

**HOW THE JAPANESE UNDERSTAND
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
CONTRIBUTION: ITS HISTORICAL NATURE AS
FEATURED IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

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INTRODUCTION

WHY CONSIDER JAPAN'S "INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTION"?

Since the late 1980's, Japan has been increasingly urged to play an international role appropriate for its economic power and, in fact, the nation has been complying with this by undertaking various activities including giving economic assistance to developing countries, participating in U.N. peace-keeping operations, and joining collaborative efforts to solve emerging global issues. Of late, Japan's role at the international level has been expanded from its former focus on economic matters to politico-military affairs, as can be seen from its involvement in peace keeping operations and its endeavors to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. The Japanese call this *kokusai kōken*, international contribution. In the discourses concerning Japanese foreign policy and activities, *kokusai kōken* has been a core concept representing the Japanese way of thinking and its policy orientation – what Japan should be in international society and what it should be doing.

In a poll conducted in 2004 in Japan,¹ when asked what first comes to mind upon hearing the word *kokusai kōken*, the most popular response was the nation's efforts toward the maintenance of international peace and to the collaborative efforts to solve global issues including the environment. After this came, humanitarian assistance to international refugees, followed by Japan's contribution to the development of the world economy. This understanding of what comprises international contribution is significantly different from that of the late 1980's when the Japanese first began to cultivate the idea of *kokusai kōken*. At that time, the Japanese gave considerably more weight to their contribution to the world economy, developing countries, scientific technology, and cultural exchange, than to the nation's

¹According to "A Public Poll on Diplomacy" (October 2004) conducted by the Japanese Government's Cabinet Office, Japanese people see "international contribution" as "contribution to the maintenance of international peace" (51.9 percent), "contribution to the solution of global issues including environmental problems" (38.4 percent), "humanitarian assistance to refugees and evacuees" (25 percent), and "contribution to the sound development of the world economy" (19.9 percent).

politico-military role in international society.² This conceptual change of *kokusai kōken* from one that focused on economic and cultural matters to one that emphasized politico-military contributions was triggered by the First Gulf War in which Japan was widely criticized for taking a passive stance, limiting its role to monetary contributions. This was a wake-up call for Japan, which, afterwards, began to actively consider human or military contributions.

Kokusai kōken is an action that entails committing Japan to international society defined according to the nation's position in that society and to how its citizens perceive the nature of it. The phenomenon of international contribution offers Japanese people a sort of ontological and epistemological basis through which they exist in international society. *Kokusai kōken* is a term that comprises (or comes from) Japan's self-consciousness and self-identity with which Japan defines itself as *kokusai kokka* (an international state). Such self-designation is an act whereby Japan commits itself to international society or to the world into which its policies and actions are projected. It is also an acknowledgment of "international responsibility" that Japan may have to bear as a member of international society.

What is the nature of "international contribution"? *Kokusai kōken* is an expression of the peace-loving minds of the Japanese people and their will to actualize their self-image as a "peace-loving nation." As far as the projection of Japan's policies and actions into international society is concerned, it cannot but depend considerably on the nature and the structure of that society. Japan's *kokusai kōken* is closely linked to *kokusaika* (internationalization), a process during which has Japan readjusted relations with international society and thereby changed its position within it. *Kokusaika* is what defines the

²The results of a 1988 public poll, for example, say that the Japanese people at that time viewed "international contribution" as "contribution to the sound development of the world economy" (52.5 percent), "cooperation for the advancement of developing countries" (39.1 percent), "contribution to scientific technology and cultural exchange" (32.4 percent), "contribution to international politics including the improvement of East-West relations and mediation efforts to resolve regional conflict" (24.6 percent), and "the strengthening of national defense as a member of the Western nations" (8.7 percent).

nature of “international contribution”; and Japan’s motivation to contribute to international society propels its *kokusaika*. The fact that the Japanese understanding of “international contribution” surfaced in the context of “internationalization” suggests that this concept of contribution is deeply intertwined with the international system.

An historical and discursive analysis of Japanese political leaders and elites will be attempted here in order to inquire into the nature of Japan’s international contribution and its understanding of international responsibility with a particular focus on the nature of the relationship between Japanese people and the world and on the authenticity of the responsibility. The nature of the relationship between the international system and Japan’s responsibility is three-fold: “nationalization,” which aims to build a nation-state and foster a sense of national responsibility; “imperialization,” which attempts to construct an empire and generate a sense of regional responsibility; and lastly, “internationalization,” which seeks to create an international state and, correspondingly, international responsibility. Each of these three phenomena will be explored by examining their respective historical roots, and, on this basis, the uniqueness in the Japanese people’s understanding of “international responsibility” will be explored.

CHAPTER 1

RESPONSIBILITY, CONTRIBUTION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Responsibility in Contexts

The Japanese equivalent of “responsibility” is *sekinin*. What is *sekinin*? What kind of *sekinin ishiki*, or sense of responsibility, do the Japanese hold? Responsibility is the state, quality, or fact of being responsible. It is also something for which one is responsible, such as a duty, obligation, or burden. In other words, being responsible is to have an obligation, duty, or accountability to someone or something. A sense of responsibility is one’s awareness or consciousness of being responsible. What responsibility do we have? Why and for what? When one is compelled to pose these questions, it means that one is feeling some tension about the relationship between the self and the other. Feeling a sense of responsibility indicates having an unusual concern about or some interest in someone or something. In the same manner, such concerns and interests, in reciprocity, give rise to a sense of responsibility. *Sakumu*, also, is a term frequently used in the Japanese discourse. *Sekinin* includes not only a response to the other, but also reflective duty over the self; *sakumu* points mainly to a one-way duty to the other.³ *Sakumu* has been often used in cases where personal, social, and national duties to or actions involving the community, the state, and international society are requested whereby a sense of duty to a larger social sphere is drawn.

Responsibility, whether compulsory or not, is an expression of other-consciousness that is derived from concerns about the other; the other-consciousness comes from the subject’s self-consciousness. A sense of responsibility, then, could be said to depend on the nature of the subject, the object, and the context surrounding them. Professor Tetsuya Takahashi of the University of Tokyo defines “responsibility” as “the possibility of response”

³According to *Kōjien*, 4th version (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), *sekinin* means “task for persons to do; fault to blame from the viewpoint of politics, morality, and law, etc.,” and *sakumu* points to “responsibility and duty; task to do as responsibility.”

when he argues about Japanese war responsibility to the Asian people. “The possibility of response” is the capacity to answer the questions or the requests posed by the other, the Asian people, or to pay attention to what they are saying.⁴ This question-and-answer formula is defined by the nature of self-other relations and the context that confines these relations.

Responsibility as “response” relies primarily on the subject’s level: individual, social group, state, or international organization. Each level controls the spatial nature of responsibility, i.e., the distance up to which responsibility or a sense of responsibility can be projected. The spatial nature of responsibility affected by the mode of self-other relations confines the nature (strength, density) of responsibility and a sense of it. Responsibility or a sense of responsibility also depends on economy and security, which define the subject’s sphere of survival: economy and security at the individual, social group, state, and international society level define the sphere and content of responsibility.

In addition, systemic ideas, used for controlling/securing the subject’s sphere of survival, control the sense of mission, the self-other consciousness, and the senses of state, region, and international society. Above all, culture as a durable force has considerable influence on responsibility and the sense of responsibility. Hence, it follows that responsibility or a sense of responsibility can be formed by ensuring survival in the economic and security realm and by ideational adornment of the real world. Imagined responsibility frequently produces an imaginary “role” as a responsible leading state and a will to perform such a role.

This nature of responsibility and its consciousness needs to be understood in the context of the system: societal, international, or global. The experiences of the civil society show that an individual’s responsibility should be based on that individual’s autonomy (self-

⁴Tetsuya Takahashi, *Sengo Sekininron* [On Postwar Responsibility] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1999), Chapter 1. Takahashi says that: “what I mean by responsibility as a possibility of response is the only way to escape from the world of solitude made only for the self, i.e., absolute isolation, and to enter into a relationship with the other.”

help, self-reliance) and ethics; for example, national responsibility or patriotism comes from self-directed individuals' responsibility ethics. A great deal of experience in non-Western societies, however, where individuals have been under the strong control of the state, reminds us that individual responsibility and its consciousness tend to be managed by the system, since it is the system that defines the individual nature of being.

Let us now consider responsibility in the international realm through Japanese responsibility in the Pacific War. Norihiro Kato, a literary critic and professor at Meiji Gakuen University, maintains that the Japanese people should first grieve for their own 5 million war dead before expressing their regrets for having imposed aggression on the Asian people,⁵ which means that Japanese domestic responsibility should take precedence over their international responsibility. Takahashi, who is critical of Kato's view, asserts that the Japanese people should take clear war responsibility by making a conclusive apology to the Asian people, and he lays stress on "the possibility of response" of the self (Japan) vis-à-vis the other (Asia).⁶

These divergent indicate a different sense of subjectivity in the dispute surrounding Japanese responsibility ethics; but they disregard the fact that Japanese responsibility ethics concerning the war are inherently bound by the nature of the international system. International responsibility and the sense of responsibility cannot be seen only from the perspective of inquiring as to the authenticity of the subject's responsibility ethics. It needs to be considered that "the structure of irresponsibility," domestic and international, fostered by the international system (imperialism and the Cold War for instance), has rendered the subject irresponsible.

⁵Norihiro Kato, *Haisengoron* [On After Defeat] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1997).

⁶Tetsuya Takahashi, *Sengo Sekinin Ron*, Chapter 1.

“International Contribution,” the International System, and Culture

The significance of Japan’s international or global responsibility since the 1990’s has been augmented by its growing consciousness of “international contribution” as its main diplomatic goal. “International contribution” is based on Japan’s commitment to pacifism and international cooperation and its aspiration for “peace and stability in international society.” In essence, however, it is none other than a representation of Japan’s foreign policy, which seeks national development and pursues national interests. Japan’s willingness to play an international role and its goal of maintaining “international peace and security” are embodied in the U.S.-Japan alliance and the United Nations. Indeed, the international system was a significant factor in determining the pacific and strictly interest-oriented nature of Japan’s “international contribution.”⁷ For Japan, “international contribution” is to play a role that is appropriate for its given position in the international system. The nature of the international system, and Japan’s position within it, has confined the nature of Japan as a state (a revisionist state vs. a status quo state) and the characteristics and style of Japan’s international activities (proactivity vs. reactivity⁸).

The international system, however, is not the only factor that defines the concept and activities entailed in “international contribution.” “International contribution” may also reveal Japan’s desire to escape or overcome its reactive nature and to be proactive so as to elevate its position to another level in the international system. The Japanese people’s understanding of international mission or responsibility represents not only their will for national survival and prosperity, but also their identity. It is through such missions and responsibilities that the Japanese find an avenue to declare themselves and let themselves be known to international

⁷In postwar Japan, pacifism or the idea of peace emerged from the viewpoint of national interest rather than ideational purism.

⁸In an analysis of Japan’s response to U.S. pressure to share the burden of defense, Harvard political scientist Susan Pharr asserted that Japan was defensive rather than reactive. Susan J. Pharr, “Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing,” Gerald Curtis, ed., *Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).

society. The Japan state has been pursuing or demonstrating its *raison d'être* in the international system via the idea and action of “international contribution,” thereby implying Japan’s will to overcome or correct what is believed to be abnormal in the international system. Japan’s professed sympathy for global issues such as environmental problems and human rights also embraces a strong desire to actively pursue its national interest and state development.

As described later, this desire comes from Japan’s sense of responsibility to preserve and fortify its national community, and this sense of responsibility, in turn, comes from the will to build “an adamant culture” (former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone). The nature and the level of responsibility and identity vary in relation to the international system. As can be seen through *nihonbunkaron* (discourses of Japanese culture) and *nihonjinron* (discourses of Japanese people),⁹ cultural identity that supports the political community’s survival and prosperity has been formed vis-à-vis the international system. Cultural identity produces a sense of *sakumu* willing to form a cultural community between the international system and the nation (*sonnojōiron*, cultural nationalism, Japanism, discourse of cultural defense). Repetitive appearances of *nihonbunkaron* and *nihonjinron*, in a sense, represent the lurking presence of responsibility consciousness. Cultural identity is prone to reveal itself when culture comes into being or when it is created vis-à-vis a civilization or the international system embedded in the structure and the context of international relations.

While cultural identity reinforces a sense of community and enhances “self-responsibility,” the ultimate basis of responsibility consciousness is in establishing the economic well-being and security of the community. International responsibility is primarily taken for national economic prosperity and security, and this international responsibility relies

⁹For the scholars of National Learning (*kokugaku*), Japanese identity was a response to the Sino-centric system. Meiji political leaders were the Japanese response to the intellectuals of civilization and enlightenment. The Meiji nationalists were also a response to the nation-state system, the imperialists, and the imperial system.

on the nature of the economic sphere that, in turn, confines the sphere of survival. International responsibility and consciousness of such responsibility differ according to the respective level of the economic sphere: the household, the state, the region, and the world. These economic spheres themselves are closely related to the different international systems that have corresponded to the various stages in Japanese history and defined national security in each one – the inward-looking *han* (feudal domain) economy in Tokugawa Japan, the national economy in Meiji Japan, the regional economy in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and the global economy in the era of globalization. The latter three of these stages correspond to nationalization, imperialization, and internationalization, respectively. The economy and security, therefore, have an influence on the sphere, the level, and the nature of responsibility.

“International contribution” is about playing a positive and meaningful role in international society or in the global economy as “an international state” (*kokusai kokka*) and as an “economic power.” The U.S.-led international system, Japan’s international status as an economic power, and Japan’s foreign policy goals of pacifism and national interest all lead us to contemplate “international contribution.” How should we understand “international contribution”? Insofar as it is a sort of international responsibility, the authenticity of “international contribution” needs to be illuminated in the historical (temporal/spatial) context of the international system Japan has had to face.

CHAPTER 2

NATIONALIZATION AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY

The Modern Subject and Responsibility

It was not until the late Tokugawa period when Japan first opened its doors to the Western world that Japanese political leaders began to perceive international society and to harbor a sense of responsibility vis-à-vis that society. With their country's independence in jeopardy, Japan's political leaders felt that it was urgent to build a new nation that was capable of coping with external threats. Such a sense of mission was expressed in the word *sakumu*, which came from the samurais' loyalty to their feudal lords in the Tokugawa regime, and this unique concept was incorporated in the course of nation-building, thereby creating a national consciousness in Meiji Japan.

The national sense of *sakumu* promoted a national consciousness by which all of Japan was conceived as one nation by reaching beyond the segmented domain system and the fragmented political consciousness to perceive the emperor as the first and foremost object of loyalty. Changes in domestic politics, detonated by the samurais' ideas and actions, which transcended the domain system, made possible the newly emerging ideas of forming an emperor-centered system, altering the object of loyalty from a feudal lord to the emperor and shifting the sphere of *sakumu* from the domain to the imperial state (*kōkoku*). Samurai reformers felt that they were entrusted with a mission as heroes and sought to exert their *sakumu* to establish a new nation-state and to protect it.

Opening Japan's doors accompanied fundamental changes in its foreign policy and political system; Meiji internationalization was a course of "civilizing" and "enlightening" for Japan by which it opened up to the world and accepted the global or Western standard. Aside from accepting modern institutions like international law and nation-state

internationalization, it was an opportunity to disperse a worldview of “civilization and barbarism.” This was followed by “civilization and enlightenment” (or nation-enriching and army-strengthening) and state-building with a particular emphasis on the perception that Northeast Asia was entering a nation-state system. Upon entering modern international society, Japanese leaders began to think of their own country in the larger framework of international society and to show awareness of having responsibility, which was equated with complying with “The Public Way of the World” (international law).¹⁰ Japan’s responsibility was to observe the rules of civilization in order to protect itself from the threat of the Western powers and to secure state-building and national independence.

Sakumu in this context was the duty or the responsibility of practicing the nation-enriching and army-strengthening that were vital to defend Japan; it necessarily required nationalization, a process of constructing a national economic and political system for a rich and strong country. In the hierarchical Tokugawa social system, personal responsibility consisted of taking care of the family and being loyal to the feudal lord. The sphere of political responsibility in which loyalty functioned was the domain; the sphere of economic responsibility was limited to the family. *Shokubun*, the duty and role designated according to class or social ranking, restricted the sphere and nature of economy; on the other hand, nationalization for “a rich nation and a strong army” required a national economy. The transition of the Japanese economy from the feudal to the national implied that economic responsibility had to be enlarged in its sphere and level to the national or societal.

Japan’s nationalization process demanded the establishment of a modern subject who was aware of his or her responsibilities. In early Meiji Japan, enlightened intellectuals’ social responsibility, *shokubun*, was to enter into civilization and achieve “a progress of the human world.” This sense of *shokubun* yielded a sense of *sakumu*, and it was here that a sense of

¹⁰The observance of international law was a key theme of the “Five Oaths” formulated by the Meiji Emperor.

sakumu or mission of enlightenment and nationalization was conceived. The enlightened thinkers of the Meiji period hoped to form a modern subject who bore self-responsibility vis-à-vis the society or the state. Educator and intellectual Yukichi Fukuzawa, for example, demanded the establishment of “individual self-reliance” as a precondition for the “nation’s independence” and encouraged people to have “spirits of independence” in “a world where so many things are happening.” Masanao Nakamura, a novelist and leading thinker of the day, believed that responsibility and autonomy could be found in the concept of personal “self-help.”¹⁰

Meanwhile, historian/journalist Soho Tokutomi, who was critical of the limitations of the Meiji enlightenment, founded, as it was, upon the idea that the masses are inevitably ignorant, suggested instead a civilized “commoner society” of “self-sustenance and self-support” in “the world of economy”, i.e., economic self-reliance. According to him, *shokubun* in the feudal world comes from “compulsion”; free competition in “the world of economy” from “spontaneity.” A “peaceful world,” where the interests of the self and the other reach harmony on the basis of economic liberalism, originates from “a responsible animal,” and responsibility in “the world of economy” defines what ought to be social action. Individual and social responsibilities confine each other.¹¹

Indeed, “civilization and enlightenment” actually did promote a sense of responsibility. Modern education and civilization led the new Meiji generation to gradually acquire a sense of self-responsibility (self-direction, self-reliance and self-respect). At the same time, the nation-state building process made them feel national responsibility, though incrementally, which unfortunately did not grow into national pride. This was because self-

¹⁰See Yukichi Fukuzawa, *Gakumon no Susume* [Encouragement of Learning] (Tokyo: Kasama Shoin, 1992); and Masanao Nakamura, “Seikoku Risshi Hen Jo” [Introduction to Self-Help] (Tokyo, 1877).

¹¹Mamoru Wada, *Kindai Nihon to Tokutomi Sohō* [Modern Japan and Soho Tokutomi] (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1990) 26-36; John D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō, 1863-1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980) Chapter 4.

responsibility was more about the individual's moral consciousness by which one took responsibility for one's own actions and because such consciousness did not arise out of collective national security and national guidance.¹²

Such a sense of self-responsibility did not satisfactorily meet the expectations of the advocates of enlightenment and democratic rights who wanted to construct a responsible society upon the three pillars of the individual's "independence," "self-help," and "self-sustenance and self-support." In the Japanese imperial regime, where the political leaders had the power to rule the nation and people were treated merely as political objects, i.e., imperial subjects (*shinmin*), the individual's autonomy to practice social responsibility could not but be restricted. *Shinmin* were passive beings who were asked to practice *sakumu* by devoting their loyalty to the Emperor and the nation. The imperial system had distorted Japanese society and its economy as a viable sphere of responsibility. Even while the imperial nation-state building process promoted the individual's sense of self-responsibility, there was, nonetheless, a discrepancy between this personal self-responsibility and national responsibility, which arose from the emerging nationalism that placed national survival before the individual's life and worth.

War and a Sense of Mission to Civilize Others

This discrepancy was seemingly reduced as the Japanese state succeeded in creating national responsibility and enforcing national identity, but the state overwhelmed the society by transforming Japanese individuals into *shinmin* by "compulsion." Since the beginning of the Meiji regime, Japanese political leaders, whose perception of the world was overwhelmingly Hobbesian,¹³ had been eager to implement state-led policies in pursuit of

¹²Kenneth Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1895* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969).

¹³Seizaburo Sato, "Bakumatsu-Meiji Shoki ni Okeru Taigai Ishiki no Sho Ruikai" [Types of Foreign Consciousness in Late Tokugawa and Early Meiji Japan], ed. Seizaburo Sato and Rogers Dingman *Kindai Nihon*

wealth and strength. As Japan continued to institutionalize its domestic society and achieved notable expansion, its state power increasingly repressed the individual's subjectivity while enforcing national responsibility and identity. The previously discussed discrepancy was, therefore, reduced as the state deprived the individual of subjectivity.

It was Japan's wars with China and Russia that brought about a critical opportunity to narrow this discrepancy. The two wars represented Japan's intention to obtain a position as a predominant power and to build a regional system in Northeast Asia favorable to Japan. These wars presented Japan with an opportunity not only to form a national identity, but also to establish a sense of international responsibility. And this opportunity was exploited by stirring up nationalistic sentiment and opinion. Japan's rise as a revisionist power in the East Asian region was, in part, influenced by the perceptual framework of "civilization-barbarism," and it was here that "a mission to civilize others" (Fukuzawa; Kanzo Uchimura, a Christian evangelist and intellectual) arose as the most important feature of Japan's international responsibility.

In particular, the "barbaric" conditions of China and Korea stirred the anger of Japanese intellectuals and encouraged them to launch a civilizing mission. The Sino-Japanese War (1894) was alleged to be "a just war," which sought to civilize "barbaric" China and was meant to politically materialize the idea that had existed since the 1880's, of "leaving [barbarian] Asia and entering into [civilized] Europe." Japan's victory further strengthened the idea of "an Asian leader state," while it continuously gave support to their mission to "civilize." A sense of responsibility as the region's leading state became even more entrenched with Japan's victory against Russia. The Russo-Japanese War (1904) was justified as a struggle against the white race. Deepened self-consciousness as the only existing leader of the yellow race who could compete with the white race of the Western countries extended

no Taiga Taidō [Foreign Attitudes in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1974) 37.

the Japanese sphere of responsibility even to the level of security in the “Orient” (*tōyō*, Northeast Asia). While the sense of leadership before and after the Sino-Japanese War was based on the ideas of modern civilization, that before and after the Russo-Japanese War was intermingled with a sense of mission to protect the Japanese or the Oriental civilization. In the context of “imperial management,” Japan came to mobilize two types of responsibility: the responsibility to civilize, which justified its colonial rule, and the responsibility to assimilate, so that it could expand and unify the Japanese Empire.

Japan’s efforts at modernization and development and its rise as a regional hegemon caused a systemic change in the region, and Japan’s sense of mission to civilize and lead its Northeast Asian neighbors aroused, within it, a sense of international responsibility. Here, the region became a sphere into which Japan’s international responsibility was projected. The sphere of responsibility coincided with the area to which the expression “Oriental peace” (*tōyō heiwa*) could be applied.¹⁵ “Oriental peace,” frequently discussed in the imperial transformation from a “constricting Japan” to an “expansive Japan,” revealed Japan’s intention to enlarge its sphere of responsibility in Asia. Although it was the basis of Japan’s rhetoric to obtain hegemony in the region, it became revitalized as a symbol to solidify the supposed sense of Japan’s mission and responsibility vis-à-vis Asia.

¹⁵Regarding the Japanese concept of “Oriental peace,” see Takeshi Ishida, *Nihon no Seiji to Kotoba* [Politics and Words in Japan], Vol.1 (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1989). The corresponding Korean concept can be grasped in In-Sung Jang, “Kindai Kankoku no Heiwa Kannen” [The Concept of Peace in Modern Korea], ed. Hiroshi Watanabe and Choongseok Park *Kankoku, Nihon, “Seiyō”* [Korea, Japan, and “the West”] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2005).

CHAPTER 3

IMPERIALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

A Sense of Imperial Mission

Imperialization can be said to have been a corollary of nationalization, which ultimately aimed at an imperial state and imperial subjects. Imperialization, an extreme type of nationalization, was a process that involved acting as a revisionist state in regional and global politics and projecting imperial power and values into East Asia. Nationalization was the process of contriving a nation-state and national identity by drawing exclusive boundaries; imperialization was that of building an empire that went well beyond the nation-state and of embracing other peoples by projecting its power abroad. The sense of responsibility to lead and civilize the Asian peoples not only fortified Japan's national identity, but formed an imperial way of thinking that required the forcible inclusion of the regional space. The process of imperialization led both the Japanese and the colonial peoples to share the imperial consciousness and identity. Imperial consciousness, a sense of one's belonging to an empire that is powerful and influential in world politics, arises from a sense of national superiority as well as racial discrimination and contempt of others.¹⁶ This was what formed the mental basis of Japan's international responsibility in the context of its imperialization process.

The Japanese sense of imperial responsibility depended not only on imperial consciousness, but also on the sphere of empire, on Japan's international position, and on its imperial norms of rule. Western imperialism itself also motivated Japan to harbor the desire to be an empire and to enter into global politics as a revisionist state, even if it led to "a decisive war" with the United States and the British Empire. Japan's expansion showed three

¹⁶Yoichi Kibata, "Eikoku to Nihon no Shokuminchi Tōchi" [British and Japan's Colonial Rule]," *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon* [The Colonial Empire Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992) 290.

distinct phases according to Japan's sensitivity to the external threat, war-waging capability, and power relations with the Western powers. The three phases consisted of: first, growing into a regional hegemon in Northeast Asia; second, expanding into Manchuria and northern China; and third, creating the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. These were the driving forces of imperialization through which Japanese values were dispersed and the sphere of international responsibility extended. These elements defined the nature of international responsibility, not to mention imperial consciousness.

Japan's imperialization was also a process of creating its consciousness and discourse on international responsibility. Japan's spatial expansion through imperialization went through two stages: the first was the process of overwhelming *tōyō* (Northeast Asia), and the second was enlarging the imperial influence to *tōa* (East Asia). International responsibility appeared to be a mission of waging "a just war" for the "civilization" of *tōyō* and "a holy war" for the "liberation" of *tōa*. "Assimilation" and "coexistence and co-prosperity" represented the nature of Japan's international responsibility for the Asian peoples at each of the two stages.

Mission to "Create a New Order"

How was the Japanese self-identification as a leader state translated into a sense of responsibility in the context of "coexistence and co-prosperity"? "Coexistence and co-prosperity," Japanese leaders asserted, were to fulfill the "great ideal of world peace." To achieve this, Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita said, "all peoples [of East Asia including the South Sea] who have close geographical, racial, cultural, and economic relations must construct a sphere of coexistence and co-prosperity. [They must] first establish peace and order within the sphere and then move on to establish the relationship for coexistence and co-prosperity with the other spheres." It is to "build a just peace [on the regional level] and by

bringing all these smaller bits of peace together to construct a whole, just peace in the world.” He stressed the empire’s mission and responsibility as “a stabilizing force” to secure “just peace” through attaining “coexistence and co-prosperity” as well as mutual cooperation among peoples in East Asia.¹⁴ Japan’s imperial responsibility was supposed to accomplish a “just peace” in regional and world politics.

“World politics” was a political sphere that Japan had to encounter in the course of its emergence as a world power and by which its emergence would inevitably be restrained, as was later demonstrated in frustration vis-à-vis the Washington system and the League of Nations. Japan succeeded in changing the status quo in regional politics, but in global politics it had to confront the Anglo-American policy of maintaining the global status quo, what the statesman Fumimaro Konoe called a “Britain-U.S.-favored peace.”¹⁵ The phrase “just peace” was, therefore, a criticism of the “current state” of peace, that is, a world order that reflected only Anglo-American interests. Hence ideas, policies, and missions for constructing “a new world order” arose in the name of accomplishing a “just peace.”

The idea of “a new world order” made the Japanese people more acute and sensitive to the concept of “world politics.” This idea was linked with that of Germany and Italy, who were equally discontent with the “British-U.S.-favored peace” and longed to change the global status quo. The Axis powers’ triple alliance advocated the cause of correcting the British-U.S.-led world order and building “a new world order.” In reality, however, it was a revelation of their political intention to construct their own “sphere of life.”¹⁶ After its

¹⁴“Kokusai Jōsei to Teikoku no Tachiba” [The International Situation and the Empire’s Position] (29 June 1840), *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Narabini Shuyō Bunsho* [Chronological Tables and Principal Documents on Japan’s Diplomacy], Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965) 433-34.

¹⁵Fumimaro Konoe, “Eibei Honi no Heiwashugi o Haisu” [Rejecting Anglo-America-Centered Pacifism], ed. Shinichi Kitaoka, *Sengo Nihon Gaiko Ronshu* [A Collection of Articles on Postwar Japan’s Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūokōron-sha, 1995) 47-52.

¹⁶“We mutually respect Japan’s sphere of survival in East Asia including the Southern Ocean, Germany’s and Italy’s sphere of survival in Europe and Africa, and [we] cooperate by all means regarding the construction of a new order in these regions” (“Nichi Toku I Suichiku Kyōka ni Kansuru Ken” [A Matter on Strengthening the Axis Among Japan, Germany, and Italy] (1940), *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Narabini Shuyō Bunsho* 449.

intrusion into northern China in 1937, Japan began to regard *tōa* as a “sphere of life” vital for its national defense, population, and economy, and, in the 1940’s, it espoused the alleged mission of improving the East Asian peoples’ welfare to justify the formation of its “sphere of life,” which was, in fact, based on the “empire mind” (*kōkoku seishin*).¹⁷

The imperial responsibility or mission to construct “a new order” of *tōa* as “a sphere of life” was embellished with traditional ethics and values. The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere must have its footing on *dōgi* (moral justice). Sino-Japanese cooperation was for “building a new order based on *dōgi* in Greater East Asia and for further contributing to the making of a new and just order in the whole world.”¹⁸ Japan’s alliances with East Asian countries like Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines were concluded in the name of “contributing to the peace of the whole world by constructing a *dōgi*-based Greater East Asia. A Confucian term, *dōgi* defined inter-state relations in the empire as another Confucian phrase *ōdōrakudō* (“king’s way and earthly paradise”) did in the making of Manchukuo. Moral concepts of inter-state relations and world politics were reflected in the Japanese sense of imperial mission.

International Responsibility of *Shokubun*

What should a “just peace” to be? World peace was conceived to realize “Japan’s unrelenting national policy” of “enabling every country to obtain its proper place through achieving East Asian security.”¹⁹ The above-cited statement by Arita began as follows: “our country’s ideal envisioned since its founding is to enable every country to obtain its proper

¹⁷“General Principles of National Policy” (April 1936), ed. Joyce C. Lebra, *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in World War II* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1975) 59-60.

¹⁸“Sensō Kansui Kyōryokuni Kansuru Nikka Kyōdō Sengen” [Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué Regarding Cooperation for Waging War] (9 January 1943), *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Narabini Shuyō Bunsho* 581.

¹⁹“Taibei Tsūchō” [A Note to the United States] (6 December 1941), *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Narabini Shuyō Bunsho* 570.

place. Unless all of the countries obtain their own individual places, world peace cannot last forever.”²⁰ As can be seen here, to “enable every country to obtain its proper place” was a premise for securing the perpetuity of “world peace.”

This concept of world order was concretely expressed in the ideas of *hakkōichiu* (the world as one family) for the empire and *shokubun* for member nations, which together formed Japanese imperial identity. The Imperial Rescript given on the signing of the Tripartite Pact (1940) with Germany and Italy said: “to enhance our great righteousness [*taigi*] in all the earth [*hakkō*] and to make of the world one household is the great injunction bequeathed by our Imperial Ancestors,” and “in order to overcome the stupendous crisis now confronting the world and to restore world peace, Japan has to implement the task of enabling each nation to find its proper place and all individuals to live in peace and security.”²¹ The Japanese sense of mission was to practice Japan’s understanding of justice, which could be realized by a spatial sense of a “one-family world” and a temporal sense of the imperial ancestors’ ideal.

The idea of *shokubun* world order described imperial Japan’s concept of the ideal world order and peace. The image of *shokubun* world order, however, was harbored by Japan’s national interest to make East Asia into one empire and to coin its imperial identity. It was also carried by Japan’s national policy to confront the “Anglo-American imperialist policy of exploitation” or their concept of peace, which was to maintain the status quo.²² The sense of *shokubun*, intermingled with the ideas of *isshidōjin* (to not differentiate peoples and to love them equally) and *dōshudōbun* (the same race and the same civilization), originated from family ethics and led to the idea of a *shokubun*-based imperial family order which

²⁰“Kokusai Jōsei to Teikoku no Tachiba” 433.

²¹Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Cleveland, New York: Meridian Books, 1946) 44.

²²“Taibei Tsūchō” 572.

defined the emperor as the father, Japan as the elder brother, the East Asian countries as the younger brothers, and offered a sense of imperial responsibility with a patriarchic hue for East Asia. The sense of *shokubun* was that “an elder brother fulfills his own duty as an elder brother; younger brothers carry out their own duties as younger brothers.” Conflicts and disputes among nations belonging to the empire are regarded as mere family trouble.²³ The same idea was also projected into the international realm: with “father” from an unending line of emperors at the very center of the empire, “an elder brother’s duty” takes in and assimilates “younger brothers” or “newcomers” and endows each of them with a “duty” or “his proper place.”

A contradiction, however, appeared in which family-based communal responsibility ethics gave birth to the subject’s irresponsibility when this was applied to the international realm. In the course of imperialization, especially under the total mobilization system, patriarchic responsibility ethics and *shokubun* consciousness weakened the individual’s identity and subjectivity, and caused “a structure of irresponsibility.” It was against this backdrop that the advocates of romanticism and “a philosophy of world history” (the Kyoto school) that found self-identity and subjectivity by identifying themselves with the imperial system and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere appeared. Also in the international realm, the growth of ultra-nationalism based on the logic of family community amplified a sense of international patriarchic responsibility; on the other hand, it caused a sense of “no boundary,” which sought a regional universality, and this, in turn, resulted in “a structure of irresponsibility.”

²³Army General Iwane Matsui, who was responsible for the Nanking Massacre, regarded the Sino-Japanese struggle as follows: “the struggle between Japan and China was always a fight between brothers within the ‘Asian family’... It is just the same as in a family when an elder brother has taken all that he can stand from his ill-behaved younger brother and has to chastise him in order to make him behave properly.” Masao Maruyama, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, expanded edition, ed. Ivan Morris (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 95.

Actually the ideas of international community based on *shokubun* and family ethics could not but inevitably lead to international irresponsibility. This was because the idea of the Co-prosperity Sphere was nothing but a strategy to “rapidly expand the total national defense power for imperial self-existence and self-defense.”²⁷ A sense of imperial responsibility was closely intertwined with Japanese nationalism and national interest. Japan officially set forth its moral responsibility toward its colonial populations and advocated its sense of mission for civilizing and enriching them; but, at the same time, its moral responsibility had concealed the Japanese mindset to seek its maximum interest. Japan’s responsibility for its colonies was a mere reflection of its own economic/military interest.²⁴ Needless to say, the Co-prosperity Sphere was an attempt to construct “an economic sphere,” “a sphere of life,” and “a sphere of national defense” to ensure Japan’s survival.

²⁷“Tai Nanpō Shisaku Yōkō” [An Outline of Policy Toward the South] (17 April 1941) and “Jōsei no Suiini Tomonau Teikoku Kokusaku Yōkō” [An Outline of Imperial Policy Accompanying Situational Changes] (2 July 1941), *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Narabini Shuyō Bunsho* 495, 531.

²⁴Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895-1945,” ed. Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984) 91-92.

CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONALIZATION AND “INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTION”

Kokusaika and International Responsibility

Japan's defeat in the Pacific War provided the nation with a critical opportunity to modify its definition of international responsibility. In the early postwar period of the 1950's and 1960's, the ideas of pacifism and economism rendered Japan defensive and reactive to the international system, causing changes in the nature of responsibility. International responsibility in postwar Japan has been defined by the nature of the international system and the degree of Japan's economic development. After having achieved remarkable economic growth in the 1960's and having overcome economic downturns caused by the oil crisis in the 1970's, Japan finally found itself, in the 1980's, expected to achieve a degree of internationalization befitting its economic power.

Complying with foreign requests to open Japan's market, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone took measures for *kokusaika* (internationalization.) These measures included liberalization of direct investment at home and abroad, opening of domestic markets through lowering tariffs, removing import regulations, and permitting foreign labor to enter Japan.²⁵ Japan's internationalization meant not only opening its domestic markets, but also playing an international role as an economic power. The suggested role was to comply with international society's requests; but it also contained Japan's intention to project its economic power and pacifism into its foreign policy. *Kokusai kōken*, “international contribution,” has become a fixture in Japan's diplomatic language that defines the doctrine or the action involved in conducting Japan's foreign policy in the larger context of Japan's internationalization and the

²⁵T. J. Pempel, “From Exporter to Investor: Japanese Foreign Economic Policy,” ed. Robert A. Scalapino, *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977).

post-Cold War system. This vocabulary was also routinely used in Japan's international activities of assisting developing countries through ODA (Overseas Development Assistance), peacekeeping operations, and non-governmental organizations, and of cooperating on global issues such as human rights and the environment.

In the Cold War system, Japan was able to save on security cost thanks to the umbrella of favorable U.S. policies and, as a result, could grow into an economic power in the U.S.-led free trade system. On the basis of such economic growth, Japan endeavored to elevate its status in international society and international organizations, which resulted in a mindset and policy for "international contribution." According to Nakasone, "international contribution" aims at accomplishing world peace, co-prosperity of mankind, and progress of civilization.²⁶ The spirit of "international contribution" consists of pacifism and internationalism. The ideas of "peace and stability of the world" come from Japanese pacifism, which originated from its critical reflection of past militarism and totalitarianism and its penchant for economic growth.

"International contribution" has materialized in the doctrine of Japan's foreign policy as follows: to fulfill "peace and disarmament" together with the mindset of "not becoming a military threat to its neighboring countries, of observing [the cause of] a wholly defensive national security policy under the peace constitution, and upholding the three principles of a non-nuclear armament policy." Furthermore, it is to cooperate with developing countries and to actively participate in preserving the global environment, so as to practice "an important *sakumu* as an international state." The Japanese understanding of international responsibility, which is essentially a "resolute will to contribute to the progress of world peace and human

²⁶Prime Minister's Address to Express His Views at the 97th Session of National Diet, 3 December 1982. The prime ministers' addresses hereafter are cited from "The World and Japan," a database project of the Institute of Oriental Culture, the University of Tokyo. All addresses are written in Japanese.

civilization,” is intertwined with their self-identity as “an international state.”²⁷ *Kokusai kōken* is a representation of the Japanese sense of responsibility to play an international role.

“International contribution” has also been an expression of postwar Japan’s foreign policy on the basis of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and its relationship with the United Nations. The contribution here indicates two types of responsibility for Japan vis-à-vis international society: one is to keep peace and stability in international society by helping the United States through its role as designated by the bilateral alliance; the other is to assist developing countries according to the ideas of the United Nations. Practicing responsibility based on the U.S.-Japan alliance has been a realistic acceptance of the U.S.-led world order; the one based on the United Nations has appeared to serve as an avenue to practice pacifist foreign policy. In reality, however, Japan’s “international contribution” has been an indispensable choice of policy because pacifism confined Japan’s politico-military role in international society. Japanese “pacifism” also contains Japan’s will to pursue its national interest.

Japan’s international role depends on the international system, and Japan’s “international contribution” is, in a way, a representation of its status and intention in the international system. From an identity-centric point of view, “international contribution” reveals Japan’s will to escape from being isolated or from being a state of uncertainty in international society; but from the international system-centric perspective, it expresses the desire to maintain the status quo and stability in the system and serves as the greater cause for Japanese pursuit of national interest. During the 1980’s, Japan’s “international contribution” remained the provision of economic/material resources and as “an order supporter,” but since the end of the 1980’s Japan has begun to show its desire to play a role as “an order

²⁷Prime Minister’s Address for Administrative Policies, the 101st Session of National Diet, 6 February 1984.

constructor.”²⁸ Japan’s contribution, however, basically, has been implemented to assist in the maintenance of international order by complying with American foreign policy, and Japan’s decision to open its domestic markets was also a reflection of its bilateral relations with America.

The nature of “international contribution” of complying with the international system poses a question about its authenticity. The contributions for “world peace,” “co-prosperity of mankind” and “the progress of civilization” have all been conducted to meet America’s or international society’s expectations of Japan as an “economic power.” At the same time, it was also spurred forward by the Japanese people’s will to actualize their self-image of “a peace-loving state” and the concept of “pacifism.” Such contradictions have both served as a driving force to bolster the cause of and the need for the contribution; but the discrepancy between the reality and the ideal inevitably brings forth suspicion about the authenticity of “international contribution.”

More significantly, “international contribution” has been equally based on a consideration for Japan’s national interest and does not limit itself to “peace,” “co-prosperity,” and “progress.” For Nakasone, “the most important task” of “international contribution” for “world peace” was to seek a way “for us to prevent the emerging pressure of protectionism.” He asserted that “international contribution” for world peace would be good not only for maintaining the free trade system and revitalizing the world economy, but also for advancing Japan’s national goal to procure “comprehensive national security,” which is a sweeping term that contains the military goals of maintaining the U.S.-Japan security alliance and improving national defense power as well as the economic goals of pursuing free trade, of securing a stable supply of foreign resources, energy, and foods, and of expanding economic cooperation. The promise of a “positive contribution” to the global environmental

²⁸Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996).

problem was also considered on the premise that the contribution would enliven Japan's economy, which is dependent on foreign resources.²⁹

The international system defines Japan's temporal and spatial mode of being. The Japanese people's understanding of international responsibility, which is a kind of response to other countries, is related to the temporal as well as the spatial mode of the Japanese state in the international system. Their sense of international responsibility is intertwined with a nation-centered "culture" and "community consciousness" that was historically constructed. The mental foundations of the Japanese nation to support "an international state," which forms the premise for the contribution, are, "self-reliance, solidarity, friendship and responsibility." These ideas aim at "propelling domestic reforms, performing an internationally just role, and obtaining an honorable position as a stabilized state." They sought to reinvigorate the Japanese self-identity to "take a significant responsibility for our future generations and our country's history" and encouraged a "fulfillment of the historical request to the utmost."³⁰ Japan's spatial sense of responsibility for the contemporary world aligns with its temporal sense of responsibility for the pursuit of the eternal nature of the national community's. The Japanese spatial sense of "an international state" (international responsibility) and its temporal sense of "a perpetual stabilized state" (national responsibility) are closely interlinked.

Japan's *kokusaika*, which is founded upon liberal democracy and a free market, sought not only "the individual's happiness and dignity" but also the diversity of cultures and values. But it could not change Japan's unrelenting resolution, firmly based on the concept of nation-state, to enhance its national interest and to preserve its national community. Its

²⁹Prime Minister's Address for Expressing His Views, the 97th Session and the 100th Extraordinary Session of the National Diet, 3 December 1982 and 10 September 1983.

³⁰Prime Ministers' Address for expressing His Views at the 100th Extraordinary Session of the National Diet.

ultimate goal is to construct “a society that binds people together, a society full of propriety and affection” through the collaborative effort of the Japanese government and the people. Japanese people are all required to know “their own responsibilities” based on the “ideas of self-reliance and self-help” and “mutual cooperation,” which are indeed those widely discussed and required during nationalization of the Meiji period. Nakasone placed a special emphasis on the significance of national “culture” in the international system. As “an international state,” which undertakes its own set of international responsibilities, he said, Japan should be a “nation” founded upon “a strong culture.”³¹ The desire for national survival and prosperity requires that “*sakumu*” construct a cultural polity. The Japanese understanding of responsibility regarding its perpetual community is, therefore, rooted upon this “strong culture.”

Globalization and Japan Between International and Global Responsibilities

Japanese society since the late 1980’s has been globalizing, and the word “globalization” itself has become part of the everyday language. Globalization is a process in which trans-boundary integration of economic activities rapidly advances and where powerful new technology is applied to collect, dispose, and transmit information related to such activities.³² The emergence of the word in Japan suggests a perceptual change in its economic growth and overseas expansion. For Japanese people, “internationalization” means to form relations with the foreign, for example, sister-city relationships or cultural exchanges with foreign countries; “globalization” is Japan’s simultaneous enlargement and expansion in all directions showing that Japan is ubiquitous in the world.³³

³¹Prime Minister’s Address for Expressing His Views at the 97th Session of National Diet.

³²Barry R. J. Jones, *The World Turned Upside Down: Globalization and the Future of the State* (Manchester, U.K., and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000) 9-10.

³³Harumi Befu, “The Global Context of Japan Outside Japan,” ed. Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis, *Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese Presence in Asia, Europe, and America* (London: Routledge, 2001) 3.

In the post-Cold War context, globalization has produced a new type of “international contribution”: “global contribution” in an effort to cope with issues that are beyond solutions at the national level, such as the environment and global warming. Today the transnational activities of non-state actors such as NGOs and private enterprises are rapidly reshaping and redefining global identity and the nature of international contribution. Globalization has widened the scope of “global contribution” while, simultaneously, it imposes limitations on “internationalization.” Japan’s “international contribution” through its economic affluence and internationalization is now facing waves of transformation in the midst of multi-centralization of global politics and economic interdependence.

Japan’s contribution to international society now takes two directions: the improvement and settlement of global issues, and the increase of humanitarian/material assistance to U.N. activities. Japan’s sense of “global contribution” represents a growing consciousness of global civil society.³⁴ Globalization, however, also has fostered grounds for the emergence of nationalism. Japanese discourses on international contribution or responsibility since the 1990’s have become more nationalistic as Japanese society becomes more conservative in a constantly changing environment where there is increasing insecurity in domestic economy and politics. Japanese political leaders still remain within the perspective of international contribution that, at the core, pursues national interest.

Japan’s official contribution to international society reveals its nationalistic mindset: its participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities comes from the idea that “it is the country’s *sakumu* to prepare the system necessary to secure the country’s independence and sovereignty and its national security as stated by the Japanese constitution,” and “our

³⁴Japanese intellectuals’ ideas of global community already began to appear in the mid-1980’s, but their sense of contribution remained at the level of economic contribution. See Yasusuke Murakami and Yutaka Kosai, eds., *Japan in the Global Community: Its Role and Contribution on the Eve of the 21st Century*, Round Table Discussions on Japan in the Global Community, 1986.

country's security and prosperity cannot be realized without the peace and prosperity of international society.”³⁵ Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's positive evaluation of international contribution also is an attempt to maintain “world peace and stability” with the aid of the U.S.-Japan alliance and international cooperation, which ultimately seeks to ensure “Japan's security and development.”³⁶ Furthermore, the September 11 terrorist attacks have increased Japan's vested interest in national security and has persuaded Japan to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

It is surely worthy of note that the globalization/post-Cold War context has worked to mitigate the politico-military characteristics of the residues of the Cold War system mold and has encouraged the emergence and spread of discourses on “war responsibility” and East Asian history inside Japan. The Japanese “war responsibility” issue is one of a caliber that can easily cast doubt on the authenticity of its international responsibility and can offer a wider perspective of than the nation-oriented concept of “international contribution,” which suggests that there are limitations to the concept. “War responsibility,” so far as it is the subject's responsibility, not only vis-à-vis the other, but ultimately for the self, will keep on raising questions about Japan's temporal mode of international responsibility. Japan's nation-oriented and economy-centric “outward *kokusaika*” needs to be complemented by the non-economy-centric “inward *kokusaika*.”³⁷ “War responsibility” is a reminder of the importance of international responsibility for “inward *kokusaika*” and reiterates the need for a critical reflection on the nature of Japan's “international contribution.”

³⁵Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's Address on Administrative Policies at the 154th Session of National Diet, 4 February 2002.

³⁶Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's Address for Expressing His Views at the 157th Extraordinary Session of National Diet, 26 September 2003.

³⁷The terms “inward *kokusaika*” and “outward *kokusaika*” are taken from Yasushi Sugiyama, “Internal and External Aspects of Internationalization,” ed. Glenn D. Hook and Michael A. Weiner, *The Internationalization of Japan* (New York: Routledge, 1992) 95.

CONCLUSION

AUTHENTICITY OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

“International contribution” or “international responsibility” depends on Japan’s international position, in other words, its disposition in the international system: it comes from Japan’s intention to achieve systemic stability and a higher position within the system. The U.S.-Japan security alliance has been one crucial determinant of the nation’s international responsibility. In that sense, Japan’s international responsibility is heavily dependent on the nature of the international system and U.S. world strategy; on the other hand, “international contribution” may also represent Japan’s will to escape from its present non-political/non-subjective self or from the past memories carried by the international system. It may also be a revelation of the conviction or the hope that Japan can/will play a considerable role as “an order-modifier” or “an order-constructor” in the future.

The phenomenon of globalization shows that Japan’s international contribution bears the problem of authenticity because of the Japanese state’s ambiguous current condition, which shifts back and forth between the wider global civil society and the nation-state. The term “international contribution,” particularly in the context of internationalization, has cast a shadow of doubt on the authenticity of Japan’s international responsibility, whether it is for “world peace” or for “national interest.” It will be difficult to wipe away the doubt as long as “international contribution” is regarded as responsibility for the other. The globalization/post-Cold War context might perhaps disclose the non-authenticity that the international system had concealed. Japan’s ambiguous views and attitudes concerning the following issues also raise doubts: legacies of Japan’s war of aggression and colonial rule (e.g. wartime comfort women), the problem of accepting foreign labor into Japan, and what is called the “neo-liberalist” interpretation of Japanese history. Japan’s “war responsibility,” excluded for a long

time from the realm of international responsibility, ought to be a barometer for fathom the authenticity of the commitment.

Japan's responsibility for its colonial rule in East Asia and the Pacific War was considerably alleviated by the formal measures of the war criminal trials and the peace treaty, followed by the international Cold War system. This system and the U.S.-Japan security alliance permitted Japan an international irresponsibility. Furthermore, Japan's economic success undermined its sense of international responsibility, which could come into play once the other is recognized. The postwar international system allowed the formation of "the structure of irresponsibility," which promoted exemption or oblivion of responsibility. The debate on war responsibility in Japan has been conducted merely at the private level between rightists and pacifists (or leftists), and its scope has been limited to the national level; but it has not produced a profound shift in policy thinking that could be an awakening to the need for self-introspection and responsibility for other countries. "International contribution" is a prospective responsibility for Japan's ongoing or expected international "role," and "war responsibility" is a retrospective responsibility for its past international "action."³⁸ "War responsibility" will not remain a temporal level of responsibility for the past self; it will also affect Japan's spatial level of responsibility vis-à-vis the present other.

"International contribution" is the problem of responsibility, and "international responsibility" is the problem of subjectivity. Absence of reflection does not merely represent the lack of responsibility consciousness, but it also throws doubt on its authenticity. Acts of *shazai* (apology) and *shitsugen* or *bōgen* (a slip of the tongue), which since internationalization Japanese political leaders have reiterated, may signify the weakness of the Japanese people's sense of subjectivity and international responsibility. When responsibility is regarded as "the possibility of response," "response" is not only an act of

³⁸About prospective and retrospective responsibilities, see R. A. Duff, "Responsibility," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 8 (London and New York: Routledge, 1988) 290-91.

“recognition” acknowledging responsibility for the other, but it means to harbor self-responsibility and the capability to “respond.”

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