

**DOING MORE WITH LESS:  
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO  
JAPANESE DEFENSE**

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ASDF	Air Self-Defense Force
DA	Defense Agency
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Force
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defense Force
NDPG	National Defense Program Guideline
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
SDP	Social Democratic Party
USFJ	U.S. Forces in Japan



## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

“Doing more with less” is an oxymoron. But sometimes, this is regarded as the ultimate goal for the private and public sectors all over the world, because when they achieve it, maximum profits or public good can be expected. Yet “ultimate” often means “the toughest of the tough” or even “infeasible” unless there is a serious sacrifice of quality. In fact, this dilemma seems to be a very good illustration of the situation now being faced by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

Although the Cold War was over some time ago, the situation surrounding Japan has consistently provided the SDF with new missions. Regional tensions in East Asia, specifically on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, still remain the same or have worsened from the military perspective. According to the Japan Forum on International Relations, a distinguished research institute, these pre-existing threats have been “‘renewed’ in the form of new nuclear weapons, missiles, and naval strength.” On the other hand, “Japan also faces global threats of the ‘newcomer-type,’ such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states,” they said. This national security environment as well as homeland defense and overseas operations are totally new for Japan and demand that the SDF undertake more operations than ever.<sup>2</sup>

Usually, when a healthy organization expands its fields of activities while maintaining its original work and goals, it increases its financial and personnel resources so that it can afford the new tasks at hand. This kind of remedy is quite similar to conventional or Western medicine:

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<sup>1</sup>Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the Japan Self-Defense Force or any other Japanese government agency/organization. Not for quotation or attribution without the express permission of the author.

<sup>2</sup>Nihon Kokusai Foramu [The Japan Forum on International Relations, INC], *Atarashii Kyoji to Nihon no Anzen Hosho* [Emerging New Threats and Japan’s National Security] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Foramu 2005) 6. The summary of this proposal paper is available at <<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-jf-pr-26/pr26e.pdf>>.

taking prescription drugs, getting X-rays, and then undergoing surgery if needed, and so forth. Something coming from the outside directly cures the body. Could this be a possible remedy for the SDF?

In a word, no. First, according to the “National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) for FY 2005 and After,” adopted by the Security Council and the cabinet on December 10, 2004, “[Japan] will *curb* [emphasis added] defense expenditures” because it is “mindful of markedly worsening fiscal conditions.”<sup>3</sup> Further, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009), which was issued at the same time as the NDPG, officially fixed the expenses required for the next five-year defense build-up at approximately ¥24.24 trillion (close to \$202 billion); this was smaller than the previous five-year program for the first time in postwar history.<sup>4</sup> And actually, even before FY 2005, i.e., since FY 2003, the increase of Japan’s defense budget each year was negative compared to the previous 12-month period.<sup>5</sup>

Second, as for the personnel issue, the number of SDF personnel is in steady decline. A reform plan was issued by the central government on January 6, 2001. One of the four pillars of this reform is a paper entitled “Drastic Streamlining of the Central Government.” This document, published by the Headquarters for the Administrative Reform of the Central Government says: “Strong efforts are to be made to reduce the number of employees in national administrative organizations by yearly reduction plans.... The goal for the government is to reduce the remaining 540,000 national public employees by 25 percent over the 10-year period starting in

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<sup>3</sup>Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*.  
<[http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2005/2005/datindex.html](http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/2005/2005/datindex.html)> and the unofficial English version is available at <[http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index\\_.htm](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm)>.

<sup>4</sup>This current program seems to have been revised and shrunk further to cover the USFJ relocation cost. See Footnote 67.

<sup>5</sup>Japan Defense Agency, *FY 2006 Defense Budget (Proposed)*.  
<<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/yosan/2006/yosan.pdf>>.

FY 2000.”<sup>6</sup> Since the legal status of SDF personnel is “special” public servant, they are exempt from this decision. It has, however, affected the SDF program, and the NDPG has involved the reduction of more than 5,000 individuals. In addition to this political restraint, there is a more fundamental problem: the decline of Japan’s entire population, which will be covered in more detail in a subsequent chapter. With or without a government decision, the SDF will have to deal with fewer human resources sooner or later due to Japan’s birth rate, which is lower than the minimum required to maintain the current population level.

Are there any ways to solve these problems? The main purpose of this paper is to propose some feasible solutions. Chapter 1 explores some fundamental measures to be taken; these can be compared to “chiropractic remedies.” The issues here are all related to Japan’s “self-constricting” policies and call for thoroughgoing revisions of current government policies such as the constitution, its official “interpretations” by the government, and various political declarations; therefore, they have been heavily debated both at home and abroad. What are the issues in these debates? Are there any that can be rectified in a legal framework in order to strengthen the SDF?

Chapters 2 and 3, on the other hand, analyze some possible measures that can be taken within the present framework. Chapter 2 focuses on the usage of the limited SDF defense budget and human resources. This could correspond with an herbal remedy that promotes natural healing energy from the inside. Chapter 3 examines another treatment, skilled nursing care, which here means relying on a trusted allied country for cooperation. The conclusion summarizes the points that should be altered or pushed forward so as to improve the defense of Japan.

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<sup>6</sup>Central Government Reform of Japan, “IV Drastic Streamlining of the Central Government,” 6 January 2006. <[http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/central\\_government/index.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/central_government/index.html)>.

## CHAPTER 1

### CHIROPRACTIC THERAPY

#### - The Legal Framework Approach -

Chiropractic is a system of healing based on the theory that disease in the human body results from a lack of normal nerve function; chiropractors manipulate and adjust body structures, such as the spinal column, and use physical therapy when necessary.<sup>7</sup> Comparing Japan's current constitution, its official interpretation by the government, political declarations, and defense laws to the spinal column, the institutional structure surrounding the SDF could be said to have suffered from a misalignment of the bones in the spine, obstructing proper nerve functions (Figure 1).

Unlike most other nations, Japan has adopted very defense-oriented policies. Although these policies have served as the tools for the prevailing pacifist image of Japan as well as its economic growth, recently they seem to have been showing a variety of negative symptoms. The following sections diagnose some of the misaligned vertebrae in the "spinal column."

#### **The Japanese Constitution**

Whether the Armed Forces of a nation are constitutional or unconstitutional – this kind of debate would not be conducted in any legislative body or private conversation other than in Japan. In the Japanese Constitution, unlike its counterparts in the United States and other nations, there is no article that specifically mentions armed forces. Instead, Article 9 of the constitution states: "1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese

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<sup>7</sup>"Chiropractic." *Encyclopædia Britannica* 2006. *Encyclopædia Britannica Premium Service* 17 March 2006 <<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9082199>>.

people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

And even quite recently, at its latest convention held in February 2006, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) of Japan has adopted a platform that seeks to “scale back the SDF, the [current] circumstances of which are clearly unconstitutional... and reform and [eventually] dissolve them in order to establish an unarmed Japan.”<sup>8</sup> Following this declaration, the former prime minister, and then the leader of the SDP, Tomiichi Murayama, reportedly remarked that he regretted having admitted that the SDF were an entity “approved by the constitution” and that this time the SDP decision was right.<sup>9</sup>

Officially, the Japanese government has interpreted the SDF as being constitutional. Yet the fact that some Diet members believe it is not shows, at least, that the existence of the SDF is still in doubt to some Japanese citizens. As long as Article 9 exists, maximum support for the SDF from the public, which is essential for national defense, cannot be expected.

Recently, however, the revision of the current constitution has been a topic of heated controversy. On November 11, 2005, the nation’s leading party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), issued a proposal paper for revisions of the current constitution. In this draft, the proposed Article 9 is as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of setting international disputes.

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<sup>8</sup>Social Democratic Party Declaration. <<http://www5.sdp.or.jp/central/02sengen.html>>.

<sup>9</sup>“SDP Cannot Turn Back Clock on SDF,” *The Yomiuri Shimbun* 12 February 2006.

1. To protect our country's peace and independence, as well as the security of our country and countrymen, there will be a self-defense army whose supreme commander is the prime minister.
2. When carrying out activities to execute their duties, in accordance with the preceding paragraph, the self-defense army shall stay under the control of the approval of the Diet and other regulations in accordance with the law.
3. The self-defense army, other than executing the duties stated in the previous paragraph, shall be allowed to execute internationally cooperative activities to ensure peace and security for international society, and activities to maintain public order in emergencies and to protect people's lives or their freedom.
4. Adding to the preceding two paragraphs, all matters relating to the self-defense army's organization and command/control systems shall be decided by law.<sup>10</sup>  
[Translation by the author]

It is still uncertain whether this draft will be debated in the Diet, let alone passed. Nevertheless, the current movement in the Diet itself is a giant step toward institutionally moving the regular army away from being an "illegal child" of the current constitution. Public recognition of the SDF as a legally full-fledged army will mentally strengthen the ailing body and raise the morale of its personnel.

### **The Basic Policy for National Defense**

The Basic Policy for National Defense was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the cabinet in May 1957. It states that: "The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any aggression with the aim of protecting Japan's independence and peace, which are founded on democracy."

In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy stipulates that Japan will:

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<sup>10</sup>Jiyuuminshuto [The Liberal Democratic Party], "Shin-Kenpo Soan [The Draft for the New Japanese Constitution]." <[http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin\\_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051122\\_a.pdf](http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051122_a.pdf)>.

I. Support U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.

II. Stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.

III. Within the limits required for self-defense, progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation's strength and situation.

IV. Deal with any external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. security arrangements until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.<sup>11</sup>

Like it or not, since it was formulated, the Basic Policy has stood as the pillar for every defense policy and political declaration. Defense White Papers say that: “The defense policy Japan has pursued under the constitution *is based on the Basic Policy for National Defense* [emphasis added]....”<sup>12</sup> In fact, there have been some conservative analysts in Japan who have criticized the policy as being overly reliant upon the dysfunctional United Nations.<sup>13</sup> Others have denounced it as a remnant of postwar anti-militarism, being just a policy paper, and lacking strategic defense lines that are normally spelled out in this kind of policy for national defense.<sup>14</sup>

As to the excessive reliance on the United Nations, their arguments are convincing in one sense. China and Russia hold permanent seats on the Security Council, which is the core of U.N. operations. But both Russia, in the past, and now China have aimed their strategic missiles at Japan. Additionally, some members of the United Nations, including Russia and China, were against Japan's March 2004 proposed resolution, which was intended as a criticism of the North

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<sup>11</sup>Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2004* (Tokyo: Inter Group, 2004) 107. A full text of the Japanese version of *Defense of Japan* is available at <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/wp/index.html>>.

<sup>12</sup>For example, Japan Defense Agency, *Defense 2004* 107.

<sup>13</sup>Takumi Fukada, *Nihonjin ga Shiranai 'Futatsu no Amerika' no Sekaisenryaku* [The World Strategy of Two Americas Which the Japanese Are Not Aware Of] (Tokyo: Takagi-Shobo, 2005) 323.

<sup>14</sup>Tsutomu Matsumura, “Kokubo no Kihonhoshin no Minaoshi [Revision of the Basic Policy for National Defense],” 24 September 2004 <<http://www.dupuy.jp/kokubou2.html>>.

Korean abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970's and the 1980's. Other than those examples, there are many reasons why it can be said that the current U.N. organization is against Japan's national interest, particularly in security matters.

Such a trust-in-the-global-community attitude, however, does not stem from this policy, but from the current constitution, which says in its preface that: "we have determined to preserve our security and existence, *trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world* [emphasis added]." Although it is obvious that the United Nations is a venue where conflicts of national interests emerge, the Basic Policy, which is rooted in the constitution, can be said to be quite logical in its flow. The problem should be Japan's seemingly blind faith in the United Nations stemming from the constitution, not the United Nations itself. With the revision of the constitution, the lineup and order of the items in this policy will surely be revised too. Moreover, as long as the United Nations is the only global and multinational government body that can give legitimacy to its members' transnational activities (e.g., peacekeeping operations), it is dangerous and thoughtless for Japan to disregard it.

### **Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy**

As for the lack of defense lines in the Basic Policy for National Defense, the policy is sometimes said to be the root cause of the nation's "exclusively defense-oriented" stance. This is because, without such defense lines and in the spirit of the constitution, Japan's defensive activities naturally tend to be limited to within or very close to the homeland. Pundits add that the "exclusively defense-oriented policy" is a cruel and absurd idea because, with it, the battlefields become Japanese territory and that leads to taking the lives of defenseless people.

Defense lines should be drawn beyond the national border, they say, and over the “enemies” harbors and missiles sites.<sup>15</sup>

These arguments make sense to some extent, but it seems to me that they can be countered with the following three points, which are basically irrefutable. First, it is practically impossible in this age of strategic missiles to draw defense lines over the enemies’ missile sites. Missile sites are located both on the rim and far deep inside of a nation’s territories. At the same time, missile ranges are getting longer and longer. Therefore, if Japan tries to draw defense lines over them, the total area covered would be far larger than the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of World War II.

Second, it is politically impossible. Since nations’ intentions are changeable and hard to correctly gauge on the surface, it is difficult and politically incorrect to call someone an “enemy.” Doing so will also cause tensions between or among the countries concerned and this will adversely affect economic and other national activities in today’s “borderless world.” What is known as “the Acheson line”<sup>16</sup> was later said to have partly caused the Korean War, because Kim Il Sung might have felt so safe in knowing where the United States stopped that he plunged into the conflict.

Third, it is tactically militarily absurd to let possible enemies know how far one will go. It is the enemies’ job to figure this out, not ours to inform them. Needless to say, a public statement such as the Basic Policy for National Defense is what goes public. It should work better as a deterrent to have defense lines as a hidden agenda, rather than to make them public.

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<sup>15</sup>Matsumura.

<sup>16</sup>The line was named after U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who drew it as the line of U.S. defense on a map of the Far East, which excluded South Korea, in the process of reorganizing the global order after World War II.

## **No Exercise of the Right of Collective Self-Defense**

Nothing weakens U.S.-Japan security ties more than the notion that Japan does not have the right of collective self-defense. In the official interpretation of the Japanese government, the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is restricted to instances in which three criteria apply and the exercise of this right is not permissible under the current constitution. First surfacing in 1972 and fixed in 1981, this interpretation has given rise to numerous debates both within and outside of the Diet. From the American side, too, it has been recognized as a hurdle to a better bilateral relationship. In October 2000, a report entitled “The United States and Japan Advancing: Toward a Mature Partnership” (what is called the “Nye-Armitage Report”) was issued by the members of a bipartisan study group on the U.S.-Japan partnership. It urged that Japan recognize the right of collective self-defense and emphasized that it was a bipartisan policy proposal of the United States.<sup>17</sup> Many other distinguished analysts both in the United States and Japan have expressed similar opinions.<sup>18</sup>

Common sense would see that the interpretation is as absurd as the notion of someone being “half-pregnant.” In addition, Japan adopted the U.N. Charter in 1956 without any reservations about collective self-defense, as it did four years later in signing the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. As long as Article 98-2 of the constitution, which says “The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed,” goes, the right of collective self-defense need not have been debated.

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<sup>17</sup>“The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” *INSS (Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University) Special Report* 11 October 2000 <<http://japan.usembassy.gov/fukuoka/wwwfarmitage.pdf>>.

<sup>18</sup>For example, James E. Auer, “*Shuudanteki Jieiken Mondai ni Kecchaku Hakaru Toki* [It’s Time to Work Out the Issue of the Right of Collective Defense],” *Tokyo Shimbun* 26 June 2004.

While the official interpretation has not been altered, there has been considerable opposition expressed by Japanese government and non-government officials. One of the more recent government views about this issue is represented by the remarks of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who said that Japan's war-renouncing constitution should be revised to enable the nation to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Appearing on NHK, Japan's public broadcasting network, he said: "It would be strange for SDF troops not to take joint action with U.S. forces when the latter are being attacked. This should be straightened out in the constitution."<sup>19</sup>

From the non-government side, Hisahiko Okazaki, a Japanese critic, referring to the above-mentioned Nye-Armitage Report, argues: "A decision to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense will strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance to the extent that the United States will see it as indispensable. Such a decision will be a noble path for Japan to walk, ensuring that the nation will enjoy safety and high living standards for many generations to come."<sup>20</sup> When Japan tried to acquire a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council last summer, Masashi Nishihara, the previous president of the National Defense Academy in Japan, had the following to say:

First of all, in the case of an incident such as described in Article 42, U.N. Charter VII [military action against Charter violators], what would Japan's vote be in the Security Council? As long as Japan sticks to this interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution and says Japan will not exercise the right of collective self-defense, Japan will vote against U.N. military actions (i.e., exercise a veto). Then, the Security Council will not be able to take actions for collective security. Even if Japan votes for such actions, it will be only Japan that will not join the collective

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<sup>19</sup>"Japanese Premier Says Constitutional Revision to Clarify Self-Defense," *BBC Monitoring International Reports* 27 June 2004.

<sup>20</sup>Hisahiko Okazaki, "Armitage Correct on Collective Self-defense," *The Daily Yomiuri* 26 December 2004. <<http://www.okazaki-inst.jp/12262004yomiuri-E.html>>.

self-defense forces of the United Nations although she votes in favor of them. If Japan cannot take either action, the choice would be always to abstain from voting. Is this the behavior of a country that is responsible for world peace and security?<sup>21</sup> [Translated by the author]

The most important matter that should be borne in mind here is that this is an issue of an interpretation of the constitution, not the constitution itself nor the defense laws. There is not a single article, law, or regulation indicating that Japan is not allowed to execute the right of collective defense. With or without the revision of the constitution, this problem can be solved easily by just saying “The constitution was wrongly ‘interpreted.’” As it stands, the government would rectify this obviously twisted interpretation by revising the constitution. But in my view, that method should be the last resort to get things right. To err is human. If the government pushes ahead without correcting past mistakes, i.e., misinterpretations, there is no guarantee that even the new constitution will not be altered by future “interpretations.” In my view, how this interpretation will be rectified is a litmus test for whether or not Japan is seriously concerned about its own defense.

### **Adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles**

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing nuclear weapons, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons by the terms of the Atomic Energy Basic Law.<sup>22</sup> In addition to the above, Japan ratified the Nuclear

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<sup>21</sup>Masashi Nishihara, “Japan’s Homework for a Permanent Member Seat in the U.N. Security Council,” 1 August 2004 <[http://homepage2.nifty.com/~rips/Institute/rips\\_eye\\_no25.html](http://homepage2.nifty.com/~rips/Institute/rips_eye_no25.html)>.

<sup>22</sup>Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that: “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management....”

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, placing itself under the obligation, as a non-nuclear weapons state, not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup> This issue has been a kind of untouchable one because of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies. Not only to doubt, but also just to raise the possibility of discussing this issue, sometimes puts a politician's reputation and career at risk.<sup>24</sup>

Although Japan is proximate to two members of the nuclear club, China and North Korea, is the notion of a "Nuclear Japan" another oxymoron? Without drawing on nuclear theorists' arguments about "nuclear-peace," it will be sufficient to quote from a practitioner's remarks in order to counter Japan's "nuclear allergy" policy stance. In November 2005, the Rt. Hon. John Reid, MP, Britain's Secretary of State for Defence, stated the following:

I think what the public is most interested in is what the present position is and the present position has been laid out quite clearly by the government, i.e., we will retain Britain's minimum nuclear deterrent. That is a pledge that we made in the last manifesto nearly six months ago and one that we will keep.... We intend, at the same time as minimizing [sic] our deterrent, which we have done, and keeping our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to maintain the nuclear deterrent.... We have always maintained that as long as some other nuclear state which is a potential threat has nuclear weapons we will retain ours.... For the foreseeable future we will be maintaining the nuclear deterrent. We are now entering a discussion about whether that foreseeable future will extend beyond the 15 to the 50-year point.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Article 2 of the NPT states that: "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes... not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...."

<sup>24</sup>Shingo Nishimura, who took his office as Parliamentary Vice Minister of the Defense Agency in October 1999, resigned just 16 days later because of a remark he made that appeared in a Japanese magazine: "We should debate on nuclear weapons in the Diet."

<sup>25</sup>"British Policy, Trident Replacement: Assessing U.K. Security Needs and Nuclear Policy," Secretary of State for Defence evidence on the question of Trident replacement, British Defence Committee, 18 November 2005 <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/uk/051118.htm>>.

Certainly, there are no convincing theories, to the best of my knowledge, which prove that nuclear peace or deterrent is ineffective. Therefore, for Japan, in particular, which is so close to the nuclear-armed communist countries of China and North Korea, it would be dangerous to discard a nuclear card so easily for national defense. But, at the same time, it should be kept in mind that that, when Japan starts to develop nuclear weapons for its own defense, it would, very ironically, provoke tensions and possibly even preventive attacks by countries that genuinely fear a nuclear Japan.<sup>26</sup>

A defense policy interacts with other defense policies and other national policies as well. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty can serve as an alternative choice for Japan to foster nuclear defense/deterrence. In my view, it is a reasonable choice to have the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) introduce nuclear weapons into Japan if needed. In other words, two, not three, non-nuclear principles would be a more practically appropriate choice.

### **Three Principles on Arms Exports**

When these principles were first declared in 1967 under the cabinet of then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Japan banned arms exports to communist countries, those subject to U.N. arms exports embargoes, and those involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In February 1976, however, the administration of Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced that Japan would also refrain from arms exports to areas other than the communist countries that were included in the original Three Principles. And, in 1983, the cabinet of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone concluded an agreement with the United States to make transfer of military technologies to the United States an exception to the Three Principles.

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<sup>26</sup>Hideo Takahashi, *The Reliability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance After 9/11* (USJP Occasional Paper 04-13, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University, 2004) 31-36.

Unlike with other defense policies, the business sector has aggressively voiced its thoughts on the Three Principles. In 2004, in response to the government plan to review the NDPG, Nippon Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation), the country's top business lobby, announced that Japan should reconsider the Three Principles on Arms Exports.<sup>27</sup> Keidanren had made similar proposals in 1995 and 2000. The organization also maintains that an outright ban on weapons exports is undesirable and that the government needs to re-examine ways to control arms exports, exchange information on related technologies with other countries, and invest in overseas arms development projects that are in Japan's national interests. Referring to the possible Japan-U.S. joint development of a missile defense system, the group noted that Japan should consider the active use of space for the sake of national security.

It is not only the private sector that has proposed the revision of the Three Principles. In November 2004, Shinzo Abe, now Chief Cabinet Secretary, then secretary general of the ruling LDP, said in a news conference for foreign correspondents: "The Miki Cabinet extensively expanded [the scope] for political reasons. We should return to the original Three Principles."<sup>28</sup> Behind his remarks, there were ongoing negotiations about how to co-develop technology for missile defense systems with the United States.

There are some experts who fear that such an exception would cause the Three Principles to lose substance because monitoring possible sales from a third country to another is practically impossible. For the financially doomed SDF, however, the revision of this policy could be good news. Let us examine rifle prices, for example, to explain the benefit. The latest SDF rifles, the 89 Shiki 5.56 mm Shoujuu [delivered in 1989, caliber 5.56 mm] cost some ¥360,000 (close to

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<sup>27</sup>"Keidanren Proposes Revising Weapons Export Embargo," *The Nikkei Weekly* 26 July 2004.

<sup>28</sup>"Japan's Arms Exports Ban Should Be Eased, LDP's Abe Says," *Kyodo News Service* 10 November 2004.

\$3,000) each.<sup>29</sup> This is about five times the cost of the M16.<sup>30</sup> Even this new rifle, however, is praised for being “half the price” in Japan because the previous-generation 64 Shiki Shoujuu [delivered in 1964] would cost ¥870,000 (close to \$7,250) at the 1989 price level. A study group on Japan’s defense industry and technology filed a report in 2000 about how to maintain and develop the defense industry and its foundation for technical advancement in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this report, this policy admittedly was claimed to be the main cause of rising defense product prices. This was because demand was exclusively limited to the domestic market.<sup>31</sup>

If the government relaxes this principle, the SDF could purchase more with less and update its weapons by exporting the old ones (under the current law, all weapons must continue to be used until becoming inoperable). At the same time, the military industries in Japan could not only make profits, but also develop their technical skills through the production process. Such a relaxation could damage Japan’s pacifist image at home and abroad, but once it is clear that weapons are to war what fire engines are to fire and that many countries including all the permanent members of the U.N. “Security” Council export them, and, above all, weapons trades could deter war among the traders, the drawbacks of changing this policy will likely be moderated.

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<sup>29</sup>“89 Shiki 5.56mm Shoujuu,” *Wikipedia*.  
<<http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/89%E5%BC%8F5.56mm%E5%B0%8F%E9%8A%83>>.

<sup>30</sup>Andrew Koch, “U.S. Army Approves Revolutionary Infantry Weapon,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly* 15 August 2000 <[http://www.janes.com/regional\\_news/americas/news/jdw/jdw000815\\_1\\_n.shtml](http://www.janes.com/regional_news/americas/news/jdw/jdw000815_1_n.shtml)>.

<sup>31</sup>Boei Sangyo Gijutsukiban Kenkyukai [Study Group on the Defense Industry and Its Technical Basis], “Boei Sangyo Gijutsukiban no Iji Ikusei ni Kansuru Kihonteki Hoko: 21-Seiki ni Okeru Kiban no Kochiku ni Mukete [Basic Direction on the Maintenance and Raising of the Defense Industry and Its Technical Foundation in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century].” <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/delibe/bo-san/tyukan/tyukan.PDF>>.

## CHAPTER 2

### HERBAL REMEDIES

#### – The Internal Revitalization Approach –

Herbal remedies, also called herbal medicine, are defined as a plant, plant part, extract, or mixture thereof used to prevent, alleviate, or cure disease.<sup>32</sup> Generally speaking, this technique evokes the body's inherent internal or natural healing powers, although it takes longer and progresses more gradually than conventional therapies. Unlike such remedies, which come from the outside, herbal remedies work from the inside.

When it comes to solving the SDF's two major problems, financial and personnel, there are two ways that are permissible within the current legal framework and that the Defense Agency (DA) and the SDF have the authority to undertake. This chapter covers these two options.

The first one is for the financial problem. As the circulation of blood is of vital importance for the human body, the flexible use of the defense budget in the three branches of the service – the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) – is critical.

The second is for the personnel problem. With the decline of the Japanese population in the near future, women will become the only human resource remaining to offset this natural loss. This can be compared to activating regularly unused muscles in the human body. Of course, utilizing more women will require some adjustments and innovations. But it is possible that this approach could cause a favorable internal side effect.

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<sup>32</sup>“Herbal remedy.” *Dictionary.com* 17 March 2006.  
<<http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=herbal+remedy&r=66>>.

## **Flexible Use of the Defense Budget Within the Three Services**

So far, this paper has explored two potential ways of solving the SDF's financial problems: to increase the defense budget and to slash the prices of each piece of armament by relaxing the "Three Principles on Arms Exports." The former is obviously impossible; the latter has greater potential, but is not permissible with the current legal framework; thus, it is quite uncertain that it will actually materialize. The following section analyzes an alternative measure that the DA can undertake independently – to eliminate the barriers among the three services in allocating the defense budget. The time is just ripe for this.

### *The "New Joint Chief of Staff" Office and Its Future Role*

March 27, 2006 saw another birthday for the SDF almost 50 years after its initial establishment – the creation of an office called the "New Joint Chief of Staff," which integrates all the chiefs of staff of the three services to facilitate joint operations. Prior to this, each branch of the service had maintained separate organizations and strategies. This is because the SDF's basic policy called for each service to oversee and execute its own operations. Each service maintained different communications, weapons, logistics, and personnel management systems. This arrangement was problematic in terms of speed and timing, however, and the SDF had to establish a joint operational posture linking SDF units organically so that they could carry out their missions swiftly and effectively on the basis of a jointly designed/planned operational concept. Now the New Joint Chief of Staff gives consolidated advice to the Minister of Defense on SDF operations on behalf of the SDF services. The DA minister directs SDF operations through the Chief of the New Joint Chief of Staff, and the orders of the minister to the SDF are executed by this office (Figure 2).

The uniqueness of this organizational change with regard to this operational integration is, unlike the same kind of change in other countries, that it was initiated and pushed along by the uniformed services, not by the Diet or civilian officials in the internal bureau of the DA.<sup>33</sup> Most of the internal debates and discussions were held at the offices of the Joint Chief Council, the ex-Joint Chief of Staff.

This uniqueness, however, has created a very operation-oriented shift in the SDF. As the first step toward operational integration, it is surely a good one. But at the same time in my view, the next step is now apparent: how to effectively and efficiently complete a defense-buildup. Even after the establishment of the New Joint Chief of Staff, each service still has the authority and personnel for a defense buildup, i.e., procurement of armaments.

#### *Favorable Effects to Be Expected*

With the limited defense budget, it is said that there has been, and will be, cutthroat competition among the services to acquire a bigger slice of the pie than the others. Although a detailed study reports that there have not been any fixed shares for each service,<sup>34</sup> annual budget-sharing fluctuations have occurred simply because each service procured high-value assets in different fiscal years. As a matter of fact, the rigidity of the budget-sharing among the three services was once criticized by a Diet member from a leading opposition party, and the then chief of the DA admitted that the point was well taken.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Shigenobu Tamura and Yoshio Sugino, *Kyokasho: Nihon no Anzen Hoshō* [Textbook: Japan's Security] (Tokyo: Fuyo-Shobo, 2004) 89.

<sup>34</sup>“Boei Yosan no Shikumi to Sono Kettei Katei [Anatomy and Process of the Defense Budget],” Japan Defense.com. <<http://www.japandefense.com/index.htm>>.

<sup>35</sup>Lower House 156th Security Committee Record 3-gou, 27 March 2003 <<http://www.maehara21.com/gijiroku/2003/03/20030327.pdf>>

Because the staff members of each branch of the service are now supposed to join in the process of developing, choosing, and purchasing the main weapons that are operationally related their respective operations, it is still uncertain to what extent the share of each service will be changed. In order to maximize the effect of this organizational shuffle, it is of vital importance to eliminate overlapping procurement from different companies and to purchase common devices in bulk from a company that offers the most reasonable prices. For this purpose, the New Joint Chief of Staff strongly needs to ascertain the purely operational demand of each service without considering the respective share and break the barriers among the three in armament procurement. If the New Joint Chief of Staff issues its operational demands “colorlessly,” that is to say, without thinking about the budget share of each service, and the receivers, i.e., each service, are satisfied with the demands and go ahead with the procurement process, this would result in “buying more (armaments) with less (financial resources).” This would be because of better circulation of money in an organization, as is the case in a human body with better circulation of blood.

### **A Key to Solve the Personnel Problem**

On February 21, 2006, Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare released an astounding report. The report was on the 2005 population increase/decrease. According to this document, there were 1,090,237 births by Japanese living both at home and abroad as well as foreigners living in Japan in that year, while the corresponding figure for deaths was 1,094,598. Thus, the natural growth of the population turned out to be minus 4,361.<sup>36</sup> This meant that the era of population decrease had just begun.

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<sup>36</sup>Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, “Monthly Demographic Movement News Flash: December 2005.” <<http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/geppo/sokuhou/m2005/12.html>>.

This development was not a surprise for everyone. Unlike the ordinary “unforeseeable future,” such as the outbreak of war, the future population is considered to be one of the easiest predictions to make. Take the population of a certain age, for example. The approximate population of 20-year-olds in 2025 can be forecast right now, because it will be nearly equal to that of the number of babies born in 2005. Therefore, this decrease of the Japanese population had been forecast earlier. According to a 2002 report by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, the Japanese population was expected to peak in 2005-2009, after which time it would continue to decline. The population in the year 2050 in Japan is expected to be between 99,031,000 and 100,593,000.<sup>37</sup> How does this affect the SDF?

### *Future Workforce in Japan*

Although the decrease of the overall population has just begun, Japan had already seen a more astounding development in 1995, when “the productive age population,” i.e., people aged 19 to 65, hit its highest, at about 87,170,000, and then began to decline.<sup>38</sup> As things stand, the institute estimates that by 2028-2033, the working population will be below 70,000,000. Focusing on a narrower age bracket, the 18-to-26-year old population, the DA warned in its *2001 Defense of Japan* that “the SDF anticipate that recruitment will become much more difficult in the medium- and long-term, with the population of males between the ages of 18 and 26 eligible to become a Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), or Airman (ASDF) falling from a peak of 9.0 million in 1994....”<sup>39</sup> and things went as had been anticipated (Figure 3).

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<sup>37</sup>The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, “Nihon no Shorai Suikei Jinko [Japan’s Future Population Estimate].”  
<[http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/Mokuji/1\\_Japan/J\\_List\\_14.asp?chap=0](http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/Mokuji/1_Japan/J_List_14.asp?chap=0)>.

<sup>38</sup>The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

<sup>39</sup>Japan Defense Agency, “Defense of Japan 2001,”  
<[http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2001/zuhyo/index.htm](http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/2001/zuhyo/index.htm)>.

This means that with or without the “drastic streamlining of the central government,” which was overviewed in the introduction of this paper, not only the SDF, but all other sectors in Japan, will be suffering from the lack of workers in the near future. Unlike most other sectors, national security cannot be transferred to other nations with companies hiring local people and setting up factories abroad. What human resources can offset the loss?

### *More Females: The Only Remaining Human Resource*

Nothing comes out of nothing. In order to maintain the necessary level of personnel, the SDF need to prepare for offsetting the certain and natural decrease of population by recruiting other groups of people who exist now and will in future. Where can we get them? In my view, the only group of people available is Japanese females. Of course, the author is not the first one to come up with this idea. As early as about 10 years ago, it was believed that the population of men aged 18 to 26 – those subject to SDF recruitment – would drop from 8,912,000 in 1994 to 6 million in 2005. This dim outlook gave the DA no other choice but to look for capable women as well as older people, and, in order to do so, it had to make the SDF attractive places to work. The agency had already expanded the areas of work in which females could participate and extended the retirement age for noncommissioned and some commissioned officers to 54.<sup>40</sup>

### *The Reasons for the Small Number of Female Personnel at Present*

Actually, more than 10,000 female personnel are now in active service, but this is less than 5 percent of all SDF personnel.<sup>41</sup> There are three reasons for this low percentage. First, as a

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<sup>40</sup>“SDF Hopes Better Quarters Attract Young Men, Women,” *The Daily Yomiuri* 3 June 1995.

<sup>41</sup>According to the latest *Defense of Japan*, as of 31 March 2005, the total number of female SDF personnel was 11,126 (Officers: 1,577, Warrant Officers: 1, Enlisted: 9,548).

workplace for Japanese women, the SDF has been considered so unusual that their female personnel are always in the limelight of news coverage. The dispatch of the SDF is quite common these days, but most news sources, even government PR, focus on how many female SDF personnel are involved.<sup>42</sup> The second is that males and females have been recruited in different categories, and there has been almost no change in the enrollment limit for females (as well as that of males). As long as the quota for females is the same, the ratio of job offers to applicants remains considerably different between men and women. The third reason is that female SDF personnel tend to quit working after marriage or childbirth, i.e., at a relatively young age. It was in 2001, in fact, almost half a century after the SDF started to recruit women, that the first female general was appointed.<sup>43</sup> Female SDF personnel have many difficulties. These often involve the choice between motherhood and a career, since it is almost impossible to have it both ways.<sup>44</sup> And usually, the women choose children over work.

### *The First Way to Attract More Female Personnel*

In order to expand the number of female personnel, it will be necessary to: 1) employ more of them, and then 2) encourage them stay. The central government and the DA have already

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<<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/defense/jda-sdf/kousei/index.html>>.

<sup>42</sup>For example, see “Group Heading to East Timor,” *Asahi News Service* 4 February 2002, or Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “What’s Up Around the Prime Minister: Representatives of the Japanese Team of International Peace Cooperation in East Timor Report to Prime Minister After Returning to Japan From East Timor,” 30 June 2004. <[http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/06/30pko\\_e.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/06/30pko_e.html)>.

<sup>43</sup>“Jieitai Hatsu no Josei Shokan [The First Female General in the SDF],” *The Yomiuri Shimbun* 28 March 2001.

<sup>44</sup>An account by a female colonel is introduced in “Josei Kanbu: ‘Kuni Mamoru’ Hokori ga Sasae [Women Officers: The Pride to ‘Defend the Nation’ Is What Supports Them],” *The Chuunichi Shimbun* 10 January 2004. <<http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/jieitai/txt/mani040110.html>>.

taken some measures to achieve these goals. But generally, they fall short of bringing about change.

In 2000, the cabinet instituted the Basic Plan for a Gender-Equal Society, based on the Gender-Equal Society Law. The DA set up the DA Headquarters for the Promotion of a Gender-Equal Society in May 2001. Since then, it has been promoting gender-equality, through such means as providing working conditions necessary for compatibility between work and family life, improving facilities and uniforms, and recruiting and utilizing more women in the SDF. The change in designation for female SDF personnel from *fujin jieikan* [Women<sup>45</sup> Self-Defense Personnel]” to *josei jieikan* [Female Self-Defense Personnel] in April 2003<sup>46</sup> reflected these developments.

The increase in the number of female SDF personnel between 1995 and 2005, however, has been pretty slim: less than 300. The reason is obvious. There has been almost no change in the female quota. Therefore, generally speaking, obtaining a job in the SDF is more competitive for women than for men, although the competition rate itself varies from year to year with changes in the nation’s economic situation. *Defense of Japan 2005*, published by the DA, says that, on average, in FY 2004, one out of 4.9 women applicants for privates, seamen apprentices, and airmen 3<sup>rd</sup> class (the lowest ranks in each service) were accepted vs. one out of each 2.9 men. And that gap has remained the same every year due to the quotas. So it might be said that more better women than men have been squeezed out at the entrance gate. First of all, this gate should

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<sup>45</sup>The Japanese term “fujin” is normally translated into English “woman” or “lady.” But there is a connotation in “fujin” that cannot be shared with “woman” or “lady.” It is considered that “fujin” means a lady of a certain age, generally marriage age, or even a “matron” in some cases.

<sup>46</sup>Japan Defense Agency 2004, 343.

be opened wider for women, that is to say, the male vs. female quota should be shifted in order to employ brighter applicants.<sup>47</sup>

### *The Second Way to Attract More Female Personnel*

After succeeding in hiring more female personnel, the next step is to keep them. In order to minimize the turnover rate of female personnel, in fact, there is a burgeoning project now getting under way. With the rapid decline in the Japanese birth rate in the background, the Supporting Policy for Bringing Up Future Generations Act was established in July 2003 to promote the creation of a society in which children can be born and be brought up in good health. In response to this, in November 2004, the DA also established the Committee to Support the Bringing Up of Future Generations. In order to provide a working environment where personnel can happily raise their children by striking a balance between work and family, the “Action Plan of the DA as Specific Proprietor” was created in March 2005. Specifically, efforts have been made to promote child-care leave and special leave for men, and discussions on the establishment of a day care center for children within the DA are underway.<sup>48</sup> Currently, only one on-base day care center is scheduled to be opened in FY 2009 – in Tokyo, as a test case.<sup>49</sup> Although day care centers are accused of “help[ing] destroy the family unit by pushing women out of their homes and into the workforce” in the United States,<sup>50</sup> this current project should be the top priority to enhance the SDF capability from inside.

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<sup>47</sup>Japan Defense Agency 2005. In the previous year, the corresponding numbers for females and males were 6.1 and 3.4, respectively, according to *Defense of Japan 2004*.

<sup>48</sup>Japan Defense Agency 2005.

<sup>49</sup>“Mishuku-chu ni Moderu Takujisho 19-Nendo ni Kaisho Yotei [Model Day Care Center to Open at Mishuku Camp in FY 2009],” *Asagumo Shimbun* 8 September 2005.  
<<http://www.asagumo-news.com/news/200509/20050908/05090802.html>>.

<sup>50</sup>“Woman in Combat,” *Real News 24/7 Com* 3 July 2003

### *Reasons for Setting Up On-Base Day Care Centers*

First of all, this kind of day care center is in great demand by the female personnel currently in the SDF. According to the results of a questionnaire conducted in 2005 across the board in the SDF, more than 90 percent of the female personnel want a day care center on base or close to their quarters. And, asked if they plan to continue working after getting married and giving birth, 61.6 percent of the unmarried female personnel said that they intend to do so, leaving their children in someone's care. Only 13.5 percent of them, whatever measures are taken, are thinking of quitting their jobs so as to raise children in the future, while 24.9 percent say they do not know.<sup>51</sup> Since the list of reasons why female personnel leave is not available, they cannot be clearly determined. But it is highly reasonable to say that, with adequate day care facilities, more females would stay in the SDF.

Second, overall, day care centers are insufficient in Japan.<sup>52</sup> Therefore, on-base day care centers can serve as “national” day care centers to meet local needs. Applicants are basically limited to SDF personnel, but, when the centers can accommodate additional applicants and be accessible to the public, local families can benefit. In addition, Japanese parents, and even the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, have recently been concerned with security at kindergartens and schools, because of some tragic incidents in which

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<[http://www.realnews247.com/spec\\_rpt\\_women\\_in\\_combat.htm](http://www.realnews247.com/spec_rpt_women_in_combat.htm)>.

<sup>51</sup>Japan Defense Agency, “ ‘Chonai Takuji Shisetsu no Secchi ni Kansuru Anketo Chosa Kekka Gaiyo [The Results of the Questionnaire About Installation of Day Care Centers],” February 2005 <[http://www.jda.go.jp/j/info/koudou/ankt\\_2.pdf](http://www.jda.go.jp/j/info/koudou/ankt_2.pdf)>.

<sup>52</sup>Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Hoiku Sabisu no Jujitsu [Enhancement of Day Care Service],” *Koizumi Cabinet Mail Magazine* 15 September 2005 <[http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/m-magazine/backnumber/2005/0915a\\_1.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/m-magazine/backnumber/2005/0915a_1.html)>.

schoolchildren were killed at school by intruders.<sup>53</sup> There are probably few places in Japan where security is better maintained than at SDF camps and bases.

Third, day care centers, when they are opened to locals, can be very good places for ordinary Japanese, many of whom have an “allergy” to national defense-related matters, to mingle with SDF personnel. This will help boost the SDF posture and raise national-defense consciousness. This is a beneficial side effect of on-site day care centers, but it can be pivotal in terms of the national defense. Needless to say, defense power consists not only of armaments and military personnel, but also of a strong nationwide will for defense and mental support of SDF personnel by the Japanese public. As with armed forces elsewhere, the morale of the SDF personnel is shaped by the attitudes of fellow citizens. Thus, for SDF facilities to function to the maximum effect, it is essential to seek harmonious relations with the surrounding areas and obtain the understanding and cooperation of local residents. Since the SDF arose as an “illegitimate child” under the constitution, this kind of understanding and endorsement are of vital importance. And, in fact, the SDF and the DA have actually taken various measures in order to gain such local support.<sup>54</sup>

Nevertheless, the reality is still quite discouraging. A recent questionnaire has shown that only 5 percent of the respondents reported that they felt that the SDF is “friendly and familiar,” while nearly 40 percent said they do not have “sufficient understanding of the SDF’s actual

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<sup>53</sup>Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, “Gakko Anzen Kinkyu Apiiru: Kodomo no Anzen o Mamoru Tameni [School Safety Emergency Appeal: In Order to Defend Children].” <[http://www.mext.go.jp/b\\_menu/houdou/16/01/04012002.htm](http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/16/01/04012002.htm)>.

<sup>54</sup>*Defense of Japan 2005* introduces measures to improve the living environment, including subsidies for sound-insulation projects on houses, giving subsidies for the construction of a solar power generation system as a part of the sound-insulation projects (i.e., monitoring), promoting sound-insulation projects, renovating community facilities, and proactively utilizing/making good use of properties in the vicinity of airfields, conserving air and water quality, conducting recycling activities, disposing of waste as well as those to improve environmental conservation facilities, conducting environmental surveys, disseminating environmental conservation measures at SDF camps (bases) and maneuver areas, and environmental impact reduction.

status” (Figure 4). This is an unfavorable sign for national security in Japan. This is because such minimal understanding of the SDF could lead to an insufficient patriotic mindset to defend the nation. According to the latest opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, more than 80 percent of respondents, a record high, feel the need to foster patriotic spirit.<sup>55</sup> In other words, it can be said that most Japanese are not satisfied with the way patriotism is encouraged at present. Hence, it is understandable that the LDP’s proposed revision of the Japanese Constitution stresses this point. The preamble, for instance, states: “We, the Japanese people, with love and a sense of responsibility and our true determination, hold in common the duties to support and defend our country and society”<sup>56</sup> [translation by the author]. Among the four items covered in the Basic Policy for National Defense, there is no mention of any concrete measures to be taken to achieve the main part of the second policy, i.e., to promote patriotism and establish the foundations required for national security. The ultimate goal of winning the understanding and support of the general public through various activities ranging from fulfilling daily duties to managing public day care centers should, intentionally or unintentionally, aim at forging this most unshakable spirit of the Japanese people.

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<sup>55</sup>Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “FY2005 Public Opinion.”  
<<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/index-h17.html>>.

<sup>56</sup>Jiyuuminshuto [The Liberal Democratic Party].

## CHAPTER 3

### SKILLED NURSING CARE

#### - The External Help Approach -

The last resort for someone who cannot stand up any more is to rely on others for skilled nursing care. An ailing person is to skilled nursing care what the SDF is to an alliance, currently U.S.-Japan security ties. Yet, with the rise of China, there have been numerous discussions taking place about whether the security ties established half a century ago are beneficial to Japan and whether the United States is the right choice for Japan's strategic partner. Even some American pundits are asking the same question. The claim is that U.S.-Japan relations are practically China-Japan relations and that Japan has not yet reached a conclusion. For example, "Japan, of course, also remains permanently preoccupied with China.... For the time being, Japan seems clueless about how to respond to China's rapidly expanding economic and political presence; until it devises a strategy, policy will continue to *drift* [emphasis added]."<sup>57</sup>

#### **Who Should Be Japan's Partner: The United States or China?**

As early as almost 10 years ago, the prominent American theorist, Harvard's Samuel P. Huntington, made a prediction. He said that Japan will be under Chinese hegemony and: "In the absence of a major and improbable show of resolution by and commitment from the United States, Japan is likely to accommodate China.... As the U.S. role in Asia subsides and China's becomes paramount, Japanese policy will adapt accordingly. Indeed, it has begun to do so."<sup>58</sup> As

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<sup>57</sup>Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, "Adjusting to the New Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, Issue 4 (July/August 2003) 119-131.

<sup>58</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) 236-37.

he pointed out, it is true that “[h]istory, culture, and the realities of power strongly suggest that Asia will opt for peace and hegemony” and that “Japanese alliance behavior has been ‘basically bandwagoning, not balancing’ and ‘alignment with the domestic power.’”<sup>59</sup> Japanese critics share his view on Japan’s tendency toward alliance.<sup>60</sup>

This does not necessarily mean that Japan will bandwagon on a rising China, however. There also are many convincing theories that conflict with the above views. These alternative views stress the geopolitical perspective in politics and history and argue that Japan has been a sea power that has enjoyed maximum benefits only when going along with sea powers such as Britain and the United States. The alliance with Nazi Germany, a land power, was a major mistake and is now considered an historic lesson for Japan. Therefore, Japan should, these views hold, stay in the alliance with the United States and other sea powers such as Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and so forth.<sup>61</sup>

In my view, whatever the theories and histories are, taking into consideration the simple fact that Japan is now surrounded by communist countries that hold nuclear warheads aimed at Japan and publicly and privately denounce Japan and the Japanese, it is a certain, natural, and logical choice for Japan to maintain its security ties with the United States. It should be noted that East Asia is not yet in the same situation as post-Cold War Europe. In Europe, Germany, for example, holding close ties with France, which is a democratic member of the nuclear club, managed to establish positive relationships with a weakening Russia and extricated itself from

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<sup>59</sup>Huntington 238.

<sup>60</sup>Nishihara and Tsuchiya 7.

<sup>61</sup>For example, Kazuo Aichi, Parliament Member, “Nihon-wa Iyoiyo Kaiyo Kokka Senryaku o Tenkai-suru Toki ga Kita [High Time for Japan to Develop a National Strategy for Sea Power]” 31 March 2003. <<http://www.aichi-kazuo.net/opinion/2003html/r.html>>; Taro Yayama, “Ichidai Kagiri no Butsugiri Bunka [A Culture That Lasts Only For One Generation],” *Sankei Shimbun* 23 May 2005; Fukada, 148.

U.S. control to some extent without losing strategic advantage. In Asia, however, there is no country other than the United States for Japan to rely on and with which to hold strategic ties. Therefore, the rest of this chapter does not refer to how important and indispensable U.S.-Japan security ties are, but instead covers issues that could hinder these ties.

### **Possible Causes of a Break-Up**

Even the relationship between a patient and his/her helper is maintained based upon each party's own interests. So there are several things that could split the partnership: different opinions about which direction would be best to take, increased costs, a weakening helper no longer being helpful, and so forth. U.S.-Japan ties seem to me to have much in common with these nursing care problems.

Five scenarios involving the termination of the U.S.-Japan alliance were introduced in a Japanese book that was published in the late 1990's.<sup>62</sup> They are quite similar to the relationship between the patient and the helper. The book says that the demise of the alliance could happen when: 1) either party become incapable of maintaining the alliance; 2) either party loses the will to maintain the alliance due to a less threatening situation; 3) the bottom line on the U.S. or Japanese balance sheet goes into the red; 4) the parties do not share the same crisis management scenarios; and/or 5) a drastic domestic system change occurs in either country. As for the second and the fifth scenarios above, they do not seem worth analyzing here, because North Korea and China are continually obvious concerns for Japan's security, and both the United States and Japan maintain relatively stabilized governments of their own. How about the other three scenarios? Are they still valid?

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<sup>62</sup>Masashi Nishihara and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, *Nichibei Domei Q & A 100* [The U.S.-Japan Alliance Q & A] (Tokyo: Aki-Shobo, 1998) 224-25.

### *Incapability of Either Party*

The reason that U.S.-Japan security ties exist is primarily because of the U.S. capability to offer security to Japan. Theories implying that such U.S. capabilities were weakening were rampant in the late 1980's, but, with the demise of the Soviet Empire, they disappeared. Nonetheless, with the staggering U.S. operations in Iraq, such theories are now coming to the fore again. Emmanuel Todd, for example, a French scholar, says in his book *After the Empire*, "... there will certainly not be in, say 2050, an 'American Empire' because the United States simply does not have what it takes to be a true empire."<sup>63</sup> If his analysis is correct in much the same way as his former predictions about the demise of the Soviet Union, which appeared as early as in 1979, Japan-U.S. relations will be in a quite a different form at that time. In the foreseeable future, however, at least within the next generation, the current order will probably continue to hold sway, and most scholars and analysts agree on this point.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, for the time being, it is said that a weakened America is an oxymoron, and, so as long as Japan maintains its present power, this factor will not cause the end of the alliance.

### *Financial Problems*

It is highly imaginable that the U.S.-Japan alliance might be troubled due to financial problems. When nursing fees are raised beyond what the patient can afford, that could be the end of the relationship. Since the autumn of 2005 when the United States requested that Japan shoulder the U.S. government-projected \$10-billion cost of relocating about 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, Washington and Tokyo have had numerous talks regarding how the two

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<sup>63</sup>Emmanuel Todd, *After the Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) 77.

<sup>64</sup>Nishihara and Tsuchiyama 224.

countries might share the burden. Washington initially wanted Japan to pay 75 percent, while a key member of the ruling LDP in Japan said 50 percent at best.<sup>65</sup> On April 23, 2006, the two parties finally reached an agreement by which Japan will pay 59 percent of the total relocation cost.<sup>66</sup> Right after this agreement was issued, the vice finance minister remarked that this expense should basically be squeezed out of the defense budget, and the Japanese government reportedly has decided to tap the on-going Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009) further to cover the relocation cost.<sup>67</sup>

Whatever the size of the Japan's burden is, the amount of the U.S. request is outrageous. Japanese common sense will not accept this proposal.<sup>68</sup> Among U.S. allies, Japan pays the largest facility charges for the maintenance of U.S. forces in their territory.<sup>69</sup> Under these circumstances, the U.S. request that Japan pay well over \$1 million per Marine in relocation costs seems outrageous to most Japanese. The U.S. side has claimed on various occasions that this movement is, first of all, for the Okinawans, and that, thus, the "local" relocation fee should be paid by Japan. Yet, it is obvious that it is a part of the U.S. global transformation. If not, there is no rational answer to the question "Why now?" Therefore, it is wrong to say this is to reduce the strain on base-hosting areas in Japan. In addition to that, nothing can guarantee that the U.S.

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<sup>65</sup>"Japan Able to Pay Up to 50 Percent to Move Marines to Guam: LDP's Yamasaki," *Kyodo News Service* 26 March 2006.

<sup>66</sup>"Japan, U.S. Reach Deal on Troop Relocation," *BBC Monitoring International Reports* 24 April 2006.

<sup>67</sup>"The Government Revises and Shrinks the Mid-Term Defense Program to Cover the USFJ Relocation Cost," *Kyodo News Service* 25 April 2006 <<http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20060425-00000241-kyodo-pol>>.

<sup>68</sup>According to an opinion poll conducted on 25-26 March 2006 by the Kyodo News Service, about 51 percent of the Japanese people are opposed to paying the cost. <<http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20060327-00000183-kyodo-pol>>. In addition, a member of the Upper House said 75 percent of the Japanese people are opposed to paying the cost. (Upper House 164th Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territory Record 4-go, 24 March 2006.).

<sup>69</sup>In FY 2005, about ¥238 billion (close to \$2 billion) was allotted to USFJ facilities as host nation support.

Forces possibly withdrawn from South Korea in the future would not be relocated and stationed in that area of Okinawa. Japan is a country whose annual defense budget is just over \$35 billion. This makes it clear how heavy the burden of the U.S. proposal would be. If the relocation obviously serves to maintain deterrence power, Japan could try to squeeze out the fee, but strategically speaking, no valid logic can explain the current request from the U.S. government.

What if, then, Japan resists payment of this kind in the future? While saying in the U.S. version of *After the Empire*: “No one is even sure if the American economy will be able to absorb the shock of the war in Iraq that... is proving to be a serious economic burden since the ‘allies’ no longer want to pay a share of the costs as they did during the first Gulf War. The domestic and foreign deficits of the United States are skyrocketing,”<sup>70</sup> the cynical Todd mentions in the preface to the Japanese version of the book (i.e., which does not appear in the U.S. version) that it could be a sufficient contribution to the demise of the American system for Japan just NOT to give financial support to American war costs.<sup>71</sup> He may be right, but that ends up posing a typical dilemma for Japan. To say “no” to financial support due to budget constraints means to relatively weaken its only alliance partner. Thus, it is highly probable that some kind of financial issue will be a factor that shakes the security treaty.

### *Conflicting Strategy Between the Two*

Suppose there is a situation in which a patient and his/her helper start to look and walk in different directions. It can easily be imagined that the two would separate, and the helper would no longer be helpful at all for the patient, or could worsen the patient’s health by leaving him/her

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<sup>70</sup>Todd xvii-xix.

<sup>71</sup>Emmanuel Todd, *Teikoku Igo [After the Empire]* (Tokyo: Fujiwara-Shoten, 2003) 7.

in an isolated situation. This state of affairs can be compared to one in which the United States and Japan have different strategies, threat evaluations, scenarios, operation plans, and so forth. For example, if there are conflicting possible actions/scenarios between the United States and Japan, the life of the alliance would be over.<sup>72</sup> Another example would be a situation in which, while Japan sees a country as a military threat, the United States values the country as a sizeable economic market. The approaches that the United States and Japan try to take will be so different that the two countries will no longer go in tandem with each other.

These gaps in perception between the United States and Japan can naturally happen, and they have been most cautiously monitored in order to maintain the alliance. First, the U.S. security interest is global, while Japan's tends to be limited to East Asia. Transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces is being conducted on a global scale, while a top new item in Japan in March 2006 regarding the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is the relocation of a U.S. air station from central Okinawa to the coastline in Nago, northern Okinawa. Since the eye-spans differ in the two countries, the strategies regarding Japan's defense can differ as well. Second, the U.S. Republican/Democratic administrations sometimes have totally different ways of looking at East Asian countries. It is said that Pakistani President Ayub Khan once commented that getting along with the Ganges River and getting along with the United States were quite similar.<sup>73</sup> What he meant was that, as the Ganges River causes massive flooding almost every four years and washes away the accumulated silt, a U.S. presidential election is held every four years and, depending on which party wins, U.S. diplomacy changes dramatically. In the meantime, Japan's consistent LDP administration maintains a comparatively unshakable political stance. Both the United

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<sup>72</sup>Nishihara and Tsuchiya 225.

<sup>73</sup>Fukada 262.

States and Japan need to use caution so as not to have different threat evaluations, scenarios, role assignments, tactics, military strategies, and so forth, in view of the fact that this is the key to allow the alliance to function well enough to defend Japan.

## CONCLUSION

Up to this point, this paper has attempted to sort out and analyze possible measures to enable the SDF to undertake more operations with less in financial and human resources. As a patient on whom conventional treatments no longer work tries to see chiropractors to get relief, takes herbal remedies to provoke natural healing power from inside, and relies on skilled nursing care, there seem to be some measures that could help the SDF extricate itself from its current dilemmas.

First, comparing spinal adjustments to revisions of some fundamental legal framework in the field of national defense, it is possible for the SDF's capabilities and flexibility to be improved when basic laws and political declarations are rectified. Ranging from the constitution to some political declarations, the items involved in this category are presently irrational in content and highly political in decisions. Because there should be profound background behind each decision and, to some extent, Japan's defensive orientation has done well for its economic recovery in the postwar period, it would not be appropriate to simply reject the current interpretations and political declarations. It is an absolutely and literally "vital" mistake, however, that such national policies have been seen as a taboo, a DNA, or a gospel. In national security, necessity should NOT be the mother of revisions and rectifications, because when the necessity arises, there are clear and present dangers or imminent threats, and it is generally too late to take effective actions after they have been perceived. It is of vital importance to think outside the box, foster circumstances in which both the public and private sectors can freely discuss issues with no taboos, and prepare for the worst in advance. "Intellectual tardiness" might be said to have been the biggest enemy for Japan.

Second, it should be noted that there are several measures that should be taken within the SDF/DA. These internal self-healing attempts would be similar to herbal remedies. Like better circulation of blood, it would be a key for each branch of the service to share the defense budget in a flexible manner. And the high walls that have existed in the past among the three services can be tackled with the advent of the New Joint Chief of Staff. As for the personnel issue, a suggestion is to employ more females instead of males and take various measures to keep them. Expanding the quota for female personnel will most effectively lessen the impact of the declining Japanese population on SDF personnel issues. On-base day care centers, which are a way of retaining women after they marry and have children, should be pushed more actively and, if possible, made accessible to local people. By offering a facility that is in such high demand to the local population and, thereby, giving them the opportunity to mingle with SDF personnel, the SDF will look more relevant and friendly, and this could encourage patriotism, which is the essence of national will power against foreign and domestic intruders. This is a favorable side effect of the “herbal remedy” that strengthens the SDF from inside.

Last, as a kind of skilled nursing care, the U.S.-Japan Alliance will serve better than any other choice. But caution should be used in maintaining and developing it. To this end, both parties must share the same mindset: evaluation of threats, contingency scenarios and plans, tactics and strategies. In addition to this, as for Japan, its twisted “spine alignment,” that is to say, legal framework, should be rectified. For its part, the United States can no longer view Japan as a cash cow. Japan’s current economic slump is so serious that, in 2004, more than 8,000 businesspeople, a record high, committed suicide due to economic reasons.<sup>74</sup> Feeling tangible hardships of life now, more and more Japanese are having a hard time understanding the


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<sup>74</sup>“Economic Suicide 8,000 and Total Exceeds 30,000 in 2004,” *The Asahi Shimbun* 2 June 2005. <<http://www.asahi.com/life/update/0602/004.html>>.

invisible effects of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In order to gain nationwide support from the Japanese public, both countries will need to show the rationality of this alliance more clearly than ever before. As long as the two countries make efforts to work out bilateral defense issues, the partnership will surely work as a deterrence power in East Asia, as it has in the past, and as the basis for the future peace and prosperity of Japan, the United States, and the rest of the world.

**Figure 1**


**Framework of Japan's Defense Policy and Planning**



Notes: The Mid-term Defense Program is legally drawn up every five years. The National Defense Program Guideline is revised when necessary (i.e., the intervals are not legally fixed).

Figure 2<sup>75</sup>


SDF Operations in the Past and the New Joint Operations Posture



<sup>75</sup>Japan Defense Agency *Defense of Japan 2004* 417 and *Defense of Japan 2005* at <[http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho\\_data/2005/2005/figindex.html](http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/2005/2005/figindex.html)>. Slightly modified by the author.

Figure 3<sup>76</sup>


**Changes in the Male Population at the Ages Eligible for Recruitment for Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), and Airman 3rd Class (ASDF)**



<sup>76</sup>Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2004* 371.

Figure 4<sup>77</sup>

Impressions of the SDF



<sup>77</sup>Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2004* 533.

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