

**THE U.S. INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPING
“REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT COMPLEX” IN ASIA**

Mie Oba

USJP Working Paper 07-10

Program on U.S.-Japan Relations
Harvard University
61 Kirkland Street
Cambridge, MA 12138-2030

2007

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Professor Oba earned her B.A. from International Christian University and her M.A. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Tokyo. Currently, she is an associate professor in the Graduate School of Management of Science and Technology at the Tokyo University of Science. Her book, *The Innovation of the Asia Pacific Region*, has won several awards, including the Ohira Commemorative Award and the Okita Commemorative Award. While she was at Harvard, Professor Oba explored the influence of the United States on the development of the “regional arrangement complex” and the implications of this for U.S.-Japan relations.

ON THE OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF THE PROGRAM ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

Established in 1980, the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies enables outstanding scholars and practitioners to come together for an academic year at Harvard University. During that year, Program Associates take part in a variety of activities and conduct independent research on contemporary U.S.-Japan relations, Japan's relations with the rest of the world, and domestic issues in Japan that bear on its international behavior.

The Occasional Paper Series is wide-ranging in scope. It includes papers that are valuable for their contributions to the scholarly literature; it also includes papers that make available in English the policy perspectives of Associates from government, business and banking, the media, and other fields on issues and problems that come within the scope of the Program.

Needless to say, all papers represent the views of their authors and not necessarily those of their home organizations, the Program, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the Reischauer Institute, or Harvard University.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Chapter 1. The Regional Arrangement Complex (RAC) in Asia	4
Chapter 2. Supportive, But Not Almighty: The United States in Asia Pacific Regionalism	16
Chapter 3. As a Prominent Outsider: The United States and “Asian” Groupings	22
Conclusion	32
References	34

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACD	Asian Cooperation Dialogue
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AMF	Asian Monetary Fund
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APEC-SOM	APEC Senior Officials Meeting
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPAC	Asian Pacific Council
CTI	Committee on Trade and Investment
EAEC	East Asia Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asia Economy Group
EAI	Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative
EAS	East Asian Summit
EAVG	East Asian Vision Group
ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
EVSL	Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization
FTA	Free trade area
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GMS	Great Mekong Scheme
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MOF	Ministry of Finance
PAFTAD	Pacific Free Trade and Development Complex

PBEC	Pacific Basin Economic Council
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference
RAC	Regional arrangement complex
SAARC	South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEATO	Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
WTO	World Trade Organization

INTRODUCTION

The development of regionalism in Asia was restricted by political splits among Asian countries during the Cold War era, while economic interdependence rapidly promoted the “regionalization” of Asian economies.¹ The circumstances surrounding regionalism in Asia, however, have changed dramatically since the end of the 1980’s. Today, various regional arrangements, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and others, have been promoted in Asia.² Some of them seek for economic cooperation/integration; others seek political and security consultation/cooperation; and yet others seek both. There are overlapping memberships and those that differ entirely, and the regional organizations have been loosely interrelated with one another with respect to goals and functions. Thus, the “regional arrangement complex (RAC)” in Asia, which is the complex of these various arrangements, has begun to determine the political relationships among Asian countries. One of the main features of the RAC in Asia is that it is composed of various regionalisms, which are based on a number of regional identities, such as the Asia Pacific, East Asia, extended East Asia, and Southeast Asia.

The position of the United States in this newly developing RAC in Asia has been ambiguous because the United States belongs to Asia Pacific regionalism and not to others. The United States is a member of Asia Pacific regional arrangements such as APEC and the ARF. On the other hand, it is not a member of ASEAN, which is the embodiment of “Southeast Asian” regionalism, or ASEAN+3 or EAS, both of which are attempting to

¹Katzenstein (1997). This does not mean, however, that regionalism and regional arrangements in Asia did not exist during the Cold War era. See Oba (2004a).

²There are many studies that focus on the rapid development of regional arrangements/multilateralism in Asia and their effect on regional politics. For a brief description of the process of their development, see Oba (2004c). As for Asia Pacific arrangements, see Ravenhill (2001) and Alagappa (1998). For East Asian regionalism, see Pempel (2005), Katzenstein and Shiraishi (2006), and Beeson (2007). Concerning Southeast Asian regionalism, see Acharya (2001) and Yamakage (1997).

construct “East Asian community.” In short, the United States has been both a partial insider and a partial outsider of the RAC in Asia, though its security/political and economic power has been prominent.

The United States, on the other hand, has affected the trajectory of the development of the RAC in Asia in various ways. U.S. policies toward some regional movements in Asia have directly influenced their development. Without U.S. support, APEC and the ARF would not have been established. U.S. attempts to promote certain specific projects in APEC and the ARF activated arguments and activities in these arrangements. Besides, it should be mentioned that U.S. “hegemony” determined one of the main characteristics of the RAC in Asia: the emergence of diverse regional identities and regionalisms, such as “Asia Pacific,” “East Asia,” and “extended East Asia.” As mentioned later, “Asia Pacific” was established in order to combine the United States, Asia, and Oceania into one group. The prominent power of the United States has been one of the triggers for the development of East Asian regionalism, while the United States itself strongly opposed the emergence of this trend in the 1990’s. Elites in some Asian countries have attempted to enhance extended East Asian regionalism in order to show that they do intend to construct a regional community that is open to non-Asian countries, including the United States, and that is based on universal values shared with Western rather than on “Asian” values.

The United States, however, is not omnipotent in the course of development of the RAC in Asia, though it has prominent power at the global level and is the primary actor in Asia. The United States has not always been able to accomplish its own objectives in even Asia Pacific arrangements. In addition, “East Asian” regionalism, which the United States did not support, developed after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s.

This paper will show how the United States has been involved in the development of the RAC in Asia. First, it will present a brief profile of the RAC in Asia and one of its main

features: the various overlapping regionalisms within it. Second, it will clarify how the United States has been involved in Asia Pacific regionalism. Third, it will show how the United States has reacted to East Asian regionalism, especially how U.S. attitudes have changed. The current political turns in and around U.S. elites, especially during the second Bush administration, will also be described. Finally, the paper will explore the role of U.S. power in Asia vis-à-vis future trends in the development of the RAC in this region. In short, the hegemonic power of the United States has been limited in Asia by the development of the RAC, although it has had an influence on the development process of the complex.³

³Yamamoto (2003) reviews various arguments regarding the United States as “empire.” In addition, Beeson (2006) conceptualizes U.S. hegemony with a comparative analysis from the realist, liberalist, Marxist, and constructivist points of view.

CHAPTER 1

THE REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT COMPLEX (RAC) IN ASIA

RAC's are complexes of various regional arrangements/institutions/organizations in a geographical sphere; they have overlapping memberships and are loosely interrelated with one other with respect to objectives and activities.⁴ Currently, RAC's can be found in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and the Asia Pacific. The point is that regions have been institutionalized with RAC's, rather than a single regional arrangement.

The evolving RAC in Asia reflects the progress of institutionalization and organization of regional politics, though it is not sufficient to be called "legalization."⁵ Power competition among major countries such as China, Japan, and the United States and the balance of power among them, of course, should be considered, but such realist-analyses alone are not sufficient for understanding Asian politics after the Cold War. Rather, it is important that the regional arrangement architecture began to affect international politics in Asia by means of providing rules, norms, procedures, and ideas by which political coordination and cooperation are promoted.

Various Arrangements in the RAC in Asia

The RAC in the Asia Pacific began to develop around the end of the 1980's. The facts that there were various attempts to construct regional arrangements/organizations in Asia during the Cold War era and that some regional arrangements were established, however, should not be ignored. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE;

⁴The term "complex" reminds international relations scholars of the "security complex" concept, which was explored by Barry Buzan. RAC, however, means various arrangements in one geographic sphere, while security complex indicates various aspects that constitute one region/regional sphere. As for Buzan's concept, see Buzan (1991) or Buzan and Weaver (2003).

⁵For details of the legalization of international relations, see, Goldstein, Kahlar, Keohane, and Slaughter (2001).

1947), the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO; 1954), the Asian Development Bank (ADB; 1965), the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC; 1966), ASEAN (1967), and the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC; 1985) were examples of governmental regional arrangements in this era. In addition, the Pacific Free Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) were established as non-governmental organizations for promoting and discussing “Pacific” cooperation. Some of them, like SEATO and ASPAC, however, were short-lived, and most of the rest had marginal effects on regional politics.⁶

Starting at the end of the 1980’s, a surge of Asia Pacific regionalism prompted the establishment of APEC, which began as a ministerial regional forum for economic issues. During the 1990’s, diverse regionalisms blossomed in this area and various regional institutions were created in addition to already-existing ones such as ASEAN. Today, there are many such institutions, and they constitute the regional arrangement architecture in Asia. Among them, APEC, the ARF, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and the EAS are the essential components.

APEC

APEC was established in 1989 as a forum for discussing trade/investment issues and economic cooperation.⁷ Its structure expanded, and now it is composed of Leaders’ Meetings (summits); Ministerial Meetings; various Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, such as Finance Ministerial Meetings and Trade Ministerial Meetings; the APEC Business Advisory Council;

⁶For details of various regionalisms and attempts to establish regional institutions from the pre-WWII era to the establishment of APEC in 1989, see Oba (2004a).

⁷For a detailed and comprehensive review and analysis of the development and activities of APEC until the early 2000’s, see Ravenhill (2001).

Senior Officials Meetings (APEC-SOM); the Secretariat; four Committees, eight SOM Special Task Groups and 11 Working Groups.⁸ There are now 21 members of APEC, not only from East Asia, but from Oceania, North America, and South America. It should be noted that, since the end of the 1990's, APEC has functioned as forum for discussing not only economic, but also political/security issues such as anti-terrorism cooperation and the security of the Korean peninsula.

ARF

The ARF was launched in 1994 as a forum for fostering dialogue and consultation on political/security issues and for contributing to efforts toward confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. Currently more than 20 countries in the Asia Pacific and EU participate in the activities and discussions of the ARF. It should be noted that the ARF is part of ASEAN, so the role of ASEAN in the ARF is crucial although ASEAN is an association of small powers. ASEAN adopts an “evolutionary approach,” which attempts to extend its activities over three stages: the promotion of confidence building among participants; preventive diplomacy; and conflict resolution.⁹

ASEAN

Since the early 1990's, ASEAN began to deepen internal cooperation and projects like the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in order to promote regional integration, but also to encourage broader regional arrangements such APEC and the ARF. In addition, ASEAN expanded its membership during the 1990's to include all of Southeast Asia with the affiliation of Vietnam (1995), Cambodia (1999), Laos (1997), and Myanmar (1997).

⁸<http://www.apec.org/content/apec/about_apec/structure.html>.

⁹<<http://www.aseansec.org/92.htm>>.

Beyond the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN countries demonstrated that they would continue to promote integration. In 2003, the ninth ASEAN summit adopted the declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which stated that ASEAN countries would promote efforts to achieve “a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN community.”¹⁰ Additionally, ASEAN has fostered linkages with various countries outside of Southeast Asia. For example, it has attempted to enhance economic and political ties with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand by means of free trade areas (FTA’s) and other cooperation. ASEAN has also succeeded in having external powers become affiliated with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). It should be noted that ASEAN is the institutional core of ASEAN+3.

One of unique characteristics of ASEAN is that it has promoted its cooperation and discussions according to the so-called “ASEAN Way,” the core principles of which are informal methods, consensus-based decision-making, and non-interference.¹¹ Recently, however, some leading ASEAN countries have begun to argue that these principles should be reviewed and partly revised in order to promote cooperation more efficiently and effectively. The Myanmar junta issue, in particular, led ASEAN to review its policies based on the non-interference principle. In December 2006, the Eminent Persons Group to Advise Leaders on the ASEAN Charter submitted a report to the ASEAN summit and recommended a review and partial revision of the ASEAN Way.

ASEAN+3

The creation of ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea) reflected the development of East Asian regionalism after the Asian financial crisis and it

¹⁰ASEAN (2003).

¹¹For details on the ASEAN Way, see Acharya (2001) 47-79.

excluded the United States. Although the crisis was not the direct reason for holding the first summit in December 1997, ASEAN+3 has advanced rapidly to enhance regional cooperation, as well as to remedy the damage caused by the crisis and to show regional solidarity in overcoming it.¹² The Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation by the ASEAN+3 Summit in November 1999 in Manila showed that ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian countries were taking steps toward build regional cooperation in East Asia beyond an ad hoc reaction to the crisis.¹³ Afterward, not only financial, but foreign, economic, and other ministerial meetings have been held regularly and various cooperation projects have been promoted.

In addition to encouraging specific cooperation, East Asian community building has been the remarkable issue in ASEAN+3 discussions. The ninth ASEAN+3 summit declared that the group would “continue to be the main vehicle” in realizing East Asian community, while the first EAS, which was held simultaneously, declared that it “could play a significant role in community building” in East Asia.¹⁴ The ninth ASEAN+3 summit also stated that it would issue a second Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation in 2007 in order to “consolidate existing cooperation and to set forth the future direction for the cooperation and East Asia community building.”¹⁵

The EAS and the Idea of East Asian Community

The first EAS was held in December 2005 simultaneously with the ninth ASEAN+3 Summit. The final report of the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) submitted to the ASEAN+3

¹²ASEAN countries put forth a counterproposal to hold an informal summit with ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea, in response to Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s proposal for a summit between Japan and ASEAN in early 1997 prior to the crisis. ASEAN’s proposal led to the First ASEAN+3 Summit.

¹³ASEAN+3 (1999).

¹⁴ASEAN+3 (2005) and EAS (2005).

¹⁵ASEAN+3 (2005) paragraph 2.

summit in 2001 proposed the idea of the evolution of the annual summit meeting of ASEAN+3 into the EAS. The EAS, however, is not a transformation of the ASEAN+3 summit, but an addition to it. In their declarations, both the first EAS and the ninth ASEAN+3 Summit stated that they would encourage East Asian community.¹⁶

The major difference between the EAS and ASEAN+3 is reflected in their respective memberships. The EAS is composed of Australia, New Zealand and India in addition to the ASEAN+3 countries. The realization of the EAS without the abolition of ASEAN+3 shows the emergence of “extended” East Asian regionalism as reflected in Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s January 2002 proposal. The Japanese government has encouraged the construction of East Asian community based on this concept. Singapore and Indonesia have also been supportive of it. The Chinese government, on the other hand, has attempted to realize East Asian community that would involve the members of ASEAN+3.¹⁷ The difference between these two factions on the vision for regional community caused arguments concerning the membership of the EAS in 2004 and 2005.

“Extended” East Asian regionalism reflects the notion that East Asian community should be based on open regionalism, functional cooperation, and universal values and global rules such as democracy, liberty, human rights, and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on trade, while it has avoided mentioning “Asian values.” In the other words, it is a sort of Asian regionalism with delusional “Asianess.” As mentioned later, the United States has shown positive support for the EAS because U.S. leaders think that the development of extended East Asian regionalism could weaken East Asian regionalism, which, in turn, might encourage China’s desires to expand its influence in the area.

¹⁶The idea to construct an East Asian Community has emerged since the EAVG examined ways to promote regional cooperation in East Asia.

¹⁷For example, see Li (2005) and Li (2006).

Other Regional Institutions in Asia

As mentioned above, APEC, the ARF, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and the EAS are the main institutions of the regional arrangement architecture in the Asia Pacific. It should be noted, however, that there are several others.

Trilateral Cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea (Trilateral Cooperation) was launched in 1999 under the strong leadership of former Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. The emergence of Northeast Asian regionalism was epoch-making because the relationship among these three countries was fractured for a long time due to the negative historical legacies surrounding World War II and ideological differences during the Cold War era. And this relationship still is, in fact, fragile and embryonic.

The Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) was established by the enthusiastic initiative of Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Since the first ministerial meeting in June 2002, various regional issues and cooperation plans and projects have been discussed. This reflects the revival of pan-Asia regionalism, which was seen in ECAFE and the Bandung Conference (1955) because it embraces a broader geographical sphere in Asia. In this institution, however, it is difficult to construct the binding regional identity that is indispensable for deepening cooperation. In addition, Thaksin's overthrow in a coup d'état in the autumn of 2006 makes the future of the ACD more ambiguous because the organization was the brainchild of his administration.

SAARC, which was established during the Cold War era, reflects South Asian regionalism in which the power of India is extremely prominent. The relationship between India and East Asia has been tightening, especially since the 1990's, because of India's Look East Policy. India became a member of the ARF in 1996. The nation is also enhancing its ties with ASEAN with the promotion of the India-ASEAN FTA and its affiliation with TAC.

Considering the growing role of India in East Asian and Asia Pacific affairs, SAARC will tighten linkages with regional arrangement architecture in the Asia Pacific in the future.

Under current conditions, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) cannot be regarded as a part of the regional arrangement architecture in the Asia Pacific, because it is not so tightly connected to the core institutions that are mentioned above. The fact that U.S. leaders are cautious about the development of the SCO, however, should not be ignored. The Shanghai Five was established in 1996 and it was later upgraded to the SCO. The SCO now focuses both on security cooperation, especially with regard to anti-terrorism, and on promoting economic cooperation, for example, cooperation in resource development, establishment of FTA's, and so on.

Diverse Regional Identities/Concepts and Regionalism


It is quite important to understand that some regional concepts/identities, both coexisting and competing, e.g., "Asia Pacific," "Southeast Asia," "East Asia," and "extended East Asia" have existed in the RAC in Asia (see below). It should also be noted that such regional arrangements are not mere "devices" for member countries to pursue their political and economic objectives. This is because they are based on the "we-feeling" among member countries in order to efficiently deal with regional issues and maintain their legitimacy.¹⁸ In other words, regional arrangements require regional identity or the intention of constructing regional identity among member countries, at least in the long run.

¹⁸ Acharya (2001), Oba (2004a), and Katzenstein, (2005) mentioned that the "we-feeling" is indispensable for the development of regionalism.

Overlapping Regionalisms in the RAC's in Asia

The types of regionalism	Asia Pacific	East Asia (Extended)	East Asia (Original, only Asian countries)	Southeast Asia	South Asia	Others (e.g. Central Asia)
U.S.'s Participation	○	×	×	×	×	×
Arrangements	APEC (1989 ~), ARF (1993 ~)	EAS (2005 ~)	ASEAN+3 (1997 ~)	ASEAN (1967 ~) AFTA (2002 ~)	SAARC (1985 ~)	SCO (2001 ~) ACD (2002 ~) BIMSTEC (1997)
Proposed ideas	Free Trade Area in Asia Pacific (FTAAP) (2006)	AMF (1997) Koizumi's Extended East Asian Community (2002) 、 METI's East Asian Free Trade Area (2005)	EAEG/EAEC (1990-91) 、 EAVG's and EASG's East Asian Community, East Asia Summit, and East Asian Free Trade Area, METI's East Asian Business Area (2002)	ASEAN Community (2003)	South Asian Free Trade Area	SCO Free Trade Area, BIMSTEC Free Trade Area

Overlapping Regionalism(s) and Major Actors



Three situations have generated diverse regionalisms and regional identities/concepts in Asia. First, it should be pointed out that the intention of some elites in Asian countries to counter U.S. hegemonic power both globally and regionally has been one of the motives for promoting regionalism in Asia. Sometimes, this has involved resentment against U.S. hegemony, which then encouraged the emergence of “East Asian” regionalism as reflected in the proposal for the East Asian Economy Group/East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEG/EAEC), the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), and the development of ASEAN+3.

Second, however, some other elites in Asian countries have been worried about the development of regionalism that excludes the United States because they believe that the enormous political and economic power of the United States in this region should not be ignored. Such people in Japan and Australia have attempted to construct new regional

concepts including not only Asia, but also the United States, for several decades.¹⁹ The regional concept of “Asia Pacific” was the product of their discursive attempts in this regard, and APEC and the ARF are the embodiment of Asia Pacific regionalism based on this notion.

Third, elites in the United States have not favored the development of regionalism that excludes their country because this would limit U.S. power and influence in Asia. The United States strongly expressed its antagonism to the EAEG/EAEC, which was proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed in December 1990.²⁰ In addition, the AMF proposal by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) in 1997 was strongly opposed by the U.S. government.²¹

The identity of “Southeast Asia” does not matter a great deal because this area is composed of small countries. Besides, the elites of Southeast Asian countries try to make Southeast Asia compatible with other broader regions. They have taken a role in encouraging not only Southeast Asian, but Asia Pacific, East Asian, and extended East Asian regionalisms. These three broader regional identities and regionalisms, however, are sometimes competitive. “Asia Pacific” is the “we,” including not only East Asia, but Oceania and some countries in the Americas. It reflects the identity or the attempt to construct an identity based not on racial (Asian) and cultural components, but on universal values such as democracy, human rights, and the market economy, which bind East and West together. On the other hand, “East Asia,” which is composed of only East Asian countries, demonstrates regional identity based on “Asianess,” although the contents of “Asianess” are still vague. The characteristics of “extended East Asia” are close to those of “Asia Pacific.”

¹⁹See Oba (2004a).

²⁰See Higgott and Stubbs (1995).

²¹See Amyx (2002).

Although it does not include the United States or other American countries, “extended East Asia” is founded not upon Asian, but universal, values.

It should be emphasized that competition among these three identities and regionalisms are correlated to the power shifts of the major players in Asia, i.e., China, Japan, and the United States. In particular, the rise of China’s power in this region and its positive encouragement of “East Asia” regionalism has raised anxiety among elites in Japan and the United States that a new China-centered regional order will emerge. As a result, Japanese elites have attempted to encourage Asia Pacific and extended East Asian regionalism. As mentioned below in Chapter 3, U.S. elites have also attempted to encourage Asia Pacific regionalism and demonstrated their support for extended East Asian regionalism. These three powers’ attitudes toward these three regionalisms in Asia make these three regional identities competitive rather than compatible.

CHAPTER 2

SUPPORTIVE BUT NOT ALMIGHTY:

THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA PACIFIC REGIONALISM

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the *raison d'être* of the “Asia Pacific” regional concept is that it can incorporate North America as well as Asia. In other words, “Asia Pacific” was created to bind North America, including the United States, and Asian countries into one “region.” APEC and the ARF reflect the embodiment of Asia Pacific regionalism, which includes the United States. The U.S. government favored the establishment of APEC and demonstrated its support for such a venture by Japan in 1989. Since the establishment of APEC and the ARF, U.S. elites have attempted to shape the directions of the discussions and cooperation in these two institutions. Some have tried to promote specific activities and projects such as the New Pacific Community proposal, and trade and investment liberalization in APEC. Attempts were made to politicize APEC after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The United States has also contributed to the course of discussions and activities within the ARF. Specific objectives pursued by the United States, however, have not always been accomplished.

U.S. Attitudes Toward Regionalism in the Cold War Era

Since the end of World War II, the United States, with its hegemonic power, has been deeply involved in Asian affairs. U.S. interests in Asia have three dimensions: security, economy, and value.²² The U.S. government has tried to maintain the stability of the regional security order, to maintain U.S. benefits in Asia, and to inculcate and spread the Western values of “liberty” and “democracy” in Asian countries. In the security field, it has preferred maintaining the regional order with the U.S.-centered bilateral hub-and-spokes

²²Oba (2004b).

system, which is composed of bilateral alliances between the United States and Asian Pacific countries (U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Korea, ANZUS, U.S.-Philippines, and so on). In the economic sphere, the United States encouraged trade liberalization within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-centered global framework until the middle of the 1980's.

On the other hand, the United States hesitated to encourage any governmental regional arrangement in Asia until it affiliated itself with APEC as one of the founding members in 1989. The reason for this hesitation was that the U.S. government did not feel any necessity to construct regional organizations/institutions in Asia. Besides, it did not want any regional arrangement to replace the bilateral hub-and-spokes system; nor did it want regional trade agreements to hamper the multilateral liberal and open economy.²³

Affiliation with APEC and the ARF: Entering into the “Asia-Pacific”

Starting in the mid-1980's, however, the United States changed this policy toward regionalism. The first sign of this policy shift was its decision to promote the establishment of an FTA with Canada and Mexico. Against the deadlock of the Uruguay Round at the end of 1988, the United States government tilted toward regional arrangements. With this development, James Baker III, Secretary of State under the George H.W. Bush Administration, articulated U.S. support of a new Asia Pacific economic framework, which had been proposed by the Japanese and Australian governments.²⁴ As mentioned in the next chapter, U.S. participation as one of the founding members of APEC was a highlight of the history of U.S. involvement in Asia.

The end of the Cold War itself, of course, had an effect on the power configuration around Asia, though the Cold War confrontation in the area was not a simple bipolar conflict.

²³Oba (2004b).

²⁴Baker (1989).

The legitimacy and authority of Communism collapsed and former communist countries including Russia began to introduce the capitalist/market economy method to manage their own economies. In addition, the risk of regional conflicts, ethnic confrontation, terrorism, and transnational crimes such as drug dealing and human trafficking grew, and these became crucial threats in Asia. This change in security circumstances influenced the growing interest in the possibility and feasibility of “cooperative security” in Asia.²⁵ Under the new circumstances, the United States supported regional security dialogue. The ARF was established in 1994 after the United States, Japan, ASEAN countries, Australia, and Canada held extended discussions about how the framework for the dialogue should be built.

The U.S. participation in APEC reflected the relative decline of its power in the region.²⁶ Furthermore, U.S. participation in regional arrangements in the Asia Pacific was an astonishing event because the United States had preferred managing the relationship with Asian countries through bilateral rather than multilateral frameworks. Finally, against many changes in international circumstances, the United States could not ignore regionalism in Asia and chose to participate in APEC.

This participation as well as that in the ARF also reflected the emerging U.S. national identity as an “Asia Pacific nation.” Of course the U.S. national identity is multifaceted, and the “Asia Pacific” part is only one aspect of it. One’s participation in a regional arrangement, however, means that it accepts that it is a member of a “we” based on one “region.” Before APEC was established, the U.S. government stated several times that it was an “Asia Pacific nation.” These facts show that the Asia Pacific identity had been gaining a foothold in the United States for several decades. U.S. participation in APEC was

²⁵For details on “cooperative security,” see Yamamoto (2004).

²⁶Crone (1993) argued that the vertical relationship in the pre-war era in the Asia Pacific prevented any multilateral framework from being established in this region. APEC was established, however, because the relative decline of U.S. power influenced the “horizontal” power configuration in this area.

an epoch-making event because it meant that the United States began to truly accept that it was a member of the “Asia Pacific.”

The U.S. Promotion of Free Trade in APEC: A No-success Story

The United States, with prominent power in the region, eagerly tried to promote some specific projects within APEC, but did not always succeed. President Bill Clinton’s proposal for a “New Pacific Community” was the impetus for the launch of the APEC summit in Seattle. It was also the driving force for APEC’s primary focus on trade liberalization, especially the rapid reduction of tariffs, rather than on trade facilitation and economic and technical cooperation.²⁷ The Clinton administration tried to make APEC a framework for negotiating with Asian countries on the issue of tariff reductions in order to promote rapid trade liberalization. This positive policy toward APEC, like the proposal for the “New Pacific Community,” entailed active discussions on trade liberalization in APEC. The Seattle APEC meeting (1993) agreed to build the Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI), and the Bogor (West Java) APEC meeting (1994) declared that the industrialized countries would complete the achievement of free and open trade and investment in the Asia Pacific by 2010 and with developing countries by 2020.²⁸

Japan, China, and other Asian countries, however, did not want to go forward with negotiations on rapid trade liberalization in APEC. This reluctance on Japan’s part entailed the contents of “General principles for entire APEC liberalization and facilitation” in the Osaka Action Agenda, which was adopted at the Osaka APEC meeting hosted by Japan in 1995. The principles, especially that of flexibility, stopped attempts at rapid trade liberalization that were endorsed in APEC.

²⁷For details, see Yamakage (1997), Ravenhill (2001), and Oba (2004b).

²⁸APEC (1993) and APEC (1994).

Moreover, when the U.S. government attempted to promote Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) starting in 1995, Japan, with the support of some other Asian countries, halted the process by refusing to agree on liberalization in forestry and fisheries at the Vancouver Leaders' meeting in 1997. In short, U.S. attempts to use APEC as a tool for rapid trade liberalization failed, though U.S. policies did have an effect on the contents of certain activities and projects in APEC.

Transformation of APEC Toward a Security Forum: The U.S. Impetus

Another example of the U.S. influence is the "politicization" of APEC after 9/11. The George W. Bush administration was eager to create a forum for discussion, not only on economic, but also on security issues, including the fight against terrorism. The U.S. pressures were involved in the adoption of the "APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism" by the Shanghai APEC summit (2001), which was held slightly after 9/11.²⁹ After Shanghai, both APEC summit and ministerial meetings have regularly discussed various security issues, not only as related to counter-terrorism, but also with regard to North Korea and human security. The APEC Los Cabos (Mexico) summit (2002) adopted a "Statement on North Korea," and summits since then have discussed enhancing human security.³⁰

Re-encouraging the Asia Pacific to Counter East Asian Regionalism

Even though the United States did not always succeed in achieving its objectives in APEC and the ARF, both arrangements have been crucial for the United States in order to emphasize its involvement in Asia. Especially after the United States faced regionalisms

²⁹APEC (2001).

³⁰Each APEC Economic Leaders' declaration mentioned the necessity of enhancing human security in the region. See APEC (2003), APEC (2004), APEC (2005), and APEC (2006).

that excluded it, U.S. policymakers emphasized the importance of Asia-Pacific regional arrangements. When the EAEG/EAEC was discussed in the early 1990's, the senior Bush and the Clinton administrations reiterated the importance of APEC.³¹ The (re)encouragement of Asia Pacific arrangements by the George W. Bush administration when it was confronted with the development of East Asian regionalism will be discussed in the next chapter.

³¹The "New Pacific Community" concept presented by James Baker III (1991), Secretary of State during the George H. W. Bush administration, and Clinton's proposal for "New Pacific Community" were some other examples.

CHAPTER 3

AS A PROMINENT OUTSIDER:

THE UNITED STATES AND “ASIAN” GROUPINGS

APEC and the ARF reflect Asia Pacific regionalism that included the United States. On the other hand, East Asian regionalism that excludes the United States appeared during the 1990's. U.S. government elites did not want the nation's preeminence in Asia to be replaced by other powers such as Japan and China. They believed that any regionalism excluding the United States could function as devices for such powers to gain predominance in Asia.

The EAEG/EAEC and the AMF, examples of emerging East Asian regionalism, were aborted because of strong U.S. government opposition. It should be noted, however, that some institutions like ASEAN+3 and the SCO, which exclude the United States, were actually established, although the U.S. government did not welcome or positively support them. Some U.S. elites are extremely apprehensive about the rising power of China in this region. Certain documents related to U.S. policy-making revealed their anxiety that the development of East Asian regionalism, as reflected in ASEAN+3, would lead to a China-centered regional order in the future.

Some U.S. government elites have been very conscious of the future development of ASEAN+3 and the EAS because this will determine the regional order in the Asia Pacific and the configuration of the East Asian community. They support APEC and the EAS instead of ASEAN+3. It is unclear, however, whether such efforts will have any influence on the outcomes that are desirable for them.

Before ASEAN+3: Antagonistic Reactions Against East Asian Regionalism

EAEG/EAEC

As noted above, the EAEG was proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed in December 1990 following APEC's establishment in 1989. The EAEG proposal represented both an orientation to manage economic development and interdependence and an orientation to construct a regional mechanism that would be relatively independent of the influences of the United States and Europe. One aspect of this is the formation of a group of like-minded countries, which share common interests in specific areas of trade, including the GATT Uruguay Round. Another is the formalization of trade and economic links, which would spur trade, investment, and other economic linkages in the proposed region.

Although Mahathir did not specify which countries could qualify for EAEG membership, he indicated that the sphere of "East Asia" was supposed to cover the part of Asia that had experienced rapid economic growth and deepening economic interdependence, i.e., Japan, China, Asian NIE's, ASEAN, and other Southeast Asian countries. The surge of this proposal reflected the feeling and belief of some East Asian elites that only a framework of Asian countries should be established in order to respond to U.S. protectionism and the accelerating trends of regionalism in North America and Europe.

In response to concerns that the name "EAEG" sounded too much like an attempt to build a regional trading bloc, the EAEG was formally renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) at the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in October 1991. The U.S. government, however, reacted antagonistically not only to the EAEG, but also to the EAEC, strongly opposing both of them. In addition, Secretary of State Baker underscored the importance of Asia Pacific regionalism reflected in APEC in a paper that appeared in *Foreign*

Affairs in 1991.³² President Clinton proposed the “New Pacific Community” concept in 1993 in order to counter the emergence of East Asian regionalism that included only one side of the Pacific Ocean. These attitudes on the part of U.S. leaders showed that Republicans and Democrats alike shared apprehension about the outcomes of growing East Asian regionalism. Further, they reflected the anxiety of U.S. leaders that a Japan-centered regional order would be evolving with these institutions.³³

AMF

It is known well that, in the summer of 1997, when some officials of the MOF proposed the establishment of the AMF slightly after the occurrence of Asian financial crisis, the U.S. government strongly opposed the proposal and pressured the ministry officials to abandon it.³⁴ The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was alone unable to provide sufficient funds to rescue Thailand, which had suffered severely from the collapse of the baht. The AMF proposal, which was presented by the Japanese Vice Minister for International Finance, was that a \$100-billion fund would provide trade finance and balance of payments support to the Asian economies damaged by economic crisis, while it would also function as a pooled reserve for currency defense.³⁵

The U.S. government and the IMF gave the proposed fund’s duplication of the IMF as the main reason for their opposition.³⁶ Because of such strong objections and criticism from the United States and the IMF, the AMF proposal was abandoned.³⁷

³²Baker (1991).

³³Higgott and Stubb (1995).

³⁴For example, see Amyx (2002) and Oba (2004c).

³⁵Amyx (2002): 6.

³⁶Amyx (2002):7.

³⁷For details, see Oba (2003).

After ASEAN+3 and EAS: From Tolerance to Concern over Regionalisms in Asia?

Is the United States “Tolerant” Toward the Development of East Asian Regionalism?

Considering the strong opposition of U.S. leaders to the EAEG/EAEC and AMF proposals, it is astonishing that the U.S. government calmly watched the development of ASEAN+3 cooperation starting in December 1997. Not only ASEAN+3, but the EAS and the SCO have been established since the turn of the millennium. The development of these institutions suggests the growing orientation of Asian countries toward regionalism and reflects the fact that the United States can no longer stop the flowering of regionalism in Asia that excludes the United States.

Some scholars have concluded that U.S. interests would be compatible with East Asian regionalism. Wesley [2006] argues that both the United States and Asian countries prefer the strong bilateral and weak multilateral structures that prevail in the Asia Pacific.³⁸ He also points out that both Democrats and Republicans “learned” during the 1990’s that regionalism was not a challenge to U.S. goals and that any regionalism would be incapable of constituting such a challenge to U.S. power.³⁹ Katzenstein [2005], on the other hand, argues that East Asian regionalism has been embedded in the *informal American imperium*. He points out that Japan has been the pillar ally in Asia for the United States and that the U.S.-Japan alliance has functioned to coordinate the relationship between East Asia and the *informal American imperium*. In addition, Curtis [2004] argues that East Asian regionalism is not necessarily inimical to U.S. national interests, while growing enthusiasm for creating

³⁸Wesley (2006): 65.

³⁹Wesley (2006): 66.

regional institutions in East Asia is creating regional circumstances that differ from and go beyond the hub-and-spokes designed by U.S. policymakers in the Cold War era.⁴⁰

Some elites in the United States, however, began to be concerned about the implications of the development of East Asian regionalism starting around 2005.⁴¹ The growing power of China generated the notion among U.S. elites that it is doubtful that regionalism excluding the United States will always be compatible with U.S. objectives and interests in Asia. China has been growing as the regional power, and it has taken a positive attitude toward only-Asian groupings like ASEAN+3, while Japan is attempting to include Australia and New Zealand in the East Asian community. China is not a U.S. ally and is not embedded in the bilateral hub-and-spokes, even though the two nations have constructed a “strategic partnership.” It will probably be more difficult for the United States to deal with China-driven regionalism in order to achieve its objectives in Asia than with a Japan-driven one.⁴²

Rising China

Against the background of China’s rapid economic growth since 1992, elites there have gained confidence that their own country is one of the great powers. It is more apparent than before that China’s strength, not only in the region, but in the world has been increasing, especially because of its economic success during the 1990’s. With rising confidence, China, which was formerly passive about involving itself with regional arrangements, began to take a

⁴⁰Curtis (2004): 206.

⁴¹Some studies and reviews that insist that the U.S. government should be more concerned about the development of multilateralism in Asia have begun to appear, especially since 2005. For example, see Cossa, Tay and Lee (2005) and Morton (2006).

⁴²Many studies have posited that China, not Japan, will be the center of the newly developing East Asian Community and focus on China’s potential, though they do not ignore the crucial role of Japan’s economic power. For example, see Abramowitz (2006). On the other hand, Katzenstein (2005) argues that Japan is still the primary power in Asia.

positive attitude toward such collaboration and toward establishing new frameworks and FTA's. The Chinese government began to participate in China-ASEAN FTA's and bilateral FTA's with Asian countries after 2000. In addition, it actively began to engage in the Great Mekong Scheme (GMS), the Boao Forum for Asia, and the ACD, and it contributed to the effort to upgrade the Shanghai Five to the SCO, which is a more formal organization.⁴³

These energetic policies toward FTA's and regional arrangements have been sustained not only by its economic interest in development, but by its desire for leadership status as a great power. China's quick and positive FTA policies underscore its rise as a great power not only in the region, but also in the world. Ties through FTA's represent strengthening political relationships between China and each counterpart. China's positive attitudes toward FTA's have raised both fears and expectations of its expanding influence among neighboring countries; this, in turn, has encouraged moves to conclude various FTA's and to develop regionalism in Asia.

Furthermore, the rise of China's power, wealth, and prestige changed the power configuration in Asia and produced severe competition between China and Japan for political leadership in Asia. Chinese and Japanese attempts to conclude ASEAN+X-type FTA's indicated the eagerness of these two countries for leadership. China and Japan are currently rivals for predominance in East Asia. Both are trying to tighten economic and political ties with ASEAN countries, while other nations such as Australia, New Zealand, India, and the ROK have negotiated FTA's with ASEAN.

⁴³The Shanghai Five was established in 1996 because of security concerns rather than economic ones. It later became the SCO. It now also focuses, however, on promoting economic cooperation, especially in relation to resource development. China's economic interest in the SCO was primarily to maintain a stable supply of natural gas, which is plentiful in middle Asian countries.

The Determinant of the Characteristics of the Arguments: Perceptions of China

U.S. elites continue to state that East Asian regionalism is not inimical to U.S. interests. In consideration of the rising power of China in East Asia, however, some policy makers in the United States seem to be aware of the great potential of Asian regionalism that will exclude their own country, which will sometimes not be compatible with U.S. policies and objectives.

Now, some political elites have begun to argue about how the United States should engage in the development of various regional arrangements, which this paper calls the “RAC.” It should be stressed that one’s interpretation of the rise of China determines his/her argument about regionalisms in Asia. Almost all U.S. political elites seem to share the “premise” that East Asian regionalism is/will be China-centered. Those people who have a negative view of China tend to argue that the United States should encourage Asia Pacific regionalism and strongly support extended East Asian regionalism in order to counter East Asian regionalism, which would be dominated by China. On the other hand, it can be speculated that those who have a more positive view of China and who believe that its rise would not be harmful to U.S. interests in Asia, do not express stronger support for extended East Asian regionalism than for East Asian regionalism.

In this context, it is natural that U.S. elites are quite cautious about the development of the SCO because both China and Russia take a leading role in this regional organization. In the Shangri-la Conference in June 2006, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the United States worried about the growth of such an anti-U.S. and China-Russia-centered alliance.⁴⁴

⁴⁴“Rumsfeld Urges China to Be More Open About Military Expansion,” CNS News, 5 June 2006, <<http://www.iiss.org./index.asp?pgid-13401&mtype=print>>.

Supporting the Asia Pacific and Extended East Asia

Some policymakers' concern about East Asian regionalism can be found in texts of press conferences and statements on EAS issues by personnel from the U.S. Department of State. Some texts from press conferences by the U.S. Department of State strongly emphasized three points concerning U.S. attitudes toward Asian regionalism. First, they emphasized that the United States is maintaining strong ties and engagement in Asia. Second, they demonstrated that APEC and the ARF function to deepen cooperation and to tighten relations in the Asia Pacific. One government official said that the United States does not view such meetings (EAS and ASEAN+3) as inimical to U.S. interests, but he underlined the importance of trans-Pacific partnerships and institutions.⁴⁵ It should be noted that President Bush expressed tentative support for the idea of an APEC FTA on the eve of the Vietnam APEC in 2006.⁴⁶ Third, they stressed the initiative of ASEAN and/or Southeast Asian countries both in East Asia and in Asia Pacific arrangements. On the other hand, they did not mention China's rising power in the region.⁴⁷ Rather, they seemed to avoid mentioning China in the discussion on this issue.

Additionally, some reports and discourses by political elites in the United States have begun to criticize "disinterest toward" regionalism in the Asia Pacific. Most of them argue that the U.S. government has to make clear policies toward regional arrangements in the Asia Pacific and to tighten U.S. engagement in them. For example, several congressional reports on U.S. policies toward the development of regionalisms in Asia were issued in 2005 and 2006.⁴⁸ They concluded that the United States should increase efforts to energize or join

⁴⁵Michalak (2006).

⁴⁶"Bush Cautiously Backs Pacific Rim Free Trade," *Washington Post*, 17 November 2006.

⁴⁷Baucher (2004), Zoellick (2005a), Zoellick (2005b), and Erel (2005).

⁴⁸For example, Nanto (2006) and Vaughn (2006).

existing organizations to push harder for building proposed ideas for regional arrangements such as the Northeast Asia Regional Forum and 16-nation Asian FTA.⁴⁹

In addition, the so-called Armitage-Nye report issued in February 2007 presents one idea about how the United States should regard the development of the RAC in Asia and how the United States should be involved in it. The report presents the negative view that the rising power of China would become inimical to U.S. interests in Asia and argues that there are critical disagreements between China and the U.S./Japan over basic norms and values. This report then recommends that the United States has to do more to encourage Asia Pacific regionalism, like APEC and the ARF, as well as extended East Asian regionalism and the EAS, including Australia, New Zealand, and India, all of which share basic norms and values with the United States and Japan. On the other hand, this report does not mention ASEAN+3.

These texts and reports indicate that political elites and intellectuals who have negative views of China's influence on U.S. interests in Asia in the future take the development of regionalisms in this region seriously. In addition, they demonstrate their support of an extended East Asia and encouragement of Asia Pacific regionalism.

Encouraging ASEAN

Further, U.S. political elites regard the encouragement of ASEAN as an efficient measure to strengthen U.S. engagement in regional arrangement architecture in the Asia Pacific. Encouraging ASEAN and enhancing economic and political ties with it have been proposed and implemented by the U.S. government under George W. Bush in order to

⁴⁹Nanto (2006): 38-39. The Northeast Asia Regional Forum was proposed by some scholars and it will be composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the ROK. In 2006, the Japanese government proposed a 16-nation Asian free FTA, whose members will be ASEAN +3 countries and India, Australia, and New Zealand.

counter the development of East Asian regionalism as well as to ensure continuing U.S. engagement in Asia.

Actually, the U.S. government attempted to tighten its relations with ASEAN countries by proposing the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) in October 2002, when China, Japan, and other countries' competitions over concluding FTA's began to heat up. Then, the U.S.-Singapore FTA took effect in January 2004. It also also concluded Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, and ASEAN.⁵⁰ The United States is also attempting to conclude FTA's with each individual ASEAN country.⁵¹

⁵⁰“U.S., ASEAN Sign Trade and Investment Framework Agreement,” News From Washington, 25 August 2006, USINFO.STATE.GOV HP, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=August&x=20060825175510ASesuarK0.8261988>>.

⁵¹“U.S., Malaysia Sign Trade and Investment Framework Accord,” 10 May 2006 <USINFO.STATE.GOV HP, <http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/May/10-66890.html>>.

CONCLUSION

The development of the “RAC” in Asia has been very much affected by U.S. policies toward regionalism in the area. This does not mean, however, that the United States totally controls the trajectory of this process. The point is that the politics and intentions of the U.S. government on how to deal with, support, oppose, and passively accept Asian regionalism were among the crucial determinants in the development of the RAC in Asia. U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests and objectives in Asia have strongly affected the content of activities, cooperation, and implementation in each regional arrangement, even if the United States is not a member of it. In addition, it should be noted that the interests and objectives of the U.S. government have been determined by how the elites in the United States regard their own country, what they think the United States should be, and, importantly, how they perceive that the people in Asian countries view the United States. In short, the opinions of elites in the United States about American identity become the crucial determinant of how the U.S. government approaches the RAC in Asia.

The power and competence of the United States to shape Asian countries, however, have been limited by the development of the RAC, even though it remains the one superpower in the world and a critical determinant of regional affairs. The development of ASEAN+3, the holding of the EAS, and the establishment of the SCO, all of which exclude the United States, show that the United States cannot stop the development of regionalism in Asia that it does not want or does not positively support. The United States could not, and cannot, completely manipulate negotiations and implementation in regional arrangements/institutions as it wants to, and sometimes it fails even to reach its own goals. It can never prevent or hamper the rise of various regionalisms/regional arrangements that do not seem to contribute to increasing U.S. power in the region, even if it can temporarily ignore and partly restrict them. Besides, the set of rules and norms in regional

arrangements/institutions in Asia have restricted U.S. competence and power, even if the U.S. government does not like this. For example, the so-called ASEAN Way sometimes prevents the United States from taking leadership in APEC and the ARF. The United States has to accept such a “way” when it wants to accomplish its diplomatic goals in regional arrangements/institutions.

Besides, by learning diplomacy in regional arrangements, elites in the United States have been gradually, though slowly, changing their perspective about the identity of their own country so they have begun to accept the identity of belonging to a “nation in the Asia Pacific.” This makes it possible for the United States to be a “we” among Asian countries. Even if perceptions of elites in the United States change, though, it is not certain that people in Asian countries think that an “Asia-Pacific” identity is plausible or desirable for them. This is not a foregone conclusion.

Political elites in the United States have to consider the developing RAC in Asia more than before even if they do not want to do so, because institutionalization in the regional politics in the Asia Pacific though the development of the RAC is definitely going forward.

REFERENCES

- Abramowitz, Morton, 2006. *Chasing the Sun: Rethinking East Asian Policy*. New York: Century Foundation.
- Acharya, Amitav, 2001. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. London and New York: Routledge.
- , 2003. "Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful Change," in Alagappa, Muthiah ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- , 2004. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization*, Vol. 58, Spring 2004.
- Alagappa, Muthiah ed., 1998. *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Amyx, Jennifer A., 2002. *Moving Beyond Bilateralism? Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund*, A. Pacific Economic Papers, 331. Australia-Japan Research Centre, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University.
- APEC, 1993. Fifth APEC Ministerial Meeting, Joint Statement. Seattle, WA, 17-19 November 1993.
- , 1994. APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve. Bogor, Indonesia, 15 November 1994.
- , 2001. APEC Leaders' Statement on Counter-Terrorism. Shanghai, 21 October 2001.
- , 2003. Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future. Bangkok, 21 October 2003.
- , 2004. 12th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Santiago Declaration: One Community, Our Future. Santiago, 20-21 November 2004.
- , 2005. 13th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Busan Declaration. Busan, Korea, 18-19 November 2005.
- , 2006. 14th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Hanoi Declaration. Hanoi, 18-19 November 2006.
- . <http://www.apec.org/content/apec/about_apec/structure.html>.
- Armitage, Richard L., and Joseph S. Nye. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020*. CSIS, February 2007.
- ASEAN, 2003. Declaration of ASEAN Concord II. 7 October 2003.
- . <<http://www.aseansec.org/92.htm>>.

- ASEAN+3, 2005. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN+3 Summit. Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2005.
- , 1999. The Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation. Manila, 28 November 1999.
- Baker, James III, 1989. A New Pacific Partnership: Framework for the Future. 26 June 1989, *Department of State Bulletin*, August 2002.
- , 1991. "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Economy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991/1992.
- Baker, Richard, 1998. "The United States and APEC," in Aggarwal V. K. and C. E. Morrison eds. *Asia-Pacific Crossroads: Regime Creation and the Future of APEC*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Baucher, Richard, 2004. Daily Press Briefing of Richard Baucher, Spokesman, 30 November 2004.
- Beeson, Mark, 2006. *Bush and Asia: America's Evolving Relations with East Asia*. London and New York: Routledge.
- , 2007. *Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bell, 1997. "Ambivalent Regionalism: The United States and APEC," in Ingleson, John ed. *Regionalism, Subregionalism and APEC*. Monash Asia Institute, Monash University.
- Buzan, Barry, 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold War Era*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner.
- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Weaver, 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- CNS News, 5 June 2006, <<http://www.iiss.org./index.asp?pgid-13401&mtype=print>>
- Cossa, Ralph A., Simon Tay, and Lee Chung-min, 2005. "The Emerging East Asian Community: Should Washington be Concerned?" *Issue & Insights*, Vol. 5, No. 9. Pacific Forum CSIS, August 2005.
- Crone, 1993. "Does Hegemon Matter?: The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," *World Politics*, Vol. 45, July 1993.
- Curley, Melissa G. and Nicholas Thomas, 2007. *Advancing East Asian Regionalism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Curtis, Gerald L. 2004. East Asia, Regionalism, and U. S. National Interests: How Much Change? *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 26.
- East Asian Summit, 2005. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit. Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2005.

- Ereli, Adam, 2005. Daily Press Briefing by Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman on 5 December 2005.
- Goldstein Judith L., Miles Kahlar, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2001. *Legalization and World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Green, Michael J., 2002. "The United States and East Asia in the Unipolar Era," Zhao, Quansheng ed., *Future Trends in East Asian International Relations*. Frank Cass.
- Higgott, Richard and Richard Stubb, 1995. "Competing Conception of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific," *Review of International Political Economy*, Summer 1995.
- Ikenberry John G., and Michael Mastanduno eds., 2003. *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Junichiro Koizumi, 2001. Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership, Speech by Prime Minister of Japan, Koizumi. Singapore, 14 January 2002.
- Kahlar, Miles, 2001. "Legalization as Strategy: The Asia Pacific Case," in Goldstein Judith L., and Miles Kahlaer, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter eds. *Legalization and World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J., 2005. *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- , 1997. "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in comparative Perspective," in Katzenstein, Peter J. and Takashi Shiraishi eds., *Network Power: Japan and Asia*. Cornell University Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. and Takashi Shiraishi eds., 1997. *Network Power: Japan and Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- , 2006. *Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism*. Cornell University Press.
- Li, Zhaoxing, 2005. Speech by Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at the 10+3 Ministerial Meeting. Vientiane, 27 July 2005.
- , 2006. Speech by Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at the 10+3 Ministerial Meeting. Kuala Lumpur, 26 July 2006.
- Mastanduno, Michael 2003. "Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and security Order in Asia" in Alagappa, Muthiah ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Michalak, Michael 2006. U. S. Senior Official for APEC, U.S. View on Asia Regional Integration, Press Conference on 25 January 2006.

- MOFA, 2005. Wagakuni-no Higashiajia-Kyodoai Kochiku ni Kakawaru Kangaekata (Japan's concept on constructing East Asian Community) made by MOFA on October 2005.
- Morrison, Richard, 1994. "The United States and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1, May 1994.
- Nanto, Dick K., 2006. East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, CRS Report of Congress, Received through the CRS Web, 18 September 2006.
- News From Washington, 25 August 2006, USINFO.STATE.GOV HP, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=August&x=20060825175510ASesuarK0.8261988>>.
- Oba, Mie, 2004a. *Ajia Taiheiyo Chiiki Keisei heno Dotei: Kyo-kai-Kokka Nichi-Go no Aidentiti Mosaku to Chiiki-Shyugi*. Tokyo: Minerva Shobo.
- , 2004b. "Ajia-Taiheiyo Chiiki Shyugi to Amerika," in Yui, Daizaburo and Endo Yasuo, eds., *Taiheiyo Sekai to Amerika, Saurty-Shya*.
- , 2004c. "Ajia ni Okeru Chiiki Shyugi no Tenkai," in Sekine Masami and Yamamoto Nobuto eds., *Kaiiki Ajia*. Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppan Kai.
- , 2003. "Tuuka-Kinyu Kyoryoku to FTA ni miru Nihon no Higashi-Ajia Chiiki Keisei Senryaku, in Yamakage Susumu ed., *Higashi-Ajia Chiiki-Shyugi to Nihon Gaiko*. Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo.
- Okamoto, 2001. *APEC Soki Jiyuka-kyogi no Seijikatei (The Political Process of EVSL in APEC)*. Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo (Institute of Developing Economies).
- Pempel, T. J., ed., 2005. *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ravenhill, John, 2001. *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Suh, J. J., Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., 2004. *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- U.S. Department of State 10 May 2006 <USINFO.STATE.GOV HP, <http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/May/10-66890.html>>.
- Vaughn, Bruce, 2006. East Asian Summit (EAS): Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 11 January 2006.
- Washington Post*, 17 November 2006,
- Wesley, Michael, 2006. "The Dog That Didn't Bark: the Bush Administration and East Asian Regionalism," in Beesen, Mark, *Bush and Asia*. London and New York: Routledge.

Yamakage, Susumu, 1997. *ASEAN Pawa [ASEAN Power]*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Yamamoto, Yoshinobu, 2003. “Kyochoteki-anzenhosho to Ajia-Taiheiyo (Cooperative Security and Asia Pacific region),” in Morimoto Satoshi ed., *Ajia-Taiheiyo no Kyochoteki-anzenhosho (Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific)*. Nihon Kokusai-mondai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for International Affairs).

---, 2004/2005. “Teikoku-Sisutemu no Kokusai-seiji-riron (International Politics of Informal Empire: A Theoretical Essey),” *Studies on International Relations*, Nos. 22 & 23. (2004/2005).

Zoellick, Robert, 2005a. Deputy Secretary’s Press Conference in Indonesia on 7 May 2005.

---, 2005b. Zoellick’s Remarks in Singapore on 10 May 2005.

---, 2005c. Zoellick’s remarks at ARF on 29 July 2005.