

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE AND THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
EU	European Union
INF	Intermediate nuclear force
KMT	Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
PRC	People's Republic of China
SCC	Security Consultative Committee
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

The divisions between the United States and the nations of continental Europe – France and Germany, in particular – concerning the war in Iraq have surprised many who thought that the Atlantic Alliance was solid and enduring. Why has the Alliance deteriorated so severely? I argue that the answer lies in a long-term discrepancy and depends no less on the postures of a political leadership than the transformation of the geopolitical world structure. Will the same chasm upset the Japan-U.S. alliance?

Nobody would deny that the most epoch-making incidents in recent world affairs have been the collapse of the Cold War structure in 1989, the terrorism of 9/11 in 2001, and the subsequent Iraq War starting in 2003. In this paper, I will conclude that the end of the Cold War was the most fundamental change and that 9/11 and the Iraq War played the role of catalyst to facilitate post-Cold-War developments.

This paper will analyze this issue by comparing Europe and Asia (Asia in this paper means East plus Southeast Asia) according to a methodology of historical and geopolitical thinking. There are analogies between the two regions (Europe and Asia) in terms of civilization and geography. Tadao Umezao, one of the leading anthropologists of Japan, wrote an article entitled “An Ecological View of the History of Civilization,” originally published in 1957 and later included in a book, arguing that Japan and Europe, as littoral regions of the east and west end of the Eurasian continent, have experienced a similar historical development through feudalism and industrialization.¹ And Nicholas John Spykman, an American geopolitical scholar, pointed out “the remarkable similarity of the

¹Tadao Umezao, *Bunmei no Seitai Shikan* (Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1967) 82-90.

geographical position of the United States in regard to Europe and Asia.”² According to him, the Sea of Japan is likened to the North Sea and Japan to Great Britain.

Both spheres faced a common threat in modern history: Eurasian land power, that is the Soviet Union/Russia. Both regions have been very significant for the United States strategically and have connected mutually, such as when the eruption of the Korean War resulted in the remilitarization of West Germany in Europe. Additionally, there is also a methodological merit that, by comparing these two regions, the distinctions of each become more evident.

The most fundamental thesis is that, after the end of the Cold War, Europe and Asia basically have been returning to the original pre-Cold-War geopolitical configurations. In this vein, a contemporary American historian, Walter LaFeber writes, “key problems seemed to resemble less the 1960’s than the 1920’s, or the late nineteenth-century-to-1914 era. After 40 years of Cold War, history seemed to be beginning again.”³

The collapse of the Cold War structure was, from a geopolitical point of view, the failure of Russia (the Soviet Union), as a huge land power, to expand and establish an empire throughout the Eurasian continent. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire meant that the ideological and military hoop that had bound a part of Europe and Asia finally got disentangled.

The global bipolar structure may have been an exceptional international system. Now a structure that is more historically consistent is emerging: in Europe, a unified

²Nicholas John Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company: 1942) 137.

³Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad: 1750 to the Present* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994) 778.

Europe promoted by the European Union (EU), in which Germany has been regaining its power; and in Asia, imperial order centered on China. But in both regions, the further the new regional order develops, the stronger the reaction to it becomes.

CHAPTER 1

EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

The U.S.-European Alliance During the Cold War

The U.S.-European relationship, termed the Atlantic partnership, extends into many different realms. But the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in particular, has played a pivotal role in the Atlantic relationship. Not only bridging the two continents in terms of security, it has also been a foundation of maintaining common values and economic prosperity. Its ability to deter the threat of the Soviet Union means that today it is considered the most successful alliance in history.

The Establishment of NATO

During the last stage of World War II, confrontations among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had already become tense, especially with regard to how to deal with East Europe, above all the arrangement of Poland. Britain and France, faced with the expanding dominance of Soviet Russia in Eastern Europe and also worrying about the possibility of a German resurgence, wanted to form a collective security alliance. The first realization of such a move was the Treaty of Dunkirk between Britain and France in March 1947.

Due to exhaustion from the war, these Western European countries were well aware that, unless there was assurance of U.S. involvement, the collective alliance would not be fully effective.

British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin played an active role in crafting this agreement. Sir Nicholas Henderson, a senior British diplomat, who was a member of the

seven-power working party for drafting the NATO treaty, observes in his publication *The Birth of NATO* how Bevin carefully undertook the drafting process. According to Henderson's account, written shortly after the conclusion of the treaty, the idea to create some sort of federation in Western Europe started at the end of 1947 under Bevin's leadership, with the knowledge that the United States had no very definite plan of how to cope with the deepening Cold War situation.⁴

The consensus among the West European leaders was that the Treaty of Dunkirk should be expanded and that it was essential to bring in the Americans. "He [Bevin] recognized that a Western union would be of little value without the assurance of American backing. But he also saw that it was useless to expect this and futile to ask for it until some worthwhile system of collaboration had been established in Western Europe."⁵

In view of this consideration, Bevin made an effort to develop the Treaty of Dunkirk into a larger security body including the Benelux countries, resulting in the Western Union in March 1948. Bevin "took a deliberate 'gamble' that the United States, although not prepared to lead, would eventually follow."⁶

During the war, Walter Lippman, a prominent journalist, had noted that "the strategic defenses of the United States are not at the three-mile limit in American waters, but extend across both oceans and to all the trans-oceanic lands from which an attack by sea or by air can be launched."⁷ But it was still premature to accept such a perception as a

⁴Sir Nicholas Henderson, *The Birth of NATO* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982) 1.

⁵Henderson 6.

⁶Allan K. Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1952," in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, eds., *American Defense Policy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) 302.

⁷Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1943) 94.

national consensus. What Bevin meant was that isolationism was still tenacious in the United States.

In the State Department, George Kennan, a diplomat who later became known as the “father of containment,” and his colleague Charles Bohlen opposed the idea of an alliance. They favored a unilateral Presidential, or Presidential-Congressional, declaration.⁸ Their reasons were that an alliance could create undue provocation towards the Soviets, and the possibility of becoming entangled in European affairs was strong.⁹

At the same time, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg, who initiated a resolution enabling the United States to associate itself with regional collective security arrangements in June 1948, was initially “suspicious about the Old World taking advantage of the New, about its expectation of having America do what was properly Europe’s work.”¹⁰

Looking back at the history of America, we notice that from the very beginning of the establishment of the country, Americans believed that it was politically and morally desirable to stay aloof from European affairs. The United States was conceived as founded in separation from the corrupted “Old World,” the balance-of-power system, monarchy, and colonialism. This sentiment was strengthened by the belief of many Americans that they were dragged somewhat “willy-nilly” into two wars on European soil. The response of the U.S. leadership to the European initiative shows how persistent this obsession has been.

⁸Henrikson 303.

⁹Henderson 25.

¹⁰Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994) 22.

The United States was, however, beginning to appreciate efforts being put forth by the Europeans on behalf of their own security. Moreover, the ever-worsening reality of the Cold War (the Communist Party coup d'état in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade by the Soviet Union) finally prevented the United States from retreating into its prewar isolationism. Nonetheless, in view of such a sentiment in the United States, the NATO treaty carefully eschewed “automatic military help,” stipulating, for example, in Article 11, that “its provisions [shall be] carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”

For the United States, the signing of the Treaty of Washington in 1949 (the establishment of NATO) was the first time since 1778 – the year when the Franco-American alliance ended – that the United States had entered into an entangling relationship with other countries. It is not an exaggeration to say that the American membership in NATO was truly “the American Revolution of 1949.”¹¹

According to a historian of Europe, Geir Lundestad, “most of the initiatives leading to the creation of NATO were taken in Western Europe,” and he concludes that “the Western Europeans were so interested in involving the Americans in the affairs of their continent that it can be argued that they invited the Americans in.”¹²

The case of the formation of NATO shows that the Atlantic partnership contained some stiffness from its post-bellum start.

¹¹Kaplan 1.

¹²Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 49.

Frictions During the Cold War

During the Cold War, as the reconstruction of Western Europe proceeded and relative stability was realized – by attaining a strategic nuclear balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union – opportunities for the Western European countries to act independently from the United States arose. Whenever tension with the Soviet Union eased, the buried inclination of Europeans to seek independence from the United States emerged.

The center of the storm was France led by President Charles de Gaulle. As late as the mid-1950's, Britain and France were still imperial powers, or at least they pretended to be. The Suez Crisis of 1956, in which both nations launched military action by occupying the Suez Canal and failed with the application of U.S. pressure, was the turning point.

Britain came to the conclusion that British foreign policy should always be carefully aligned with U.S. global objectives, whereas France decided the opposite. Combined with concern for the decline of its status and being dubious about the U.S. nuclear umbrella, France decided to deploy its own nuclear force. And, in 1966, seeking for an independent status from U.S. hegemony, de Gaulle withdrew from NATO's integrated command structure. These were the expressions of French self-esteem and pursuit of autonomous foreign policy.

Détente posed yet another crisis. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt carried out Ostpolitik (change through rapprochement) to facilitate a reconciliation between Eastern and Western Europe. This caused the U.S. concern that “the European allies would become ‘infected’ by the Soviet peace campaign.”¹³ To the contrary, the bilateral arms control

¹³Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community* (Lanham, U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 49.

discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union “occasionally left the allies wondering whether their interests would be protected by their American ally.”¹⁴

Tensions between the West and the East built up again at the end of the 1970's. Facing the deployment of the advanced Soviet intermediate nuclear force (INF) SS20, Helmut Schmidt, Brandt's successor, asked the United States to remove the disparities by using Pershing II missiles, American INF, and cruise missiles in Europe. The European concern was that the United States would refrain from using its strategic nuclear forces in a crisis out of fear of a direct encounter with the Soviet Union. This would result in a limited nuclear war, rendering Europe a nuclear battlefield.

To avoid this, Schmidt thought that “Eurostrategic balance,” namely the balance of power between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc, should be maintained. The United States accepted this. Objecting to such a move, however, a huge peace movement grew throughout many cities in Western Europe, sharing mistrust of the United States and insisting that the deployment of U.S. missiles would, contrary to Schmidt's view, augment the possibility of nuclear war on European soil.

Despite huge demonstrations, Schmidt and his successor Helmut Kohl did not change their position. Being very concerned about the enormous opposition movement, French President François Mitterrand made a speech in the West German Bundestag (Lower House) in January 1983 in favor of the deployment. This was believed to have played a major role for the West German government's ability to withstand the political crisis.

¹⁴Sloan 49.

During the Cold War, therefore, a number of crises did indeed arise across the Atlantic, but mutual restraint worked, and they were soon overcome.

Even de Gaulle, the most formidable challenger of American world leadership, did not intend to withdraw completely from NATO's security framework. He was well aware that the United States was to be the guarantor of last resort for Western Europe. He left behind a statement: "As long as there is the major reality of the mighty Russia, there is no other solution than American support so that Europe is not dominated. That was why we concluded the Atlantic Treaty, and that is why we must maintain it."¹⁵

This unity shown by the Atlantic Alliance put pressure on the Soviet Union and constituted a significant factor in its final collapse.

Collapse of the Cold War Structure

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, namely, the end of the Cold War meant the dissolution of communist ideological and military binding in Europe. The barrier that had separated Europe was removed, and unified Europe began to emerge. On the other hand, historical and geopolitical dissensions, which had underlain the Cold War, between the United States and Europe as well as among European countries, started to resurface.

Throughout the post-Cold War period up until 9/11, however, the discord between the United States and Europe was contained and did not reach a critical point. One reason for this was the sizeable legacy of communism, which Europe urgently needed to overcome urgently with the help of the United States: Europe had to embrace the new democracies in

¹⁵Lundestad 136.

Central and Eastern Europe, establish a consultative and cooperative relationship with Russia, and, above all, deal with ethnic conflicts in the Balkans.

The European unification process had started soon after the end of World War II and progressed with coordination between the political power of France – ensured by its seat on the United Nations Security Council and its possession of nuclear weapons – and the economic power of (West) Germany. For its part, Germany, the potential regional power, assumed a low-profile posture, refraining from political self-assurance vis-à-vis other European countries due to its Nazi past. In addition, it has been careful to maintain a balanced relationship with the United States as well as with France.

The end of the Cold War also meant the realization of a unified Germany as the most powerful country in Europe both in terms of economy and population.

During this transitional period, which ended with 9/11, the unification process of Europe accelerated. The Maastricht treaty, which led to the formation of the EU, was signed in 1992; the Euro was introduced in 1999; and new membership (mainly of Eastern European countries) in the EU was realized. Germany and France, deepening their collaboration, played roles as accelerators of this process and tried to amplify their influence on the world stage through the strengthening of the EU, while actually the expansion of the EU has implied the enhancement of the German presence in it.

Below the surface, substantial disagreements among the various nations steadily worsened. Regional conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo and how countries dealt with these conflicts allow us a window through which to view the deepening of this discord.

It became clear that there was a serious capability gap between the U.S. military and its European counterpart within NATO. During the Kosovo War, the United States flew 70-80 percent of all sorties and dropped 80 percent of precision munitions. NATO member

countries depended on the precision strike capability, surveillance assets, and command and control systems of the U.S. military.

In his memoirs, General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the time of the Kosovo War, notes: “Where the American role was dominant was in planning the air operation. The reason was basic. NATO itself had no intelligence. NATO only received national intelligence and then disseminated it. It had no collection and little analytic capabilities.”¹⁶ The trans-Atlantic capability gaps were regarded by the United States as a long-standing lack of burden-sharing efforts by the Europeans.

But the most striking fact is that U.S. hesitancy to be involved in European domestic affairs became evident shortly after the end of the Cold War.

James Baker, the Secretary of State under the George H. W. Bush administration, says: “the United States had fought three wars in this century in Europe – two hot wars and one cold one. And three was quite enough... [I]f Europe was going to assume its place as a great power, then the Europeans, not the Americans, should take the lead in managing the Yugoslav crisis.”¹⁷

And Bill Clinton’s administration also “proved unwilling either to put Bosnia center stage in his foreign policy or to commit the type of military capabilities that would be necessary to bring the conflict to a halt.”¹⁸ Almost two years elapsed after the start of

¹⁶Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War, Bosnia: Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 422.

¹⁷James Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons) 636.

¹⁸Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) 7.

ethnic conflicts in Bosnia before Clinton finally took on the leadership role necessary to mediate the Dayton peace agreement.

Baker states:

We had been engaged in a political battle in Brussels over the relationship of the Western European Union (WEU) – the EU’s defense arm – and NATO..... Some Europeans... were headstrong about asserting a European defense identity in which America’s role on the Continent was minimized. We had been fighting this for some time, and trying to get them to recognize that, even with a diminished Soviet threat, they still needed an engaged America. But our protestations were overlooked in an emotional rush for a unified Europe. The result was an undercurrent in Washington, often felt but seldom spoken, that it was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power. Yugoslavia was as good a first test as any.¹⁹

Not only was there the division across the Atlantic, but also geopolitical relationships reemerged in Europe mostly in a form of historical antagonism – between the Germans and the Slavs, the Christians and the Muslims, and the Roman Catholic and the Russian Orthodox churches.

France, for example, has traditionally been a close ally of the Serbs. According to Clark: “a French general told me privately, ‘Sir, do not fight against the Serbs.... Do not forget, only Serbia stands between Europe and an “Algeria” in Europe.’ Of course, this wasn’t the official policy of France.... But it was a sentiment I had heard expressed more than once unofficially.”²⁰

The Harvard political scientist, Samuel Huntington, astutely writes: “The war in Bosnia was a war of civilizations. The three primary participants came from different

¹⁹Baker 637.

²⁰Clark 427.

civilizations and adhered to different religions... Orthodox countries and organizations universally backed the Serbs... Western governments and elites backed the Croats, castigated the Serbs, and were generally indifferent to or fearful of Muslims.”²¹

According to Baker: “The Europeans’... tendency was to become prisoners of their own history, falling back to alliances that had been developed decades or even centuries before.”²²

9/11, the Iraq War, and the Chasm in U.S.-European Relations

The rift between the United States and “Old Europe,” namely France and Germany, became significant with 9/11 and the Iraq War. Inside Europe, a sharp contrast surfaced between “Old Europe” and “New Europe,” namely Eastern European countries plus Britain and Italy, concerning the response to the Iraq War.

The rift virtually originated from the change in the posture of Germany. The German general election campaign in 2002, in which Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder used anti-American slogans in order to win back support, was a watershed in terms of the U.S.-European relationship. It was the first time for post-World-War-II German politicians to appeal publicly to anti-war sentiment among their people. When the threat of Russia vanished, there was hardly any reason for Germany to hesitate to maintain its own position. And its growing status in Europe has enabled the nation to put aside some of its post-war taboos.

²¹Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster) 288.

²²Baker 645.

The United States and France engaged in a diplomatic struggle in the U.N. Security Council concerning the legitimacy of the Iraq War. Britain and the East European countries sided with the United States and Germany in this dispute, and Russia sided with France. It was because of this struggle that the Bush administration launched the Iraq War almost unilaterally without the authorization of a U.N. Security Council resolution.

A confrontational geopolitical picture became apparent: on one hand, continental Europe, above all France and Germany, sought a unified, strong Europe as a pillar of the world in order to compete with the United States; in contrast, maritime Britain plus the Eastern European countries considered it vitally important to cooperate with the United States on the world stage.

Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, fellows at the Brookings Institute, cite the following gaps between the United States and Europe as the background of the diplomatic wrangling over the Iraq War: disparity in military power, sharply differing assessments of the current rules of the international system, and a perception gap concerning terrorism, among other things.²³

But even as I wrote the above, the rift between the United States and continental Europe and geopolitical frictions among European countries had already long existed beneath the surface. The United States, shocked by the tragedy of 9/11, pushed forward robustly the anti-terrorism military campaign in Afghanistan and the Iraq War led by the “Bush Doctrine.” And 9/11 played a role as a catalyst to make the contradictions resurface.

²³Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004) 49-59.

The Bush Doctrine

U.S. diplomacy contains an idealistic, ideological feature. It goes without saying that the diplomacy of each country needs to maximize national interests. But a unique assumption that interests should be advanced by the spread of liberal and democratic political institutions and values abroad has been very deeply rooted in U.S. diplomacy

One sometimes points a finger at such idealism for sheer hypocrisy, used simply as an excuse for self-interest. But for the United States, its real interests have been expressed in terms of ideals, and occasionally these ideals become the real aim of its diplomacy. “Democracy promotion is not just another foreign policy instrument or idealist diversion; it is central to American political identity and its sense of national purpose.”²⁴

And it should be noted that American idealism has been strongly associated with exceptionalism: America has “unique origins, a national credo, historical evolution, and distinctive political and religious institutions.”²⁵ One of the most significant sources of exceptionalism is Calvinism (Puritanism), and the Americans from the beginning had the notion that they were “a chosen people” and had “special providence.”

Henry Kissinger, a former secretary of state and a scholar of foreign policy, identifies two trends in U.S. history: beacon and crusader. “The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them for a perfect future.”²⁶

²⁴Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005): 112.

²⁵Monten 119.

²⁶Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994) 18.

In his State of the Union address on January 31, 2006, Bush stressed that: “Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror. Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer – so we will act boldly in freedom’s cause.” This statement is an optimistic expression of the idealism that the promotion of American values, such as freedom, democracy, and free trade, leads almost automatically to the peace and prosperity of the United States as well as of the rest of the world.

The difference between the diplomacy in this administration and those that preceded it may be the vehemence of the idealism and the way it tries to achieve its goals. Ivo H. Daalder, a scholar of U.S.-European relations, terms the means used by the Bush administration to achieve its goals as a “revolution”: “Bush had set in motion a revolution in American foreign policy. It was not a revolution in America’s goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them.”²⁷ The content of the “revolution” was: reliance on the unilateral exercise of power rather than on international law and institutions; dependence on an ad hoc coalition of the willing; adoption of a proactive doctrine of preemption; and the preference of regime change over direct negotiations, etc. Finally, a unipolar distribution of military power facilitates the mission to pursue. We may conclude that the Bush doctrine is the culmination of a particular form of the crusader trend that has been evident throughout U.S. history.

The way the Bush administration has acted, however, has been perceived by many as too hasty and arrogant. Differentiating nations (including allies) in such black-and-white

²⁷Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institutions Press, 2003) 2.

terms has irritated the political leaders of European countries, and this, in turn, encourages divisions among countries.

Difficulties of Reconciliation

There have been many efforts to mend the Atlantic alliance, especially to adapt NATO to the changing strategic situation of the post-Cold War era. These have included establishing “The NATO Response Force (NRF),” and activating “out-of-area involvements.” The situation leading to the Iraq War, however, made it much more difficult to form consensus in NATO. Without unanimity, NATO could be irrelevant in responding in crises and wars.

An example was the case concerning the defense situation in Turkey. Shortly before the start of the Iraq War, the United States insisted that NATO prepare to come to Turkey’s defense in the event that Iraq retaliated against Turkey. But France, Germany, and Belgium fiercely opposed such preparation, maintaining that it would be unnecessarily provocative. They were afraid that approving such a move by the United States would mean an implicit acceptance of the Iraq War. There were “angry exchanges and even shouting matches not normally heard at meetings of the North Atlantic Council.”²⁸ To break the deadlock and as an exceptional measure, the decision was made at the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), on which France, the most stubborn objector, did not sit.

It would be premature to say that NATO has become completely worthless. NATO, or the presence of the United States in Europe, is still working as “hedges” for the security of most European nations, especially for the new up-and-coming members of Europe.

²⁸Gordon and Shapiro 138.

There are many advantages of NATO, such as its command structure and system for standardization of weapons, to be utilized, for example, for peacekeeping operations.

Nevertheless, pessimistic views are becoming common. Daalder argues that the United States now favors a hegemonic foreign policy, while Europeans rely more on international cooperation. He notes: “The main consequence of these changes in U.S. and European policy priorities is to make the transatlantic relationship less pivotal to the foreign policy of both actors.”²⁹ James Kitfield, who covered the NATO Defense Minister Conference in Warsaw in September 2002, reports: “It is becoming increasingly clear that in terms of military utility, the Pentagon views NATO primarily as a useful joint-training-and-exercise organization from which the United States can cherry-pick ‘coalitions of the willing’ to participate in U.S.-led operations.”³⁰

To deal with the new realities, the United States believes that there is not much to gain from alliance considerations. The current Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, states that “the mission defines the coalition, and I think that was not only a correct statement, but it has been an enormously helpful concept in this war on terror. Every nation is different, with different cultures and geographies, and the thought that they should all agree at the same moment about how to contribute to this war is nonsense.”³¹ The United States seems to be reverting to its original suspicion of permanent alliance.

During the Cold War era, U.S. diplomacy assisted in the unification process of Europe. This was favorable to the United States, since it contributed to containing both the

²⁹Ivo H. Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” *Survival* Vol. 45, No.2 (Summer 2003): 153.

³⁰James Kitfield, “U.S. to NATO: Change or Else,” *National Journal* Vol. 34 Issue 41 (12 October 2002): 2978.

³¹Quoted in Daalder, “Atlanticism” 156.

Soviet Union and Germany and allowed for a unified Europe to share some of the burden. As for enlargement of the EU, the United States went on supporting the stabilization of Eastern Europe.

But the Bush administration seems to be concerned that an enlarged EU would be harmful to the European balance of power. According to Daalder: “He [President Bush] retreated from America’s decades-long policy of backing European integration, and instead exploited Europe’s internal divisions.”³² The administration seems to be undertaking, consciously or unconsciously, a “divide and rule” policy between “The Old Europe” and “The New Europe.”

Division of Basic Values

It has been argued that common values of democracy and freedom have played a very important role as a glue to connect the Atlantic partners. But the process of differentiation has deepened to the extent that the rift has come to be perceived of as even more fundamental, involving, for example, worldviews or religion.

The widely known thesis concerning this point is that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus,” as foreign policy scholar Robert Kagan noted. He postulates that the Europeans are living in a post-historical paradise of Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace,” whereas the Americans are in an anarchic Hobbesian world.³³ According to him, the Americans and Europeans have come to hold different views in terms of the causes of conflict, the nature of power, the role of international legal

³²Daalder and Lindsay 2.

³³Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003) 3.

organizations, and so on. From the European side, there is now hardly any hesitation to direct accusations against U.S. foreign policy and to maintain the righteousness of the European cause.

Juergen Habermas, a German philosopher, acknowledged “a sign of the birth of a European public sphere” in the mass anti-Iraq War demonstrations throughout major European cities in February 2003, insisting that “Europe has to throw its weight on the scales to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States.”³⁴

According to Russell Berman, a scholar of the humanities, “a post-democratic anti-Americanism” is now prevailing in Europe. This sentiment is “driven by the resentment that the United States is unwilling to cede sovereignty to the structure of international governance, as European states have done in the process of European unification.” And he stresses, “As the process of European unification progressed, anti-Americanism proved to be a useful ideology for the definition of a new European identity.”³⁵

Observing domestic changes in the United States, the conservative swing of values in general, especially the emergence of neoconservative [neocon] ideology, cannot be overlooked. Leo Strauss, a Jewish philosopher who immigrated from Nazi Germany, laid the most fundamental philosophical backbone of the neocon ideology. The core idea in Strauss’s work is denunciation of relativism and the need for an elite group of politicians,

³⁴Daniel Levy et. al. (ed.), *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War* (New York, London: Verso, 2005) 4-6.

³⁵Russell A. Berman, *Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2004) xii.

as described in Plato's *Republic*, who can impress upon a political leader and upon the masses the need for virtue and for strong moral judgments about good and evil.³⁶

The original neocon intellectuals, represented by Irving Kristol, were Democratic Party advocates, who were disappointed by the party's drift toward the political left and switched to the Republican Party in the 1970's. Since then, neocon intellectuals have advocated supply-side economics, family values, the importance of religion, and aggressive defense policies to triumph over, among others, liberalism and counterculture. At the same time, they have increased their influence on administrations, mainly by setting up print media and think tanks

As for the current Bush administration, it is wrong to overestimate the influence of neocon ideology. The final determiners in the administration, such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, are not themselves neocons.³⁷ But the influence of such neocon intellectuals William Kristol, the editor the *Weekly Standard* magazine, or by some senior government personnel can hardly be neglected. According to the American Jewish scholar and historian Murray Friedman, "They were among the first to recognize the imminent danger long before 9/11, and they were among the strongest advocates of the invasion of Iraq."³⁸ Paul Wolfowitz, in particular, as an adviser on international affairs during Bush's first presidential campaign in 1999 and as the deputy defense secretary in Bush's first term, was influential in carrying out the Iraq War.

³⁶James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York, London: Penguin Books, 2004) 26.

³⁷Murray Friedman, *The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 3.

³⁸Friedman 223.

In fact, according to journalist and author Bob Woodward, Wolfowitz was “the intellectual godfather and fiercest advocate for toppling Saddam Hussein.”³⁹

Although opinions about the extent to which the Bush administration has been affected by neocon ideology differ among observers, the trend may represent a long-term transformation of the American intellectual paradigm.

On the contrary, the general trend in Europe is emphasis on secularism, the welfare state, and international law. Anne Norton, a political scientist from the University of Pennsylvania, writes that: “There is nothing like neoconservatism in Europe and most Europeans are highly skeptical of its legitimacy.”⁴⁰ In the 1990’s, according to Huntington, religious ideas and groups experienced a dramatic resurgence and religion became a key element in American politics. This trend is almost global, with only the exception of Western Europe.⁴¹ Roman Catholic theologian George Weigel maintains critically that the Europeans are falling into “atheistic humanism.” And, he believes, this is causing a serious crisis because the “process of secularization had profound public consequences: it led to the collapse of a transcendent horizon of moral judgment in European public life.”⁴²

The division of the Atlantic alliance and the domestic transformation of American fundamental values are linked. The two continents may have reached a point where their worldviews are so different that they identify themselves apart from each other.

³⁹Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) 21.

⁴⁰Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004) 177.

⁴¹Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) 356.

⁴²George Weigel, *The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America, and Politics Without God* (New York: Basic Books, 2005) 52.

CHAPTER 2

ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES

The Postwar Situation in East Asia

As is the case with Europe, we should look back at an earlier Asian international structure, namely that during World War II and shortly thereafter. Compared to Europe, the main feature of the Asian order was that it was fluid.

Unlike Germany, Japan did not wage war down to the very last soldier. Japan surrendered, leaving most of its armed forces stationed in China or South East Asia intact. And since the surrender was earlier than the United States had expected, there were no evident lines of division and occupation as was the case in Europe. There were vast regions that experienced a power vacuum (mainly China and Korea), and, penetrating this vacuum, warfare occurred among major powers. A civil war started in China between the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and the Communist Party (CCP). From this instability, the People's Republic of China (PRC), ruled by the CCP and which was fairly independent from the Soviet Union, emerged.

The basic power structure in Asia became a triangular one. The combination of three major players – the United States, the Soviet Union, and the PRC – resulted in a number of conflicts, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the war between China and Vietnam. The last war, the civil war in Cambodia, finally came to an end in 1991.

In Europe, the cracks of the dissolution of the Cold War structure spurred ethnic conflict. The communist ideology had suppressed nationality in Eastern Europe, whereas in Asia, communism and nationalism were not necessarily contradictory; rather in most cases, they were closely bound with anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Thus, the impact of

the collapse of the Soviet Union was limited, and the legitimacy of communist regimes persisted.

China as an Empire

After Deng Xiaoping took power in China in 1978 and to date, the PRC has accelerated its reform policy and, abandoning its revolutionary diplomacy, has been expanding economically and politically as well as militarily. China's GDP has achieved an average yearly growth of more than 9 percent over the last 25 years, becoming the sixth largest in the world. Its defense budget has shown double-digit annual increases since the mid-1990's and is now the third largest in the world, making China the largest defense spender in Asia.⁴³ The end of the Cold War in Asia means that, instead of Russia, China has been gaining status as the most dominant Eurasian land power. In Asia, the beginning of "history" is taking the shape of a resurgence of China as an empire.

This process was coordinated with a de-ideologization while maintaining the authoritarian state system of China. In place of Marxist ideology, nationalism has gradually become the major element in the legitimacy of the Chinese state.

Moreover, the Chinese historical sentiment of cultural superiority and nationalism could easily turn into ideology to sustain an imperial system. China rules a landmass in which more than a third of the population is non-Chinese. One could call this ideology "imperial nationalism."⁴⁴

⁴³*Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense) 21-22.

⁴⁴Ross Terrill, *The New Chinese Empire: And What it Means for the United States* (New York: A Cornelia and Michael Bessie Book, 2003) 13.

China is now reorganizing the neighboring regional order, though in a way “to prevail without fighting,” acquiring hegemony over North Korea, and dominating mainland Southeast Asia, including Thailand or Burma.⁴⁵ Even South Korea is now developing close strategic ties with China, and the Chinese influence on that nation is increasing steadily.

The United States has maintained a stronghold on the southern part of the Korean Peninsula and it has contributed to ensuring strategic stability between the regional powers in Eastern Asia. But the swell of Chinese influence seems to be transforming this structure into an imperial order centered on China. According to Ross Terrill, a Harvard-based expert on Chinese affairs: “Skillfully, China has changed gears from ideological to economic and military methods. Its aim, unchanged from the Mao era and much earlier in Chinese history, is to make Beijing the centerpiece of Asia. Strikingly, the Chinese state’s view of its centrality to a wide Eurasian zone has endured for more than 2,000 years.”⁴⁶

U.S. Policy Toward Asia

In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine announced that the United States would not interfere with the internal affairs of European nations, whereas it asked the Europeans not to encroach in the Western Hemisphere. Actually, this was possible because Britain, which had naval supremacy in the Atlantic, had the same interests as the United States concerning the Western Hemisphere.

After the American frontier vanished at the end of the 19th century, the expansion of the United States toward the West continued. The Monroe Doctrine, motivated by a sense

⁴⁵Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999): 84.

⁴⁶Ross 254.

of religious mission, racial superiority, social Darwinism, and manifest destiny, was long used as an explanation for why the United States had its back to Europe and expanded westward even across the Pacific Ocean. As Walter A. McDougall, a professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania, says: “the watery boundary where America stopped Asia began was never defined.”⁴⁷

It has been frequently observed that the United States has a sentimental attachment to China. The background for this was that China was long an unenlightened part of the world where U.S. missionaries played a very active role. The late historian Louis J. Halle believed that: “At least part of the reason why we Americans loved the Chinese people was that we were allowed to patronize them. We made ourselves their mentor and protector.”⁴⁸

A British historian Christopher Thorne stressed, too that: “In short, the underlying conviction for many Americans, including those whose admiration and concern for the Chinese people was [sic] great, was the one expressed by Pearl Buck herself: that it was essential for ‘the American way of life to prevail in the world’ and in Asia above all.”⁴⁹

The “crusader” aspect of U.S. diplomacy has had its expression mainly vis-à-vis the Western Hemisphere and Asia. And the latter, in particular, has been a venue where the United States has been most able to play a role as a builder of the new order with a comparatively free hand.

⁴⁷Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997) 117.

⁴⁸Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York, Evanston, IL: Harper & Row, 1967) 193.

⁴⁹Christopher Thorne, *The Issue of War: States, Societies, and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985) 206.

Today, the U.S. government has repeatedly announced that it will live as a member of the Asia-Pacific family of nations. In addition to the historical trends, economic interests and the unstable security situation in the area, namely tensions in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, the domestic instability of China, and Sino-Japanese relations, are compelling the United States to continue to be actively involved in Asian regional affairs.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the security situation in Asia went adrift. As was the case in Europe, the loss of the “common enemy” had a profound effect on the *raison d’être* of Japan-U.S. alliance. As Huntington has written: “What purpose is it [the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty] meant to serve in the post-Cold War era?... Doubts were increasingly being raised in Japan about the American military presence there and in the United States about the need for an unreciprocated commitment to defend Japan.”⁵⁰ Harvard’s Joseph Nye, a scholar of international politics, has also noted: “Opinion polls and popular novels reflect the concern that Japan will become a major challenger to the United States in the post-Cold War era.... Some Americans speak about Japan as the new enemy that must be contained in an ‘economic Cold War.’”⁵¹

Considerable effort has been undertaken to adapt the alliance to the new post-Cold-War situation. In 1995, the East Asia Strategy Report (known as the Nye Report) was issued followed by “The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security” and the revision of the “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” enhancing the bilateral cooperation

⁵⁰Huntington, *Clash* 309.

⁵¹Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Coping with Japan,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 89 (Winter, 1992-93): 96-97.

of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with the U.S. military. The most recent announcement, “Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” adopted in October 2005 by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC), stipulated the “regional and global common strategic objectives” of the alliance.

Both the deepening and widening of the military cooperation has been attained throughout these processes. The alliance, on the one hand, changed into an instrument for regional and global stability to respond to such security concerns as rogue states, international terrorism, and nuclear proliferation, among others. And, on the other hand, strengthening of the alliance was possible because concerns about growing Chinese power have been shared by the two countries – especially since the middle of the 1990’s.

The current Bush administration has stressed the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance and labeled China a strategic competitor. In the “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” issued in February 2006, Washington warned of the increase of defense spending and lack of transparency in the Chinese military build-up, stressing that “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States.”⁵²

Under the leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Bush, the Japan-U.S. relationship is now enjoying its closest alignment ever since the end of the Cold War, mainly due to Japan’s unprecedented political and military support for the United States in the war against terrorism – war in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq after 9/11.

But the ostensibly robust alliance relationship seems to be partially based on an intimate personal relationship between Koizumi and Bush. Skepticism that the Japan-U.S. alliance has a fragile basis still persists. As in South Korea, there is a concern that anti-U.S.

⁵²*Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006) 29.

sentiment has been growing both from left and right wings of Japan's political spectrum. The Japanese, especially those who live in Okinawa, are not happy with the location of huge U.S. bases on their soil.

Another concern stems from the asymmetry of the Japan-U.S. security relationship.

In the post-World-War-II period in Europe, Britain was the major power, and it took a leadership role in forming NATO, the collective security alliance that stipulated proportional defense duties among member states. In 1955, West Germany became involved in this organization on the condition that its army would be wholly dedicated to the NATO command. Looking back, the forming of the collective alliance in Europe was possible on the condition that there was homogeneity among the countries of Western Europe and between the United States and Europe. Christopher Hemmer, an associate professor at the Air War College, and Peter J. Katzenstein, a professor at Cornell University, say: "As Dean Acheson saw it, the threat to which NATO responded was posed 'not only to our country, but also to the civilization in which we live.' ... 'To understand this threat,' Acheson continued, one had to 'go back more than 2000 years, to the beginning of Western civilization.'" ⁵³

In Asia, on the other hand, the countries differed so greatly that the perception of threat held by each country varied widely. In the early Cold War stage, the major threat was the Soviet Union for Japan and the United States, while for the Philippines and Australia, it was Japan. The mutual distrust among Asian nations was very strong. There was little, if any, collective identity among them, let alone that shared with the United States.

⁵³Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002): 585.

A collective security alliance similar to NATO was pursued, but, mainly due to this complication and mutual antagonisms, the idea was eventually abandoned. Moreover, Japan was a defeated country and basically demilitarized. There was no reliable core partner with which the United States could work out a regional security framework. Instead, each Asia-Pacific country had a bilateral security arrangement with the United States: a “hub and spoke” type of network.

In the case of Japan-U.S. security alliance signed in 1951, the disproportion was evident. The treaty was revised in 1960, but the underlying asymmetrical structure, namely the bargain between U.S. military manpower and the bases located in Japanese sovereign territory, remained.

Basically, Japan’s contribution to the United States does not go beyond its pledge to provide facilities to U.S. forces. It can be said that Japan, cleverly evading the heavy burden of building up its own armed forces and obedience to the commanding structure of the United States, has maintained considerable independence from the United States. But it can also be argued that Japan has been so accustomed to the de facto evasion of the responsibility that it has not seriously taken its own role in international security and order into consideration for a long time.

The United States has long been asking Japan for a buildup of defense and, indeed, the reciprocity has been steadily improving. Nevertheless, the U.S. side, so far, has not been fully satisfied with Japan’s “free ride.” According to Thomas J. Christensen of Princeton University, the United States thinks that the alliance is “lopsided and unfair because the United States guarantees Japanese security without clear guarantees of even

rudimentary assistance from Japan if U.S. forces were to become embroiled in a regional armed conflict.”⁵⁴

China is deepening its involvement in the global economy, and the United States welcomes this development. But it is contradictory, on one hand, to keep a balance of power with China, namely to contain China politically and militarily, while boosting the relationship economically. Given the rise of China combined with the displeasure of the United States concerning the asymmetrical alliance with Japan, the time might come when the United States will entrust China with leadership in the East Asian order.

Clinton and his administration appeared to have taken some steps to lead the United States in this direction. He made it clear that the enlargement of foreign markets was more important to contain China and “was downplaying human rights to keep the Chinese as growing trade partners.”⁵⁵ When he visited China on June 1998, Clinton did not go to Japan, leaving a concern that the United States had changed its fundamental strategic posture.

The position of South Korea is also becoming ambiguous. It would cause instability on the Korean Peninsula as well as in Asia as a whole if the United States reconsidered its presence in South Korea. This is reminiscent of the so-called “Acheson line,” announced by American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson in 1950, and which excluded South Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter.

For the foreseeable future, though, the United States is going to ensure its interests through a balance-of-power mechanism in alliance with some Asian maritime states,

⁵⁴Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999): 58.

⁵⁵Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002* (Boston: McGrawHill, 2002) 378.

especially with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and probably South Korea. As Robert Ross, a scholar of Chinese affairs at Boston College, notes: “The post-Cold-War bipolar regional structure is characterized by Chinese dominance of mainland East Asia and U.S. dominance of maritime East Asia.”⁵⁶ At the same time, it cannot be denied that the situation in Asia heavily depends on the behavior of Japan.

⁵⁶Ross 84.

CONCLUSION

Power, Values, and Configuration

When “history” came back, it was almost inevitable that the United States and continental Europe would part ways. And on the same basis, I argue that it is almost inevitable that Japan and the United States would remain allied.

Here I would like to present a thesis by which to view the international scene from the following three standpoints: I: Power; II: Values; III: Configuration (Location). I assume that these are the most fundamental elements that mold international relations. (Power in this context includes military, political, and economic power.) And to talk about “Values” and “Configuration” and their mutual interrelations, I would like to apply the idea of geopolitics: the framework of maritime nations (sea power) and continental ones (land power).

The typical example of the former is Britain, which, to maintain the European balance of power, historically has demanded naval power, intelligence capabilities, diplomatic skills, and freedom of the seas. It is disposed toward “a multi-dimensional, flexible, and open international order that tolerates the existence of smaller countries.”⁵⁷ By contrast, the continental states, represented by Russia and China, can be characterized by the opposite traits: seeking for hegemony; autocratic, coercive policies; and state control of markets.

⁵⁷Makoto Iokibe, “The Japan-U.S. Alliance as a Maritime Alliance,” *Japan’s Grand Strategy for the 21st Century – From an Insular Nation to a Maritime Nation* (Tokyo: The Japan Forum on International Relations, 2000).

It should be noted that these two categories are abstract and that it is normal for any country to embody a combination of both. But by and large, I would argue that the “Values” of each nation correspond to its “Configuration.”

From each of these three perspectives, continental Europe and the United States have good reasons to be separated.

From the “Power” perspective, I apply the thesis postulated by Huntington. According to him, contemporary international politics is a uni-multipolar system with one superpower (the United States) and several major regional powers (the EU, China, Russia, India, Brazil, etc.).⁵⁸ In each region, there is a secondary regional power, such as Britain, Japan, Ukraine, Pakistan, Argentina, etc. The superpower has an interest in maintaining the world system, whereas the major regional powers would prefer a multipolar system in which they could pursue their interests. And for the secondary regional powers, “superpower intervention is a resource that they potentially can mobilize against their region’s major power. The superpower and the secondary regional powers will thus often... share converging interests against major regional powers.”⁵⁹

The EU as “the German-French condominium” has grown to become a major regional power, and it is quite natural for it to try to evade “being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger superpower,”⁶⁰ whereas Britain, as a secondary regional power, has firmly committed itself to a “special relationship” with the United States and will not abandon this for the foreseeable future.

⁵⁸Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, Issue 2 (March/April 1999) 35.

⁵⁹Huntington, “Lonely” 46.

⁶⁰Huntington, “Lonely” 37.

From the “Values” perspective, democracy and freedom are shared as Western values by both parties, while at more fundamental levels of values, such as custom or religion, there is division, as seen in the first chapter.

From the perspective of “Configuration,” Germany had an historical tendency to expand eastward to acquire “lebensraum (living space),” maintaining autocratic characteristics as a continental nation. West Germany was established on the grounds that it was separate from such a tradition. Today, I argue that the EU expansion corresponded to the eastern expansion of Germany. As the influence of Germany is to be dominant in the EU, the foothold of the union will move eastward into the Eurasian continent.

The widening of the “Values” between the continental Europe and the United States may reflect the transformation of the “Configuration” of Europe.

Japan-U.S. Alliance as Destiny

On the contrary, there are substantial grounds to form an alliance between Japan and the United States, from each of three above considerations. In terms of “Power,” Japan is a secondary regional power in Asia and has good reasons to maintain an alliance with the United States. We have seen that the deepening and widening of the alliance was to a large extent to respond to China, the major regional power in Asia.

In terms of “Values” and “Configuration,” I argue that the two aspects are closely interrelated. The United States as a nation has an amphibious, namely, a maritime as well as a continental character. But if we observe its development in Europe and Asia across the ocean, it can be said that the United States has inherited from Britain its fundamental

perspectives on foreign policy and international order.⁶¹ It has maintained the freedom of the seas and has had seldom, if ever, had territorial ambitions.

Japan in modern history attempted to transform itself into continental empire, and this ended in disaster. Japan's post-World-War-II footsteps have been a process of redefining itself as a maritime nation. As for relations with the United States, it is evident that Japan and the United States belong to different civilizations. But, as maritime nations, they also share an extensive range of values: matured liberal democracy, free trade, tolerance, and the multi-dimensional world order.

I would like to refer to the thesis by Umezao in addition to geopolitical ideas. According to him, Japan and Eurasian land power, e.g. China, belong to different civilizations: the former belonged to "the first region" and the latter to "the second region" of the globe. The characteristics of the first region could be summarized as a "history of feudalism, modern industrialization, democracy, and freedom," while those of the second region are "huge empires, colonization and revolutions in the modern age, and the servitude of the people."⁶²

An example of the difference of values is how to recognize history. Contrary to the case of Japan, where free exchange of various views of history is guaranteed and quite common, there is a single understanding of history in China. According to Harvard's Terrill: "Leopold von Ranke's definition of history as 'what actually happened' was the last thing history meant to Chinese power-holders who paid so much heed to history.... Chinese history itself became an instrument of rule. 'Chinese historiography,' wrote [Etienne] Balaz

⁶¹Iokibe 7.

⁶²Umezao 82-90.

[Hungarian-born Sinologist], 'is the most massive monument ever raised to glorify a particular social class.'"⁶³

The view that Japan should live as a sea power and keep a sensible distance from continental affairs is not something new. For example, one of the major strategists in the pre-World-War-II period, Vice-Admiral Tetsutaro Sato, insisted soon after Japan won the war with Russia in 1905 that Japan should develop as a maritime state due to the historical fact that no nation could afford to develop both as land power and sea power.⁶⁴

And Masataka Kosaka, one of the most prominent scholars of international politics in post-war Japan, stressed the need to recognize that Japan is located next to the continent, but is not a part of it. He concluded that the sea is dominated by the U.S. navy worldwide; therefore, to secure itself, it is essential for Japan to have a favorable relationship with the U.S. navy. Japan should keep balance of power with neighboring countries by maintaining a stronger linkage with a power in the distance, namely the United States. And he insists that, from the history of Britain, which developed as a typical maritime state, we can draw a number of lessons.⁶⁵

Spykman presented the following assessment just three weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Japanese sea power lies between the Continent of Asia and the Pacific and, therefore, between Asia and the United States. With naval superiority in Asiatic waters, Japan can control all communications through the marginal

⁶³Terrill 52.

⁶⁴Tetsutaro Sato, *Teikoku Kokubo Shiron* [A Historical Treatise on the Defense of the Empire], Vol. II (Tokyo: Harashobo, 1979) 311-371.

⁶⁵Masataka Kosaka, *Kaiyo Kokka Nihon no Koso* [Vision for Japan as a Maritime Nation]: *Kosaka Masataka Chosakushuu* [Works], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Toshishuppan, 1998) 156-179.

seas of that continent from Siberia to Amoy. She can act as a buffer and balance against continental threats to the United States and against American threats to the Asiatic mainland. The United States can be effective on that mainland in a military sense only in alliance with Japanese sea power and not against it....

Because Japan lies across our path and is the most important Asiatic sea power, it is her power politics more than that of any other state that has defied our relations to the Asiatic balance.

The remarkable similarity of the geographic position of the United States in regard to Europe and Asia is, however, not paralleled by a similarity in political relations. On the contrary, they have been quite different. The United States has usually accepted and supported the continental policy of Great Britain, but the continental policy of Japan, the dominant sea power in Asia, has been systematically opposed.⁶⁶

The insights noted above suggest a deeply considered foundation of the geopolitical inevitability of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Agreeing with this assessment, I would call the Japan-U.S. alliance an “alliance of destiny.”

This is not determinism; there have been many stumbling blocks for the two nations to overcome, and they will persist. Rather it is a determination to maintain and nurture the relationship beyond emotions or shortsighted calculations, taking the destined conditions fully into consideration.

⁶⁶Spykman 136.

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