

Repeal in Historical Context: Key Parliamentary Debates on the Corn Laws Before 1846

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey

*Government Department
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Ph. (44) 020 7955 7187
Fax (44) 020 8658 5738
Email: c.m.schonhardt-bailey@lse.ac.uk
Website: <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/schonhar/>*

Abstract

In this paper, I use computer-assisted content analysis to identify themes in Parliamentary Debates on trade policy during three key junctures prior to the famous Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846: 1814-15, leading to the passage of the 1815 Corn Law; 1826-28, leading to the 1828 Sliding Scale; and 1842-44, leading to Prime Minister Peel's new sliding scale and the defeat of League-sponsored motions for repeal. The software (ALCESTE) allows me to fully analyse the content of nearly 900,000 words of text in order to assess the influences of institutions, interests and ideas on the thinking of MPs over a thirty-year period during which Britain shifted from a highly protectionist trade policy to one of unilateral free trade. I identify both economic and political themes for each set of debates and then map these into correspondence space, thus enabling an analysis of how key characteristics of MPs (party affiliation and constituency economic make-up) were associated with specific themes. In sum, the analysis of MPs' speeches helps to trace the demand-side momentum for Repeal of the Corn Laws, and supports previous work that models the shift to free trade as the product of both demand-side and supply-side pressures.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In Chapter XX, I argue that in the years before 1846, the Anti-Corn Law League generated considerable pressure on MPs to embrace free trade, as evidenced by its registration campaign, widespread propaganda and speaking tour. The League helped to create a momentum for free trade, which achieved some success in converting more Liberals and in moving Peelites nearer to the brink of free trade. The 1846 debates illustrate that MPs were highly conscious of League pressure, but these debates do not trace the demand-side *momentum* for repeal—that is, they do not capture how MPs perceived the League’s campaign *prior* to the Government’s introduction of the repeal legislation. Hence, to better gauge the effect of demand-side pressures for repeal *independent of* the supply-side shift, we must examine MPs speeches on repeal before 1846.

A second thread left hanging from Chapter XX is the question of the *novelty* of the “re-interpretation of repeal”. I argue that it was this supply-side shift¹ that ultimately explains why the Peelites converted to repeal. But, in order to gauge its novelty, we must examine the statements of MPs earlier in the 1841-47 Parliament. If the re-interpretation of repeal is indeed unique to 1846, we should not find MPs discussing free trade in terms of the “territorial constitution” or related concepts in the years preceding 1846.

Other, more general considerations also arise as one reflects on this demand-side / supply-side interpretation of repeal. First, how did the delegate and trustee theme evolve in the thinking of early nineteenth century MPs as they considered trade policy? The clash between Liberal delegates and Conservative trustees shaped how Peelites came to re-define repeal, and so, it is worth questioning how this theme developed over time in the context of British trade policy.

Second, through textual analysis of parliamentary debates we can gauge the influences of institutions, interests and ideas on the thinking of MPs, and so it is worth questioning the extent to which key changes in these factors influenced MPs. In particular, (1) did the 1832 Reform Act shape how MPs viewed constituency interests on the topics of trade and agriculture?; (2) did the lobbying of the Anti-Corn Law League affect how MPs viewed their roles as representatives?; and (3) to what extent did MPs absorb the ideas of the political economists as they considered British trade policy in the decades preceding repeal?

Given these motivations, I apply the same Alceste textual analysis to parliamentary debates on trade policy during three key junctures prior to 1846: 1814-15, leading to the passage of the 1815 Corn Law; 1826-28, leading to the 1828 Sliding Scale; and 1842-44, leading to Peel’s new sliding scale and the defeat of League-sponsored motions for repeal. Following a brief sketch of the revisions in the Corn Law before 1846 (in sections II, III and IV), and a presentation of the Alceste results (in section V), I address the questions posed above (in section VI). In Section VI, I first attempt to gauge the extent to which lobbying by the Anti-Corn Law League created increased pressure on MPs to support repeal. I focus on the 1842-44 debates in order to gauge the role of the League independent of the supply-side shift in early 1846. At issue is whether there is clear evidence to demonstrate a League-sponsored momentum for free trade early in the 1841-47 Parliament. The 1842-44 debates also allow us to evaluate the second theme of this chapter—i.e., the *novelty* of the territorial constitution argument. If my argument about the supply-side shift is correct, this theme should not feature prominently (if at all) in debates on trade policy in the early years of this Parliament. Rather, it should arise as a new theme in 1846. Third, I examine how MPs viewed their roles as representatives, and in particular, whether the conflict between delegates and trustees featured in the pre-repeal debates. Finally, I explore how changes in institutions, interests and ideas affected MPs’ thinking on trade policy. The fundamental *institutional* change was the 1832 Reform Act, which enfranchised the middle class and improved the representation of industrial areas. The Anti-Corn Law League provided the critical shift in *interests* as it mobilized a multi-faceted lobbying campaign against the Corn Laws. More gradually, political economists like Ricardo, Torrens and McCullough were creating a *liberal ideology* which embraced free trade (in various forms). Though the League popularised and propagated many of the ideas of the political economists (hence, effectively fusing interests and ideas, or “Nationalizing the Interest”), it is likely that (some) MPs were receptive to these ideas before the League organized in 1838.

II. THE CORN LAW OF 1815 AND THE SLIDING SCALE²

Government regulation of exports and imports of corn was well-established long before the nineteenth-century (Barnes 1930). The Corn Laws of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries had a dual purpose--they sought to prevent “grain from being at any time, either so dear that the poor cannot subsist, or so cheap that the farmer cannot live by growing of it.”³ The Napoleonic Wars brought a fundamental change in the history of the Corn Laws. During the war years, agriculturists had enjoyed high grain prices, but with the peace prices fell dramatically.⁴ In response, Parliament enacted the Corn Law of 1815, which allowed free entry when the price of corn was above 80s. per quarter, and prohibited entry when the price fell below 80s. Some argue that this new legislation, unlike that of the earlier Corn Laws, was “defiantly protective”. “It sought to fasten on a country at peace the protection furnished by a generation of war.”⁵ Hence, economic *interests* comprised an important motivation for the 1815 law. Others maintain, however, that fear of scarcity drove government policy. Rapid population growth and a dependence upon foreign corn are said to have justified a policy of self-sufficiency based on concerns for national security.⁶ This second justification is thus more concerned with aggregate national welfare. A third rationale for the move to protection is that the Government hurriedly passed the legislation in order to gain the support of landowners as it scrambled to pay its war debt⁷ -- which provides a budgetary impetus for the law.

The 1815 law suffered from two basic flaws--it generated no government revenue from protection and it was too rigid. Public petitions of distress that resulted from the 1815 law were directed to a Select Committee of the House of Commons, whose report was drafted by William Huskisson. In the report, Huskisson called for a return to the “practically free” trade that existed before 1815.⁸ The Act of 1822 allowed wheat to be imported until the price fell to 70s., at which point imports were again prohibited. In 1822, David Ricardo proposed that protection should be withdrawn gradually, beginning with a fixed duty of 20s. and lowered by annual reductions of 1s., until it reached 10s., at which it would then remain.⁹ By 1827, discussion was not of free trade in corn, but rather of the choice between a fixed duty (as Ricardo suggested) or a sliding scale (as Huskisson, President of the Board of Trade, proposed). Practical considerations drove the discussions. The fixed duty avoided the problem of averaging prices which any sliding scale would face. George Canning (Foreign Secretary)¹⁰ and others stressed that a fixed duty would not allow flexibility in times of scarcity, posing the likelihood that the Government would be forced to suspend the duty during such times¹¹. Other politicians favoured the sliding scale because it, unlike the fixed duty that was favoured by the “cold-blooded political economists”, was based on “experience” not “theory”¹². Huskisson’s justification for the sliding scale was that it remedied the worst feature of 1815--rigidity. The agriculturists rejected Huskisson’s 1827 bill, however, on the grounds that his pivot point of 60s. (from which the duty of 20s. would gradually descend) would afford them inadequate protection. In drafting the 1827 bill, Huskisson and the Duke of Wellington (to become Prime Minister in 1828) became embroiled in a fundamental disagreement: the former sought to move towards freer trade in corn, while the latter sought to consolidate protection for agriculture.¹³ In 1828, Huskisson and Wellington agreed upon a sliding scale tariff for corn, so that as the price rose the duty would fall. Fay described the 1828 sliding scale as “Huskisson’s sliding scale spoiled.”¹⁴ While Huskisson suggested a pivot point of 60s. or 62s., the 1828 Act legislated 66s. According to the 1828 Act, when the price of British wheat was 52s. per quarter or below, the duty would be 34s. 8d.; as the price rose, the duty would fall to 1s. when the price hit 73s. The 1828 scale also differed from Huskisson’s in that it introduced large jumps in the scale (a 13s. 8d. duty at 69s., and 1s. at 73s.). Speculators took advantage of the rapid descent of the scale when prices were high, withholding sales until the price rose one or two shillings to avoid the payment of duties. In spite of this defect, the 1828 act continued to operate until Peel introduced a modified sliding scale in 1842. Peel’s sliding scale differed from both the 1827 bill and the 1828 Act in that it abolished the pivot point. Peel also lessened the incentive for speculation by smoothing out the scale at the lower end and reducing the maximum duty to 20s. when the price hit 51s. or below.

III. THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE 1815 CORN LAW

In brief, 1815, 1828 and 1842 were the years of significant changes in the Corn Laws. Paralleling the history of Corn Law legislation were major demographic and economic changes that cut against the fabric of protection for food. From 1811 to 1841 the population of Great Britain was assessed to have

increased from 12.6 million to 18 million and British farmers were becoming less able to provide sufficient supplies for the home market. This said, while Britain had not been self-sufficient in corn since the early 1760s, British agriculturists “still managed to feed every year on the average all except about 700,000 and as late as 1831-40, all except about 1,050,000 of the population.”¹⁵ A second factor proved more fatal to the Corn Laws--the growth of British manufacturing industry and export trade, especially in textiles. More particularly, as the industrial prosperity and export boom of the early 1830s began to crack, industrialists became increasingly vocal about “unfair” protection enjoyed by the agriculturists. Beginning in 1836, an economic downturn together with a series of poor harvests sparked the industrialists into action. High food prices and unemployment gave impetus both to the middle and working classes, the former organised as the Anti-Corn Law League and the latter as the Chartist movement.

IV. THE ANTI-CORN LAW LEAGUE

The Anti-Corn Law League was the first modern and national-level political pressure group to emerge in Britain. It began in London in 1836 as the Anti-Corn Law Association, but by 1838 had found its natural base in Manchester. The leaders of the League were manufacturers and professionals engaged in the export trade, most of whom were concentrated in the county of Lancashire. Foremost among its leaders were two cotton textile manufacturers--Richard Cobden and John Bright. In the course of the struggle against the Corn Laws, both were to become Members of Parliament, Cobden for Stockport and Bright for Rochdale. Another key MP in the Corn Law struggle was Charles Villiers, Member for Wolverhampton. It was Villiers who became famous for his annual motions for repeal of the Corn Laws, which began in 1838 and continued until 1846.

Historians refer to the League as “the most impressive of nineteenth-century pressure groups, which exercised a distinct influence on the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846” (Howe 1984). It was called the *league machine*, whose organisation “presents one of the first examples of a recurring feature of modern political life, the highly organised political pressure group with its centralised administration and its formidable propaganda apparatus.”¹⁶ The *Times* even led with an article announcing the League as “a great fact” (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: v II, art 17).¹⁷ The two key features of the League’s operational strategy were its nation-wide propaganda and electoral registration campaigns. The League raised substantial subscriptions to finance its propaganda campaign. It maintained a small army of workers and speakers, who toured the country distributing numerous tracts (most notably, the famous *Anti-Corn Law Circular*¹⁸) and giving thousands of speeches on the virtues of free trade and the evils of protection. The registration campaign was the League’s tool for replacing protectionist landowners in Parliament with free trade supporters. After electoral losses in 1841-2, the League focused its energy and resources on returning a free trade majority in the expected general election of 1848. In order to achieve this, its leaders adopted a tactical strategy which included manipulating the voter registers and employing propaganda devices on existing voters. Looking toward the 1848 election, the League sought to add as many free traders and delete as many protectionists from these registers as possible. The latter they accomplished by making objections against thousands of protectionists at the annual revisions of the registers. The former required a different tactic--exploiting a loophole in the 1832 Electoral Reform Act (which effectively enfranchised the middle class). This loophole was the forty-shilling county property qualification, which Bright referred to as “the great constitutional weapon which we intend to wield” (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: v II, art 19). While the 40s. qualification had been a feature of the system since 1430, the increase in county seats from 188 to 253 (an increase from roughly 29% to 38% of the total seats) magnified the importance of this overlooked loophole in the 1832 Reform Act.¹⁹ The League used the 40s. qualification to create several thousand new free trade voters in county constituencies with large urban electorates, constituencies whose representation was increased by the Reform Act. Leaguers went so far as to urge parents, wanting to create a nest-egg for a son, to make him a freeholder: in Cobden’s words, “it is an act of duty, for you make him thereby an independent freeman, and put it in his power to defend himself and his children from political oppression” (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: v II, art 18). In spite of an Appeal Court ruling in February 1845 and January 1846 that votes created by the 40s. freehold qualification were valid, protectionists continued to challenge the constitutionality of the League’s registration campaign (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: v II, arts 7, 10, 11), and Leaguers continued to defend their activities (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: v II, arts 9, 10).

The propaganda and registration campaigns, moreover, were brought together to further the political success of the League. As its agents distributed propaganda tracts to every elector in 24 county divisions and 187 boroughs, they submitted to the League headquarters consistent and complete reports on the electorate in their districts. These reports provided the League with a comprehensive picture of the electoral scene throughout England, thereby allowing it much greater knowledge of, and control over, electoral districts than either the Conservatives or Liberals possessed “with their more limited and local organisation.”²⁰ The earlier distribution of propaganda tracts thus provided the League with an extensive data base from which they could inflict political pressure on Members of Parliament, who were concerned with their bids for re-election in the expected 1848 election.

In 1844, as the League’s success--particularly that of its registration campaign in the counties--became more conspicuous, a defensive Anti-League (or, Agricultural Protection Society) emerged (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: v II, arts 21, 22). This group of protectionist landowners and farmers did not, however, match the momentum or stature of the League. According to W.H. Chaloner, the Anti-League “failed to make an impression on British agricultural policy because Conservative politicians were reluctant to speak or vote against Sir Robert Peel until 1846, and it cannot be said that its literary contribution was as solid or as logical as that of the Free Traders” (Chaloner 1970). In financial terms, while the League grew from a £5000 annual fund in 1839 to one of £250,000 in 1845, the latter year saw the core of the Anti-League (the Essex Agricultural Protection Society) scraping together the paltry sum of £2000 to fund its campaign (McCord 1958; Crosby 1976).

A second challenge to the League was the Chartist movement. The Chartists were an organised working class movement that sought Parliamentary reform, arguing that reform must encompass the entire social and political horizon. In contrast, the League chose a single-issue strategy--to gain repeal. Clashes between the Chartists and the League often erupted in open hostility and violence, as Chartists viewed Leaguers as traitors to the reform movement, and conversely, Leaguers criticised Chartists for pushing unrealistic reforms and thereby threatening to sabotage their focused strategy (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: v II, arts 14, 23).

Quite clearly, MPs faced multiple pressures in the decades before repeal. Parliamentary debates provide an excellent means for gauging how these pressures unfolded over time.

V. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE 1814/15, 1826/28 AND 1842/44 DEBATES

a. Basic Statistics

Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide the basic statistics for the 1814/15, 1826/28 and 1842/44 debates. The total word count for each period was, respectively, 184,660; 135,597, and 571,775. It should be noted that in the earlier periods, debates were often not reported verbatim but rather were written more in summary (Aspinall 1956; Gordon 1983: 232-33), and so the word count is, on average, lower. Nonetheless, for both the 1815 and 1828 periods, the 10,000 word minimum for successful Alceste results is well exceeded. Moreover, 595 speeches and interjections were analysed for 1814/15, 363 for 1826/28, and 408 for 1842/44. And, between 75% to 85% of the retained E.C.U.s were classified. Finally, the tables report a total of five classes for 1814/15, four for 1826/28, and seven for 1842/44. (Appendix 1 lists all the speakers for the first two sets of debates, while Appendix 2 details the parliamentary activity on the Corn Laws during these time periods. For a list of all the MPs who spoke during the critical repeal debates in 1846, see Appendix YYY in my forthcoming book (Schonhardt-Bailey forthcoming)).

b. Identifying the Themes in the Debates

For each set of debates, Tables 4, 5 and 6 list the most characteristic words associated with each class. Similar to the results for 1846, the most characteristic words are those with high chi-squared values. Words ending with “+” indicate that these are reduced forms (e.g., cultiv+ may refer to cultivate, cultivators, cultivated, and so on).

i. 1814/15 Debates

For 1814/15, an examination of the word lists and the representative ECUs for each class reveals the following themes: Class 1 - *Prices and Rents*; Class 2 - *Parliamentary Rhetoric*; Class 3 - *Food Self-Sufficiency*; Class 4 - *Grain Trade*; and Class 5 - *Petitions and Civil Unrest*.

1. Prices and Rents

For Class 1, words such as “poor+”, “cultiv+”, “labour+”, “wages”, “bread”, “landlord+”, “rate+”, “tenant+”, and “price+”, suggest that MPs were concerned with the effect of falling grain prices on the farmers and landowners (“cultivators”). But, core to this discussion was the question of how falling prices--and inflated land rents--were affecting labourers and tenants, and of course, landlords. The logic behind this theme is that the government sought not only to protect but also to extend capital investment in agriculture, particularly by protecting marginal lands (which reinforces the interests-based explanation for the 1815 law, described in Section II). If falling prices forced agriculturalists to abandon inferior land (which required intensive cultivation), employment would fall and poor rates would rise. Protection provided a means to promote investment in “high farming”—that is, advanced farming methods that would lead to higher yields. Higher yields would, in turn, allow farmers to pay landlords higher rents, thereby resolving the conflict between landlords and tenants over high rents (Hilton 1977). These sentiments are seen in the top 20 ECUs from this theme (chi squared values are in brackets)²¹:

(47) he agreed that rents must and ought to fall. Rents were the effect and not the cause of prices. The landlords had properly taken advantage of the high prices to raise their rents, and they should, now the prices were low, reduce them, and would not be worse off with the lower than they had been with the higher rents.

(33) He considered rent as one of the charges which the farmer incurred in the cultivation of his land, and he knew that rents had been raised in some instances exorbitantly high.

(28) Let me next ask if the landed gentlemen will have all the advantages from the high price of corn that are held out to them? I have already noticed the effect that would inevitably be produced on the poor rates, and the price of labour, by dearness of grain and that in many instances the increased price of bread directly raises the price of labour.

(25) The cultivator of the land at home had a very heavy tax to pay before he could bring his corn to market. It was the land that paid the poor rates, that paid the functionaries of religion; it was from the rents of the land that churches were built and roads made.

2. Parliamentary Rhetoric

As will be seen shortly, every set of debates (including 1846) includes one class whose content is best described as *Parliamentary Rhetoric*. This is the case for Class 2 in the 1814/15 debates. Words such as “propose+”, “intention+”, “move+”, “report+” and so on illustrate that the substance of this class concerns the *process* of legislation, and so is not of particular relevance to our discussion here.

3. Food Self-Sufficiency

A concern for maintaining Britain’s *food self-sufficiency* is the theme for Class 3, with characteristic words including, “countr+”, “supplie+”, “foreign+”, “depend+”, “independent+”, and “food”. This theme provides empirical grounding for the aggregate national welfare justification for the 1815 law (see Section II). As Boyd Hilton explains: “It was precisely because Europe could *not* feed England that English cultivation had to be protected and expanded. Such surplus as there was abroad would rarely suffice to fill a deficiency, but would be quite enough to drive down prices, especially since the home grower, never sure how large a foreign surplus would prove to be, was liable to rush his own corn on to losing markets in panic.” (Hilton 1977: 22) It was not until later in the century, when Britain relied more on foodstuffs from regions with different climatic conditions, that autarchy lost its appeal as an argument for protection (Hilton 1977: 22). Top representative ECUs illustrate this theme:

(32) If any one branch of the wealth of nations ought to be encouraged more than another, it was agriculture. It was that on which all depended. It differed from every other source of prosperity, as it was the first necessary. Even were foreign countries able to supply us, we ought not to depend on them.

(29) Situated as this country was, equally the admiration and the envy of every other, it became their duty to watch carefully over its interests, to guard against it being dependent on any country, and least of all dependent on France.

(28) He therefore told his constituents; that it was their interest; that it was the universal interest of the nation to encourage the industry of our own countrymen, by preferring the produce of our own agriculture to that of foreigners, and thus to render ourselves independent of foreign supply.

4. Grain Trade

Class 4, titled *Grain Trade*, refers to a long history of previous legislation on the grain trade (Fay 1932). This class reflects less a discussion and more a report of previous restrictions on foreign trade (which had bearing on the bill currently under discussion). Words such as “British”, “duty”, “licence”, and “preced+” characterize this theme. One ECU (which is representative of the rest) illustrates that the content is more a report than a discussion:

(114) 1802. 43 G 3, c12. Further to continue the preceding act, authorizing the King to permit importation and to stop exportation. 1803. 44 G 3, c.4 ditto. 1804. 44 G 3 c.109. Repeals the prices at which corn might be exported and imported under the 31 G 3 c30 except the warehousing duties.

5. Petitions and Civil Unrest

Class 5, titled *Petitions and Civil Unrest*, reflects MPs’ responses to the many petitions against the 1815 Corn Bill that were submitted to Parliament. Characteristic words such as “sign+”, “public+”, “opinion+”, “express+”, “people+”, “represent+”, and “clamour”, suggest that MPs were concerned about the numerous protests (both in the form of petitions and demonstrations) against the Corn Bill. Interestingly, the representative ECUs reveal a disdain, bordering on contempt, for these petitions. While this theme is an early precursor to the 1846 themes of “electoral connection” and “MPs as trustees”, it clearly demonstrates that the concept of MPs as delegates had not yet formed in the minds of MPs. Rather, MPs saw themselves entirely as trustees, willing to act *against* the wishes of their constituents as they saw fit:

(35) . . . and if the persons concerned in the tumults out of doors thought their representatives in Parliament so lost to themselves, and so forgetful of their duty to the community, as to suffer these disgraceful riots to have any influence on their conduct . . .

(28) Sir John Newport opposed the Committee. It would only occasion useless delay, and give opportunity for raising a clamour against the measure. The House should never suffer clamour of this kind to have the least influence upon their decisions.

(26) Mr Alderman C. Smith said, the amendment should have his cordial support. He expressed his concern to observe, that the Hon. Gentlemen who were in favour of the bill seemed so very anxious to hurry it through the House, in the teeth of so many numerous signed petitions, which were pouring in every day, almost unanimously and decidedly against the measure.

(25) He gave due weight to the petitions; but when he had once made up his mind, no quantity of petitions heaped on the table, or of clamour out of doors, should induce him to give his vote against his judgment.

In sum, the evidence supports two of the three commonly cited explanations for the 1815 law—namely, propping up the economic interests of agriculturalists, and ensuring food self-sufficiency for Britain. No evidence is found, however, that MPs linked the 1815 law with the budgetary aim of repaying the war-time debt. What is evident is that both contemporary and secondary interpretations of the initial shift to protection have discounted the importance of petitions and civil unrest as MPs considered the legislation. Even though MPs expressed contempt for constituency demands (thereby defending their roles as trustees), constituents (including the unenfranchised (Taylor 1995)) nonetheless sought to exert influence on MPs and MPs, in turn, felt compelled to acknowledge this pressure by defending their independence from it. Hence, we see an early tension emerging between the delegate and trustee modes of representation, with constituents pressuring MPs to behave as delegates and MPs resisting this initial pressure.

For 1826/28, an examination of the word lists and the representative ECUs for each class reveal the following themes: Class 1 – *Grain Trade*; Class 2 – *Political Economy: Capital, Labour, Land*; Class 3 – *Electoral Connection and Public Opinion*; and Class 4 – *Parliamentary Rhetoric*.

1. Grain Trade

Similar to the 1814/15 debates on the *Grain Trade*, the first theme examines the history of British trade in grain—but, now the focus is more on the recent history of the 1815 Corn Bill. Characteristic words such as “import+”, “year+”, “grain+”, “corn”, “freight+”, and “duty” make evident the focus on grain imports and exports. The representative ECUs, however, are more revealing, in that they depict the general dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the 1815 Corn Law and a discussion of the various permutations of a sliding scale:

(36) . . . the effect of which was, that the law of 1815, sanctioning the admission of foreign corn at 80s, came into operation. The next year, however, the summer having proved exceedingly fine and favourable to the harvest, the price of corn fell as rapidly as it had before risen, the consequence was, that the farmers were frightened out of their wits, and predicted, . . .

(31) . . . the result was, therefore, that the ports remained closed during three starving months from August to November 1816; and did not open until the 15th November of that year, after the price had been for about fifteen weeks, above the importing price, and when all the northern ports of Europe were shut against supply.

(28) He did not think that evils to be apprehended from fluctuation of price would be corrected by commencing the duty at 20s when the price at 60s. If there was a deficiency in the supply, the price would easily rise to 65s; and if by the fall in the stock of grain here the price would rise to 70s, the foreign grower would pour a great quantity into this country at a great advantage; . . .

(25) Let the price of corn in England be 55s per quarter, the duty on corn imported would then be 30s; so that the price of corn bought in the Baltic for 25s per quarter, and subsequently brought to England, would be 55s, independent of the cost of freight, insurance, etc., which would be a dead loss to the importer.

2. Political Economy

Class 2 is titled *Political Economy: Capital, Labour, Land* as it raises more general issues of the political economy of the factors of production. Characteristic words include “wages”, “manufactur+”, “capital+”, “cultiv+”, “labour+”, “land+” and “classes”. The ECUs illustrate two core issues of particular concern to MPs. First, the inflationary effects of the 1815 corn law suffered criticism. Some MPs focused simply on the rising food prices:

(34) . . . and in proportion as the price of food rose, the greater would be the necessity of having recourse to sterile soils for the production of corn; and consequently the greater would be the expense of feeding the population. If that population was industrious and by industry was adding to the general wealth of the country, it was most desirable that they should be fed at the cheapest rate.

Others argued that protection raised labour costs in agriculture, and this fed through to labour costs in manufacturing:

(28) . . . capital was the life and active principle of that commerce, and on the profits of that capital the subsistence of so many depended. In raising the price of corn here by prohibition, or by high duties equivalent to prohibition, you increase the price of labour;

(32) . . . but if the trade in corn were thrown open, it would afford a vent for those manufactures; and every knife or stocking sent abroad would produce a profit, that would enable the manufacturer to pay his portion of the interest of the national debt.

Huskisson’s fear that an inflationary price spiral would undermine the fixed money settlement of 1819 and thereby threaten the stability of the currency forms the backdrop to this discussion. As Huskisson

noted in earlier debates: “In the present value of money a monopoly of the corn market, up to the price of 80s a quarter, and the continuance of a great paper circulation, constantly convertible into coin at a *fixed* standard, are, I will venture to say, for any considerable number of years, incompatible.” (quoted in (Hilton 1977: 280)

A second political-economy theme transcended domestic interests by arguing that freer trade in agriculture would induce other countries to specialize in agriculture, and thereby leave Britain to dominate world trade in manufactures:

(30) . . . and induce them to return to the natural labour of an agricultural country the production of grain. By these means this country, possessing more capital than all others, would be able to extend her commerce to an indefinite extent, by exchanging her manufactures for the corn of America and the other nations of the world;

From their parliamentary speeches it is clear that MPs were increasingly aware of the practical relevance of the theories of the economists for British trade policy, particularly links between trade policy and, issues of inflation, labour costs, currency stability and British economic hegemony.

3. Electoral Connection and Public Opinion

Class 3, *Electoral Connection and Public Opinion*, exhibits characteristic words such as “interest+”, “parliament+”, “discuss+”, “connect+”, “feelings” and “consider” (Table 5). Yet, it is the ECUs that illustrate the content of this class most clearly:

(36) . . . gentlemen who had already addressed the House. He saw how hopeless any effort on his part must be in the present temper of the House; but he should, nevertheless, endeavour to discharge with fidelity the duty he owed to his constituents.

(29) . . . but he hoped it would not be considered too much if he said, that when any question was propounded in which the people expressed a decided voice, the House was doing itself harm, by not listening to what their representatives had to say.

(22) . . . springing from the people, he was of the people, and was proud of being their champion, either in or out of that House. At the present moment this petition was of peculiar interest, as it was intimately in alliance with a subject which absorbed, more than any other, the attention of Parliament – the Corn Laws.

(21) . . . some prayed for a total abolition of the Corn laws; other petitioners prayed that the House would not interfere in the subject at all; while a third class of petitioners, and by far the most reasonable of the three, prayed that Parliament; in legislating on the subject, would consider the interests of all classes of the people, without reference to any particular body.

As MPs assessed the many hundreds of petitions for and against change in the Corn Law, their sentiments demonstrate a marked shift from the debates of 1814-15. In the space of about a dozen years, the idea of MPs as delegates of their constituents had taken hold and gained some acceptance. While the notion of MPs serving as trustees remained strong, it was no longer the unchallenged interpretation given to their role. Increasingly, MPs espoused the importance of listening to and acting upon the “feelings” of their constituents.

4. Parliamentary Rhetoric

Finally, Class 4, *Parliamentary Rhetoric*, concerns the *process* of legislation, with characteristic words as “bill+”, “proposition+”, “propose+”, “motion”, and “vote+”, and so is not of relevance to the discussion here.

In sum, the analysis of the 1826-28 debates reveals some expected findings—namely, that the practical implications and difficulties of the 1815 law were central to the discussion for reform—and some unexpected findings— that MPs had begun to digest the arguments of the economists more thoroughly than perhaps has been appreciated,²² and that MPs were increasingly sensitive to the preferences of their constituents.

For 1842/44, the word lists and the representative ECUs reveal seven classes: Class 1 – *Parliamentary Rhetoric*; Class 2 – *International Grain Supply*; Class 3 – *Class Conflict*; Class 4 – *International Grain Trade*; Class 5 – *Anti-ACLL* (i.e., opposition to the Anti-Corn Law League); Class 6 – *Wages of Labour*; and Class 7 – *Peel’s Sliding Scale*. As with the previous years, Class 1 (*Parliamentary Rhetoric*) will be noted but not discussed. For sake of coherence, I will first explore the classes with economic themes (2, 4 and 6), and will then turn to those with political themes (3, 5 and 7). It is important to note that the time frame of these debates includes both Peel’s revision to the sliding scale in 1842, and motions to repeal the Corn Laws in 1844 (see Appendix 2). Hence, some of the themes relate only to the sliding scale debates, some only to the proposed repeal in 1844, and some to both the sliding scale and repeal.

1. International Grain Supply and International Grain Trade

Classes 2 and 4—*International Grain Supply* and *International Grain Trade*—are obviously closely related, but nonetheless remain distinct. “Supply” refers to just that—the supply of grain to Britain from international grain markets, and particularly the method for regulating this supply. Characteristic words are “flour”, “foreign+”, “import+”, “duty”, “season+”, “price+”, “America” and “supply+”. Key to this theme is the continuing debate over the merits of a sliding scale versus a fixed duty. Just as Ricardo had proposed the fixed duty in the 1822 (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: vol 1) and thereby launched the debate, J. R. McCulloch re-ignited it in 1841 when he argued for a fixed duty over a sliding scale (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: vol. 2) . Representative ECUs show how MPs grappled with the operational effect of the two different schemes, as they considered Peel’s revision to the sliding scale:

(39) . . . the question was, not whether this country should be independent, but in what way, by what terms, and by what regulation could the foreign supply which must be brought into this country be rendered most advantageous to all classes. The question that debate was to bring to an issue was, whether that object could be best effected by a sliding scale or by a fixed duty.

(34) . . . as long as the sliding scale existed, so long would exaggerations of its effects be put forth. It was argued, you have upon your scale a duty of 20s, and that duty prevents a regular trade, and a constant supply being raised in foreign countries. The great advantage of a fixed duty was, that after it had been once settled, and the price of corn should become high, there could be no exaggeration.

(32) . . . the consequence was the necessity of purchasing at a disadvantage, and there was a great rise of prices in the ports on the continent, and if you pay the foreigner much more for his corn than you would do, if the trade was at all regular, a great deal of money was necessarily thrown away. If then, there was a fixed duty, it would be the means of producing a revenue to the country, instead of our being exposed to constant loss, as at present.

While some argued in favour of the sliding scale, others continued to criticize the problems with speculation:

(34) . . . he said there were some advantages in this scale, and among others it would yield a larger revenue to the state. If it yielded a larger revenue to the state it necessarily must bring a larger amount of foreign corn into the market, and at a time when it was most wanted. The natural effect also of the present law was to hold out expectations to the holders of corn, that by continuing to hold it they would get it admitted at a low duty.

(34) . . . it is also said to be injurious to commerce, because where the corn is grown at a distance, in America for instance, the grower is subject to this disadvantage, that before his cargo arrives in this country, the sudden pouring in of wheat at 1s duty from the countries nearer England, may have so diminished the price, and increased the duty, that this speculation may have turned out, not only a failure, but ruinous.

Class 4, *International Grain Trade*, addresses more the detailed mechanics of the grain trade, rather than the regulatory process. Characteristic words such as “quarter+”, “average+”, “wheat+”, “price+”, “oat+” and “freight” suggest that MPs who spoke on this theme were comparing average prices of grain over the previous several years, so as to evaluate the merits of the 1828 sliding scale, and Peel’s

revision. Just two of the ECUs serve to illustrate that this class consisted more of a catalogue than a substantive discussion of policy:

(93) . . . for rye 17s to 20s per quarter; for barley 10s 9d to 15s 6d per quarter; for oats 8s 6d to 10s 6d. And in 1841 for wheat 35s; rye 23s; barley 16s. 6d; oats 11s. and he adds that the freight of grain by water from the provincial ports to Copenhagen, Kiel, or Elsinore, may be computed at from 1s 4d to 1s 8d per quarter, adding to the cost of conveyance the expense of removing, warehousing, and turning the grain, . . .

(78) . . . gentleman then read the following table, showing the percentage amount of difference between the highest and lowest annual prices: wheat in England between 1821 and 1828: highest 66s 6d; lowest 43s 3d; percentage difference 53. Between 1829 and 1837: highest 66s 4d; lowest 39s 4d; percentage difference 68. Rye in Prussia between 1821 and 1828: highest 22s 7d; lowest 10s 9d; percentage difference 102.

2. Wages of Labour

Class 6, *Wages of Labour*, embodies some of the concerns of earlier debates (for 1814-15, in *Prices and Rents*; and for 1826/28, in the *Political Economy* theme). The three most characteristic words, “labour+”, “wage+” and “employ+” leave little question as to the substance of this theme, but further words such as “capital+”, “land+”, “manufacture+” and “rent+” illustrate that MPs continued to grapple with the political economy of the factors of production and that manufactures had acquired greater prominence in this consideration. Three issues in particular concerned MPs: high food prices; unemployment; and wage rates vis-à-vis profit levels.

First, MPs noted that land scarcity would continue to force up the price of food while wages would remain static, thereby further impoverishing workers :

(54) . . . before it is divided between those by whose labour and capital it is drawn from the soil. Thus wages and profits in agriculture are kept down, while rents are raised by the limited extent of land in proportion to the numbers of the people; but as those engaged in other branches of the industry must exchange directly or indirectly a large part of the produce of their labour for food, . . .

(48) . . . a payment in the shape of rent which has to be deducted from the gross produce of the soil before it is divided between the labourer, and the farmer or capitalist who employs him. The increasing population and consequently increasing demand for the total produce of the soil, creating a greater and greater competition for land, more and more, in proportion to the amount produced, is thus subtracted from the produce, . . .

This poverty was made worse by the fact that food consumed well over fifty percent of workers’ wages:

(35) . . . an investigation had been made in several large manufacturing establishments with a view of ascertaining what proportion of the earnings of the operatives was spent in agricultural produce. In one establishment the amount of wages paid in 1836, was £33,000, the amount expended in food was £22,000, leaving £11,000 for rent, clothing, and other necessaries of life.

Beyond high food prices, agricultural protection lowered the income of foreign producers (relative to the counterfactual where they could export to Britain at any prevailing market price), and consequently lowered their demand for manufactured exports from Britain. In the eyes of British industrialists, this reduced foreign demand for their exports (from the counterfactual) and that kept the level of employment in manufactures below what it would otherwise have been. While protection raised the income of the agricultural sector, industrialists argued that the demand, and hence employment, effects of this were more limited because of the impact of higher land rental charges.²³ Or, more precisely, higher land rents would raise the income of landlords who were amongst the more wealthy, and thus would likely have a lower marginal propensity to consume manufactured goods out of additional income from higher rents.

(46) . . . was not compensated by a general increase of the demand for labour: and that the fact was, that the number of persons out of employment was fearfully large. The account of the effect upon wages of those still employed was not quite so unsatisfactory. In the case of some classes of workmen wages had increased; but as a counter balance, one out of every two workmen in those classes had been thrown out of employment.

Third, while free trade leaning MPs endorsed the view that the economic gains from protection were absorbed by high rental charges:

(38) . . . now, he should like to know in what proportion rents of land, taken in connection with the wages of labourers employed on land, stood in comparison with the profits of manufactures taken in connection with the wages paid to artisans. Rents were the same now as in 1815 [that is, *high*]; the produce of the land was two fold, and wages remained where they were;

protectionist MPs hotly denied the existence of exorbitant rents, and instead accused manufactures of profiteering:²⁴

(40) . . . on the other hand, the produce of manufactures had increased beyond all imagination; the profits of manufacturers had increased in a similar proportion; but he wished to know whether wages were the same now as formerly, especially those of the handloom weavers and the framework knitters and others. There was no body of men who derived so small a profit on so large an amount of capital as the landlords, and, vice versa, there was no body of men who derived so great profits on so small capital as the manufacturers.

This class clearly demonstrates a shift in MPs’ discourse on the political economy of trade—namely, the prominence of the manufacturing interest vis-à-vis that of farmers and landowners. No doubt this heightened influence was the product of economic influence of manufactures, but very probably the Anti-Corn Law League helped to focus and harness the manufacturing interest into a more articulate and forceful voice.

3. Class Conflict

Turning now to the political themes—Classes 3, 5 and 7—we observe a distinct “heating up” of the discourse. For *Class Conflict* (Class 3), the leading most characteristic word is “aristocracy”, followed by “class+”, “interest+”, “communit+”, and “suffer+”. The evidence from outside Parliament is clear that class conflict between the industrialists and the aristocracy figured prominently in the agitation leading up to Repeal. Chartism also featured prominently in this conflict, but as a broader, more sweeping threat to the power and privileges of the landed aristocracy than that of Repeal. With their focus on Repeal, Anti-Corn Law Leaguers viewed Chartist reforms as diversionary to the primary struggle for free trade, but nonetheless sought to portray itself and Repeal as fundamental to the interests of the workers, the industrialists and even the farmers *against* those of the landed aristocracy. John Bright, in his famous Covent Garden speech, described the Repeal campaign as “a struggle between the numbers, wealth, comforts, the all in fact, of the middle and industrious classes, and the wealth, the union, and the sordidness of a large section of the aristocracy of this empire” (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997a: vol 2, art. 19). Within Parliament, MPs were alarmed by the democratising reforms demanded by the Chartists, but most importantly, they feared a working class / middle class alliance in pursuit of such reforms. Thus, the seeds of what in 1846 became the “territorial constitution” linchpin of Repeal began to take hold in the minds of MPs—that is, they recognized that Repeal may be a necessary concession to avoid a working class / middle class alliance in favour of constitutional reform:

(36) . . . until they [the Chartists] shall have first obtained the political changes for which they seek; because they believe that, if the Corn Law were first repealed, they could no longer hope for any support for their designs from the middle classes, but that, if the Corn Law cannot be otherwise got rid of, the middle classes will ultimately join them in their assaults on the present constitution of the country.

(31) . . . it is a feeling of hostility to our institutions which is the true key to their [the Chartists’] conduct; but this feeling never would have become so general, or so strong, had it grown up merely from a persuasion of the theoretical injustice of their own exclusion as a class from political power. It is a sense of suffering and distress, it is what the Chartists

themselves have called, a knife and fork question which is at the bottom of their desire for a change in our political institutions;

MPs are also seen to have treaded carefully on the topic of the landowners’ economic (and political) monopoly (after all, eighty percent of MPs in the 1841-47 were also landowners). Not wishing to appear too defensive, MPs attempted to deflect direct criticism of a legislative body in which the vast majority of its members were direct beneficiaries of the policy of agricultural protection:

(29) . . . gentleman is that the agriculturalists as a class are not entitled to any legislative protection whatever. That is a doctrine broadly and unequivocally laid down, and cannot be departed from in future. The whole defence of the Corn Law, then, is narrowed to that miserable, and shallow, and untenable doctrine of non-dependence on other countries, a doctrine so narrow and so ignorant, so replete with misery, and starvation, and self-destruction. . .

(28) . . . he did not accuse them of wilfully or corruptly perverting their legislative powers for their own purposes - they only acted in accordance with the dictates of human nature but he did complain that they had, and that in pursuance of those dictates they exercised those powers to injure and oppress the poor for their own exclusive benefit.

(26) . . . I do not wish this law to be repealed in times of excitement, nor do I wish its destruction to be achieved as a great party victory; I would rather it were for ever abolished by the unanimous verdict of the honest and intelligent classes of the country. We should regard it as a question of great national interest, not as one affecting our own profits or property;

4. Anti- Anti-Corn Law League

Class 5, *Anti- Anti-Corn Law League*, illustrates the contempt in which many MPs held the Anti-Corn Law League and its pressure tactics. By far, the two leading characteristic words are “league+” and “anti”. Further words target the leader of the League, Richard Cobden, MP for Stockport (“stockport”, “cobden”), as allegations of Cobden subjecting his factory workers to unreasonably long hours are debated. Importantly, other words make evident that MPs sought to discredit the core activities of the League—holding meetings where Leaguers gave free trade speeches (“meetings”) and obtaining signatures for free trade petitions (“sign+”, “count+”, “petition+”). Several ECUs illustrate the attack on the League and its activities:

(73) . . . Dr. Bowring was only desirous of uttering a sentence or two. The Hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had brought forward a very grave charge against the Anti-Corn Law League. He had stated that they had sent forth incendiaries amongst the people to whom might be attributed the attacks upon property. In his place in the House he had requested the Hon. Member to name the parties to whom he attributed these gross misdemeanours, but the Hon. . . .

(48) . . . nobody has ventured here to deny your assertions. The Leaguers are raging at their exposure. But I should not have troubled you had not Mr. Bernal doubted your statements respecting the anti-Corn Law petitions. Why, in Leeds, on several occasions, the Leaguers have been defeated by the Chartists at public meetings. The very number of signatures of the petitions prove them to be forgeries.

(42) I will read a few passages which I have extracted from some of the speeches of the Anti-Corn Law League orators, and then leave the House to judge which has been most violent, they or I – the Right Hon. Member will perhaps permit me to call his attention to the language uttered by an individual at a meeting of the Anti-Corn Law delegates, in allusion to the Right Hon. . . .

League leaders in Parliament (e.g., Cobden, Bright, Villiers) not only defended the League and the legality of its activities, but also used the legislative limelight to exert further pressure on their colleagues:

(36) It gives us satisfaction now to be able to state that the result has been triumphantly successful. Thus encouraged, the [Anti-Corn Law League] Council have taken steps for immediately paying visits to Warrington, Stockport, and Macclesfield; and without relaxing any of their other modes of agitation, they will make it their first duty to visit, in a similar manner, the electors of every borough in the manufacturing districts represented by bread taxes.

5. Peel's Sliding Scale

Class 7, *Peel's Sliding Scale*, overlaps somewhat with the *International Grain Supply* theme, but whereas the latter focuses on the economic implications of Peel's revision in 1842, Class 7 expounds upon its political implications. In particular, MPs consider how their electors will respond to the new measure, and more generally, they evaluate the principle of protection in its various forms (sliding scale, gradual sliding scale, fixed duty), as reflected in the characteristic words: “measure+”, “principle+”, “adopt+” and “fixe+”. The ECUs illustrate both the electoral connection dimension to Peel's revised scale, and MPs' reconsideration of the concept of protection:

(36) I have no doubt that they do so: I have no doubt they feel that their long cherished Corn Law can no longer be maintained in its present shape. But will the change now proposed be satisfactory either to the agriculturalists themselves, or to any one class of the community? If it is not calculated to give immediate satisfaction, is it founded upon principles so just in themselves, so consistent with truth and sound reason, that the practical working of the measure is likely to reconcile the country to it?

(34) Did the government, then, obtain the concurrence of the agriculturalists by arguments based on the principles which Adam Smith and Mr Huskisson had compounded? On the contrary, although those principles had been long established and relied on among commercial men, they had not yet [received], he believed the concurrence of the agriculturalists. The real argument used was, that if the farmers did not consent to this alteration, they would have a change in the administration, and a party would come into office who would treat them still worse than they were treated now.

(27) If you can make the system general, then general protection cannot be special protection, and you can do no good to anybody by its adoption. Abandon this system – it is unsound; it cannot be defended upon any principle of justice or sound policy; and therefore I ask you now to give your decision against the principle. You may say, we are strong in power, we have the constituencies with us. Yes, you have the constituencies.

(26) The more discussion I hear, the more convinced I am that if protection is to be given to agriculture, it is infinitely better to maintain the present law than to attempt to conciliate any support or favour by any slight modification whatever. I think with the Hon. Gentleman, that is, the real practical question is the present law to be maintained totally and entirely without any qualification or modification of it?

Classes 3 and 5 demonstrate that two demand-side pressures weighed heavily on the minds of MPs: (1) that continued protection would facilitate an alliance of the middle and working classes in favor of sweeping parliamentary reform; and (2) that the activities of the League (especially its voter registration campaign) were alarmingly effective and were forcing protectionists MPs into a defensive position. Hence, MPs were undoubtedly responsive (orally, at least) to the pressure of the League.

c. Linkages Between the Themes

Having identified the word classes, or themes, for each set of Parliamentary debates, we may now consider the relationships between those themes.

i. Tree Graphs

Figures 1, 2, and 3 are tree graphs of the classes for each time period, and are schematised according to ALCESTE's descending hierarchical classification procedure. For all three time periods (and indeed, as we also saw for the 1846 debates), there exists a primary bifurcation between classes with economic themes and classes with political themes. In Figure 1 (1814-15), *Prices and Rents*, *Food Self-Sufficiency*, and *Grain Trade* are the economic themes, while *Parliamentary Rhetoric* and *Petitions and*

Civil Unrest comprise the political themes. *Prices and Rents* and *Food Self-Sufficiency* are closely linked, as these themes address substantive issues of political economy, while *Grain Trade* merely reports previous legislative acts. In Figure 2, *Grain Trade* and *Political Economy* are the economic themes, while *Electoral Connection* and *Parliamentary Rhetoric* are the political themes. Finally, in Figure 3, *Parliamentary Rhetoric*, *Peel's Sliding Scale*, *Class Conflict* and *Anti-Anti-Corn Law League* comprise the political themes, while *International Grain Supply*, *International Grain Trade*, and *Wages of Labour* form the economic themes. The distinctive feature of the 1842-44 debates is their increased complexity vis-à-vis that of the previous years. The tree graph helps to organize this complexity by showing classes that are most closely linked in terms of word co-occurrences. *Parliamentary Rhetoric* and *Peel's Sliding Scale* form a “Legislative” branch of discourse within the main political group, while *Class Conflict* and *Anti-Anti-Corn Law League* form a “Social” branch within the same political group. Simply put, the legislative branch reflects discourse relating to the legislative procedure, while the social branch captures more of the socio-political dynamics outside Parliament. Not surprisingly, the two international grain classes are closely linked, and are distinct in their use of economic discourse from the *Wages of Labour* class. Overall, the tree graphs provide further evidence of ALCESTE's ability to organize the textual data into a meaningful and cogent structure.

ii. Correspondence Analysis

Similar to 1846 (chapter XX), the results from ALCESTE's classification are represented graphically in a correspondence space, thus providing a spatial representation of the relations between the classes, where distance reflects the degree of association. As noted in the presentation of the 1846 results, correspondence analysis aims to account for a maximum amount of association along the first (horizontal) axis. The second (vertical) axis seeks to account for a maximum of the remaining association, and so on. The map thereby provides a way to transform numerical information into pictorial form, though interpretation remains subjective.

Figures 4, 5 and 6 present maps of the correspondence analysis for each set of debates, along with selected tagged indicators. (See Appendix 1 for the tagged indicators for 1814/15 and 1826/28. Data for the 1842/44 MPs may be obtained from <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/SCHONHAR/>). Below each map, we can see that the first two factors together account for about 65% of the total association for 1814/15; 78% for 1826/28; and 58% for 1842/44.²⁵ Recalling that two factors accounted for 61% of the total association in 1846 debates, the 1826/28 debates are somewhat anomalous in the large value of association explained and thus the relatively good quality of this map in representing the multidimensional space on a simple plane. Generally speaking, we can see that the first two periods (1814/15 and 1826/28) can be classified more simply than can the later debates (1826/28 and 1846). This may suggest that over time, the discourse on trade policy became more complex as new issues (e.g., the activities of the Anti-Corn Law League and, in 1846, the export trade) became more salient.

Bearing in mind from the previous chapter the methodological difficulties in interpreting the dimensionality of the debates from correspondence analysis, it remains prudent to report the “dimensionality” of the correspondence analysis with caution, and to note (once again) that speaking is not voting, even though the two are intimately connected. Even so, it is remarkable that just as we saw in 1846, the first (horizontal) dimension in all three figures appears to reflect a spatial representation of the bifurcation between politics and economics, as identified in all three tree diagrams (Figures 1-3).

The locations of the tagged indicators tell more interesting stories. Taking each figure in turn, the tagged indicators reported in Figure 4 are the MP's party affiliation (Tory, Whig, Independent), the month of the speech²⁶, and some MPs by name (e.g., Sir Robert Peel, father to the same who led Repeal in 1846). Two further indicators are proxy measures for constituency economic make-up: (1) county / borough is a rough measure for the rural/urban divide (which in 1815, was less prominent than in subsequent decades as most areas were still largely rural at this time); and (2) the effect of the 1832 Reform Act on the MP's constituency differentiates industrial areas (which enjoyed increased representation) from rural areas (which experienced reductions in representation). The categories for this measure are: (a) abolished representation from the constituency; (b) reduced its representation; (c) increased its representation; or (d) kept representation fixed.²⁷ Elsewhere, I find that the effect of the 1832 Reform Act on MPs' votes for Repeal in 1846 was both substantively and statistically significant (Schonhardt-Bailey 1994) (Schonhardt-Bailey 2003). (While it might seem odd to apply a measure from the 1830s, this simple classification of districts might possibly be backdated to 1815, as many districts were starting to distinguish themselves as areas of industry or agriculture by this time.)

The tagged indicators reveal two features of the 1814/15 debates. First, they show that during both an early month in the debates (June 1814) and the final month (March 1815), the political theme of petitions and civil unrest most closely characterized the discourse. In between these debates, the economic themes of food self-sufficiency and prices and rents were more prominent in MPs’ speeches. Hence, debates on the 1815 Corn Law began and ended with MPs recognizing (but intentionally ignoring) the interests of their constituents. Very tentatively, one might conclude that while many MPs expressed disdain for representing the interests of their constituents, petitions to Parliament (which provided the un-enfranchised with a means of representation (coined “virtual representation”) (Taylor 1995)), did indeed appear to have a bearing on the thinking of MPs because at the least they were compelled to discuss interests while denying their legitimacy. Thus, Figure 4 provides evidence of nascent form of electoral connection which appears to have affected MPs’ speeches, if not their votes. MPs thus found themselves juggling the economics of the relationship between falling grain prices and land rents, and food self-sufficiency, with the real political pressures of constituency demands.

Second, the effects of constituency economic make-up and party affiliation are mixed. The locations of the borough and county tags suggest that the y-axis may represent an urban-rural divide, overlapping with party affiliation (Tory, Independent, Whig). However, the location of the 1832 Reform proxies appear more random, though it may be that 1815 was too early for these measures of industrialization to be relevant. Moreover, to the extent that the second dimension reflects early partisan sentiments and/or urban/rural differences, the content of the grain trade and parliamentary rhetoric classes in the upper quadrants is so weak as to blur these cleavages. One might sensibly conclude that any cleavages based on constituency economic make-up and party affiliation were only weakly evident at this time. (While this conclusion will come as no surprise to historians, it is useful to establish empirical evidence within the parliamentary debates to substantiate this assessment.)

Turning to Figure 5, the reported tagged indicators are party affiliation, the two proxies for constituency economic make-up, the month of the speech, and key MPs (Peel—the Prime Minister in 1846; Huskisson, and Torrens). Five features are evident from this figure. First, politics—namely, the electoral connection and public opinion—figure more prominently in the early months of debates on the sliding scale (November and December 1826, March 1827), but as the legislation takes form (April 1828—first reading, May 1828—third reading), economic themes—political economy and the grain trade—prevail. A possible interpretation might be that while electoral politics sparked the momentum for reform of the 1815 Corn Law, economics ultimately determined its shape. Second, a clear divide appears between borough MPs, who tended to focus on politics, and county MPs, who were more concerned with economic themes. It may be that county MPs, with larger and more mixed constituencies, perceived a greater distance from their constituents that afforded them the luxury of more theoretical concerns. Third, as we saw in the 1815 debates, a partisan second dimension emerges between Whig and Tory MPs, with Tory MPs situated in the lower quadrant along with grain trade, and Whig MPs in the upper quadrant near the political economy theme. Tentatively, one might infer that both in 1814/15 and 1826/28, Whig MPs tended to drive the discussions of economic and political economic themes, while Tory MPs focused more on the more practical and legislative implications of the grain trade. Moreover, in both sets of debates, Whigs were more closely aligned with the political themes of petitions in 1814/15 and the electoral connection in 1826/28, which seems to provide empirical evidence for their later advocacy of a delegate mode of representation (Hill 1929: 83-85). Fourth, and reassuringly, key party leaders such as Peel, Huskisson, and Torrens are located near their party tags. Finally, electoral connection and public opinion is located near MPs whose districts were abolished by the 1832 Reform Act, and only a short distance from MPs whose districts received increased representation (with the former pulled toward the political end of the first dimension and the latter toward the economic end). It is tempting to conclude that MPs from both more rural and more industrialized areas recognized the importance of constituents’ interests, though it is more likely that MPs from rotten boroughs incorporated the electoral connection discourse to defend a few landholding interests in their constituencies while those from industrializing areas (also positioned near the political economy theme) used the same discourse to note the distress of their constituents as they faced higher grain prices from the 1815 Corn Law.

Tagged indicators for the period 1842/44 (Figure 6) include party affiliation (designated as Non-Peelite Conservative, Peelite, Whig-Liberal); the borough/county measure for constituency economic make-up plus a more refined measure (Most Protectionist, Protectionist Oriented, Neutral, Free Trade Oriented, and Most Free Trade)²⁸; the date of the speech (thereby differentiating motions for repeal from Peel’s sliding scales); and key MPs (Prime Minister Peel, Richard Cobden, Charles Villiers, John Bright). By

1842/44, socio-economic and political cleavages are far more visible and pronounced. Figure 6 reveals three distinct camps: (1) the strident free traders, led by the Anti-Corn Law League leaders (the two upper quadrants); (2) the protectionists, led by the Non-Peelite Conservatives (lower right quadrant); and (3) the reforming Peelites, led by Peel (lower left quadrant). Free traders tended to represent industrializing districts (Most Free Trade, Free Trade Oriented), protectionists tended to represent highly agricultural districts (Most Protectionist), and Peelites tended to represent agricultural districts with some degree of manufacturing interests (Protectionist Oriented). The proximity of each of these camps to districts with distinct economic orientations provides strong and independent support for the argument developed in my previous two chapters, in which I argue that the cleavage between Peelites and Non-Peelite Conservatives predated 1846 and was constituency-based.

Figure 6 reveals three further features. First, the two themes that appear to characterize best the concerns of the reforming Peelites were International Grain Trade and International Grain Supply, or more substantively, the economic implications of Peel’s revision to the sliding scale in 1842. In contrast, the Protectionists were less concerned with the economic implications and more concerned with the reconsideration of the concept of protection (hence their closer proximity to the Peel’s Sliding Scale theme). Peelites therefore appear to have been less wedded to the concept of protection well before 1846, a finding which further strengthens my earlier argument in Chapter XX. Second, three themes best characterize the free traders in their campaign for repeal: the wages of labour, class conflict and defending the Anti-Corn Law League against attacks by the protectionists. Notably, MPs from highly industrialized districts (including Cobden) appeared to be predominantly concerned with the economic issues surrounding the Wages of Labour, leaving John Bright, MP for Durham, (and others) to exchange barbs with the protectionists over class conflict and the Anti-Corn Law League. A final feature is the position of the Whig Liberals, which brings us to a possible interpretation of the second dimension. The Y axis locates the free traders at one extreme, the reforming Peelites at the other, and protectionists in the middle. In the early 1840s, the Liberals endorsed neither outright repeal nor Peel’s sliding scale reform, and so in correspondence space, they are situated the furthest distance from these endpoints—that is, precisely in the middle. Hence, the second dimension is less a gradation and more a reflection of two policy options, with the status quo of no change in the middle.

VI. The Debates Over Time

Table 7 lists the themes for 1814/15, 1826/28 and 1842/44, along with those for 1846 (presented in chapter XX). As evidenced by both the tree diagrams and the correspondence analysis, each set of debates bifurcates into economic and political themes, and so the classes are grouped accordingly. Table 7 provides a quasi-time line for how the concepts of free trade and protection evolved in the policy debates, and moreover serves as a focal point for a discussion of the questions raised in the introduction.

First, there is clearly evidence of a demand-side momentum for repeal in the years leading up to 1846. From 1842/44 we can see that the Anti-Corn Law League appears to have driven the political momentum for repeal. With its electoral registration drive and its propaganda campaign, the League blatantly antagonized the protectionists. But, moreover, the League inflamed class conflict to the extent that protectionists were forced onto the defensive—that is, they were left having to defuse allegations of abusing political power to protect their economic monopoly. This mounting concern for the preservation of a governing landed aristocracy in the face of a League-sponsored middle class / working class alliance, served to lay the groundwork for a concessionary strategy (repeal) that would sever this alliance.

Second, the supply-side shift outlined in chapter XX appears to have been unique to 1846. That is, the analysis does not identify any theme prior to 1846 in which repeal is considered as a means to preserve the “territorial constitution”. Hence, when Peel offered his re-interpretation of repeal, characterizing it as a means to preserve the landed basis of Parliament, and Peelites latched onto this re-interpretation as a way to vote as delegates but to justify their betrayal of a protectionist Conservative ideology in the language of trustees, a new dimension was created that allowed repeal to pass.

Third, and following on from above, parliamentary speeches illustrate an evolution in MPs’ understanding of their representative role from that of unquestioned trustees in 1815 to a crystallization of the conflict between the delegate and trustee modes in 1846. In 1815, MPs expressed outright contempt for the sentiments expressed within petitions to parliament, but by the late 1820s, support for

the delegate mode of representation clearly had gained momentum (e.g., the “feelings” of constituents had gained more legitimacy). In the early 1840s, discussions of representation were subsumed within the clamour of the activities of the Anti-Corn Law League. Very probably it was the League’s activities and the protectionists’ response to these that helped to crystallize the inherent conflict between the delegate and trustee mode of representation. Thus, by 1846, MPs sought to characterize their positions on repeal in terms of their roles as representatives—either as delegates adhering to an electoral connection or as trustees serving the wider public interest.

Fourth, Table 7 helps to evaluate the influences of *institutions* (1832 Reform Act), *interests* (as mobilized by the League) and *ideas* (free trade liberalism) on the thinking of MPs. While the absence of substantive debates on trade policy in the immediate aftermath of the 1832 Reform Act prevents us from adequately gauging the effect of this reform on repeal, previous statistical analysis suggests that this reform did indeed feature prominently in the success of repeal (Schonhardt-Bailey 1991; Schonhardt-Bailey 1994). Nonetheless, the evidence in this chapter illustrates that the League’s voter registration campaign—which exploited the property qualifications of the 1832 Reform Act—forced protectionist MPs to envisage constitutional change far more devastating to their interests than repealing the Corn Laws. Thus, indirectly, these debates support the view that institutional reform in 1832 was essential to creating the conditions necessary for repeal. Next, the *interests* of industrialists, as mobilized within the “League Machine”, are seen to have had a major role in driving the repeal momentum as MPs faced heightened class conflict and increased legitimacy for their role as delegates to an increasingly industrialized population. And finally, Table 7 illustrates a progression in the economic understanding of (or the *ideas* underpinning) free trade and protection, but specifically, the themes reflect a shift in the overall capital intensity of the economy, which is evident from the greater attention given to export interests and those of manufactures more generally. In 1815, MPs strongly endorsed self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and saw protection as the means to extend capital investment in agriculture. In the late 1820s, the growth of manufactures raised the issue of higher labour costs that resulted from protection. Industrialization also encouraged MPs to consider free trade in agriculture as a means to retain its dominance in world trade in manufactures. In the early 1840s, the political economy of trade acquired a distinct class flavour, with industrialists faulting landowners for their exorbitant rental charges and landowners accusing industrialists of profiteering. By 1846, MPs still argued about the relationship between wages and prices, but now, considered Britain’s international trade in manufactures to be welfare-enhancing.

VII. Conclusion

In summary, this paper provides evidence that first, MPs did indeed become anxious about the lobbying activities of the Anti-Corn Law League “Machine”. In particular, protectionist MPs were increasingly alarmed about the prospect of a middle class / working class alliance in pursuit of far more radical reforms than that of repeal. It was this fear that in 1846 underpinned the logic for a re-interpretation of repeal that would preserve the landed basis of parliament (the “territorial constitution”) by severing any possible middle class / working class momentum for parliamentary reform. Second, Peel’s re-interpretation of repeal as a policy that would preserve the territorial constitution was indeed *unique* to 1846. This argument was not articulated as a theme in any of the debates prior to 1846, which lends significant weight to my argument that while demand-side pressures were necessary for repeal, the final explanation for repeal must hinge upon the introduction of a second dimension of argumentation, thereby splitting the Non-Peelite Conservatives from the Peelites. Third, systematic analysis of parliamentary debates over time provides a unique perspective on the evolution of the delegate and trustee modes of representation in early nineteenth-century British politics. In 1815, virtually no MP defended his behavior in terms of serving the wishes of his constituents. But as early as the late 1820s (before the 1832 Reform Act), the delegate mode of representation had gained respectability and by the 1840s, it had become commonplace, if not the norm. Finally, it is perhaps not surprising that computer-assisted content analysis of parliamentary debates finds evidence of the influence of institutions, interests *and* ideas—as, most analysts of this time period would accept that all three factors had bearing on repeal. Yet, the value-added from this analysis is that we have located more precisely *which* institutional feature, set of interests, and range of ideas mattered, and even more, how these influences evolved during a critical period in Britain’s political-economic history.

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¹ Supply-side theories of policy making may highlight the institutional setting in which legislators operate, Krehbiel, K. (1991). Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Cox, G. and M. McCubbins (1993). Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley, University of California Press, Krehbiel, K. (1998). Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, Stewart, C. (2001). Analyzing Congress. London, W.W. Norton. or the ideas that influence policy makers, Baumgartner, F. R. and B. D. Jones (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.. To recap, the argument from Chapter XX is that a shift in constituency demands was necessary, but not sufficient to convert a majority of MPs to repeal. Even if all Liberal MPs voted for repeal, it could not have passed without the support of some Conservative MPs. In order to push the wavering Conservatives to free

trade, the definition of repeal required re-interpretation so that it could be seen to be compatible with Conservative ideology. Peel provided this re-interpretation when he introduced the repeal legislation, and Peelites latched onto this re-interpretation as political and ideological cover for their free trade votes. By trumpeting themselves as loyal to the longer-term preservation of the territorial constitution, and acceding that repeal was a necessary concession to ensure this outcome, Peelites could vote as delegates without having to justify themselves as such.

² The historical overview is taken from Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge..

³ C. Smith, *Tracts on the Corn Trade and Corn Laws*, II.72, as quoted in Fay, C. R. (1932). The Corn Laws and Social England. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press..

⁴ In 1814, the average price of wheat was 74 s. 4 d. per quarter, but following the war and with a good harvest in 1815, the price dropped to 52 s. 10 d. William Spence noted in 1815 that “thousands of farmers, who but twelve months ago were living in prosperity, are utterly unable to raise money for their taxes merely, and tens of thousands to discharge them are forced to sell their produce at less than one half its prime-cost” Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge.

⁵ Fay, C. R. (1932). The Corn Laws and Social England. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.; Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge..

⁶ Hilton, B. (1977). Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments, 1815-1830. Oxford, Oxford University Press.; Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge..

⁷ Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge..

⁸ Fay, C. R. (1932). The Corn Laws and Social England. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁹ Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge.. J.R.

McCulloch, J.S. Mill and Joseph Hume also supported a fixed duty, although Mill and Hume suggested a lower starting duty, Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge..

¹⁰ Canning was Foreign Secretary from 1822 to April 1827, whereupon he became Prime Minister.

¹¹ Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Hilton describes the misunderstanding *cum* disagreement emerged in an ambiguous rider that Huskisson proposed to Wellington’s warehousing amendment to the 1827 bill Hilton, B. (1977). Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments, 1815-1830. Oxford, Oxford University Press.. In Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge., Huskisson reads the correspondence between himself and Wellington to the House of Commons, exposing the source of their disagreement. The keyword in this passage is “thenceforward” which Wellington read as meaning permanent, whereas Huskisson had meant it as a temporary measure.

¹⁴ Fay, C. R. (1932). The Corn Laws and Social England. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press..

¹⁵ W.H. Chaloner, ‘Introduction to the Second Edition,’ in Prentice, A. ((1853) 1968). History of the Anti-Corn Law League, I & II. London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd..

¹⁶ McCord, p. 187.

¹⁷ According to Prentice, the *Times* ‘had an influence, for good, beyond that of any other journal’ and its leader article gave ‘fresh impulse to the agitation against the then existing Corn Laws’ (Prentice, vol. 1, p. 136).

¹⁸ The *Circular* was published under three titles: (1) *The Anti-Corn Law Circular*, numbering from 1 to 57, Vol. II (16 April 1839 to 8 April 1841) and published in Manchester; (2) *The Anti-Bread Tax Circular*, numbering from 58, Vol. III to 140, Vol. IV (21 April 1841 to 26 September 1843) also published in Manchester in a larger size; and (3) *The League*, numbering 1 to end (30 September 1843 to 1846), published in London, at the League’s Fleet Street office (Fay, p. 91 fn.).

¹⁹ Norman Gash Gash, N. (1977). Politics in the Age of Peel, A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation, 1830-1850. Hassocks, Harvester Press. explains that ‘until the Reform Act an elector claiming a vote for the county under the property qualification had to be assessed to the land tax. This necessity was abolished by the act and the way was thus thrown open for a flood of 40s. freeholders from the urban and industrial areas to join the county electorate’ (91). Upon realising this loophole’, the League encouraged and actively helped arrange purchases of 40s. freehold voting qualifications for free trade supporters.

²⁰ McCord, pp. 147-150.

²¹ All representative ECUs in this paper are drawn from the top 20, ranked according to chi-squared values.

²² But see Fetter, F. W. (1980). The Economist in Parliament: 1780-1868. Durham, Duke University Press..

²³ The logic of this argument rests upon Ricardian theory of rent, which the Anti-Corn Law League exploited in an attempt to divide the interests of landowners and tenant farmers. As I explain elsewhere Schonhardt-Bailey, C. (1997b). Introduction. The Rise of Free Trade, vol. 1, Protectionism and Its Critics, 1815-1837. C. Schonhardt-Bailey. London, Routledge. **1**: 1-51.: “The argument put to tenant farmers was that it was the landlord, not the farmer, who benefited from high food prices. As food prices rose, so too would the value of land. Thus, while in the short term farmers might enjoy the benefits of higher prices for their produce, in the longer term, as they renewed their leases, these benefits would evaporate with higher rental charges.” For Torrens’ exposition of this theory, see article 15 in Volume 1, and articles 25 and 34 in Volume 2 of Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge.. For the application of this argument by the League, see articles 13 and 16 in Volume 2 of Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge..

²⁴ Elsewhere I have noted that “landowners challenged the rent argument [of the Anti-Corn Law League] directly, claiming that landowners received only 3% return (rent) while capitalists received from 20% to 50% interest on their investments” Schonhardt-Bailey, C. (1997b). Introduction. The Rise of Free Trade, vol. 1, Protectionism and Its Critics, 1815-1837. C. Schonhardt-Bailey. London, Routledge. **1**: 1-51.. For evidence, see article 22 in Volume 2 of Schonhardt-Bailey, C., Ed. (1997a). Rise of Free Trade (4 volumes). London, Routledge..

²⁵ A further two factors are required to account for the total association for 1814/15, with factor 3 accounting for 17.9% and factor 4 for 16.9%. One further class is required to make up the remaining 22.2% association for 1826/28. And, four further factors are needed to account for the total association for 1842-44, with each, consecutively, accounting for 16.0%, 10.3%, 9.4% and 6.5% Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, the “dimensionality” of each coordinate system is one less than the number of classes.

²⁶ See Appendix 2 for a detailed legislative schedule.

²⁷ A fifth category—creating new representation for the constituency—clearly does not apply during this pre-reform period.

²⁸ For a detailed description of this “District Economic Orientation” variable, see Schonhardt-Bailey, C. (2003). “Ideology, Party and Interests in the British Parliament of 1841-1847.” British Journal of Political Science **forthcoming**..

Table 1: Alceste Analysis: Basic Statistics for 1814-15

Total Word Count	184,660										
Unique Words Analyzed	69,576										
Passive Variables (Tagged Indicators)	150										
I.C.U.s (= number of speeches)	595										
Classified E.C.U.s	3905 (= 85% of the retained E.C.U.)										
Lexical Classes	5										
Distribution of Classes (%)	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>20.26</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>18.87</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>28.66</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>6.20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>26.02</td> </tr> </table>	1	20.26	2	18.87	3	28.66	4	6.20	5	26.02
1	20.26										
2	18.87										
3	28.66										
4	6.20										
5	26.02										

Table 2: Alceste Analysis: Basic Statistics for 1826-28

Total Word Count	135,597
Unique Words Analyzed	50,967
Passive Variables (Tagged Indicators)	116
I.C.U.s (= number of speeches)	363
Classified E.C.U.s	2716 (= 82% of the retained E.C.U.)
Lexical Classes	4
Distribution of Classes (%)	1 25.85 2 22.50 3 27.03 4 24.63

Table 3: Alceste Analysis: Basic Statistics for 1842-44

Total Word Count	571,775
Unique Words Analyzed	216,692
Passive Variables (Tagged Indicators)	174
I.C.U.s (= number of speeches)	408
Classified E.C.U.s	6057 (= 75% of the retained E.C.U.)
Lexical Classes	7
Distribution of Classes (%)	
	1 15.59
	2 9.94
	3 11.69
	4 11.31
	5 9.23
	6 25.59
	7 16.66

Table 4: Characteristic words of each class by strength of association 1814-15

Class 1		Class 2		Class 3		Class 4		Class 5	
<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>
94	poor+	95	exchequer	95	france	98	ch	94	sign+
86	cultiv+	94	propose+	95	count+	97	british	92	public+
78	labour+	93	intention+	91	great+	96	duty	90	opinion+
73	sum+	92	move+	90	industry	91	licence	87	express+
71	tax	88	day+	84	supply+	90	export+	77	people+
69	land+	84	word+	81	wealth+	86	preced+	73	represent+
67	remuner+	79	discuss+	77	market+	83	king+	69	motive+
65	wages	75	baring	75	supply+	82	ed	68	house+
64	acre+	72	wednesday	75	britain	76	ibid	66	constitut+
57	bread	69	report+	73	foreign+	75	flour	64	parliament+
56	landlord+	66	debate+	73	depend+	71	exceed+	59	popular+
51	amount+	66	robinson+	65	commerce	70	warehouse+	59	member+
49	cent+	65	friday	64	manufacturer+	67	parl	59	clamour+
47	increase+	61	speaker+	64	produce+	67	rot	56	deliber+
45	english	58	second+	62	encourage+	65	american+	56	mind+
45	witnesses	56	proposition+	62	demand+	60	repeal+	54	pray+
44	rate+	55	huskisson+	59	independent+	59	bount+	54	present+
43	holder+	55	chair	58	food	59	scotland	51	precipit+
42	reduce+	54	intend+	52	home+	57	sect	48	door+
41	tenant+	54	division+	52	dependent	56	north	48	baronet+
40	price+	54	propriety	52	derive+	55	corn+	47	hurry+
40	cheap+	53	observ+	46	agriculture	54	consumption	46	person+
39	evidence	53	bill+	45	commercial	52	rye	46	improper+
38	surveyor+	52	committee+	41	manufacture+	51	gallon+	44	bill+
38	asked	51	stage+	41	resource+	51	colon+	41	opportunit+
37	fixe+	50	postpone+	38	article+	51	restrain+	40	city
35	grower+	50	adjourn+	38	applic+	50	meal+	40	police
34	consumer+	50	alderm+	37	power+	50	regul+	38	decided+
34	double+	49	pamphlet+	36	subsis+	46	continue+	38	minister+
30	comfort+	48	order+	36	policy	46	quatern	36	conduct+
29	rent+	47	chairman	36	empire	46	stop	36	common+
28	corn+	47	print+	36	advantage+	44	prohibit+	36	judgment+
28	webb	46	agree+	34	europe	44	ships	34	mob

Table 5: Characteristic words of each class by strength of association 1826-28

Class 1		Class 2		Class 3		Class 4	
<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>
93	import+	98	wages	93	interest+	82	canning+
88	home	96	manufactur+	87	parliament+	81	bill+
83	year+	86	countries	79	discuss+	77	friend+
74	harvest+	85	capital+	79	house+	76	proposition+
67	scale+	79	rate+	63	question+	75	object+
64	average+	76	product+	60	minister+	72	secret+
60	grain+	75	cultiv+	50	hope+	70	propose+
58	quantit+	74	country+	49	law+	69	motion
58	corn	68	labour+	47	connect+	64	vote+
57	thousand+	66	land+	44	feelings	61	imperial
54	open+	64	increase+	44	consider+	59	resolution+
52	freight+	64	soil+	34	currency	59	original+
52	hundred+	64	wealth+	33	occasion+	55	clause
46	scarcit+	54	classes	28	class	55	huskisson+
46	specul+	51	produce+	28	particular+	55	measure+
44	last+	51	rent+	27	body	53	night+
44	british	51	taxation	25	noble	47	duke+
43	crop+	51	manufacture+	25	attention	47	support+
41	quarter+	49	money	25	proceed+	46	president
39	duty	45	cheap+	24	conduct+	41	letter+
39	growth	44	high+	23	different+	37	board
37	exceed+	42	goods	23	delay+	37	baronet+
37	grower+	41	industry	23	enter+	36	move+
36	bond+	40	proportion+	22	majesty+	34	propos+
35	barley	40	cent	22	policy	34	chair
34	price+	40	commerce	22	gentlemen	34	grant+
33	flour	39	popul+	22	manner	33	observ+
32	fixed	39	consume+	21	liberal+	32	alter+
31	duties	39	war+	21	political+	29	divide+
31	month+	37	mill+	21	sentiment+	29	essex
31	prohibit+	36	burthen+	20	assembl+	29	amendment+
30	sufficient+	35	remuner+	20	subject+	29	carri+
30	dantzic	34	prosper+	19	pursue+	28	peel

Table 6: Characteristic words of each class by strength of association 1842-44

Class 1			Class 2			Class 3			Class 4			Class 5			Class 6			Class 7		
<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>chi2</i>	<i>Word</i>	
564	motion+	416	flour	204	aristocracy	1291	quarter+	927	league+	498	labour+	614	measure+							
528	member+	313	foreign+	191	class+	1090	average+	731	anti	492	wage+	341	principle+							
404	house+	312	import+	189	classes	841	wheat+	291	member+	438	employ+	258	govern+							
261	vote+	278	duty	170	interest+	803	price+	229	stockport	366	food	171	adopt+							
209	peel+	248	season+	140	people+	435	oat+	176	sign+	272	increase+	163	fixe+							
195	proposition+	219	price+	126	communit+	358	dantzic	154	meetings	252	capital+	141	settle+							
193	wolverhampton+	210	america	120	suffer+	358	freight+	142	assert+	241	land+	132	propose+							
179	speech	208	merchant+	85	feeling+	287	return+	136	commission+	225	manufacture+	128	opinion+							
179	noble+	205	american+	82	spirit+	252	barley	134	ferrand	184	rent+	123	right+							
161	friend+	202	supply+	81	law+	243	meek+	127	electors	164	product+	120	noble+							
160	debate+	197	market+	70	poor+	202	quantit+	126	letter+	162	rate+	118	plan+							
158	right+	179	harvest+	68	sympath+	197	year+	126	count+	157	manufacturer+	103	baronet+							
154	side+	168	scale+	66	abuse+	173	consul+	116	cobden+	156	population+	99	scale+							
151	baronet+	138	canada+	64	institut+	164	september	111	associat+	149	machinery	98	proposal+							
143	discuss+	134	trade+	62	middle	159	add+	109	petition+	138	goods	97	concili+							
141	gentleman+	124	fixe+	59	political+	132	elsinore	109	mr	126	cotton+	97	change+							
137	speeches	122	grain+	58	distress+	130	august+	95	manchester	125	proportion+	96	protect+							
129	russell	122	canadian+	58	countrymen	127	odessa	92	dare+	122	famil+	95	final+							
125	support+	118	grower+	56	provid+	123	grain+	83	borough+	106	produce+	90	majesty+							
125	mr	116	consum+	54	injustice	121	rye	82	knarborough+	106	cultiv+	83	alter+							
121	committee+	111	disadvantage+	52	legislat+	118	estimate+	82	bolton	105	comfort+	80	modification+							
113	amend+	110	scarce+	48	motive+	117	duty	78	honour+	105	mill+	77	present+							
103	lincolnshire	108	specul+	48	destruct+	112	town+	77	visit+	101	number+	76	support+							
102	voting	101	regul+	46	effort+	111	london	77	report+	101	amount+	74	interest+							
102	bill+	100	cargo	46	deep+	110	market+	74	language	99	industr+	74	scheme+							
96	question+	95	stead+	45	enem+	103	amount+	70	district+	98	reduce+	70	satisfactory							
93	intention+	94	advantage+	45	manufacturing	91	sale+	69	publish+	95	soil+	68	law+							
93	govern+	93	countries	41	self+	85	lowest	69	house+	93	work+	68	mitigat+							
93	viscount+	88	holder+	40	patience	84	week+	66	chairman	90	cheap+	65	oppose+							
92	opposition	87	deficienc+	38	share+	82	charge+	60	election+	89	poor+	61	ought							
87	evening+	86	colon+	38	removal+	79	import+	53	work+	88	want+	60	reason+							
86	night+	82	unite+	37	promote+	77	calculat+	50	appoint+	87	money	60	found+							
83	move+	79	abundant+	37	repeal+	75	inform+	49	heart+	82	value	56	reject+							

Table 7: A Comparison of the themes from the 1814/15, 1826/28 and 1842/44 debates with those from 1846 debates

Themes from 1814/15	Themes from 1826/28	Themes from 1842/44	Themes from 1846
<i>Economic</i> Prices and Rents	<i>Economic</i> Political Economy: Capital, Labour, Land	<i>Economic</i> Wages of Labour	<i>Economic</i> Wages & Prices; High Farming
Food Self-Sufficiency			
Grain Trade	Grain Trade	International Grain Supply International Grain Trade	Agricultural Market & Ireland
			International Trade
<i>Political</i> Parliamentary Rhetoric	<i>Political</i> Parliamentary Rhetoric	<i>Political</i> Parliamentary Rhetoric	<i>Political</i> Parliamentary Rhetoric & Timing of Repeal
Petitions and Civil Unrest	Electoral Connection & Public Opinion	Class Conflict	Electoral Connection
		Peel's Sliding Scale	MPs as Trustees
		Anti-Anti Corn Law League	

Figure 1: Descending Hierarchical Classification: Tree Graph of the Stable Classes: 1814-1815




Figure 2: Descending Hierarchical Classification: Tree Graph of the Stable Classes: 1826-1828




Figure 3: Descending Hierarchical Classification: Tree Graph of the Stable Classes: 1842 – 1844






Figure 4: Correspondence Analysis of Classes, Parties and Time Frame of 1814 – 1815 Debates




	Eigenvalue	% Association	% Cumulative
Factor 1	0.29	36.7	36.7
Factor 2	0.22	28.5	65.2

Figure 5: Correspondence Analysis of Classes, Parties and Time Frame of 1826 – 1828 Debates



	Eigenvalue	% Association	% Cumulative
Factor 1	0.25	46.4	46.4
Factor 2	0.17	31.4	77.8

Figure 6: Correspondence Analysis of Classes, Parties and Time Frame of 1842 – 1844 Debates



	Eigenvalue	% Association	% Cumulative
Factor 1	0.20	33.3	33.3
Factor 2	0.15	24.4	57.7

APPENDIX 1

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>District Type</i>	<i>Refching</i>	<i>Other</i>
1814-1815					
Mr. Abercrombie	Whig	Calne	Borough	1	
Sir T. Acland	Tory	Devonshire	County	4	
Mr. JH Addington	Tory	Harwich	Borough	3	
Alderman Atkins	Tory	London	Borough	3	
Mr. T. Babington	Tory	Leicester	Borough	3	
Mr. H. Bankes	Tory	Corfe Castle	Borough	1	
Lord Barnard	Whig	Durham County	County	4	
Sir F. Burdett	Whig	Westminster	Borough	3	
Mr. Barclay	Tory	Southwark	Borough	3	
Mr. Blackburn	Tory	Lancashire	County	4	
Mr. Barham	Whig	Stockbridge	Borough	1	
Mr. A. Baring	Whig	Taunton	Borough	3	
Mr. Bathurst	Tory	Bodmin	Borough	3	
Lord Binning	Tory	Mitchell	Borough	1	
Mr. Brand	Whig	Hertfordshire	County	4	
Mr. Broadhead	Tory	Wareham	Borough	2	
D. Browne	Whig	County Mayo	County	3	
Mr. W. Burrell	Tory	Sussex	County	4	
Sir C. Burrell	Tory	New Shoreham	Borough	3	
Mr. Butterworth	Whig	Coventry	Borough	3	
Sir Egerton Brydges	Tory	Maidstone	Borough	3	
Mr. Brooke	Whig	Chippenhams	Borough	3	
Mr. J. Buller	Tory	Exeter	Borough	3	
Lord Castlereagh	Tory	County Down	County	3	
Mr. Cartwright	Tory	Northamptonshire	County	4	
George Canning	Tory	Liverpool	Borough	3	
Mr. Calcraft	Whig	Rochester	Borough	3	
Mr. C. Calvert	Whig	Southwark	Borough	3	
Mr. Courtenay	Tory	Exeter	Borough	3	

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>District Type</i>	<i>Refchng</i>	<i>Other</i>
Colonel Carew	Whig	County Wexford	County	3	
Mr. Pole Carew	Tory	Lostwithiel	Borough	1	
Mr. Cawthorne	Tory	Lancaster	Borough	3	
Sir G. Clerke	Tory	Edinburghshire	County	3	
Mr. TW Coke	Whig	Norfolk	County	4	
Sir N. Colthurst	Tory	Cork	Borough	3	
Lord Compton	Tory	Northampton	Borough	3	
EJ Curteis	Tory	Sussex	County	4	
Sir W. Curtis	Tory	London	Borough	3	
Mr. Daly	Tory	County Galway	County	3	
Mr. Hart Davis	Tory	Colchester	Borough	3	
Mr. F. Douglas	Whig	Banbury	Borough	3	
Mr. W. Douglas	Tory	Dumfries Burghs	Borough	3	
Mr. Wm. Elliot	Whig	Peterborough	Borough	3	
Mr. Ellison	Tory	Wootton Bassett	Borough	1	
Mr. Fawcett	Ind.	Carlisle	Borough	3	Regarded himself as champion of the independent party
Mr. Finlay	Whig	Glasgow Burghs	Borough	4	
Sir Frederick Flood	Tory	County Wexford	County	3	
Mr. Forbes	Tory	Beverley	Borough	3	
Mr. AJ Foster	Tory	Cockermouth	Borough	3	
J. Foster	Tory	County Louth	County	3	
W. Fitzgerald	Tory	Ennis (Ireland)	Borough	3	
Mr. Fremantle	Tory	Buckingham	Borough	3	
General Gascoyne	Tory	Liverpool	Borough	3	
Mr. Davies Giddy	Tory	Bodmin	Borough	3	
Mr. Gooch	Tory	Suffolk	County	4	
Sir James Graham	Tory	Carlisle	Borough	3	
JP Grant	Whig	Great Grimsby	Borough	2	
Mr. Gordon	See 'Other'	Staffordshire	County	3	Lord GL Gordon, Staffordshire 8 March 1799-1815 (Tory); Lord

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>District Type</i>	<i>Refchng</i>	<i>Other</i>
	column				GL Gordon II, Staffordshire 31 July 1815-1820 (Whig)
Mr. Leveson Gower	Ind.	Staffordshire	County	3	
Mr. Grattan	Whig	Dublin	Borough	3	
Mr. Grenfell	Whig	Great Marlow	Borough	1	
Lord A. Hamilton	Whig	Lanarkshire	County	3	
Mr. Harvey	Tory	Norwich	Borough	3	
Sir G. Heathcote	Tory	Rutland	County	3	
Mr. Horner	Whig	St. Mawes	Borough	1	
Mr. Howorth	Whig	Evesham	Borough	3	
Mr. W. Huskisson	Tory	Chichester	Borough	3	
Lord Jocelyn	Tory	County Louth	County	3	
Mr. F. Lewis	Whig	Beaumaris	Borough	3	
Lord Lascelles	Tory	Yorkshire	County	4	
Mr. JG Lambton	Whig	Durham County	County	4	Described occasionally as Lambert but there is no Lambert in the Commons at this time
Mr. Shaw Lefevre	Whig	Reading	Borough	3	
Mr. Gore Langton	Whig	Somerset	County	4	
Mr. Lockhart	Tory	Oxford	Borough	3	Approved committee on Corn Laws, 6 June 1814, disagreeing with a petition of his constituents against agricultural protection
Mr. C. Long	Tory	Haslemere	Borough	1	
Mr. Lushington	Tory	Canterbury	Borough	3	
Mr. Marjoribanks	Tory	Buteshire & Caithness-shire	County	4	
Mr. Marryat	Ind.	Sandwich	Borough	3	Claimed to be free of all parties but felt a disposition to give vote in favour of those in Administration
Mr. Methuen	Tory	Wiltshire	County	4	

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>District Type</i>	<i>Refchng</i>	<i>Other</i>
Lord Milton	Whig	Yorkshire	County	4	
C. Monck	Whig	Northumberland	County	4	
Mr. P. Moore	Whig	Coventry	Borough	3	
Mr. Morritt	Tory	Northallerton	Borough	2	
Sir J. Newport	Whig	Waterford	Borough	4	
Lord Nugent	Whig	Aylesbury	Borough	3	
Lord Ossultoun	Whig	Knarborough	Borough	3	
Mr. Paget	Tory	Carnarvon Burghs	Borough	3	
Sir Robert Peel	Tory	Tamworth	Borough	3	
Mr. Peel	Tory	Chippenham	Borough	3	
Mr. G. Phillips	Whig	Ilchester	Borough	1	
Sir H. Parnell	Whig	Queens County	County	3	
General Porter	Whig	Stockbridge	Borough	1	
Mr. Ponsonby	Whig	Peterborough	Borough	3	
Mr. Portman	Whig	Dorset	County	4	
Mr. Preston	Tory	Ashburton	Borough	2	
Lord Proby	Whig	Huntingdonshire	County	3	Acted generally with Grenville (Whig) but defended Corn Laws
Mr. Protheroe	Whig	Bristol	Borough	3	
Sir MW Ridley	Whig	Newcastle upon Tyne	Borough	3	
Mr. Rose	Tory	Christchurch	Borough	2	
Mr. Round	Tory	Ipswich	Borough	3	
Mr. Robinson	Tory	Ripon	Borough	3	
Sir S. Romilly	Whig	Arundel	Borough	2	
Mr. Horace St. Paul	Tory	Bridport	Borough	3	
Mr. Home Sumner	Tory	Surrey	County	4	
Sir James Shaw	Tory	London	Borough	3	
Mr. Shiffner	Tory	Lewes	Borough	3	
John Sebright	Whig	Hertfordshire	County	4	
Alderman C. Smith	Tory	St. Albans	Borough	3	
Mr. John Smith	Whig	Nottingham	Borough	3	

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>District Type</i>	<i>Refchng</i>	<i>Other</i>
Mr. W. Smith	Whig	Norwich	Borough	3	
Mr. Smyth	Whig	Cambridge University	Borough	3	
Mr. Stephen	Tory	East Grinstead	Borough	1	
Sir John Stewart	Tory	County Tyrone	County	3	
Mr. Wortley Stuart	Tory	Bossiney	Borough	1	
Mr. Swann	Tory	Penryn	Borough	3	
MA Taylor	Whig	Poole	Borough	3	
Mr. T. Thompson	Ind.	Midhurst	Borough	2	
H. Thornton	Tory	Southwark	Borough	3	
Mr. Tierney	Whig	Appleby	Borough	1	
N. Vansittart	Tory	Harwich	Borough	3	
Mr. Vyse	Ind.	Honiton	Borough	3	Chancellor of the Exchequer Considered himself neutral but was expected to vote for the Liverpool Tory ministry. Voted to reduce the protection price in 1815 though he was convinced of the necessity of protection.
Mr. Long Wellesley Pole	Tory	Queen's County	County	3	A champion of the Corn Bill, 8 March 1815
Mr. WPTL Wellesley	Tory	St. Ives	Borough	2	
Mr. Wilberforce	Tory	Bramber	Borough	1	
Colonel Wood	Tory	Breconshire	County	3	
Sir M. Wood	Tory	Gatton	Borough	1	
Mr. Whitbread	Whig	Bedford	Borough	3	
CW Wynn	Tory	Montgomeryshire	County	3	
WW Wynn	Tory	Denbighshire	County	4	
Mr. Western	Whig	Essex	County	4	
Mr. Wharton	Whig	Beverley	Borough	3	
Sir G. Warrender	Tory	Truro	Borough	3	
Mr. Yorke	Tory	Liskeard	Borough	2	

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>District Type</i>	<i>Refchng</i>	<i>Other</i>
1826-1828					
Sir T. Acland	Tory	Devonshire	County	4	
Lord Althorp	Whig	Northamptonshire	County	4	
Mr. G. Bankes	Tory	Corfe Castle	Borough	1	
Mr. C. Barclay	Tory	Dundalk	Borough	3	
Mr. A. Baring	Whig	Callington	Borough	1	
Mr. W. Baring	Ind.	Thetford	Borough	3	Characterised as non party but drifting towards the Conservatives
Mr. Beaumont	Whig	Northumberland to Dec 1826 then Stafford	County Borough	4 & 3	
Mr. Bernal	Whig	Rochester	Borough	3	
Mr. J. Benett	Whig	Wiltshire	County	4	
Mr. Birch	Whig	Nottingham	Borough	3	
Mr. Brougham	Whig	Winchelsea	Borough	1	
Sir F. Burdett	Whig	Westminster	Borough	3	
Sir J. Brydges	Tory	Coleraine	Borough	3	
Mr. Byng	Whig	Middlesex	County	3	
Mr. Calcraft	Whig	Wareham	Borough	2	
N. Calvert	Whig	Hertford to 1826; Hertfordshire thereafter	Borough County	3 & 4	
G. Canning	Tory	Harwich 1822-6, Newport Isle of Wight 1826-10 April 1827, Seaford 20 April -8 August 1827	Borough Borough Borough	3 3 1	Chancellor of the Exchequer & Prime Minister, April to August 1827
Lord Geo. Cavendish	Whig	Denbighshire	County	4	
Mr. O. Cave	Tory	Leicestershire	County	4	
Mr. C. Cole	Tory	Glamorganshire	County	4	
Mr. J. Cripps	Tory	Cirencester	Borough	3	
Sir G. Clerk	Tory	Edinburghshire	County	3	
Lord Clive	Tory	Ludlow	Borough	3	
Mr. Curteis	Tory	Sussex	County	3	

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>District Type</i>	<i>Refchng</i>	<i>Other</i>
Mr. Curtis	Tory	London 1820-26; Hastings 1826-December 1826	Borough Borough	3 3	
Mr. JC Curwen	Whig	Cumberland	County	4	
ED Davenport	Tory	Cheshire	County	4	
Mr. Dawson	Tory	County Londonderry	County	3	
Mr. WJ Denison	Whig	Surrey	County	4	
Mr. C. Duncombe	Tory	Newport, Isle of Wight until 1826	Borough	3	
Mr. Fergusson	Whig	Kirkcudbrightshire	County	3	
Mr. Fergusson	Whig	Dysart Burghs	Borough	3	
Lord Folkestone	Whig	Salisbury	Borough	3	
JL Foster	Tory	County Louth	County	3	
Mr. TB Fyler	Tory	Coventry	Borough	3	
General Gascoyne	Tory	Liverpool	Borough	3	
Mr. Davies Gilbert	Tory	Bodmin	Borough	3	
Mr. Gipps	Tory	Ripon	Borough	3	
Sir T. Gooch	Tory	Suffolk	County	4	
Captain Gordon	Whig	Cricklade	Borough	3	
Mr. A. Grant	Tory	Aldborough	Borough	1	
Mr. C. Grant	Whig	Inverness-shire	County	3	
DW Harvey	Radical	Colchester	Borough	3	
Mr. JC Hobhouse	Whig	Westminster	Borough	3	
Lord Howick	Whig	Winchelsea	Borough	1	
Mr. R. Hurst	Whig	Horsham	Borough	2	
Mr. Hume	Whig	Aberdeen Burghs	Borough	3	
William Huskisson	Tory	Liverpool	Borough	3	
Mr. J. Irving	Tory	Bramber	Borough	1	
Mr. King	Tory	County Sligo	County	3	
Sir E. Knatchbull	Tory	Kent	County	4	
Mr. R. Leycester	Ind.	Shaftesbury	Borough	2	
Mr. HT Liddell	Tory	Northumberland	County	4	

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>District Type</i>	<i>Refchng</i>	<i>Other</i>
Sir T. Lethbridge	Tory	Somersetshire	County	4	
Mr. F. Lewis	Tory	Ennis to April 1828; Radnorshire from 9 April 1828	Borough; County	3 & 3	
Mr. EJ Littleton	Whig	Staffordshire	County	3	
Colonel Maberly	Whig	Northampton	Borough	3	
Mr. J. Maberley	Whig	Abingdon	Borough	3	
Mr. J. Marshall	Whig	Yorkshire	County	4	
J. Maxwell	Whig	Renfrewshire	County	3	
Mr. P. Moore	Whig	Coventry until 1826	Borough	3	
Lord Milton	Whig	Yorkshire	County	4	
Mr. JB Monck	Whig	Reading	Borough	3	
Lord Morpeth	Whig	Morpeth	Borough	2	
Sir John Newport	Whig	Waterford City	Borough	4	
F. Palmer	Whig	Reading	Borough	3	
R. Palmer	Tory	Berkshire	County	4	
Sir H. Parnell	Whig	Queen's County	County	3	
Mr. Secretary Peel	Tory	Oxford University	Borough	3	
Mr. GR Phillips	Whig	Steyning	Borough	1	
Sir G. Phillips	Whig	Wootton Bassett	Borough	1	Baronet from 19 December 1827
G. Pigott	Tory	Kinross-shire	County	3	
Mr. EB Portman	Whig	Dorsetshire	County	4	
Mr. Spring Rice	Whig	Limerick	Borough	4	
Mr. G. Robinson	Whig	Worcester	Borough	3	
Mr. F. Robinson	Tory	Ripon	Borough	3	Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1823 until April 1827
Lord John Russell	Whig	Huntingdonshire to 1826; Bandon Bridge 19 December 1826-1830	County Borough	3	
Sir J. Sebright	Whig	Hertfordshire	County	4	
Colonel Sibthorpe	Tory	Lincoln	Borough	3	
Alderman C. Smith	Tory	St. Albans	Borough	3	

Name	Party	Constituency	District Type	Refchng	Other
Mr. Stanley	Whig	Lancashire	County	4	
Alderman Thompson	Tory	London	Borough	3	
CP Thompson	Whig	Dover	Borough	3	
Colonel Torrns	Whig	Ipswich	Borough	3	
Alderman Waithman	Whig	London	Borough	3	
Mr. Warburton	Whig	Bridport	Borough	3	
Mr. Western	Whig	Essex	County	4	
Mr. T. Whitmore	Tory	Bridgnorth	Borough	3	
Mr. Wodehouse	Tory	Norfolk	County	4	
Alderman Wood	Whig	London	Borough	3	
Colonel Wood	Tory	Breconshire	County	3	
J. Wood	Whig	Preston	Borough	3	
Mr. W. Ward	Tory	London	Borough	3	
Sir J. Wrottesley	Whig	Staffordshire	County	3	
Sir WW Wynn	Tory	Denbighshire	County	4	
H. Goulburn (Chancellor of the Exchequer from January 1828 –1830; 1841-46)	Tory	St. Germans 1812-18 West Looe 1818-26 Armagh Borough 1826-31 Cambridge University 1831 until his death in 1856	Borough (4)	1812-26: 1 1826-56: 3	
Lord Belgrave	Whig	Chester	Borough	3	

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APPENDIX 2

Summary of Parliamentary Proceedings 1814-1844

Volume XXVII **1813-1814**

5 April & 25 April 1814

Petitions presented for and against the Corn Laws.

5 May 1814

Sir Henry Parnell's motion: 'That it is expedient that the exportation of corn, grain, meal, malt and flour, from any part of the United Kingdom, should be permitted at all times, without the payment of any duty, and without receiving any bounty whatever.' (c. 666)

13 May 1814

Report on Parnell's resolutions on Corn Laws

16 May

Further consideration of the resolutions

17 May

Report on Corn Trade re-committed

18 May

Report on Corn Trade

23 May

Vote for a Committee to inquire into the Corn Laws, defeated by 99-42, majority 57 (c. 997)

Third Reading of Corn Exportation Bill 107-27, majority 80 (c. 1013)

24 May 1814

Corn Importation Bill, Petitions, 3 & 6 June

6 June 1814

Committee on Corn Laws: Vote that the Report should be taken into consideration in six months (Amendment by General Gascoyne) passed 116-106. Chancellor of the Exchequer on behalf of the government had proposed 3 weeks. (c. 1102)

Volume XXIX **1814-1815**

14 & 17 February 1815

State of the Corn Laws, average price of bread (15 February)

22 February 1815

Committee reported on State of the Corn Laws – voted for House in the Committee. The first three Resolutions were agreed. The fourth resolution fixing prices at which wheat shall be imported gave rise to debate. The Government proposed 80s as the domestic price at which foreign corn was admissible.

23 February 1815

Amendment proposed by Mr. Baring to substitute 72s for 80s, was defeated by 209-65, majority 144 (c. 1043)

27 February 1815

Vote for bringing up the Report including price of 80s, passed 235-38, majority 197 (c. 1082)

Report to be read passed 193-29, majority 164 (c. 1084)

28 February 1815

Mr. Calcraft's Amendment to substitute 72s for 80s defeated by 154-35, majority in favour of 80s, 119. Subsequent Resolutions agreed to and leave given to bring in a Bill upon said Resolutions. (c. 1117)

1 March 1815

Corn Bill: Amendment by Mr. Whitbread to delay the Bill defeated by 109-30 (c. 1126)

3 March 1815

Second Reading for the Bill regulating the importation of corn. Lambton's Amendment that the bill be read a second time in six months time, defeated 218-56, majority 152 (c. 1242)

Baring's motion to delay the second reading by a week defeated 215-44, majority 171. Bill committed on the following Monday. (c. 1243)

Volume XXX

1815

8 March 1815

Amendment to delay bringing up the Report by six months defeated 168-50, majority 118 (c. 69)

Baring's Amendment to bring up the report after the Easter recess defeated 206-57, majority 149 (c. 77)

For price of 80s, passed 184-78, majority 106 (c. 77)

Baring amendment to delay the Third Reading defeated 220-46, majority 174 (c. 78)

10 March

Third Reading: Protheroe's Amendment to delay the measure by six months defeated 245-77, majority 168. (c. 124)

*After the Bill had been read a third time, Mr. Portman proposed by way of rider, the substitution of 76s. as the protecting price instead of 80s. On this proposition another division took place. For the Amendment 73, Against 213, Majority against 241

Baring introduced two motions

1. Rendering Bill liable to be amended or repealed during the present session. This was agreed to.
2. Making the duration of the measure co-extensive with the Bank Restriction Act. Negatived without a division.

Bill then passed (c. 125)

Volume XVI

1826-1827

22 & 28 November 1826

Petitions for and against revision of Corn Laws presented by Sir T. Lethbridge (protectionist) & Joseph Hume (free trader) (c. 97, c. 143)

1 March 1827

House resolved into Committee to consider the Acts relative to the trade in Corn, moved by George Canning. (c. 758)

Ministerial measures: Revision of duties, when corn was 60-61s a quarter, the duty was to be £1, and for every shilling the price was raised, the duty was decreased by 2s until 70s. Above 70s, the duty should be 1s for every quarter.

Between 59-60s the duty shall be £1 2s. Under 59s: for every shilling under 59s, the duty was to be increased by 2s. (c. 772-773)
Similar measures for barley, oats, rye, beans, peas etc.

8 March 1827
Committee on Corn Trade Acts

9 March 1827
Whitmore's Amendment: when the price of wheat shall be between 50-51s the quarter, the duty shall be £1 for every quarter. The original resolution had the same duty at the price of 60s. (c. 1100-1101)

Amendment defeated 335-50, majority 285 (c. 1122)

Volume XVII

1827

27 March 1827

Report of Committee on Corn Trade Acts

Hume's Amendment that the duty should be reduced by 1 shilling yearly. From 5 July 1827 – 5 July 1828, the rate shall be 15s a quarter on wheat. The following year it would be 14s, next 13s etc, until 5 July 1833 when a 10s fixed duty on every quarter of wheat from foreign countries would be permanent, except from Canada. (c. 100)

Hume's Amendment defeated 140-16, majority 124 (c. 105)

29 March 1827

Corn Duties Bill based on the late Resolutions – First Reading (c. 132)

2 April 1827

Second reading

Sir T. Lethbridge's Amendment that the Bill be read six months hence (c. 177)

Divisions: For the Second reading, 243; For the Amendment 78, majority 165 (c. 198)

6 & 9 April 1827

Further Reports on the Bill (c. 286, c. 345)

12 April 1827

Third reading passed – No division list or figures (might have passed without division) (c. 391-392)

18 June 1827

Corn Trade Committee proposed by Canning, passed 238-52, majority 186 (c. 1339)

Volume XVIII

1828

31 March 1828

Committee on Corn Laws (c. 1379-1411)

Volume XIX

1828

22 April 1828

Calcraft's Amendment to revise the scale of duties to correspond to Canning's scale of duties last year (c. 29)

Amendment defeated 202-58, majority 144 (c. 39)

25 April 1828

Committee on Corn Laws: Amendment of Benett by which the duty decreased 2s instead of 1s when the price was 62s, till it reached 67s. Defeated 230-32, majority 198 (c. 155)

Amendment of Portman: Descending scale at 1s each; Instead of 1s advance in the duty upon every shilling of fall in price, it should be 2s. This was last years scale. Defeated 140-50, majority 90 (c. 156)

29 April 1828

First Reading of Corn Bill

Hume's Amendment (same as his previous one of 27 March 1827)

For original resolution 139

Hume's Amendment 27

Majority 112 (c. 229)

Further Amendments defeated.

23 May 1828

Third Reading (c. 900-902) No figures available in Hansard.

Volume LX

1842

3 February

Peel introduces the consideration of revision of the scale of duties relating to importation of foreign corn (c. 40)

9 February

Ministerial Plan relating to duties on import of foreign corn (c. 202-236)

16 February

Amendment against the adoption of the government measure as the principle of the sliding scale, causing price fluctuations, was maintained. Amendment defeated 349-226, Majority 123 (c. 620)

18 February

Villiers motion for total repeal (c. 648)

24 February

Villiers motion that all duties cease defeated 393-90, Majority 303 (c. 1082)

25 February

Christopher's Amendment to the Ministerial Plan, substituting a more protective scale of duties (c. 1093)

Average price of wheat between 50-51s a quarter, duty to be 25s. (c. 1103)

25 February

Division on the original question, that under 51s, the duty for every quarter of wheat should be 20s. Passed by 306-104, Majority 202 (c. 1168)

28 February

Division on duty of 7s on Oats when priced between 19s-20s a quarter. Passed by 256-53, Majority 203 (c. 1221)

Volume LXI

1842

4 March

First reading of Peel's revision of the Sliding Scale (c. 44)

9 March

Second Reading of above. Passed 284-176, Majority 108 (c. 405)

14 March

Committee stage, with Ward's motion for the appointment of a Select Committee on Burdens on Land. (c. 519)

Defeated 230-115, Majority 115 (c. 572)

Division on the motion that the Chairman of the Committee report the progress of the Bill; Passed 89-64, Majority 25 (c. 582)

Volume LXII

1842

7 April

Cobden's Amendment to the Third Reading, that it was 'unjust to pass a law to regulate, with a view to raise unnaturally, the prices of food.' (c. 27)

Amendment defeated 236-86, Majority 150 (c. 58)

7 April

Amendment by Hindley to adjourn the debate defeated 247-68, Majority 179 (Division List c. 61-63)

On Third Reading 229 to 90, Majority 139 (c. 63-66)

Various motions regarding bonding and warehousing defeated. Third Reading passed (c. 75)

An Amendment of Mr. French, that the measures affecting the importation of flour from foreign countries should be delayed six months, was negatived without a division. (c. 66-68)

Volume LXIV

1842

11 July

Repeal of the Corn Laws motion by Villiers (c. 1307)

Defeated by 231-117, Majority 114 (c. 1385)

Volume LXV

1842

22 July

Gibson's Amendment that the House should consider the distressed state of the country (c. 517)

Volume LXXIII

1844

12 March

Protective Duties – The Agricultural Interest: Cobden's motion for a Select Committee into the effects of Protective Duties upon tenant farmers and labourers.

Defeated 224-133, Majority 91 (c. 960)

Volume LXXV

1844

25 June

Villiers motion on Abolition of Corn Laws (c. 1353)

26 June

Villiers motion defeated 328-124, Majority 204 (c. 1549)

Volume LXXXIV

27 February

Ministerial measures: First Reading passed 337-240, Majority 97 (c. 349; Division List c. 349-354)

2 March

Total and Immediate Repeal Motion defeated - vote on the Chairman reporting progress defeated 227-70.
(c. 422-467; Division List c. 467-470)

3 March 1846

Total and Immediate Repeal defeated 265-78, Majority 187 (c. 527-575; Division List c. 575-578)

Volume LXXXV

27 March

Ministerial measures: Second Reading passed 302-214, Majority 88 (c. 265; Division List c. 265-271)

Volume LXXXVI

15 May

Ministerial measures: Third Reading passed 327-229, Majority 98 (c. 721; Division List c. 721-726)