Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Publication information:
Robinson, James, and Daron Acemoglu. (January) 2005. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
Abstract
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation andconsolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer differentpolitical institutions because of the way they allocate political powerand resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens,but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable whencitizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, whenthe costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises ofconcessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy.By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to thecitizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elitesdo not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes dependon the strength of civil society, the structure of politicalinstitutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level ofeconomic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form andextent of globalization.
Notes
Winner, John Bates Clark Medal, American Economic Association, 2005
Winner, Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, 2007
Winner, William H. Riker Award, Political Economy Section, 2007
Winner, Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, 2007
Winner, William H. Riker Award, Political Economy Section, 2007