Political Violence Workshop

Date and Time

February 26, 2013
12:00PM - 02:00PM EST

“A Model of Conflict with both Rational and Boundedly Rational Actors”

Abstract: In this paper I present an evolutionary model of state failure where citizens engage in pairwise conflicts over time. Evolutionarily stable strategies depend on the material benefits of violence, the government's ability to defend attacks, the punishments associated with failed rebellion, and initial mixtures of citizen-strategy combinations in the population. These factors influence the replicator dynamics of citizen strategies and determine whether the state will asymptotically decay into failure. Extensions of the model include optimal strategies for rational governments to employ in the face of an evolving conflict.

Speaker:

Michael Z. Gill, PhD student, Department of Government, Harvard University.

Chair:

Robert H. Bates, Faculty Associate (on leave 2012–2013); Harvard Academy Senior Scholar. Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Department of Government; Professor of African and African American Studies, Department of African and African American Studies, Harvard University.

See also:
Share on:
Save: Add to calendar

Valuing Accessibility

The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs welcomes individuals with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. If you would like to request accommodations or have questions about the access provided, please get in touch with the person listed as the contact on the individual event listing in advance of your participation or visit. Requests for Sign Language interpreters and/or CART providers should be made at least two weeks in advance, if possible. Please note that the Weatherhead Center will make every effort to secure services, but that services are subject to availability.