foreign and defense policy issues than about the parochial benefits of military spending. However, these wider issues also had economic stakes.

Second, the results in Table 1 indicate that ideology also influenced congressional voting on national security policy. The second model in Table 1 indicates that conservatives have been more likely than liberals to vote in favor of national security policy across the entire 1947-2000 period. Manufacturing export orientation and import sensitivity remain statistically significant when ideology is added to the model.

The effect of ideology is not as simple as most previous research on foreign and defense policy voting suggests, however. As Cronin and Fordham (1999) found, its effect on support for national security policy changed enormously during the early 1960s. The third model uses an interaction term to estimate different effects for ideology during the early Cold War era, from 1947 through 1963, and for the rest of the period considered here, from 1964 through 2000. This specification produces far superior model-fit statistics. Figure 1 illustrates why this is so. During the early Cold War era, liberals were

highly likely to vote in favor of the elements of national security policy examined here. Conservatives were more skeptical. This pattern was reversed after 1963. The effect of ideology estimated in the second model, also depicted in Figure 1, averages across these two very different effects.

[Figure 1 about here.]

The fact of this large shift in the meaning of liberal and conservative ideology is overlooked in most accounts of congressional voting on foreign and defense policy because nearly all of them focus on votes taken after 1963. Statistical models of congressional voting were uncommon before that date, and most subsequent work has understandably focused on issues of contemporary concern. The changing effect of ideology requires an explanation that is missing from most research that emphasizing the importance of this variable. It is possible that the world changed so much during the 1960s that liberals could no longer support American national security policy. Alternatively, ideologies themselves may have evolved such that being a liberal in the 1970s no longer implied the same foreign policy positions that it did in the 1950s. Developing and testing an account of ideology that can account for its changing foreign policy implications is beyond the scope of this paper. Providing such an explanation is important for accounts of roll-call voting on foreign and defense policy that rely on ideology, however.

Third, the effects of both ideology and the manufacturing sector are robust to the addition of other influences on national security policy preferences. The last model in Table 1 includes several variables considered in previous research on congressional

voting or public opinion.⁸ Loyalty to the president, gender, and education appear to have influenced voting on national security issues. Party and military experience were not statistically significant. Comparisons with the modal Senator—a male, college-educated, Democratic military veteran facing a president of the opposite party—help illustrate the substantive importance of these effects. Such a Senator had a 0.43 probability of supporting a national security policy measure. Under a Democratic president, this probability would rise to 0.59. Changing the modal Senator to a woman would reduce the probability to 0.36. Without a college education, the probability falls to 0.37. These effects may arguably merit more attention than they can be given in this paper. The main point here is that their inclusion in the model does not greatly change the estimated effect of ideology or constituent economic interests.

Do constituents' economic interests also influence congressional voting by affecting the ideology of their representative? This is the second question about the role of ideology raised in the opening section of this paper. The fact that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for the constituent economic interest variables falls when ideology is included in the model strongly suggests that the answer is probably "yes." The fact that ideology accounts for some of the variance the economic interest variables explained in the first model can only be due to this indirect influence. The structure of a state's economy is causally prior to the ideology of its Senators.

Estimating the magnitude of this indirect effect in a conventional way entails regressing the constituent economic interest variables onto Senators' ideologies at the time of each vote. Such a model finds substantial indirect effects, but is not a realistic

⁸ Concerning loyalty to a president of the same party, see Howell and Pevehouse (2005). On gender, see Conover and Sapiro (1993). On military experience, see Feaver and Gelpi (2002) and Bianco (2005). On college education, see Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).

representation of the way economic interests are likely to influence Senator ideology. Examining the influence of constituent economic interests at the time each Senator is chosen is a more difficult and realistic test of their indirect effect through ideology. Senators often remain in office for a long time. Not only are their terms six years long, but most who seek reelection are returned to office. Senators' ideologies do not usually change greatly over the course of their time in office. Constituent economic interests are thus most likely to influence Senators' ideologies when they are initially elected.

Table 2 presents several regression models of the influence of constituent economic interests on the ideology of Senators during their first year in office. In order to help insure that the estimated effects of these variables do not reflect other correlated features of each state's political economy and historical experience, a fixed-effect dummy variable for each state is included in the model.

[Table 2 about here.]

The results support the claim that constituents' economic stakes in the global order supported by American defense and foreign policy influenced the ideology of their Senators. As in the models of congressional voting, manufacturing export orientation had the greatest influence. The other constituent economic interest variables were not statistically significant. Across the entire 1947-2000 period, Senators chosen in the ten states most dependent on manufactured exports had DW-NOMINATE scores that were roughly 0.40 more conservative than Senators elected in one of the ten states least dependent on manufactured exports. Because the DW-NOMINATE scores range from -1 to 1, this is a large effect.

The effects are stronger when Senators who were appointed rather than elected are excluded. Voters do not always have the opportunity to pass judgment on appointed Senators, and often choose another candidate when they do. Results excluding Senators who are not elected are presented in the second model in Table 2. In this case, both manufacturing export orientation and import sensitivity have significant effects. The difference between Senators elected in the sets of states discussed in the last paragraph rises to roughly 0.50 in this model. Senators elected in the ten most import-sensitive states were about 0.27 more liberal than Senators elected in the ten least import-sensitive states.

The effect of constituent economic interests on the ideology of new Senators also holds up when the period since 1960 is considered separately. Because the effect of ideology on voting patterns changed in the early 1960s, theoretical expectations about the effect of constituent interests are arguably different during the early and later parts of the period considered here. Unfortunately, there are not enough observations from the early part of the Cold War to estimate the effect of constituent economic interests on new Senator's ideologies during that period. The third model in Table 2 reports considers only Senators elected in 1960 or later. The results are quite similar to those found when appointed Senators are excluded. Both export orientation and import sensitivity substantially influence new Senators' ideology.

Conclusion

Congressional roll-call voting provides a useful window onto the sources of domestic preferences on military spending. The evidence presented here points to several general conclusions about the relationship between economic interests and national

security policy. First, most quantitative analyses of congressional voting on security issues have defined constituency economic interests too narrowly. The economic stakes in military spending involve more than just the share of it that goes to a Senator's state or a representative's district. They also include the implications of the world order American policy makers have sought to establish and maintain since the end of World War II, in part by maintaining a relatively large (and expensive) military force. Because the United States has underwritten the security dimensions of the postwar economic order, many of the same economic interests that are relevant to trade policy also bear on postwar military spending. The evidence considered here indicates that the export-orientation and import-competition of Senators' home states, particularly in manufacturing, have influenced their willingness to support military spending.

Second, most previous studies of congressional voting on foreign and defense policy have employed research designs that are likely to overstate the importance of ideology. Most regress indicators of ideology along with variables representing constituent economic interests and other considerations onto a few recent votes on an issue of interest. There is nothing wrong with this approach as far as it goes. However, such a model does not consider that variables like constituent economic interests may influence legislators' ideologies. The evidence considered here suggests that ideology is, to some extent, an intervening variable that stands causally between constituent economic interests and Senators' voting decisions. As a result, ideology appears more important than it actually is compared to constituent economic interests. The use of a few votes on a recent issue in this kind of model also masks the fact that the policy implications of liberal-conservative ideology have changed over time. In arguing for the causal

importance of ideology, researchers need to offer an account of the process through which it influences voting that can account for this change.

The process through which economic interests influence policy preferences on security questions deserves further study. Arguments emphasizing economic interests have long been plagued by the cynical and unrealistic image of members of Congress trading away the national interest in order to secure parochial benefits for their constituents, or, worse, the support of narrow but powerful economic interests for their own reelection efforts. Although the notion of an exchange of policy for political support is a useful metaphor for some purposes, it is misleading as an account of the process through which these interests influence policy preferences. Economic interests like those considered here are closely tied to the broader way of life in a Senator's home state. They are not simply indicators of the power of some narrow set of wealthy people. It is neither surprising nor scandalous that these considerations shape Senators' policy views. The fact that constituent economic interests influence Senators is compatible with the argument that members of Congress act on their understanding of the long-run interests of the nation as a whole. Conversations with friends and constituents are probably the only way members of Congress can discern "the national interest." The fact that these conversations produce different sets of policy preferences in import-competing and export-oriented parts of the country suggests that concepts like "the national interest" do not tell us much about policy preferences, not that members of Congress are cynical or self-consciously parochial.

Finally, it is worth asking what one can learn about the politics of security issues in general from a study of the postwar United States. Although this case is substantively

important for world politics, it is unusual in many respects. Not all the patterns identified here will hold in other times and places. The specific foreign policy concerns attributed to export-oriented and import-competing interests here depend on the special circumstances confronting the United States after World War II. Few states have enjoyed the political and military predominance the United States did during this period. As a result, political actors with similar economic interests in others states might support different national security policies. Most states—and the political factions within them—have had little or no opportunity to shape the international system. In these cases, exporters might be primarily concerned about maintaining ties to a powerful ally or multilateral institution in order to secure their international interests. Those threatened by import competition might prefer other policy commitments. In any event, the policy interests of all these political actors will depend heavily on the options open to the state in which they reside.

Although the specific linkages between interests and policy choice posited here may be unique to the United States, the more fundamental conclusion that domestic economic interests have a stake in security issues as well as foreign economic policy applies more broadly. There is no reason to think political actors in the United States are unique in this respect. Different stakes in the international economy may help explain the domestic political foundations of some commonly observed patterns in international relations, such as the increased likelihood of trading partners forming a military alliance (e.g., Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Hirschman 1980 [1945]; Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004; Oneal and Russett 1997). They might also shed light on the tendency of powerful

states, who cannot free ride on the efforts of others to construct a favorable world order, to define their security interests very broadly.

The extensive and well-developed literature on the politics of foreign economic policy has more to offer to those interested in the politics of national security policy than is commonly appreciated. The sub-disciplinary division between those who study international political economy and those who study security issues works against the recognition of the important relationships between the substantive concerns of these two groups of scholars. Explaining the domestic politics of military spending is only one subject on which the field of international relations would be well-served by greater theoretical arbitrage between these two areas of study.

Appendix A.
Senate Key Votes on Military Resources, Intervention , and Aid, 1947-2000

Date	Outcome	Description
22 Apr 47	Agreed to, 67-23 D: 32-7 R: 35-16	Passage of Greek-Turkish aid bill (S 938).
14 May 47	Rejected, 19-64 D: 7-32 R: 12-32	Kem (R-MO) amendment to foreign relief bill (H J Res 153) cutting funds from \$350 million to \$200 million.
26 Nov 47	Rejected 30-56 D: 10-29 R: 20-27	Malone (R-NV) amendment to interim aid bill (S 1774) cutting funds from \$597 million to \$400 million.
13 Mar 48	Agreed to, 69-17 D: 38-4 R: 31-13	Passage of authorization for European Recovery Program (S 2202).
9 Jun 48	Agreed to, 78-10 D: 41-2 R: 37-8	Passage of Selective Service Act (S 2655).
1 Apr 49	Rejected, 23-54 D: 9-35 R: 14-19	Taft (R-OH)-Russell (D-GA) amendment to European Recovery Program authorization bill (S 1209) cutting the proposed funds by 10 percent.
22 Sep 49	Agreed to, 55-24 D: 36-10 R: 19-14	Passage of Mutual Defense Assistance Act (HR 5895) providing military aid to NATO members.
5 May 50	Agreed to, 37-36 D: 29-11 R: 8-25	Connally (D-TX) amendment to Foreign Economic Assistance Act (S 3304) adding authorization for Point IV technical assistance program.
21 Aug 50	Agreed to, 50-36 D: 12-34 R: 38-2	Bricker (R-OH) amendment to Defense Production Act of 1950 (S 3936) to eliminate selective price controls and provide that if and when price controls are put into effect, wage controls will also be applied.
9 Mar 51	Rejected, 20-68 D: 2-44 R: 18-24	Johnson (D-CO) and Bricker (R-OH) amendment to Universal Military Training and Service Act (S 1) to eliminate provisions for universal military training and service.
2 Apr 51	Agreed to, 49-43 D: 11-35 R: 38-8	McClellan (D-AR) amendment to S Res 99 stating sense of Senate that no more than four divisions of ground forces be sent to Europe without congressional approval.
27 Jun 51	Agreed to, 47-33 D: 10-30 R: 37-3	Butler (R-NE) amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1951 (S 1717) to prohibit OPS from placing any restrictions, quotas, or other limitations on livestock slaughtering.
31 Aug 51	Agreed to, 36-34 D: 10-29 R: 26-5	Dirksen (R-IL) amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (HR 5113) to cut European aid from \$1,311 million to \$881 million.
4 Oct 51	Agreed to, 49-21 D: 35-0 R: 14-21	Passage of revised Defense Production Act of 1951 (S 2170).
28 May 52	Agreed to, 37-34 D: 11-27 R: 26-7	Long (D-LA) amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1952 (S 3086) to reduce authorization by \$200 million.
29 May 52	Rejected, 18-52 D: 2-40 R: 16-12	Dirksen (R-IL) amendment to delete sections of Defense Production Act of 1952 extending price and wage controls, thus ending these controls on June 30, 1952.

23 Jul 53	Rejected, 38-55 D: 37-9 R: 0-46	Maybank (D-SC) amendment to Defense Department Appropriations for fiscal 1954 to increase funds for the purchase of aircraft by \$400 million.
29 Jul 53	Rejected, 32-52 D: 13-38 R: 18-24	Ellender (D-LA) amendment to Mutual Security Administration appropriation bill (HR 6391) to cut funds for European aid by \$500 million.
26 Feb 54	Rejected, 60-31 D: 28-16 R: 32-14	Bricker (R-OH) resolution (S 1) to amend the Constitution limiting the treaty-making powers of the president and requiring congressional action to implement specific measures agreed to in Treaties.
14 Aug 54	Agreed to, 41-34 D: 29-7 R: 12-26	Maybank (D-SC) amendment to cut funds for Mutual Security Administration by \$200 million (HR 10051).
28 Jan 55	Rejected, 13-74 D: 11-32 R: 1-42	Amendment to joint resolution authorizing president to protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories (H J Res 159) limiting this authority to Formosa and the Pescadores only.
20 Jun 55	Agreed to, 40-39 D: 37-2 R: 3-37	Symington (D-MO) amendment to Defense Department Appropriations for fiscal 1956 to add \$46 million to provide for 22,000 more Marines than the president had requested.
22 Jul 55	Agreed to, 50-38 D: 20-23 R: 29-15	Committee amendment to foreign aid bill (HR 7224) adding \$420 million to amount authorized by the House.
26 Jun 56	Agreed to, 48-40 D: 43-3 R: 5-37	Committee amendment to the Defense Department Appropriation bill for fiscal 1957 (HR 10986) to increase funds for aircraft and related procurement by \$800 million.
24 Jul 56	Agreed to, 50-42 D: 24-22 R: 26-19	Knowland (R-CA) amendment to foreign aid bill (HR 12130) barring military aid to Yugoslavia.
24 Jul 56	Passed, 60-30 D: 30-15 R: 30-15	Passage of amended foreign aid bill (HR 12130)
5 Mar 57	Passed, 72-19 D: 30-16 R: 42-3	Passage of resolution (H J Res 117) authorizing president to provide aid, including the use of American military forces, to several countries in the Middle East.
18 Jun 57	Ratified, 67-19 D: 35-9 R: 32-10	Ratification of International Atomic Energy Agency statute.
5 Jun 58	Agreed to, 43-42 D: 17-27 R: 26-15	Knowland (R-CA) amendment to Mutual Security Act of 1958 (HR 12181) striking language authorizing president to give aid to some Communist-dominated states.
1 Jul 59	Rejected, 42-48 D: 35-24 R: 7-24	Aiken (R-VT) motion to table Case (R-SD) appeal on ruling of chair concerning provision of Mutual Security Act of 1959 (S 1451) allowing borrowing to finance Development Loan Fund.
7 Jul 59	Agreed to, 52-41 D: 40-19 R: 12-22	Ellender (D-LA) amendment to Mutual Security Act of 1959 (S 1451) reducing military aid authorization to \$1.3 billion.
13 Jul 59	Agreed to, 43-48 D: 40-19 R: 3-29	Modified Symington (D-MO) amendment to Defense Department appropriation bill for fiscal 1960 (HR 7454) to increase Army procurement funds by \$253 million above the president's request and designate \$453 million for the modernization of Army combat equipment.
12 Sep 59	Passed 49-40 D: 33-23 R: 16-17	Passage of S 1697, a measure permitting the president to give aid to certain communist countries.
29 Aug 60	Agreed to, 56-31 D: 31-23 R: 25-8	Committee amendment to second supplemental appropriation bill for fiscal 1961 providing \$190 million for the Mutual Security Program.

11 Aug 61	Rejected, 39-56 D: 16-46 R: 23-10	Byrd (D-VA) amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (S 1983) requiring annual authorization for the Development Loan Fund.
6 Jun 62	Agreed to, 57-24 D: 34-18 R: 23-6	Lausche (D-OH) amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (S 2996) prohibiting the provisions of PL-480 food aid to Communist-dominated countries.
7 Jun 62	Agreed to, 56-34 D: 37-19 R: 19-15	Mansfield (D-MT)-Dirksen (R-IL) amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (S2996) permitting president to give PL-480 food aid to Communist-dominated countries under some circumstances.
1 Oct 62	Agreed to, 47-28 D: 33-16 R: 14-12	Committee amendments to the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1962 (HR 13175) providing \$785 million more than the House for the aid program.
24 Sep 63	Ratified, 80-19 D: 55-11 R: 25-8	Ratification of Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
5 Nov 63	Agreed to, 42-40 D: 29-29 R: 13-11	Morse (D-OR) amendment to pending Mansfield (D-MT)-Dirksen (R-IL) amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 (HR 7885) reducing amount for development aid.
7 Nov 63	Rejected, 32-46 D: 28-23 R: 4-23	Fulbright (D-AR) amendment to pending Gruening (D-AK) amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 (HR 7885) to give president discretion in cutting off aid to aggressor nations.
11 Aug 64	Agreed to, 50-38 D: 26-32 R: 24-6	Mundt (R-SD) amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 (HR 11380) providing more stringent terms for repayment of foreign aid loans.
11 Jun 65	Rejected, 38-43 D: 28-25 R: 10-18	Church (D-ID) amendment to reduce fiscal 1966 and 1967 authorizations for foreign assistance (S 1837) by \$115 million each year.
1 Mar 66	Agreed to, 92-5 D: 60-5 R: 32-0	Motion to table Morse (R-MT) amendment to supplemental Defense Department appropriations bill (S 2791). Amendment would have repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
27 Jul 66	Agreed to, 55-32 D: 43-20 R: 12-17	Church (D-ID) amendment to Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966 (S 3583) to reduce military sales by \$100 million.
1 Mar 67	Agreed to, 72-19 D: 48-9 R: 24-10	Modified Clark (D-PA) amendment to supplemental Defense Department appropriation (S 665) declaring that Congress would provide all necessary support for U.S. servicemen in Vietnam and also that it supported efforts to convene an international conference to end the war.
16 Mar 67	Ratified, 66-28 D: 44-15 R: 22-13	Ratification of U.S.-Soviet Consular Convention.
9 Aug 67	Rejected, 40-49 D: 27-27 R: 13-22	Ellender (D-LA) amendment, as modified by Clark (D-PA), to Export-Import Bank funding measure (S 1155) prohibiting Bank from financing arms purchases by less developed countries.
31 Jul 68	Rejected, 31-43 D: 22-27 R: 9-16	Morse (D-OR) amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 reducing the authorization for the Alliance for Progress from \$90 million to \$70 million.
1 Aug 68	Rejected 27-46 D: 22-32 R: 5-14	Nelson (D-WI) amendment to Defense Construction Appropriation bill (HR 18785) to delete funds for deployment of the Sentinel ABM system.
13 Mar 69	Ratified, 83-15 D: 49-7 R: 34-8	Ratification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
25 Jun 69	Passed, 70-16 D: 43-3 R: 27-13	Passage of National Commitments Resolution (S Res 85) affirming role of Congress in making commitments to use force or assist foreign countries.

6 Aug 69	Rejected, 50-50 D: 36-21 R: 14-29	Second Smith (R-ME) amendment to Defense Procurement Authorization bill (S 2546) to prohibit funds from being used for the Safeguard ABM system, while allowing the development of other ABM systems.
15 Dec 69	Agreed to, 73-17 D: 35-15 R: 38-2	Church (D-ID) substitute for Cooper (R-KY)-Mansfield (D-MT) amendment to Defense Department appropriations bill (HR 15090) stating that no funds be used to introduce American ground troops into Laos and Thailand.
20 Dec 69	Agreed to, 39-29 D: 31-10 R: 8-19	Mansfield (D-MT) motion to table conference report on foreign aid appropriations bill (HR 15149) in order to kill \$54.5 million in aid for Taiwan to buy fighter aircraft.
30 Jun 70	Agreed to, 58-37 D: 42-11 R: 16-26	Cooper (R-KY)-Church (D-ID) amendment to Foreign Military Sales bill (H.R. 15628) barring use of appropriated funds for U.S. military operations in Cambodia after July 1, 1970, unless authorized by Congress.
12 Aug 70	Rejected, 47-52 D: 35-22 R: 12-30	Hart (D-MI)-Cooper (R-KY) amendment to Military Procurement Authorization bill (HR 17123) deleting funds for deployment of Safeguard ABM system.
25 Aug 70	Rejected, 35-52 D: 15-34 R: 20-18	Hatfield (R-OR)-Goldwater (R-AZ) amendment to Military Procurement Authorization bill (HR 17123) increasing military salaries and recommending a volunteer army. (The president opposed this bill.)
1 Sep 70	Rejected, 39-55 D: 32-21 R: 7-34	McGovern (D-SD)-Hatfield (R-OR) amendment to Military Procurement Authorization bill (HR 17123) limiting the number of troops deployed to Vietnam and providing for a complete withdrawal by December 31, 1971.
4 Jun 71	Rejected, 43-49 D: 33-20 R: 10-29	Schweiker (R-PA) amendment to military draft bill (HR 6531) extending the draft by one year instead of the two years provided in the bill.
22 Jun 71	Agreed to, 57-42 D: 45-10 R: 12-32	Mansfield (R-MT) substitute for modified Cook (R-KY) amendment setting a 9-month deadline for withdrawal of U.S. force from Vietnam provided American prisoners of war were released.
28 Oct 71	Agreed to, 47-44 D: 17-33 R: 30-11	Scott (R-PA) amendment to Foreign Aid Authorization bill (HR 9910) deleting provision prohibiting use of funds in Indochina for any purpose except withdrawal or protection of troops as they withdraw.
29 Oct 71	Rejected, 27-41 D: 8-26 R: 19-15	Passage of foreign aid authorization bill (HR 9910).
23 Nov 71	Rejected, 39-54 D: 34-17 R: 5-37	Committee amendment to fiscal 1972 Defense Department appropriations bill (HR 11731) prohibiting use of funds to support more than 250,000 troops in Europe. (Current strength was 300,000.)
24 Jul 72	Rejected, 42-48 D: 28-19 R: 14-29	Passage of foreign military aid authorization bill (S 3390) containing a measure terminating American participation in the Vietnam War.
2 Aug 72	Agreed to, 49-47 D: 38-14 R: 11-33	Brooke (R-MA) substitute amendment to Defense Procurement Authorization bill (HR 15495) ending funds for U.S. military operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia within four months of enactment, pending the release of American prisoners of war.
3 Aug 72	Ratified, 88-2 D: 48-1 R: 40-1	Ratification of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
29 May 73	Agreed to, 55-21 D: 37-4 R: 18-17	Vote treat as germane a committee amendment to supplemental appropriations bill (HR 7447) barring use of funds to support military operations in or over Cambodia or Laos.
26 Jun 73	Agreed to, 48-44 D: 11-40 R: 9-30	Scott (R-PA) amendment to foreign military aid authorization bill (S 1443) deleting language requiring the phase-out of all grant assistance by 30 June 1977.
26 Sep 73	Agreed to, 49-46 D: 42-12 R: 7-34	Mansfield (D-MT) substitute amendment to Defense procurement bill (HR 9286) to reduce by 40 percent the land-based U.S. troops stationed overseas.

27 Sep 73	Rejected, 47-49 D: 37-19 R: 10-30	McIntyre (D-NH) amendment to Defense procurement bill (HR 9286) to reduce the \$1.5 billion authorized for the procurement of the Trident submarine by \$885 million.
21 Aug 74	Rejected, 37-55 D: 30-23 R: 7-32	Eagleton (D-MO) amendment to fiscal 1975 Defense Department appropriations bill (HR 16243) limiting defense spending to \$81 billion.
4 Dec 74	Agreed to, 55-36 D: 24-28 R: 31-8	Humphrey (D-MN) amendment to Eagleton (D-MO) amendment to foreign aid authorization bill (S 3394), delaying amendment's call for aid cutoff to Turkey over Cyprus invasion.
4 Dec 74	Passed, 46-45 D: 23-29 R: 23-16	Passage of foreign aid authorization bill (S 3394).
19 May 75	Passed, 41-40 D: 15-30 R: 26-10	Passage of bill authorizing aid to Turkey on a contingent basis (S 846).
1 Aug 75	Rejected, 42-48 D: 21-36 R: 21-12	Adoption of conference committee report on military procurement authorization bill for fiscal 1976 (HR 6674). Opponents complained that it exceeded the budget ceiling for defense.
9 Oct 75	Passed, 70-18 D: 41-12 R: 29-6	Passage of joint resolution authorizing participation of American civilian volunteers in Sinai observer force.
18 Nov 75	Agreed to, 52-47	Kennedy (D-MA) amendment to Defense Department appropriations bill for fiscal 1976 to dismantle the Safeguard ABM system site in North Dakota, except for its Perimeter Acquisition Radar system.
19 Dec 75	Agreed to, 54-22 D: 38-7 R: 16-15	Tunney (D-CA) amendment to Department of Defense appropriations bill (HR 9861) limiting U.S. involvement in Angolan civil war to intelligence gathering.
28 Apr 76	Passed, 52-22 D: 39-4 R: 13-18	Adoption of conference report on foreign military aid and arms sales authorization bill (S 2662) providing new congressional controls on arms sales.
19 May 76	Rejected, 31-63 D: 11-48 R: 20-15	Tower (R-TX)-Stennis (D-MS) amendment to Cannon (D-NV) substitute amendment to S Res 400 denying the proposed intelligence committee jurisdiction over Department of Defense intelligence agencies.
20 May 76	Agreed to, 44-37 D: 37-15 R: 20-15	Culver (D-IA) amendment to Defense procurement authorization bill (HR 12438) to bar obligation of funds for procurement of B-1 bomber before February 1, 1977.
2 Aug 76	Rejected, 27-63 D: 22-32 R: 5-31	Eagleton (D-MO) amendment to Defense Department appropriations bill (HR 14262) reducing the amount authorized by \$1 billion.
16 Jun 77	Agreed to, 79-15 D: 58-0 R: 21-15	Byrd (D-WV) amendment to State Department authorization bill (HR 6689) stating that policy toward South Korea should be arrived at by as joint decision to the president and congress.
16 Jun 77	Agreed to, 54-37 D: 49-9 R: 5-28	Byrd (D-WV) substitute for Dole (R-KS) amendment to State Department authorization bill expressing sense of congress concerning conditions for negotiations with Cuba.
13 Jul 77	Rejected, 38-58 D: 28-30 R: 10-28	Hatfield (R-OR) amendment to Energy Research and Development Administration appropriation bill (HR 7553) cutting off funds for development of neutron bomb.
16 Mar 78	Ratified, 68-32 D: 52-10 R: 16-22	Ratification of Panama Canal Treaties.
25 Apr 78	Rejected, 21-70 D: 17-39 R: 4-31	Eagleton (D-MO) amendment to the fiscal 1979 budget targets resolution (S Con Res 80) reducing the budget authority for defense by \$1.4 billion and outlays by \$900 million.

26 Apr 78	Rejected, 21-74 D: 4-57 R: 17-17	Tower (R-TX) amendment to the fiscal 1979 budget targets resolution (S Con Res 80) increasing the budget authority for defense by \$1.6 billion and outlays by \$1.2 billion.
15 May 78	Rejected, 44-54 D: 33-28 R: 11-26	Adoption of resolution disapproving of sale of \$4.5 billion in jet fighter aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
26 Jul 78	Rejected, 39-57 D: 12-46 R: 27-11	Baker (R-NT) motion to kill Case (R-NJ) amendment to military aid bill keeping sanctions against Rhodesia in place until commitment to free elections is made.
8 Mar 79	Rejected, 42-50 D: 7-45 R: 35-5	Percy (R-IL) amendment to the Taiwan Relations Act (S 245) declaring hostile action against Taiwan a threat to the United States.
15 May 79	Agreed to, 75-19 D: 37-17 R: 38-2	Schweiker (R-PA) amendment to State Department appropriations bill (HR 4473) expressing sense of Congress that Rhodesia has met conditions required for lifting of sanctions.
18 Sept 79	Adopted 55-42 D: 24-35 R: 31-7	Part two of the Hollings (D-SC) amendment to the fiscal 1980 budget levels resolution (S Con Res 36) to increase the fiscal 1981 and 1982 defense spending targets.
9 Oct 79	Agreed to, 49-46 D: 30-25 R: 19-21	Committee amendment to foreign aid appropriations bill (HR 4473) deleting House provision prohibiting aid to Vietnam.
9 Nov 79	Rejected, 11-77 D: 9-41 R: 2-36	Hatfield (R-OR) amendment to the fiscal 1980 Defense appropriations bill (HR 5359) to eliminate funding for the mobile MX missile and conversion of existing Minuteman missile to be carried by submarines.
7 May 80	Agreed to, 64-30 D: 30-25 R: 34-5	Hollings (D-SC) motion to table the Nelson (D-WI) amendment to the fiscal 1981 budget targets resolution, which would have cut \$2 billion from defense funds and \$400 million from interest payments, transferring then funds to domestic programs.
12 June 80	Agreed to, 58-34 D: 33-18 R: 25-16	Passage of bill to transfer 13.3 million from the Air Force to the Selective Service Agency to begin draft registration (H J Res 521).
24 Sep 80	Rejected, 46-48 D: 24-31 R: 22-17	Passage of resolution overturning Carter administration decision to sell enriched uranium to India (H Con Res 432).
7 Apr 81	Agreed to, 79-15 D: 35-9 R: 44-6	Tower (R-TX) motion to table Pressler (R-SD) amendment to the fiscal 1981 supplemental defense authorization bill (S 694), which would have deleted \$7 million for research on the MX missile.
28 Oct 81	Rejected, 48-52 D: 36-11 R: 12-41	Passage of concurrent resolution (H Con Res 194) disapproving of Reagan administration decision to sell military equipment to Saudi Arabia.
3 Dec 81	Rejected, 28-66 D: 23-23 R: 5-43	Hollings (D-SC) amendment to the fiscal 1982 Defense Department appropriations bill (HR 4995) to transfer the \$2.249 billion intended for research and development of the B-1 bomber to other accounts.
16 Dec 82	Agreed to, 56-42 D: 15-30 R: 41-12	Jackson (D-WA) amendment to fiscal 1983 continuing appropriations resolution (H J Res 631) setting out procedures for administration to submit MX basing plan for congressional approval. (The measure was an administration plan to obtain MX funding.)
13 July 83	Agreed to, 50-49	Tower (R-TX) motion to table Pryor (D-AR) amendment to Omnibus Defense Authorizations bill (S 675) that would have prohibited the production of lethal binary chemical munitions.
29 Sep 83	Passed, 54-46 D: 2-43 R: 52-3	Passage of joint resolution (S J Res 159) providing statutory authorization under War Powers Act for U.S. troop presence in Lebanon for next 18 months.

31 Oct 83	Agreed to, 58-40 D: 12-33 R: 46-7	Dole (R-KS) motion to table Kennedy (D-MA) amendment to debt limit increase bill (H J Res 308) calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons.
7 Nov 83	Rejected, 37-56 D: 31-10 R: 6-46	Bumpers (D-AR) amendment to fiscal 1984 Defense Department appropriations bill (HR 4185) deleting \$2.1 billion intended for procurement of 21 MX missiles.
2 Apr 84	Rejected, 25-63 D: 23-15 R: 2-48	Kennedy amendment to supplemental appropriations bill (H J Res 492) cutting funding for military assistance to El Salvador from 61.75 million to \$21 million.
4 Apr 84	Agreed to, 59-36 D: 10-31 R: 49-5	Baker (R-TN) motion to table Leahy (D-VT) amendment to supplemental appropriations bill (H J Res 492) requiring congressional authorization for use of U.S. combat forces in El Salvador
13 Jun 84	Agreed to, 47-45 D: 7-35 R: 40-10	Tower (R-TX) motion to table Percy (R-IL) amendment to Omnibus Defense Authorization bill (S 2723) which would have reduced the amount authorized for the Strategic Defense Initiative by \$100 million.
14 Jun 84	Agreed to, 49-48 D: 5-38 R: 48-6	Tower (R-TX) motion to table Moynihan (D-NY) amendment to Omnibus Defense Authorization bill (S 2723) to prohibit production of the MX missile but authorized study of single-warhead "Midgetman" missile.
18 Jun 84	Agreed to, 58-38 D: 10-32 R: 48-6	Tower (R-TX) motion to table Kennedy (D-MA) amendment to Omnibus Defense Authorization bill (S 2723) prohibiting aid to rebels in Nicaragua.
19 Mar 85	Agreed to, 55-45 D: 10-37 R: 45-8	Passage of joint resolution to reaffirm the authorization of \$1.5 billion in fiscal 1985 for the purchase of 21 MX missiles (S J Res 71).
4 June 85	Rejected, 38-57 D: 32-12 R: 6-45	Proxmire (D-WI) amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill (S 1160) to reduce from \$2.96 billion to \$1.9 billion the authorization for research on anti-missile defenses.
6 Jun 85	Agreed to, 55-42 D: 14-32 R: 41-10	Nunn (D-GA) amendment to State Department authorization bill (S 1003) authorizing \$24 million in humanitarian aid to the Nicaragua rebels.
7 Jun 85	Agreed to, 71-13 D: 30-9 R: 41-4	Kassebaum (R-KS) amendment to State Department authorization bill (S 1003) limiting U.S. contribution to the United Nations and related agencies to 20 percent of their total budget.
27 May 86	Agreed to, 53-47 D: 11-36 R: 42-11	Lugar (R-IN) substitute amendment to S J Res 283 authorizing \$100 million in aid to the Nicaragua rebels.
5 Jun 86	Rejected, 66-34 D: 42-5 R: 24-29	Passage, over President Reagan's veto, of joint resolution to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
5 Aug 86	Agreed to, 50-49 D: 9-38 R: 41-11	Warner (R-VA) motion to table the Johnston (D-LA) amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill (S 2638) limiting research on the Strategic Defense Initiative to \$3.24 billion. (The president requested \$5.3 billion.)
7 Aug 86	Rejected, 50-51 D: 36-11 R: 14-39	Pryor (D-AR) amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill (S 2638) deleting funds for production of the "Bigeye" chemical bomb.
2 Oct 86	Passed, 78-21 D: 47-0 R: 31-21	Passage, over President Reagan's veto, of bill imposing sanctions on South Africa (HR 4868).
17 Sept 87	Agreed to, 58-38 D: 50-1 R: 8-37	Nunn (D-GA) motion to table Warner (R-VA) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 1174), which would have removed a provision limiting the development of a mobile anti-ballistic missile system.
24 Sept 87	Agreed to, 61-36 D: 21-30 R: 40-6	Reid (D-NV) motion to table Hatfield (R-OR) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 1174) prohibiting nuclear tests of more than one kiloton in fiscal 1988-89, subject to some conditions.

2 Oct 87	Agreed to, 57-41 D: 49-5 R: 8-36	Bumpers (D-AR) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 1174) require compliance with the SALT II sub-limits on multiple-warhead strategic missiles.
27 Oct 87	Agreed to, 57-41 D: 49-5 R: 8-36	Byrd (D-WV)-Warner (R-VA) substitute amendment requiring presidential report on U.S. military operations in Persian Gulf and setting time limits for operations under War Powers Act.
15 Mar 88	Passed, 71-19 D: 45-2 R: 26-17	Passage of bill requiring president to notify congress of all covert operations.
11 May 88	Rejected, 48-50 D: 42-11 R: 6-39	Exon (D-NE) motion to reconsider rejection of Johnston (D-LA) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 2355) transferring funds from the Strategic Defense Initiative to restore operation of the space shuttle.
11 May 88	Agreed to, 51-45 D: 42-11 R: 6-39	Nunn (D-GA) to table the Bumpers (D-AR) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 2355) barring deployment of multiple-warhead missiles beyond numbers deployed on January 25, 1988.
25 May 88	Rejected, 28-69 D: 10-41 R: 18-28	Hollings (D-SC) amendment to Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty providing that limits on land-based cruise missiles apply only to those with nuclear warheads.
27 May 88	Agreed to, 64-33 D: 51-0 R: 13-33	Byrd (D-WV) motion to table Specter (R-PA) amendment to Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty reversing previous amendment barring reinterpretation of Treaty without Senate approval.
10 Aug 88	Agreed to, 49-47 D: 49-4 R: 0-43	Byrd (D-WV) perfecting amendment making technical changes to his previous amendment setting out limits and conditions on aid to Nicaragua rebels.
13 Apr 89	Passed, 89-9 D: 50-4 R: 39-5	Passage of bill (HR 1750) providing \$49.75 million in non-military aid to Nicaragua rebels.
16 May 89	Rejected, 47-52 D: 36-18 R: 11-34	Dixon (R-IL) amendment to Byrd (D-WV) amendment to bar proposed transfer of design data on F-16 to Japanese firms for use in development of FS-X fighter.
16 May 89	Agreed to, 50-47 D: 13-41 R: 37-6	Nunn (D-GA) motion to table the Johnston (D-LA) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 1352) reducing to \$3.95 billion appropriation for the Strategic Defense Initiative.
18 Jul 89	Agreed to, 57-42 D: 53-1 R: 4-41	Moynihan (D-NY) amendment to State Department authorization bill (S 1160) prohibiting solicitation or diversion of funds for activities for which foreign assistance would be prohibited.
26 Sept 89	Rejected, 29-71 D: 27-28 R: 2-43	Leahy (D-VT) amendment to fiscal 1990 Defense Department appropriation bill (HR 3072) to delete all funds for additional B-2 bombers.
15 Oct 90	Rejected, 46-50 D: 38-16 R: 8-34	Conrad (D-ND) amendment to fiscal 1991 Defense Department appropriations bill (S 3189) reducing U.S. forces in NATO by 30,000 and the total authorized for the Defense Department by the same number.
15 Oct 90	Rejected, 44-50 D: 35-18 R: 9-32	Leahy (D-VT) amendment to fiscal 1991 Defense Department appropriations bill (S 3189) cutting funds for the B-2 bomber program beyond the 15 bombers already being produced and tested.
19 Oct 90	Agreed to, 74-25 D: 55-0 R: 19-25	Leahy (D-VT) amendment to committee amendment to foreign operations appropriations bill (HR 5114) to reduce aid to El Salvador and link future aid to human rights improvement.
19 Oct 90	Rejected, 42-55 D: 32-21 R: 10-34	Harkin (D-IA) amendment to foreign operations appropriations bill (HR 5114) striking provisions canceling Egyptian debt to U.S.
12 Jan 91	Approved, 52-47 D: 10-45 R: 42-2	Passage of resolution (H J Res 77) authorizing president to use "all necessary means" to reverse Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

23 Jul 91	Passed, 55-44 D: 49-7 R: 6-37	Passage of bill (HR 2212) prohibiting president from granting MFN status to China unless China makes progress on human rights and fulfills other conditions.
31 Jul 91	Rejected, 43-56 D: 41-15 R: 2-41	Bingaman (D-NM) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill stating that goal of ballistic missile defense is to maintain strategic stability with the Soviet Union, thus remaining in compliance with the ABM treaty.
23 Nov 91	Agreed to, 86-8 D: 52-0 R: 34-8	Nunn (D-GA) amendment to CFE Treaty implementation bill (HR 3807) authorizing \$500 million in Defense funds to assist in dismantling Soviet weapons under treaty.
1 Aug 92	Rejected, 35-60 D: 24-30 R: 11-30	Pressler (R-SD) motion to table Pell (D-RI) amendment to DeConcini (D-AZ) amendment to give one-year grace period before imposing DeConcini provision to suspend aid unless Russia withdraws from Baltic States.
7 Aug 92	Rejected, 43-49 D: 9-44 R: 34-5	Warner (R-VA) motion to table Sasser (D-TN) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 3114) to cut funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative by \$1 billion.
18 Sept 92	Agreed to, 55-40 D: 42-11 R: 13-29	Hatfield (R-OR) amendment to the Cohen (R-ME) amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill (S 3114) imposing a nine-month moratorium on nuclear testing, with some conditions attached.
9 Sept 93	Rejected, 33-63 D: 30-25 R: 3-38	Boxer (D-CA) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 1298) striking language regarding homosexuals in the military and expressing the sense of Congress that the president should decide the issue.
9 Sept 93	Agreed to, 50-48 D: 44-12 R: 6-36	Sasser (D-TN) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (S 1298) cutting funding for ballistic missile defense from \$3.4 billion to \$3 billion.
23 Sep 93	Passed, 88-10 D: 52-3 R: 36-7	Passage of foreign aid appropriation bill (HR 2295).
15 Oct 93	Agreed to, 76-23 D: 52-3 R: 24-20	Byrd (D-WV) amendment to Defense appropriation bill (HR 3116) terminating funding for military operations in Somalia after 31 March 1994.
20 Nov 93	Passed, 61-38 D: 47-8 R: 34-10	Passage of bill implementing statutory changes required under the North American Free Trade Agreement.
27 Jan 94	Agreed to, 62-38 D: 42-14 R: 20-24	Kerry (D-MA) amendment to State Department authorization bill (S 1281) expressing sense of Senate that embargo on trade with Vietnam be lifted.
29 Jun 94	Rejected, 34-65 D: 0-55 R: 34-10	Gregg (R-NH) amendment to foreign operations appropriation bill (HR 4426) prohibiting military action against Haiti without prior congressional authorization.
1 Jul 94	Rejected, 50-50 D: 13-43 R: 37-7	Dole (R-KS) amendment to Defense authorization bill (S 2182) terminating U.S. arms embargo on Bosnia.
26 Jul 95	Passed 69-29 D: 21-24 R: 48-5	Passage of bill (S 21) to end U.S. participation on arms embargo on Bosnia.
5 Sept 95	Agreed to, 62-35 D: 14-31 R: 48-4	Passage of fiscal 1996 Defense Department appropriations bill (S 1087), providing \$6.4 billion more than the administration's request.
5 Mar 96	Agreed to, 74-22 D: 27-18 R: 47-4	Adoption of conference report on bill (HR 927) strengthening sanctions against Cuba.
24 Apr 97	Agreed to, 74-26 D: 45-0 R: 29-26	Ratification of Chemical Weapons Treaty (S Res 75), which prohibits development, production, acquisition, transfer, or use of chemical weapons.

4 Nov 97	Agreed to, 69-31 D: 26-19 R: 43-12	Motion to invoke cloture on debate over bill granting president "fast track" authority to on trade agreement implementation bills.
28 Mar 98	Agreed to, 84-16 D: 26-19 R: 41-14	McConnell (R-KY) amendment to IMF funding bill (S 1768) providing additional funding as long as aid recipients conform to trade agreements and observe other conditions.
30 Apr 98	Rejected, 41-59 D: 17-28 R: 24-31	Warner (R-VA) amendment to NATO expansion bill prohibiting further expansion for three years after Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic join the alliance.
25 June 98	Rejected, 39-53 D: 8-32 R: 31-21	Byrd (D-WV) amendment to Defense Department authorization bill (HR 3616) barring military services from putting male and female recruits in same small units or same housing.
15 Jul 98	Agreed to, 53-46 D: 26-18 R: 27-28	Stevens (R-AK) motion to table Lugar (R-IN) amendment to economic sanctions bill (S 2159) limiting presidential power to impose sanctions.
25 May 99	Agreed to, 52-48 D: 35-10 R: 17-38	Warner (R-VA) motion to table Specter (R-PA) amendment to Defense authorization bill (S 1059) prohibiting use of ground forces in Yugoslavia.
3 Aug 99	Rejected, 28-70 D: 10-34 R: 17-36	Helms (R-NC) motion to table Ashcroft (R-MO) amendment to Daschle (D-SD) amendment to Agriculture appropriation bill (S1233). Amendment would limit presidential power to impose sanctions involving food and medicine.
13 Oct 99	Rejected, 48-51 D: 44-0 R: 4-50 I: 0-1	Passage of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
18 May 00	Agreed to, 53-47 D: 38-7 R: 15-40	Levin (D-MI) amendment to military construction appropriation bill (S 2521) striking provision terminating funding for U.S. ground troops in Kosovo.
21 Jun 00	Rejected, 19-79 D: 6-38 R: 13-41	Gorton (R-WA) amendment to foreign operations bill (S 2522) reducing counter-narcotics aid to Latin American countries from \$934 million to \$200 million.
13 July 00	Agreed to, 52-48 D: 0-45 R: 52-3	Motion to table Durban (D-IL) amendment to Department of Defense authorization bill (HR 2405) requiring more extensive testing of missile defense system before deployment.
13 Sep 00	Agreed to, 65-32 D: 35-9 R: 30-23	Roth (R-DE) motion to table Thompson (R-TN) amendment to HR 4444, imposing sanctions on China for selling weapons of mass destruction.

Appendix B.

Data on State Export-Orientation and Import-Sensitivity, 1947-2000

Because data on export orientation and import sensitivity by state are not available, they were estimated based on industry and commodity trade data, and state manufacturing and agricultural commodity production data. This appendix explains the sources of these data, the procedures for handling missing data, and the way in which the state trade orientation figures were computed.

Manufacturing Data

Exports and imports by sector, 1947-1994. The most comprehensive data on manufacturing exports and imports for the postwar era were assembled by Robert Feenstra, and cover 1958-94 period. Data on exports and imports before 1958 are available from the Office of Business Economics (OBE), but are not organized in the same way as the post-1958 figures (Lechter 1970). These series overlap by ten years. Regressions based on this overlap were used to impute values of exports and imports and extend the Feenstra data back to 1947. The "impute" procedure in Stata 8 SE was used, which selects the best fitting regression from among the specified independent variables. The basic model, from which one or more variables may have been omitted, was as follows:

$$FEENSTRA_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_{i1}OBE_{it} + \beta_{i2}TREND_t + \beta_{i3}TOTAL_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where

$FEENSTRA_{it}$ is the export or import shipment figure in the Feenstra data for 2-digit industry group i at time t ;

OBE_{it} is the export or import figure for industry group i , from related parts of the 1970

Office of Business Economics data;

$TREND_t$ is a time trend variable, indicating the number of years since 1947;

$TOTAL_t$ is the value of all goods exported (or imported) from the United States, from NIPA table 4.1.

The most important variable was the OBE trade data, which was highly correlated with the Feenstra data for the eleven years in which the two series overlap. As the subscripts indicate, separate regressions were run for each 2-digit industry group. R-squared statistics indicates that these fit extremely well, often at the .999 level.

Next, regressions were estimated in order to impute the value of total shipments for each 2-digit sector. Model fit was once again extremely good. The basic regression was as follows:

$$SHIPMENT_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_{i1} VALUE\ ADDED_{it} + \beta_{i2} TREND_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where

$SHIPMENT_{it}$ is the total shipment figure for the 2-digit sector in the Feenstra data;

$VALUE\ ADDED_{it}$ is the total value added for the 2-digit sector, from the *Historical*

Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times through 1970, series P-65;

$TREND_t$ is a time trend variable, indicating the number of years since 1947.

The OBE series used to represent exports and imports for each sector are listed in the table below.

Two-Digit SIC Industry Group	Representative OBE Export End-User Categories	Representative OBE Import End-User Categories
20 Food and Kindred Products	0 Foods, feeds, and vegetables	01 Foods, feeds, and beverages, n.e.s., including manufactured and processed

21 Tobacco Manufactures	4112 Cigarettes, cigars, and other tobacco manufactures	4013 Consumer nondurable products, n.e.s., including apparel, handbags, n.e.s.; wigs, toiletries, notions, writing and art supplies, smokers' supplies, printed matter, etc.
22 Textile Mill Products	126 Industrial textile fibers, yarn, fabric—nonagricultural	1203 Manmade filaments, yarns, etc. 121 Textile materials—finished 410A Rugs and other floor coverings
23 Apparel and Related Products	410 Consumer textile products, except rugs	400 Consumer textile products, except rugs
24 Lumber and Wood Products	1240 Logs, Lumber, Plywood, and Veneers	1300 Lumber 1301 Plywood and veneers
25 Furniture and Fixtures	4005 Manufactured consumer durables, n.e.c. (rugs, furniture, cameras, etc.)	4100 Wood furniture, household items, baskets, ski goods, etc.
26 Pulp, Paper and Products	1242 Paper base stocks—pulpwood and wood pulp 1243 Newsprint and other paper products	11 Paper and paper base stocks
27 Printing and Publishing	4111 Books, magazines, maps, and other printed matter	4013 Consumer nondurable products, n.e.s., including apparel, handbags, n.e.s.; wigs, toiletries, notions, writing and art supplies, smokers' supplies, printed matter, etc.
28 Chemicals and Products	125 Chemicals, excluding medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations 4113 Medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations	1225 Industrial chemicals—unfinished 1226 Fertilizers—crude 1230 Industrial chemicals, excluding medicinals—manufactured 1231 Fertilizers—manufactured 4012 Medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations
29 Petroleum and Coal Products	11 Fuel and lubricants	10 Fuel and lubricants
30 Rubber Products	1270 Synthetic rubber, excluding reclaimed rubber 1274 Tires and tubes 1275 Industrial rubber products, n.e.c.	1610 Tires and tubes 4011 Rubber goods, including footwear, drug sundries, etc.
31 Leather and Leather Goods	1271 Leather and furs, unmanufactured 4110 Footwear, luggage, apparel of leather, fur, rubber, or plastic	1220 Hides and skins, except fur skins 1221 Leather 1222 Fur skins 4010 Leather goods, including footwear, gloves, luggage, notions, etc.
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass	1276 Clay, glass (except auto), and other manufactured mineral supplies	1302 Stone, sand, cement and lime 1310 Glass—plate, sheet, etc. (excluding glass for automotive use)
33 Primary Metal Industries	121 Iron and Steel Products, except Advanced Manufactures 122 Nonferrous Metals and Other Primary Metals and Scrap, except Steel—Crude and Semi-Manufactured	141 Iron and steel mill products—semifinished 142 Major nonferrous metals—crude and semifinished 143 Miscellaneous nonferrous metals, n.e.s., and platinum—crude and semifinished
34 Fabricated Metal Products	123 Finished Metal Shapes and Advanced Metal Manufactures, including Advanced Steel, NEC	15 Finished metals associated with durable goods output

35 Machinery, except Electrical	210 Construction and contracting machinery and nonfarm tractors, parts, and attachments 211 Nonelectrical industrial machinery, n.e.c.; parts and attachments, n.e.c. (less 2116, which is associated with SIC 38) 212 Agricultural, scientific, and business machinery; parts and attachments, n.e.c. (less 2122, which is associated with SIC 36, and 2123, which is associated with SIC 38) 4002 Nonelectric cooking and heating equipment, glassware, cutlery, etc.	201 Nonelectrical machinery; miscellaneous transportation equipment excluding auto and aircraft (less 2016, which is associated with SIC 36)
36 Electrical Machinery	20 Electrical machinery, except consumer-type, and related components, n.e.c. 2122 Business machines, including office computing, copying, etc. 4000 Electric household appliances, including air-conditioning 4001 Radio, television, phonographs, tape recorders, and records	200 Electrical machinery, except consumer-type, and related parts and components 2016 Business machines, including office computing, copying, etc. 4103 Household appliances—electric, and radio, TV, and phonographs 4104 Home sewing machines and accessories
37 Transportation Equipment	22 Transportation equipment, except automotive 3 Automotive vehicles, parts and engines	21 Civilian aircraft, engines, and parts 3 Automotive vehicles, parts and engines
38 Instruments and Related Products	2116 Measuring, testing, and control instruments and parts 2123 Scientific, professional, medical, and hospital instruments and equipment 4003 Clocks, watches, jewelry, and antiques	4106 Photographic and optical goods, consumer-type 4108 Clocks, watches, and parts
39 Miscellaneous Manufactures	4004 Toys, sporting and amusement equipment, and pleasure boats	4107 Toys, shooting, and sporting goods, n.e.s. 4109 Consumer hardgoods, n.e.s.—jewelry, artworks, musical instruments, etc.

Exports, Imports, and Shipments by Sector, 1995-2000. Peter Schott has developed export and import data comparable to Feentra's that are available at his website, http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm. The Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis records data on total shipments at the 2- 3- and 4-digit level. (These are available at <http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gpo.htm>.)

Schott's data were aggregated at the 2-digit level and paired with the commerce department shipment data for the 1995-2000 period.

State industrial structure. Estimating the overall export-orientation and import-sensitivity of manufacturing in each state also requires data on their industrial structure. Personal income data disaggregated by sector after 1958 are readily available from the Department of Commerce. For the 1947-57 period, only data on value added by manufacturing is available at the sectoral level. These data are rather fragmentary, with nothing available for 1948, and values for many other sector-years missing in each state. Treating these missing values as zeroes would be unrealistic, because data on subsequent years strongly suggests that some activity was taking place in these sectors in years when the annual *Survey of Manufactures* or periodic *Census of Manufactures* record no value-added.

Missing values were imputed using the best-fitting subset of the following regression, using the impute command in State 7 SE.

$$\text{VALUE-ADDED}_{ijt} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta_{1ij}\text{VALUE-ADDED}_{it} + \beta_{2ij}\text{VALUE-ADDED}_{jt} + \beta_{3ij}\text{MOVING AVERAGE}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

In this equation, the subscript *i* denotes the state, *j* the two-digit SIC manufacturing sector, and *t* the year. As the equation implies, imputations were done for each state-sector based on total value-added in the state and national value-added in the sector.

These two series were complete except for 1948 for all states and sectors. (For estimation, 1948 was linearly interpolated.)

Agricultural Data

Exports and imports by commodity group. Export, import, and production data were collected for eleven major agricultural commodity groups produced in the United

States. (Many agricultural imports, such as coffee, are not domestically produced. These have no effect on import sensitivity.) These commodity groups are:

1. Meat and poultry⁹
2. Dairy products
3. Wool
4. Food grains (including wheat and rice)
5. Feed grains (including corn, barley, and oats)
6. Cotton, excluding linters
7. Tobacco, unmanufactured
8. Oil crops (including soybeans and other oilseeds)
9. Vegetables
10. Fruits and nuts (not including bananas, which are not domestically produced)
11. Sugar

Complete export and import data on these commodity groups were available for the 1948-2001 period with three exceptions (Economic Research Service, annual). First, because fruit and nut preparations were excluded from the post-1978 data, values comparable to those recorded for the 1948-77 period were imputed using the 1978-2001 data, total imports of supplementary (i.e., also domestically produced) agricultural commodities, and lagged values of the 1948-77 data. Second, imports of wool, cotton, and tobacco, for the 1984-88 period were linearly interpolated from FATUS data. Third, food grain imports prior to 1989 are assumed to be one tenth of feed grain imports. Data are not published on imports of rice and wheat before 1989, but these were consistently much less than the trade in other grains and feeds even after that date. Although this assumption is quite artificial, it is probably not very important because of the small amount of imports relative to domestic production before the 1990s. Finally, exports of sugar and wool, for which no data are available, are assumed to be zero.

⁹ Although state-level production data on poultry were gathered, a consistent series disaggregating exports and imports could not be assembled.

State agricultural production by commodity group. As with manufacturing, estimating state agricultural export orientation and import-sensitivity required data on state commodity production. Farm cash receipts data gathered by the Department of Agriculture were used for this purpose. (These data are available online from the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture at <http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmIncome/finfidmu.htm>.) The following regression model was used to impute missing values for cash receipts series for each commodity group j in state i .

$$\text{CASH RECEIPTS}_{ijt} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta_{1ij}\text{CASH RECEIPTS}_{it} + \beta_{2ij}\text{CASH RECEIPTS}_{jt} + \beta_{3ij}\text{MOVING AVERAGE}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

As with the data on manufacturing value added, the subscript i denotes the state, j the commodity, and t the year.

Computing Export Orientation and Import Sensitivity

Once data on state economic structure and industry/commodity data on the share of exports and imports were complete, estimates for state agricultural and manufacturing export orientation and import sensitivity were computed as follows. Y indicates personal income, E indicates exports, I indicates imports, and S indicates shipments. States are subscripted with i , and two-digit SIC sectors by j , and manufacturing as a whole with m .

$$\text{State manufacturing export orientation} = \frac{Y_{mi}}{Y_i} \sum_{j=1}^J \left(\frac{S_{ij}}{\sum_{j=1}^J S_{ij}} * \frac{E_j}{S_j} \right)$$

$$\text{State manufacturing import sensitivity} = \frac{Y_{mi}}{Y_i} \sum_{j=1}^J \left(\frac{S_{ij}}{\sum_{j=1}^J S_{ij}} * \frac{I_j}{S_j} \right)$$

Two aspects of these indices are worth noting. First, each sector's share of manufacturing in the state was determined by its share of total shipments from all manufacturing sectors, rather than its share of personal income in manufacturing, because shipments were used to measure export orientation and import sensitivity. Second, the weighted sum of sectoral export and import shares is adjusted for the size of the manufacturing sector in each state using personal income data because personal income was the only consistently available indicator of the total size of the state economy. This makes sense politically, because even a very export-oriented manufacturing sector may be politically unimportant if it constitutes only a small share of overall economic activity. The index indicates the impact of manufactured exports and imports on the economy of the state as a whole.

Similarly, agricultural export orientation and import sensitivity were computed for each state as follows. In this case, C indicates agricultural cash receipts, agricultural commodities are subscripted with k, and agriculture as a whole with a:

$$\text{State agricultural export orientation} = \frac{Y_{ai}}{Y_i} \sum_{k=1}^K \left(\frac{C_{ik}}{\sum_{k=1}^K C_{ik}} * \frac{E_k}{C_k} \right)$$

$$\text{State agricultural import sensitivity} = \frac{Y_{ai}}{Y_i} \sum_{k=1}^K \left(\frac{C_{ik}}{\sum_{k=1}^K C_{ik}} * \frac{I_k}{C_k} \right)$$

As the equations indicate, the sum of imports as a share of cash receipts over all the major commodity groups was weighted by that commodity's share of cash receipts for the included commodity groups rather by its share of all agricultural cash receipts. While export and import data were estimated for all 20 SIC major industry groups, exports and imports could not be estimated for all agricultural commodities. The eleven major

commodity groups examined comprised a very large share of agricultural production, but not all of it. Thus, the estimate for agricultural trade orientation assumes that the remaining groups shared the trade orientation of those actually measured. Although this assumption may be misleading in some cases, it is preferable to assuming instead that commodities for which no data were available were untraded. As with manufacturing, the agricultural export and import scores were adjusted for the size of the agricultural sector as a proportion of personal income in the state.

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Table 1.
Probit Models of Senate Voting on National Security Policy, 1947-2000

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Manufacturing export-orientation	57.38* (10.28)	47.10* (10.22)	16.99* (9.24)	22.94* (9.46)
Manufacturing import-competition	-35.55* (6.63)	-33.43* (6.61)	-25.20* (5.75)	-29.31* (5.83)
Agricultural export-orientation	1.71 (2.46)	3.89 (2.30)	0.75 (2.18)	0.32 (2.24)
Agricultural import-competition	-8.46 (5.31)	-2.77 (5.37)	1.93 (3.86)	0.72 (3.88)
Military share of personal income	-2.49 (1.80)	0.72 (1.80)	-2.92 (1.76)	-4.73 (1.81)
Ideology		0.86* (0.06)	1.61* (0.10)	-1.60* (0.13)
1964-2000 period			-1.64* (0.22)	-0.65* (0.25)
Ideology * 1964-2000 period			3.53* (0.12)	3.59* (0.12)
Democrat				-0.05 (0.07)
Member of president's party				0.41* (0.03)
Female				-0.24* (0.12)
College Education				0.16* (0.09)
Military experience				-0.06 (0.04)
Constant	-1.41* (0.26)	-0.40 (0.23)	1.40* (0.25)	1.06* (0.27)
Observations	13,785	13,785	13,785	13,129
Pseudo R-squared	0.11	0.14	0.24	0.28

Note: The dependent variable is the individual vote on *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* key votes on military resource allocation, foreign aid, and intervention. All models include fixed-effect dummy variables for each roll call vote and each state. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the state-year are in parentheses beneath coefficient estimate. Starred coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test. Export-orientation is estimated manufacturing and agricultural exports as a proportion share of state personal income. Import-competition is manufactured goods and agricultural products produced in the state that are also imported from abroad, as a proportion of state personal income.

Table 2.
Regression Models of Senators' Ideologies in Their First Year in the Senate

Variable	All Senators	Elected Senators only	Elected Senators, 1960-2000
Manufacturing export-orientation	23.41* (8.88)	29.13* (10.23)	24.96* (12.12)
Manufacturing import-competition	-6.41 (4.97)	-13.14* (6.07)	-9.76 (6.92)
Agricultural export-orientation	-10.42 (4.26)	-12.40 (4.88)	-14.50 (7.27)
Agricultural import-competition	4.85 (5.28)	5.49 (5.87)	9.87 (11.72)
Military share of personal income	-1.52 (2.18)	-2.70 (2.64)	-6.73 (3.88)
Constant	-0.54* (0.17)	-0.49* (0.19)	-0.57* (0.26)
Observations	373	263	180
R-squared	0.33	0.33	0.32

Note: The dependent variable is an individual Senator's DW-NOMINATE ideology score in his or her first year in the Senate. All models include fixed-effect dummy variables for each state. Starred coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test. Export-orientation is estimated manufacturing and agricultural exports as a proportion share of state personal income. Import-competition is manufactured goods and agricultural products produced in the state that are also imported from abroad, as a proportion of state personal income.

Figure 1.
Ideology and Support for National Security Policy

